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Note on Referencing 
When a reference is to a numbered remark in the works of Wittgenstein this is indicated by a 
‘§’; otherwise references are to page numbers
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1 WHY STUDY WITTGENSTEIN FOR MORAL THEOLOGY? 
 Introductory Remarks: Wittgenstein, Metaphysics and Moral 1.1
Theology 
The philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein has greatly influenced theology in the 
English speaking world. Wittgenstein’s influence is not confined to one particular confession 
or to a particular subject matter, but can be observed in theologians from a variety of 
traditions writing on dogmatic, moral and spiritual topics. Although mention will be made in 
this thesis of this rich variety of uses of Wittgenstein we will be concerned primarily with the 
work of those theologians and philosophers who have read Wittgenstein as sharing something 
in common with that tradition beginning with Plato which connects grammar, metaphysics 
and dialectic. Former students of Wittgenstein such as Peter Geach and G.E.M. Anscombe 
drew upon Wittgenstein’s writings to show how the insights of philosophers like Aristotle are 
relevant to contemporary philosophical questions.1 Likewise, theologians inspired by 
Wittgenstein developed readings of Aquinas which sought to recover aspects of his thought 
lost by modernity. Victor Preller is of particular note as a theologian who used Wittgenstein 
to gain insights into Aquinas,2 and two influential theologians belonging to the English 
Province of the Order of Preachers, Cornelius Ernst and Herbert McCabe, were influenced in 
their presentation of Aquinas by Wittgenstein. Ernst gives a summary statement of the 
Wittgenstein influenced approach to Aquinas in the following passage from his 1964 paper 
‘Words, Facts and God’: “St Thomas’s metaphysics may be regarded as an examination of 
the presuppositions of our language, at least of our subject-predicate language. The logic of 
                                                 
1 For example see, G. E. M. Anscombe, Intention (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1957). 
2 See Victor Preller, Divine Science and the Science of God : A Reformulation of Thomas Aquinas (Princeton, 
N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1967). 
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our language is a revelation of the logic, the intelligibility of Being.” 3 Such approaches to 
Aquinas have in recent year suffered a decline in influence. Stephen Mulhall observes the 
following in his book The Great Riddle: “It is my understanding that this project is now 
generally regarded as being part of the history of theology rather than of its vital present—as 
very much a project of the 1960s and 1970s, when Wittgenstein’s later writings were at their 
most influential.”4 By contrast, Mulhall’s objective is to show how such approaches: “can be 
seen not only as an authentically Wittgensteinian enterprise, but also as a genuinely fruitful 
approach to theology.”5 This thesis also seeks to show how the writings of Wittgenstein can 
be used fruitfully in moral theology. To this end a special debt is owed to Fergus Kerr (as the 
title of this thesis indicates), who has shown perhaps more than any other theologian the 
relevance of Wittgenstein for theology, and been a guide for his Dominican brethren and 
many others in understanding how the study of Wittgenstein can help to renew theology. 
There are at least two major challenges in showing how Wittgenstein’s writings are 
relevant for contemporary questions in moral theology. Firstly, there is the question of how to 
interpret Wittgenstein. In section 1.3 we will ask why Wittgenstein attracts such a wide 
variety of interpretation, and offer reasons for holding the reading of Wittgenstein developed 
in this thesis as both an interpretation of Wittgenstein and as a dialogue partner for moral 
theology. Secondly, there is a wider question concerning the use of philosophy in theology. 
In the Catholic tradition the philosophy of nature and metaphysics have played a central role 
in the development of moral theology. Wittgenstein’s seeming lack of interest in the former 
and antipathy to the later seems to indicate that there is little space for a constructive dialogue 
                                                 
3 Cornelius Ernst, O.P., "Words, Facts and God," in Multiple Echo : Explorations in Theology (London: Darton, 
Longman and Todd, 1979), 18. The echo of Heidegger is also present in this remark. 
4 Stephen Mulhall, The Great Riddle : Wittgenstein and Nonsense, Theology and Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2015), 1. 
5 Ibid., 22. Mulhall borrows the term ‘Grammatical Thomism’ from Francesca Murphy to characterize the works 
of theologians such as McCabe who drew on grammatical insights from Wittgenstein in their reading of 
Aquinas. In a recent editorial of New Blackfriars Fergus Kerr questions the description of these theologians as 
‘Grammatical Thomists’, and claims that they were more indebted to earlier Catholic theologians than to 
Wittgenstein in their treatment of religious language. See: Fergus Kerr, "Comment: Grammatical Thomism?," 
New Blackfriars 97, no. 1071 (2016). 
3 
 
between Wittgenstein and Catholic moral theology. Some theologians, particularly those in 
the Reformed Traditions, welcome Wittgenstein’s critique of metaphysics and see him as 
offering a philosophy which avoids the importation of Greek philosophical ideas into 
Christian theology.6 By contrast, we will argue in this thesis that Wittgenstein can be read in 
continuity with the metaphysical tradition which originates with Plato.7  
In section 1.2 we will begin a dialogue between Wittgenstein and the metaphysical 
tradition by following Anscombe in making Wittgenstein a conversation partner with Plato, 
Aristotle and Aquinas. This will involve asking what metaphysics is, and tracing the 
connections between metaphysics, grammar and practice. We will argue that despite his 
antipathy to metaphysics Wittgenstein shares much in common with the tradition which 
begins with Plato. The first four chapters of this thesis will develop this dialogue; using the 
metaphysical tradition to cast a critical light on Wittgenstein’s philosophy, while showing 
how he in his turn helps us to see aspects of that tradition which have been neglected or 
which require revision and development. In addition to providing a context of philosophical 
practice for the evaluation of Wittgenstein’s philosophy this dialogue will provide an opening 
for a conversation with moral theology. This dialogue will therefore have three principle 
conversation partners and a fourth voice, the philosophy of nature (physics) will emerge in 
the course of our discussions. The question of nature will be a guiding theme throughout this 
thesis, for although Wittgenstein lacks a philosophy of nature his concern for origins can be 
read as continuous with the question of nature as origin in the metaphysical tradition. The 
dialogue between Wittgenstein, metaphysics, physics and moral theology will be developed 
in chapters five, six and seven. These chapters will draw upon the discussion from the first 
four chapters, and draw parallels between the work of various contemporary moral 
                                                 
6 See for example Tim Labron, Wittgenstein and Theology (London: T & T Clark, 2009). 
7 A theologian who reads Wittgenstein within the metaphysical tradition and applies this reading to questions in 
theology is Stephen D. Long. See D. Stephen Long, Speaking of God : Theology, Language, and Truth, The 
Eerdmans Ekklesia Series (Grand Rapids, Mich. ; Cambridge: William B. Eerdmans Pub. Co., 2009). We will 
draw upon Long’s work in chapter five. 
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theologians and Wittgenstein. In particular we will show how Wittgenstein in his later 
philosophy shares many of the concerns found among those moral theologians who have 
revived natural law and virtue traditions. 
 
 Wittgenstein and Metaphysics: A Return or a Rejection? 1.2
1.2.1 Does Wittgenstein Trivialize Philosophy? 
Mulhall recounts how when seeking to understand why Wittgensteinian influenced 
approaches to Aquinas are seen as passé he was: “pointed to Francesca Aran Murphy’s book, 
God is Not a Story,”8 in which Murphy argues that ‘Grammatical Thomists’ have reduced 
metaphysical concerns to linguistic ones. Murphy blames this reduction on the influence of 
Wittgenstein, which is seen: 
Not only to misrepresent genuinely metaphysical reflection; it is to eviscerate or 
etiolate it, by reducing a concern for the ultimate ground of being to an 
anthropocentric, reflective, and emptily formal reflection on our means of 
representing reality rather than on the reality we aspire to represent.9 
 
This contrast between grammatical remarks and metaphysical enquiry characterizes 
Wittgenstein as replacing an interest in substantive philosophical questions with empty 
linguistic play. Mulhall, a leading scholar of Wittgenstein, takes issue with Murphy’s 
interpretation: “For Wittgenstein . . . elucidating grammar and articulating the essence of 
things are not distinct tasks at all.”10 How we understand the relationship between grammar 
and metaphysics will be a central concern of this thesis. At first sight Wittgenstein’s 
dialogical style of writing and the lack of a more technical philosophical language in his later 
works may create the impression that he lacked an interest in the deeper questions of 
philosophy. We will argue, however, that despite various deficiencies and limitations 
                                                 
8 Mulhall, The Great Riddle : Wittgenstein and Nonsense, Theology and Philosophy, 2. See Francesca Aran 
Murphy, God Is Not a Story : Realism Revisited (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007). In chapter five we 
will examine a criticism made by Murphy of Kerr’s use of Wittgenstein. 
9 Mulhall, The Great Riddle : Wittgenstein and Nonsense, Theology and Philosophy, 2. 
10 Ibid. 
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Wittgenstein can be read as belonging to that tradition of enquiry which places dialogue, 
questioning and grammar at the service of deep philosophical concerns. This is illustrated in 
the following vignette recounted by Anscombe. 
In the introduction to the second volume of her collected philosophical papers 
Anscombe recounts how during one of Wittgenstein’s classes in 1944 she finally saw how 
phenomenalism could be overcome. Prior to this she had “felt trapped by it”11 and the 
standard kinds of objections to phenomenalism raised by Bertrand Russell far from releasing 
her from this trap had left live and active its “central nerve.”12 Anscombe does not here 
define what she understands by phenomenalism, but it is reasonable to assume that she is 
referring to the empiricist doctrine according to which: “propositions asserting the existence 
of physical objects are equivalent in meaning to propositions asserting that subjects would 
have certain sequences of sensations were they to have certain others.”13 Anscombe felt 
trapped by phenomenalism and describes how: “For years I would spend time, in cafés, for 
example, staring at objects saying to myself: “I see a packet. But what do I really see? How 
can I say that I see here anything more than a yellow expanse?’’14 
Anscombe’s example concerns a human made object, an artefact, but the source of 
her perplexity arose when she changed her considerations from artefacts to natural things: 
the first more natural examples that struck me were ‘wood’ and the sky. The latter hit 
me amidships because I was saying dogmatically that one must know the category of 
object one was speaking of – whether it was a colour or a kind of stuff, for example, 
that belonged to the logic of the term one was using. It couldn’t be a matter of 
empirical discovery that something belonged to a different category. The sky stopped 
me.15 
 
                                                 
11 G. E. M. Anscombe, Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Mind, The Collected Philosophical Papers of G E M 
Anscombe (Oxford Oxfordshire: B. Blackwell, 1981), viii. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Robert Audi, The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, 2nd ed. (Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1999), 663. 
14 Anscombe, Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Mind, viii. 
15 Ibid. 
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This confusion resulted from the influence exerted by an empiricist picture of concept 
acquisition on Anscombe’s account of how we classify objects.16 According to this empiricist 
account the human mind receives impressions from an external source, which it internally 
classifies using different categories. The picture sets up a gulf between the inner and the 
outer, the constructed and the given, which is reflected in a separation of the empirical and 
the conceptual into given content and the classification of this content. Anscombe’s 
consideration of natural things challenged this separation, but the power exerted by the 
picture prevented her from questioning the picture itself. Instead she continued to operate 
within the picture, seeking a means to bridge the gulf between content and concept, but 
seeing no alternative to collapsing the latter into the former: “How can I say that I see here 
anything more than a yellow expanse?”  
Anscombe thus found herself trapped within the modern empiricist account of 
concept formation according to which concepts are formed from mental images, such that the 
concept ‘blue’ is the result of a mental operation whereby we extract blue from the 
multiplicity of colours we experience.17 Wittgenstein’s arguments against such empiricist 
theories are well known, pointing out the circularity of such accounts; they assume we 
already possess the very concept we are trying to define. At the start of The Blue Book 
Wittgenstein notes that: “for many words in our language there do not seem to be ostensive 
definitions,”18 and such words cannot be defined by pointing to a sample. The ability to point 
                                                 
16 Anscombe’s account of classification draws upon the modern empiricist tradition which is developed by 
empiricists such as Locke and Hume. Although this tradition is presented as resting upon a common sense 
account of naming it makes various metaphysical and epistemological assumptions. Wittgenstein helped 
Anscombe to see through these assumptions. Not all empiricist theories of knowledge, however, rest upon these 
modern assumptions. For an account of how an Aristotelian/Thomist empiricism differs and overcomes many of 
the challenges made of the modern tradition see John O'Callaghan, Thomist Realism and the Linguistic Turn : 
Toward a More Perfect Form of Existence (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 2003). 
17 For an account of how an Aristotelian/Thomist account of abstraction differs from an empiricist one see ibid., 
218-24. 
18 Ludwig Wittgenstein, The Blue and Brown Books, 2nd ed. (Oxford,: Blackwell, 1969), 1. N.B The Blue and 
Brown Books were dictated in English. 
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to a colour requires the prior mastery of colour concepts.19 Anscombe relates how during a 
class she:  
came out with “But I still want to say: Blue is there.” Older hands smiled or laughed 
but Wittgenstein checked them by taking it seriously, saying “Let me think what 
medicine you need . . . Suppose that we had the word ‘painy’ as a word for the property 
of surfaces.” The ‘medicine’ was effective, and the story illustrates Wittgenstein’s 
ability to understand the thought that was offered to him in objection.20 
 
I suspect that most of us like Anscombe would protest: but surely there is something there 
that is ‘blue’, something we can point to, something we refer to when we say an object is 
blue. Wittgenstein’s response is to help us see that this ‘something’ is an illusion.21 He asks 
us to think what it would be like if we used the word ‘painy’ to describe surfaces which cause 
us pain when we touch them. In such cases the temptation to say ‘but surely pain is there’ 
does not overcome us.  
Yes, you may concede, pain is not a something ‘there’ in the world, but it surely is a 
something; when I am in pain that is no illusion. Wittgenstein is not denying that there are 
objects which are blue, nor that when I trap my hand in a door that the pain is real. His 
response to Anscombe is not to draw doubt on our colour ascriptions, nor on our cries of 
pain; rather he wishes us to see through the belief that our concepts are things in the world. 
Pain grows and it diminishes, it lasts for seconds or for years, but the concept of pain is not 
something which grows or diminishes, nor does it last for seconds or years. We cannot point 
to the concept of pain and say ‘there’ in the same way that we can when a doctor asks: ‘where 
is does it hurt?’ The mistake that Anscombe made was in the attention she paid to objects 
                                                 
19 This is not to say that particular colours cannot be defined by ostensive definition, but such definitions assume 
a prior mastery of colour concepts. 
20 Anscombe, Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Mind, viii-ix. 
21 Wittgenstein notes that: “In reality (Wirklichkeit), however, we quite readily say that a particular colour 
exists; and that is as much as to say that something exists that has that colour.” Ludwig Wittgenstein, 
Philosophical Investigations, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1997), §58. “In 
Wirklichkeit aber sagen wir sehr wohl, eine bestimmte Farbe existiere; und das heißt soviel wie; es existiere 
etwas, was diese Farbe hat.” Philosophische Untersuchungen. In Tractatus Logico-Philosopicus, Ludwig 
Wittgenstein Werkausgabe Band 1, ed. Joachim Schulte (Sinzheim, Germany: Suhrkamp, 1984), §58. Here 
Wittgenstein acknowledges the tendency which Anscombe witnesses to, but argues that it is not the existence of 
a ‘something’ which is the colour, but that the colour exists when something has the colour. 
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with the expectation that focusing on an object and analysing it will yield its essence: “How 
can I say that I see here anything more than a yellow expanse?” Wittgenstein’s medicine was 
to show her that there is no object of attention in this sense; he freed her from the trap of 
expecting to see the essence of an object if you look long enough and hard enough.22 
It may seem that Wittgenstein’s fascination with such questions as those raised by 
Anscombe trivializes philosophy and ignores the deep and central questions which 
philosophers have traditionally sought to answer. If such is the case then the value of 
Wittgenstein’s writings for a renewal of moral theology would be limited: perhaps useful in 
helping us to avoid various linguistic and conceptual confusions, but incapable in throwing 
light on the central questions facing moral theologians today. In order to evaluate 
Wittgenstein’s writings it is essential to see how his grammatical remarks connect with the 
deeper issues philosophers have reflected on throughout the ages. Many of those who follow 
Wittgenstein would agree that philosophy is a matter of grammatical remarks, but would 
argue that far from making his thought trivial such grammatical reminders go to the root of 
problems which have troubled philosophers over the centuries.  
Nor does this emphasis on grammar imply anti-realism. The much discussed remark 
in the Philosophical Investigations: “Grammar tells what kind of object anything is. 
(Theology as grammar)”23 does not entail that Wittgenstein intends to deny the reality of God 
any more than he denies the reality of colours or of pain. 24 His purpose is to draw our 
attention to the ways in which we talk about God and how language can mislead us into 
                                                 
22 It is an interesting historical and psychological question to ask how this picture of the mind arose. Standardly 
Descartes is attributed with introducing the picture, but for an argument that introspection of mental contents as 
a model for the mental is introduced by the British empiricists, notably Hobbes see Gordon P. Baker and 
Katherine J. Morris, Decartes' Dualism (London ; New York: Routledge, 2002). 
23 Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, §373. “Welche Art von Gegenstand etwas ist, sagt die Grammatik. 
(Theologie als Grammatick.) ” Philosophische Untersuchungen. In Tractatus Logico-Philosopicus, Ludwig 
Wittgenstein Werkausgabe Band 1, §373. 
24 For a realist reading of Wittgenstein and religious language see Felicity McCutcheon, Religion within the 
Limits of Language Alone : Wittgenstein on Philosophy and Religion (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2001). 
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misrepresenting what God is.25 The temptation to misrepresent how grammar works is one 
which Wittgenstein came to see as a general human weakness, expressed in the following 
famous remark in the Investigations: “Philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our 
intelligence by means of language.”26 Wittgenstein sees this general human temptation as 
particularly prevalent in the work of metaphysicians. His antipathy to metaphysics is clearly 
stated in the following passage from Zettel: “Philosophical investigations: conceptual 
investigations. The essential things about metaphysics: it obliterates the distinction between 
factual and conceptual investigations.”27 Another example is the well-known saying in the 
Investigations, where Wittgenstein states: “What we do is to bring words back from their 
metaphysical to their everyday use.”28 Yet, despite this hostility to metaphysics Anscombe 
interprets Wittgenstein in a manner which places him in the midst of philosophers normally 
considered as metaphysical. 
In the introduction to From Plato to Wittgenstein, a collection of Anscombe’s essays, 
Mary Geach tells us that Anscombe: “recorded that before she knew him [Wittgenstein], the 
great philosophers of the past had appeared to her like beautiful statues: knowing him had 
brought them alive for her.”29 Anscombe, in a paper contained in this same collection, ‘Frege, 
Wittgenstein and Platonism’, 30 traces the continuity she sees between these three 
philosophers. In Wittgenstein’s notion that essence is given through grammar Anscombe 
                                                 
25 For realist anti-metaphysical reading of Wittgenstein see Cora Diamond, The Realistic Spirit : Wittgenstein, 
Philosophy, and the Mind (Cambridge, Mass. ; London: MIT Press, 1991). 
26 Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, §109. “Die Philosophie ist ein Kampf gegen die Verhexung unsres 
Verstandes durch die Mittel unserer Sprache.” Philosophische Untersuchungen. In Tractatus Logico-
Philosopicus, Ludwig Wittgenstein Werkausgabe Band 1, §109. 
27 Zettel, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe, 2nd ed. ed. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1981), §458. “Philosophische 
Untersuchungen: begriffliche Untersuchungen. Das Wesentliche der Metaphysik: daß sie den Unterschied 
zwischen sachlichen und begrifflichen Untersuchungen verwischt.” Zettel. In Wissenschaft Bemerkungen Über 
Die Farben ; Über Gewissheit ; Zettel ; Vermischte Bemerkungen, Ludwig Wittgenstein Werkausgabe Band 8 
(Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1984), § 458. 
28 Philosophical Investigations, §116. “Wir führen die Wörter von ihrer metaphysischen, wieder auf ihre 
alltägliche Verwendung zurück.” Philosophische Untersuchungen. In Tractatus Logico-Philosopicus, Ludwig 
Wittgenstein Werkausgabe Band 1, §116. 
29 G. E. M. Anscombe, From Plato to Wittgenstein : Essays by G.E.M. Anscombe (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 
2011), viii. 
30 Ibid., 127-35. 
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finds a continuation of the tradition Plato inaugurates with his theory of forms: “Now: was 
Wittgenstein an ‘essentialist’? To the extent that I have described, yes.”31  
These arguments for a continuity between Wittgenstein and the metaphysical tradition 
stand at odds with interpretations of Wittgenstein as anti-Platonic. Robert Fogelin gives a 
succinct summary of such interpretations in the following passage, in which he argues that 
Wittgenstein in the Investigations came to refute an ontological theory of meaning in favour 
of one which draws attention to the uses of language: 
The Platonist is parsimonious in the number of uses of language he acknowledges, and 
then makes up for this by being profligate in his ontology. Wittgenstein is profligate in 
the number of uses of language he admits, but this, in itself, relieves the pressure to 
explain differences in meaning by reference to differences in things signified.32 
 
Fogelin argues that it is not in failing to observe grammatical distinctions that Platonists 
creates confusion, but rather in their manner of explaining such distinctions. Thus red is 
posited to exist as an object, whereas attention to the actual use we make of the word ‘red’ 
shows us how we use it in referring to things that are red. The story Fogelin tells in this 
interpretation of Wittgenstein reads the development of Wittgenstein’s thought, from his 
earlier emphasis in the Tractatus on the general logical form of language to the later stress on 
the multiplicity of linguistic forms, as mirroring more generally the history of philosophy. 
Whereas in the past philosophers (including the Wittgenstein of the Tractatus) were misled 
by the grammar of language into thinking that our words correspond to an independent reality 
which their meanings mirror, Wittgenstein in his later writings came to see that the task of the 
philosopher is not to discover the ontological foundations of the world, but to show how our 
familiar world is given through the various uses we make of language; thus relieving the 
pressure on an overblown ontology.  
                                                 
31 Ibid., 135. 
32 Robert J. Fogelin, Wittgenstein, 2nd ed. ed. (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1987), 115. 
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Such readings of Wittgenstein are challenged by the ‘New Wittgenstenians’ who 
argue that the Tractatus does not offer a realist metaphysics as the basis for its theory of 
meaning, but like the later works should be understood as a work of conceptual 
clarification.33 Rather than reading the change from the early to the later Wittgenstein as the 
replacement of an ontological model by a theory of linguistic use, the New Wittgensteinians 
argue that there is a basic continuity between the Tractatus and the Investigations. Both a 
metaphysical realist account of the Tractatus and a corresponding linguistic anti-realist 
account of the Investigations are ruled out. Cora Diamond, one of the earliest and most 
influential proponents of such a reading of Wittgenstein, sums up this reading of Wittgenstein 
in the following passage: 
The idea that Wittgenstein was an anti-realist about facts underlying the logical features 
of our forms of expression goes very naturally with a particular way of taking the 
Tractatus, and of seeing its relation to the later writings. We may think of Wittgenstein 
as having gone from taking a realist view of such metaphysical facts in his earlier 
writings to an anti-realist view afterwards.34 
 
Diamond argues that Wittgenstein no more affirms than he denies the existence of 
‘metaphysical facts’; rather he returns us to the familiar reality we inhabit through the 
linguistic practices we possess: “There are no metaphysical facts to make our way of 
speaking right or wrong; there is nothing out there to make the necessities we have built into 
our languages correct.”35 The mistake philosophers make when they attempt to do 
metaphysics is to assume that we can have access to a reality which is independently of our 
linguistic practices: “The demands we make for philosophical explanations come, seem to 
come, from a position in which we are as it were looking down onto the relation between 
ourselves and some reality, some kind of fact or real possibility. We think that we mean 
                                                 
33 For an account of this new reading of Wittgenstein see the introduction to Alice Marguerite Crary and Rupert 
J. Read, The New Wittgenstein (London: Routledge, 2000). 
34 Diamond, The Realistic Spirit : Wittgenstein, Philosophy, and the Mind, 17. 
35 Ibid., 15. 
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something by our questions about it.”36 This reading of Wittgenstein is one which takes its 
cue from Wittgenstein’s remark: “Not empiricism and yet realism in philosophy, that is the 
hardest thing”37 and argues that throughout his writings he preserves a realistic spirit. For 
Diamond, Wittgenstein’s rejection of metaphysics far from entailing anti-realism is made in 
the spirit of realism. Wittgenstein wishes to help us return to the basis of our concepts in our 
linguistic practices and to preserve us from the illusion that those concepts are obtained by 
stepping outside those practices. 
Diamond’s reading of Wittgenstein entails that his rejection of metaphysics, far from 
making his work irrelevant for theology, holds the promise of helping us see through 
metaphysical illusions and of returning us to the reality of our lives as moral creatures. It is 
attractive for those contemporary theologians who wish to maintain realism in theology, 
while for various reasons rejecting metaphysics. So are we to reject Anscombe’s reading of 
Wittgenstein as part of a tradition beginning with Plato? We could argue in the first instance 
that insofar as the intention of the Platonic tradition is a realistic one there is some common 
ground with the realistic spirit of Wittgenstein. The wholesale rejection of metaphysics, 
however, weakens the case for continuity, as Platonic realism rests upon metaphysics. Was 
Anscombe therefore overoptimistic in her ascription of common ground? Did her admiration 
for her teacher and her adherence to the metaphysical tradition tempt her to overstate the 
connections between the two? 
There are three factors which militate in favour of Anscombe’s readings. Firstly, there 
is the historical connection between metaphysics and grammar. The central role which 
Wittgenstein assigns to grammar provides a common ground with metaphysics, which has 
                                                 
36 Ibid., 69. 
37 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe, 3d ed. 
(Oxford Eng.: B. Blackwell, 1978), VI, §23. “Nicht Empirie und doch Realismus in der Philosophie, das ist das 
schwerste.” Bemerkung Über Die Grundlagen Der Mathematik, Ludwig Wittgenstein Werkausgabe Band 6 
(Sinzheim, Germany: Suhrkamp, 1984), VI, §23. 
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from its inception been concerned with grammar. Secondly, there is the question of 
metaphysics itself. Diamond, no less than Fogelin, offers a crude caricature of metaphysics: it 
is the positing of certain ‘metaphysical’ facts or objects. Wittgenstein in his writings, as we 
have seen, can be no less guilty of such a caricature. The metaphysical tradition, however, is 
primarily a practice of philosophy, and although this practice entails ontological 
commitments it does not reduce metaphysics to positing a static model of reality. Thirdly, 
once we have reappraised the nature of metaphysics we can question whether Wittgenstein’s 
writings are in fact as anti-metaphysical as many of his followers would have us believe. We 
will argue that Wittgenstein develops a practice of philosophy in his later works which has 
several points in common with the metaphysical tradition. In the remainder on this section we 
will examine these three factors.  
 
1.2.2 Metaphysics and Grammar 
In Metaphysics and Grammar William Charlton argues that the task of the 
metaphysician is to show how grammar works: “It is not the business of grammarians to say 
how metaphysical concepts work, but it is the business of metaphysicians to say how 
grammar works.”38 Charlton notes that both metaphysics and grammar initially developed 
with Plato: “Plato’s grammatical analyses not only provided him with an account of truth; 
they opened up the whole field of metaphysics.”39 In the following passage, which asserts 
that solving philosophical problems requires seeing how language works, Charlton 
acknowledges his debt to Wittgenstein: “I follow one twentieth-century thinker, Wittgenstein, 
in arguing that a principle source of bad metaphysics is misunderstanding how language 
works.”40 Anscombe also draws attention to this connection: “Plato was about the first 
                                                 
38 William Charlton, Metaphysics and Grammar (London: Bloomsbury, 2014), 9. 
39 Ibid., 30. 
40 Ibid., 11. 
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grammarian,”41 but we will see in chapter three that Charlton is far more critical of 
Wittgenstein’s account of grammar than Anscombe. For present purposes it is sufficient to 
note the connection he draws between metaphysics and grammar. 
But what is metaphysics and how is it connected to grammar? Charlton notes that the 
term ‘metaphysics’, which means ‘after physics’ in Greek, came initially to be applied to 
those parts of Aristotle’s writings which were arranged after his physics. As such Charlton 
asserts that: “the word metaphysics means very little,”42 but rather became associated with 
the examination of certain topics which continue to be the province of metaphysicians, such 
as existence and causation. Charlton argues that by determining forms of speech grammar is 
the principle tool used by metaphysicians. For example, the question: ‘what is time?’ cannot 
be answered by discovering an object which gives the word ‘time’ its meaning. Rather, 
metaphysicians throw light on the question of time by attending to how our concept of time is 
expressed in the grammatical construction of our language. By examining how we express 
concepts such as existence and causation philosophers were able to distinguish between 
grammatical enquiries and those empirical investigations which are carried out in particular 
sciences such as zoology or botany: “Before any progress can be made, either in the sciences 
or in any other academic discipline, people must distinguish questions which can be answered 
by empirical investigation from questions which must be tackled in other ways.”43 Here 
Charlton has in mind questions like: ‘what is an animal?’ Such questions are not answered by 
the empirical sciences, but are presupposed by them. In contrast, question such as: ‘which is 
the fastest land animal?’ can be answered using agreed methods of observation and 
measurement.44 Wittgenstein’s characterization of philosophy as conceptual investigations 
thus continues a long tradition of grammatical enquiry. 
                                                 
41 Anscombe, From Plato to Wittgenstein : Essays by G.E.M. Anscombe, 133. 
42 Charlton, Metaphysics and Grammar, 2. 
43 Ibid., 22. 
44 These examples are my own. 
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Through drawing attention to the connection between metaphysics and grammar 
Charlton helps to overcome the misconception that metaphysics involves positing a realm of 
objects which the metaphysician uses to explain reality. There is, of course, bad metaphysics, 
but the notion that those philosophers who have practiced metaphysical ways of thinking are 
all guilty of blindly making unwarranted ontological commitments is itself an unwarranted 
assumption. 
 
1.2.3 Metaphysics and Practice 
The misconception that metaphysics involves the discovery or construction of 
‘metaphysical objects’ brings with it the further mistake of characterizing metaphysics as 
primarily a technical disciple which provides models of reality. Academia has become 
increasingly the province of specialists, with each subject area requiring knowledge of 
sophisticated methods, and it is thus tempting to portray philosophy as a technical discipline 
which will yield results from the application of its methods. It is certainly true that 
philosophers throughout the ages have used various methods and instruments, many of which 
require considerable training to master. If we follow Charlton it is clear that the development 
of metaphysics went together with the development of grammar. It would be wrong, 
however, to conclude that philosophy is primality about the application and development of 
various methods and instruments. So, if philosophy (and more specifically metaphysics) is 
not primarily about putting forward models, which use various methods and instruments to 
solve philosophical problems, what is it about?  
One answer to this question is to say that philosophy is not about anything, rather it is 
a way of living: a practice of wisdom. For many modern thinkers this kind of answer is 
attractive because it divests philosophy of the responsibility to demonstrate its claims. If 
philosophy cannot demonstrate its claims in the same way that the specialist empirical 
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sciences can, then why hold that philosophy is theoretical? Rather than making theoretical 
claims philosophy becomes primarily a way of living. The problem with such views is that 
they assume an opposition between theory and practice. If the reduction of metaphysics to the 
status of a particular science fails to acknowledge metaphysics as a practice, characterizing 
metaphysics as practice free from theory is no less guilty of assuming a dichotomy between 
contemplation and practice. 
In his work Aquinas, Ethics and Philosophy of Religion: Metaphysics and Practice 
Thomas Hibbs attempts to overcome the modern dichotomy between theory and practice.45 
Hibbs notes that although there is a tension in the works of Aristotle between theory and 
practice, “the relationship between these two might be said to constitute the central and 
unifying theme in Aristotle’s philosophy.”46 Aquinas follows Aristotle in defining, 
“contemplation as an activity— indeed, as the highest type of activity.”47 In contrast to the 
modern opposition between theory and practice Hibbs argues that in the thought of Aquinas: 
“If theoretical contemplation is to be considered the highest activity, it will be so only in light 
of a conception of excellence internal to the notion of practice.”48 The reference here to 
excellence internal to practice recalls Alasdair MacIntyre’s revival of virtue ethics, which 
Hibbs applies to metaphysics in order to characterize it as a practice of wisdom.49 Hibbs sees 
MacIntyre in his revival of virtue theory as avoiding the modern dichotomy between theory 
and practice: 
MacIntyre suggests a third way between the advocates of philosophy as a theoretical 
enterprise of establishing epistemological foundations and a flight from theory in its 
entirety. That, in some form, is the position we intend to develop on the basis of 
                                                 
45 Thomas S. Hibbs, Aquinas, Ethics, and Philosophy of Religion : Metaphysics and Practice, Indiana Series in 
the Philosophy of Religion (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2007). 
46 Ibid., 8. 
47 Ibid. 
48 Ibid. 
49 See Alasdair C. MacIntyre, After Virtue : A Study in Moral Theory, 3rd ed. (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of 
Notre Dame Press, 2007). 
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Aquinas’s texts, a position most accessible through a consideration of Aquinas’s 
reading of Aristotle.50 
 
This third way is the practice of prudence, which incorporates the use of theory while 
avoiding the danger of reducing philosophy to a merely ‘theoretical enterprise.’ Furthermore, 
as a practice of prudence metaphysics is not conformed to a particular goal, but is open to the 
truth of everything.51 Metaphysics uses various tools and techniques, but it is ultimately a 
practice which is concerned with all things; not the technical exploration of a given subject 
matter. 
These reflections upon the relationship between metaphysics and practice do not in 
themselves tell us what metaphysics is, but they do move us in the right direction. Here 
Hibbs, following Stanley Rosen, argues that the only way to understand metaphysics is to 
engage in metaphysics ourselves.52 It is only from within the practice of metaphysics that we 
can answer the question: what is metaphysics? Hibbs is not proposing that we each invent our 
own metaphysics, but rather that we join those who are the great practitioners of metaphysics, 
notably Aquinas. For his part Aquinas follows Aristotle’s various descriptions of 
metaphysics: firstly, as the study of being, secondly as first philosophy and thirdly as divine 
science or theology.53 Hibbs underlines the importance of understanding these descriptions 
within the context of the relationship between metaphysics and practice. In particular, 
describing metaphysics as theology has brought the charge that Aquinas substitutes the real 
living experience of our encounter with the divine for a set of static categories and 
propositions. By drawing attention to the connection between metaphysics and practice in 
                                                 
50 Hibbs, Aquinas, Ethics, and Philosophy of Religion : Metaphysics and Practice, 74. 
51 For an account of the practice of philosophy as open to the truth of all things see: Josef Pieper, In Defense of 
Philosophy : Classical Wisdom Stands up to Modern Challenges (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1992). 
52 Hibbs, Aquinas, Ethics, and Philosophy of Religion : Metaphysics and Practice, 9. In this thesis we will talk a 
great deal about dialectical reasoning, but like the question of metaphysics there is no single answer to the 
question: what is dialectical reasoning? Rather it is through engaging in dialectical reasoning that we learn what 
it is. The historical links between metaphysics and the development of dialectic indicate that any answer to the 
question of metaphysics will also throw light on the question of dialectic. 
53 It is important to distinguish between what is here understood as theology and theology as the study of 
Scripture. In chapter five we will examine the relationship between metaphysics and theology understood in this 
latter sense. 
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Aquinas Hibbs can assert that: “At least as practiced by the believer, metaphysics is among a 
number of activities, including preaching and disputation, that arise from a surplus of 
contemplation, a surplus that always exceeds our ability to articulate it in speech.”54 
In seeking to characterize metaphysics we have used the reflections of two 
contemporary practitioners of metaphysics. Charlton and Hibbs in their turn draw upon some 
of the great figures in the tradition of metaphysical practice. At first sight it may appear that 
despite using the same sources Charlton, with his emphasis on grammar, and Hibbs, with his 
preoccupation with the relationship between theory and practice, have drawn very different 
and not necessarily compatible lessons from this tradition. This first impression is reinforced 
if we again contrast Charlton’s understanding of the relationship between grammar and 
metaphysics with the three characterizations of metaphysics which Hibbs finds in Aquinas. 
Despite these differences, however, there is more in common between Charlton and Hibbs 
than first meets the eye. Common ground is found in Charlton’s argument that language 
acquisition requires participation in pre-linguistic practices. He adapts H. P. Grice’s theory of 
conversational implication to develop his own theory of initial language acquisition, which he 
applies to both the acquisition of language by children and the development of language from 
the pre-linguistic past inherited by human beings: 
The beginnings of language are probably to be sought outside the human species. 
It is hard to see any continuity between the dance of bees, by which the location 
of pollen is communicated to a hive, and human speech; but it is clear that some 
hunting mammals teach their skills to their young, and that bats have friendships 
and make requests of one another is well documented.55 
 
The grammatical reflections that Charlton carries out are not disconnected from our goal 
oriented (teleological) practices as human beings, but arise out of these practices. For 
Charlton, understanding grammar in relation to our teleological practices does not, however, 
                                                 
54 Hibbs, Aquinas, Ethics, and Philosophy of Religion : Metaphysics and Practice, 11. 
55 Charlton, Metaphysics and Grammar, 194. Charlton runs the risk here of anthropomorphizing animals. In 
chapters four, five and six we will argue that it is necessary to use analogy when speaking of animals in such 
terms. For Grice’s theory of conversational implications see: H. P. Grice, Studies in the Way of Words 
(Cambridge, Mass; London: Harvard University Press, 1989). 
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reduce grammar to a given pre-linguistic set of desires: “Making statements and giving orders 
or advice are social practices in which we engage for practical purposes; but they are 
linguistic practices, practices of saying.”56 This opens the path towards understanding 
metaphysics as a practice which is rooted in our animal, social and conversational nature. As 
such metaphysics is a distinctively human activity, but is not reducible to the expression of a 
pre-given concept of human nature.57 
Common ground can also be found on Hibbs’ side, for although Hibbs places 
emphasis on metaphysics as a practice this is a practice of contemplation. In particular it 
involves dialectical reasoning, which is essential in the establishment of first principles and 
also in the operation of the various sciences: “Dialectical reasoning and a variety of 
intellectual virtues are operative not just on the way to the principles of a variety of inquiries 
but even in the midst of the sciences.”58 In medieval universities dialectic was taught 
alongside rhetoric and grammar, and a connection between dialectic and grammar is present 
in Charlton’s understanding of grammar as rising out of exchanges between individuals 
involved in teleological practices: “We construct sentences in order to say that certain things 
are or are not the case, or that doing certain things would be good or bad. … Once this is 
admitted, how languages are learnt, and how grammatical rules come to be grasped, is readily 
understandable.”59 Hibbs also points to the connection between linguistic practice and 
dialectic: “It is called dialectic because it is the art of conducting a real dialogue.”60 
Furthermore, although Hibbs has little to say about grammar like Charlton he argues that our 
                                                 
56 Charlton, Metaphysics and Grammar, 60. This point is made in an argument against what Charlton sees as 
Wittgenstein’s reduction of meaning to pragmatics. Whether Charlton is correct in his interpretation of 
Wittgenstein as developing a pragmatic theory of meaning is a question we shall return to in chapters two and 
three. 
57 It is important to note that in talking of the pre-linguistic inheritance of human beings we are referring to 
something which is related to but distinct from the pre-linguistic behaviour of human beings. It is not clear that 
Charlton marks this distinction. The pre-linguistic behaviour of human infants is related to but distinct from the 
pre-linguistic behaviour of other animals.  
58 Hibbs, Aquinas, Ethics, and Philosophy of Religion : Metaphysics and Practice, 44. 
59 Charlton, Metaphysics and Grammar, 202. 
60 Hibbs, Aquinas, Ethics, and Philosophy of Religion : Metaphysics and Practice, 42. 
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use of language develops from a pre-linguistic basis: “The underlying assumption here is that 
human beings, like other animals, have pre-conceptual experiences and that the task of 
human inquiry is to craft concepts to articulate those experiences.”61 
 In this section we have offered a reappraisal of metaphysics in order to determine how 
to understand Wittgenstein in relation to the metaphysical tradition. To accomplish this we 
have been guided by two contemporary exponents of metaphysics and noted that despite 
obvious differences they share more in common than first meets the eye. In particular, both 
Charlton and Hibbs see metaphysics as a practice which has its origin in our pre-conceptual 
practices (and hence metaphysics requires physics). This does not reduce metaphysics to a 
pragmatic science, and the central importance of theory is stressed by both philosophers. This 
reappraisal of metaphysics is itself a dialectical exercise through which we are putting in 
place the starting points for our investigation of Wittgenstein’s relevance to moral theology; 
providing an orientation for our enquiries through which we will ask how Wittgenstein can 
help us to reflect upon the kind of creatures we are. If Anscombe is right, and Wittgenstein 
can be read in continuity with the Platonic tradition, then we should expect to find points of 
connection between his thought and the conception of metaphysics we have been developing. 
It is this task we turn to in the next section. 
 
1.2.4 Wittgenstein and Metaphysics 
We have seen how Anscombe reads Wittgenstein in continuity with the Platonic 
tradition. Her argument for this continuity rests on two related grounds. Firstly, she argues 
that Wittgenstein’s understanding of philosophy as grammatical remarks shares a kinship 
with Plato’s development and use of grammar as an instrument for understanding the essence 
                                                 
61 Ibid., 62. 
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of things. In her paper ‘A Theory of Language’62 Anscombe states: “Strange to say, 
Wittgenstein’s conception of the grammatical is far closer to the Platonic-Aristotelian 
tradition than that of the linguistics which seems to hold the field at the present day.”63 
Secondly, she sees in Wittgenstein a practice of philosophy which resonates with that of 
Plato. In her Introduction to Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Anscombe notes how the 
preoccupations of the Tractatus are not those of the empiricists or idealists who have for so 
long dominated philosophy, and therefore it should not be read through such a philosophical 
lens. Rather, Wittgenstein’s concerns turn on our ability to be: 
naively struck by such questions as the following ones: If I say that Russell is a clever 
philosopher, I mention Russell, and say something about him: now, is what I say about 
him something that I mention, just as I mention him? If so, what is the connection 
between these two mentioned things? If not, what account are we to give of the words 
expressing what I say about him? Have they any reference to reality? …. The 
investigations prompted by these questions are more akin to ancient, than to more 
modern, philosophy.64 
 
The parallel drawn here between Wittgenstein and Plato concerns dialectic as least as much 
as grammar.65 This is not surprising once we consider the connection we earlier traced 
between dialectic and grammar. It is also interesting to note that although Anscombe’s 
remarks concern the Tractatus they are true also, perhaps more so, of Wittgenstein’s later 
works, in which the structure of question and response has clear parallels with dialectic as it 
is practiced by ancient and medieval philosophers. One way of reading the development of 
Wittgenstein’s thought is to see it as a shift of emphasis, whereby the earlier preoccupation 
with general logical forms is replaced by the later emphasis on the actual practices within 
which grammatical tools are used. 
                                                 
62 Printed in Anscombe, From Plato to Wittgenstein : Essays by G.E.M. Anscombe, 193-203. 
63 Ibid., 201. 
64 An Introduction to Wittgenstein's Tractatus (South Bend, Ind.: St. Augustine's Press, 2000), 13. 
65 To illustrate the parallel Anscombe in a footnote gives the following argument from Plato’s Theaetetus 189A: 
“‘In Judging, one judges something; in judging something, one judges something real; so in judging something 
unreal one judges nothing; but judging nothing, one is not judging at all.’” To which she adds the comment: 
“Wittgenstein returned to the problem presented by this argument again and again throughout his life.” Ibid. 
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 If we read the transition in Wittgenstein as a change of emphasis from theory to 
practice then it is important not to read this change according to the modern opposition 
between theory and practice. The Tractatus is a practice in philosophy, and the use of 
grammatical tools is central to the later works. There is, however, a significant change insofar 
as the practice of philosophy in the Tractatus is determined by the requirements of the logical 
system employed, whereas in the later works logical tools arise within practice.66 This 
reading of the transition in Wittgenstein’s thought is given support from a passage in the 
Investigations in which Wittgenstein criticizes logicians for placing logical requirements on 
language: “It is interesting to compare the multiplicity of the tools in language and of the 
ways they are used, the multiplicity of kinds of word and sentence, with what logicians have 
said about the structure of language. (Including the author of the Tratatus-Logico-
Philosophicus.)”67 
In the Investigations Wittgenstein’s purpose is to return us to the practices out of 
which “the multiplicity of tools in language” arise and from which they gain their point. In a 
section of the Investigations exploring the question of human intention Wittgenstein argues: 
“Grammar does not tell us how language must be constructed in order to fulfil its purpose, in 
order to have such-and such an effect on human beings. It only describes and in no way 
explains the use of signs.”68 The grammar of intentional language does not lay requirements 
on our intentional practices, rather it describes those practices. Furthermore, Wittgenstein 
adds: “The rules of grammar may be called “arbitrary”, if that is to mean that the aim of the 
                                                 
66 In this respect we are in agreement with Norman Malcolm’s influential reading of the Tractatus, see Norman 
Malcolm, Nothing Is Hidden : Wittgenstein's Criticism of His Early Thought (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986). 
67 Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, §23. “Es ist interessant, die Mannigfaltigkeit der Werkzuge der 
Sprache und ihrer Verwendungsweisen, die Mannigfaltigkeit der Wort- and Satzarten, mit dem zu vergleichen, 
was Logiker über den Bau der Sprache gesagt haben. (Und auch der Verfasser der Logisch-Philosophischen 
Abhandlung.) Philosophische Untersuchungen. In Tractatus Logico-Philosopicus, Ludwig Wittgenstein 
Werkausgabe Band 1, §23. 
68 Philosophical Investigations, §496. “Grammatik sagt nicht, wie die Sprache gebaut sein muß, um ihren 
Zweck zu erfüllen, um so und so auf Menschen zu wirken. Sie beshreibt nur, aber erlärt in keiner Weise, den 
Gebrauch der Zeichen.” Philosophische Untersuchungen. In Tractatus Logico-Philosopicus, Ludwig 
Wittgenstein Werkausgabe Band 1, §496. 
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grammar is nothing but that of the language.”69 The mistake made by philosophers is to lay 
down requirements for language, whereas we thrown light upon our practices when we use 
grammar to describe rather than explain them.  
In turning to practice Wittgenstein has been accused of giving human understanding a 
purely pragmatic role as bringing about certain pre-defined results. In chapter three we will 
examine how Charlton makes this charge against Wittgenstein. We will argue that although 
Charlton’s criticisms have some substance, the dialectical nature of Wittgenstein’s later 
works entail that he cannot be read as a pragmatist in this sense. In the remainder of this 
present section we will attempt to show that despite his seeming opposition to the 
metaphysical tradition Wittgenstein is concerned with questions which lie at the heart of that 
tradition; in particular the question of our human nature and its origins. Despite his criticisms 
of metaphysics the practice of philosophy which Wittgenstein develops in his later writings 
has much in common with the dialectical practices of the metaphysical tradition.  
   
1.2.5 Wittgenstein, Human Nature and Moral Theology  
Wittgenstein can be read as sharing a kinship with metaphysics in his dialectical 
practice of philosophy, but does this entail that his practice of philosophy is also an exercise 
of practical wisdom? The answer to this question will turn upon the degree to which 
Wittgenstein’s writings cast light on what it is to be human, and whether his practice of 
philosophy is one which helps us to become more fully human. We will examine these 
questions in chapters two, three and four of this thesis. The question of the relationship 
between the pre-conceptual and the conceptual will be central to this examination.70 If the 
                                                 
69 Philosophical Investigations, §497. “Man kann die Regeln der Grammatick “willkürlich” nennen, wenn damit 
gesagt sein zoll, der Zweck der Grammatik sei nur der Sprache.” Philosophische Untersuchungen. In Tractatus 
Logico-Philosopicus, Ludwig Wittgenstein Werkausgabe Band 1, §497. 
70 In the following discussions we will identify the distinction between the conceptual and the pre-conceptual 
with the distinction between the linguistic and the pre-linguistic. This opposes the understanding of philosophers 
such as Charlton, who argue that animals possess concepts in their behaviour. Against the claim that animals 
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relationship between the pre-conceptual and the conceptual is to be understood as an 
opposition between two separate realms, then either the pre-conceptual dominates and the 
conceptual is seen as merely expressive of pre-given desires, or the conceptual dominates and 
the pre-conceptual is seen as having no relevance for our human practices. It is by 
maintaining the dialectical tension between the pre-conceptual and the conceptual aspects of 
our human nature that philosophers cast light upon our human nature and upon the wider 
questions concerning our existence and place in the world. In that tradition which follows 
from Aristotle, which is developed by Aquinas, human beings are defined as rational animals. 
This definition provides the starting point for a discourse on our human nature which uses 
dialectical reasoning to throw light on the manner in which human beings are animals that 
use reason.71  
Wittgenstein follows in this tradition by characterizing humans as linguistic animals. 
By reading Wittgenstein in the light of this tradition we will investigate how he can help us to 
renew and develop it, but also how the tradition can throw a critical light upon his own 
philosophical practices. Our objective is to construct a dialogue between Wittgenstein and the 
metaphysical tradition which illuminates both conversation partners. This dialogue will aim 
to help us understand some of those deep questions concerning our human nature which 
philosophers have asked throughout the ages, and thus to contribute something towards a 
                                                                                                                                                        
possess concepts I would argue that it is only when we have an awareness of possessing a concept that we can 
be said to properly possess that concept. A cat staking a mouse can be said to be hunting the mouse, but the cat 
is not aware of what it is doing in the manner of a human being, who can answer the question: “what are you 
doing following that mouse?” Animals exhibit intentionality in their actions, but this is not the intentionality of a 
human agent, although there are analogies between them. Perhaps it is best to say that by analogy animals 
possess concepts, but only human beings properly possess concepts. Similarly, I would argue that by analogy 
with the fuller linguistic abilities of human beings other animals possess language. This is not to say, however, 
that all animals communicate in the same manner, nor that all are capable of interacting with the human world to 
the same degree. For a reflection on what it entails to say that other animals have language see Vicki Hearne, 
Adam's Task : Calling Animals by Name (New York: Knopf : Distributed by Random House, 1986). In this 
thesis, when we talk of the boundary between the linguistic and the pre-linguistic it is important to keep in mind 
the complexity of this border. When do we say a child has learnt to speak? We may pinpoint certain key stages, 
such as the utterance of the child’s first word, yet it is difficult to say when the child has sufficiently mastered 
speech (do any of us manage this?). This does, not entail, however, that speaking of a boundary between the 
linguistic and the pre-linguistic is meaningless. Not all borders are clearly definable or undisputed.  
71 In this tradition it is because we are rational animals that the form of understanding which is proper to human 
beings is discourse, and dialectic is central to discourse.  
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renewal in our understanding of human nature for moral theology. In particular we will draw 
attention to the way in which Wittgenstein helps us to overcome the modern dichotomy 
between the pre-conceptual and the conceptual by returning us to the question of our origins. 
In doing his Wittgenstein seeks to develop that realism which Diamond highlights. Unlike 
Diamond, however, we will argue that this realism far from overcoming metaphysics 
connects Wittgenstein with the metaphysical tradition. 
In chapters five, six and seven we will take the results of this dialogue between 
Wittgenstein and metaphysics and attempt to show how they are relevant to contemporary 
questions in moral theology. This raises a more general question concerning the role of 
philosophy, and particularly metaphysics, in moral theology; here lies the danger of treating 
philosophy as a self-enclosed system to which theology is merely added as an external 
cladding. We will see in chapter five that Wittgenstein is criticised for emphasising the basis 
of our concepts in our ordinary human practices in a manner which seemingly cuts off any 
possibility for human transcendence. Hibbs notes that one of the prime sources of the 
contemporary rejection of metaphysics is the use by philosophers of Wittgenstein’s notion of 
the ordinary:  
the recovery of the ordinary has been at the heart of an influential movement in 
philosophy at least since Wittgenstein. The problem with aligning Aquinas with this 
movement is its antipathy toward metaphysics. Stanley Cavell, a noted proponent of the 
return to the ordinary, contrasts metaphysics, understood as a ‘‘demand for the 
absolute,’’ with the ‘‘ordinary or the everyday.’’72 
 
How Wittgenstein understands the divine and its relation to the human is by no means simple 
to answer. On the one hand it is clear that Wittgenstein does not reject the God, but has great 
respect for those human practices which seek to connect with the divine.73 On the other hand 
we will not find in Wittgenstein the same kind of theological commitments we find in 
                                                 
72 Hibbs, Aquinas, Ethics, and Philosophy of Religion : Metaphysics and Practice, 2. 
73 For an example of an approach to Wittgenstein which argue that he sees religion as natural to human beings 
see Gordon Graham, Wittgenstein and Natural Religion, First edition. ed. (Oxford, UK: Oxford University 
Press, 2014). 
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Aquinas. The dialectical reading we develop of Wittgenstein will enable us, however, to 
show how Wittgenstein’s philosophy remains open to theology. Here the question of origins 
is the key to understanding how Wittgenstein helps us to overcome the modern dichotomies 
which place philosophy and theology in two opposing realms. We will draw parallels 
between how Wittgenstein prompts us to ask about our origins and Aquinas’ understanding 
of nature as it is used in the works of the moral theologian Servais Pinckaers. The purpose of 
this comparison will be to throw light on deep questions which concern human nature, and to 
ask how human nature is transformed in the encounter with divine wisdom revealed in Jesus 
Christ. 
 
 Interpreting Wittgenstein and Using His Work 1.3
1.3.1 The Context and Practice of Interpretation 
Although we have attempted to justify the claim that Wittgenstein can be located in a 
tradition from Plato, this claim is bound to seem for many commentators on Wittgenstein so 
contrary to what Wittgenstein says about metaphysics that further justification is required. 
The interpretation of any philosopher can split commentators into opposing ranks, with 
Wittgenstein divisions can be particularly stark, and interpretations widely vary. New-
Wittgensteinians criticise anti-realist reading of Wittgenstein, but this is just one example of 
the many disputes in interpretation which have marked readings of Wittgenstein and which 
continue to multiply. In the interpretation of any author we can allow our own 
presuppositions and concerns to dominate, but in the case of Wittgenstein this danger is 
particularly pronounced; especially in regard to his later works. Why is this? Why do 
Wittgenstein’s writings lend themselves to such a wide variety of interpretations? I believe 
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that the answer to these questions lies in seeing how the critical and the constructive aspects 
of Wittgenstein’s work interact.74 
Wittgenstein offers a powerful and persuasive diagnosis of the ills of philosophy and 
in particular of modern philosophy. Anscombe relates how once in conversation with 
Wittgenstein she asked him to describe the difference he had made to philosophy, in response 
to which he replied: “that if you looked at the titles of most of the famous works of 
philosophy in recent centuries, you found that they tended either to contain the word 
‘principles’ or some reference to the human mind.”75 Wittgenstein’s powerful diagnosis of 
the ills of modern philosophy has been used by a wide variety of philosophers to overcome 
philosophical ills; providing a practice of philosophy which on the one hand avoids lapsing 
into an idealism that mistakes principles for reality, while on the other hand avoiding the 
reduction of reality to the empirically verifiable.76 Differences occur in interpretation when 
those using Wittgenstein’s writings begin to develop accounts of the more constructive 
elements of this philosophy. Here there is the danger that the modern principles which 
Wittgenstein strove to overcome are reimported, such that Wittgenstein is characterized as 
sharing the very preoccupations he so strenuously resists. Diamond’s arguments against anti-
realist readings of Wittgenstein demonstrate how such readings are founded upon the very 
presuppositions he so vigorously stove to unmask. Similarly, criticisms of Saul Kripke’s 
account of rule following in Wittgenstein, such as those developed by Colin McGinn, turn on 
                                                 
74 I do not mean to imply that Wittgenstein is a constructivist, but rather to point to those aspects of his work 
which offer us a way of seeing things. 
75 Anscombe, From Plato to Wittgenstein : Essays by G.E.M. Anscombe, 165-66. Anscombe notes that although 
her question to Wittgenstein implied a reference to his later works, his answer was equally true for the 
Tractatus. 
76 For an account of how Wittgenstein can be read as a realist who seeks to avoid idealism and empiricism see 
Fergus Kerr, O.P., Theology after Wittgenstein, [New ed.] ed. (London: SPCK, 1997). This reading of 
Wittgenstein has influenced my approach.  
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the accusation that Kripke reintroduces the modern epistemological concerns which 
Wittgenstein strove to combat.77 
So how are we to interpret Wittgenstein’s philosophy or more generally the writings 
of any philosopher? This is not easy to answer as it requires setting the text which is to be 
interpreted within a context of interpretation. In Remarks on The Foundations of Mathematics 
Wittgenstein draws our attention to the unstated context within which the proof of a 
proposition makes sense: “The proof of a proposition certainly does not mention, certainly 
does not describe, the whole system of calculation that stands behind the proposition and 
gives it its sense.”78 Likewise, any interpretation of a philosopher involves a background 
which is not necessarily stated. But how are we to know whether the background we operate 
with is one which truly enables us to understand what that philosopher is doing? We may 
reject one misleading background, but how do we know that our preferred interpretation is 
not just as wide of the mark? We would seem to be forced back upon the need for principles 
of interpretation which again brings us back to the primacy of epistemological concerns. 
A way out of this circle is suggested by Wittgenstein in his observation that 
mathematical proofs, such as that for the infinite number of prime numbers, involve the 
mastering of techniques; and it is this mastery which enables us to locate a proposition within 
the wider context of interpretation: 
I believe this: Only in a large context can it be said at all that there are infinitely many 
prime numbers. That is to say: For this to be possible there must already exist an 
extended technique of calculating with cardinal numbers. That proposition only makes 
sense within this technique. A proof of the proposition locates it in the whole system of 
calculation. And its position therein can now be described in more than one way, as of 
course the whole complicated system in its background is presupposed.79  
                                                 
77 See Saul A. Kripke, Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language : An Elementary Exposition (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1982). Also, Colin McGinn, Wittgenstein on Meaning : An Interpretation and Evaluation, 
Aristotelian Society Series (Oxford ; New York, NY, USA: B. Blackwell, 1984). 
78 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe, 3rd ed. ed. 
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1978), VI, §11. “Der Beweis eines Satzes erwahnt ja nicht, beschreibt ja nicht, das ganze 
Rechnungssystem, das hinter dem Satz steht und ihm seinen Sinn gibt.” Bemerkung Über Die Grundlagen Der 
Mathematik, Ludwig Wittgenstein Werkausgabe Band 6, VI, §11. 
79 Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, VI, §11. “Ich glaube: Nur in einem Zusammenhang kann man 
überhaupt sagen, es gäbe unendlich viele Primzahlen. Das heißt: Es muß dazu schon eine ausgedehnte Technik 
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In asking how to interpret Wittgenstein we can be misled into thinking that our task is to 
provide a series of criteria, the application of which will bring about a correct interpretation. 
Whereas what Wittgenstein is offering us is not so much a philosophy to be interpreted, but a 
practice of doing philosophy. He invites us to follow him as he guides us; not giving us a 
series of principles, but by teaching us how to think. Thus in the preface to the Investigations 
he remarks: “I should not like my writing to spare other people the trouble of thinking. But, if 
possible, to stimulate someone to thoughts of his own.”80 There are criteria for interpretation, 
but these can only be understood and applied within a philosophical practice. 
 
1.3.2 Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Practice 
One influential interpretation of Wittgenstein’s philosophical practice sees it as 
primarily a therapy to combat the restlessness produced by our attempts to solve 
philosophical problems. Support for this interpretation is given in the following well known 
analogy from the Investigations: “What is your aim in philosophy? – To shrew the fly the 
way out of the fly-bottle.” 81 The image is a powerful one of liberation, and is consistent with 
the view that in the Investigations Wittgenstein seeks to free us from metaphysical confusions 
by returning us to our ordinary ways of living. There is, however, another way of interpreting 
how Wittgenstein uses the fly-bottle analogy. In the Investigations Wittgenstein sets out the 
purpose of his philosophical method. He is not advancing empirical theses, but solving 
philosophical problems by making the workings of language perspicuous: “The problems are 
solved, not by giving new information, but by arranging what we have always known. 
                                                                                                                                                        
des Rechnens mit den Kardinalzahlen geben. Nur innerhalb dieser Technik hat dieser Satz Sinn. Ein Beweis des 
Satzes gibt ihn seiner Platz im ganzen System der Rechnungen. Und dieser Platz kann nun auf mehr als eine 
Weise beschrieben werden, da ja das ganze komplizierte System im Hintergrund doch vorausgesetzt wird.” 
Bemerkung Über Die Grundlagen Der Mathematik, Ludwig Wittgenstein Werkausgabe Band 6, VI, §11. 
80 Philosophical Investigations, Preface. “Ich möchte nicht mit meiner Schrift Andern das Denken ersparen. 
Sondern, wenn es mölich wäre, jemand zu eigenen Gedanken anregen. ” Philosophische Untersuchungen. In 
Tractatus Logico-Philosopicus, Ludwig Wittgenstein Werkausgabe Band 1, Vortwort. 
81 Philosophical Investigations, §309. “Was ist dein Ziel in der Philosophie? – Der Fliege den Ausweg aus dem 
Fliegenglas zeigen.” Philosophische Untersuchungen. In Tractatus Logico-Philosopicus, Ludwig Wittgenstein 
Werkausgabe Band 1, §309. 
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Philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language.”82 
The liberation that Wittgenstein is here seeking is not just from one particular use of language 
(e.g. the metaphysical), but from language itself. The problems which arise when we misuse 
language are not primarily the creation of philosophers, but rather: “their roots are as deep in 
us as the forms of our language and their significance is as great as the importance of our 
language.”83 
If the problems we face are the general result of our misuse of language the solution 
Wittgenstein here offers for our restlessness is not so straight-forward as it first appears. 
When the bewitchment of language is attributed to metaphysics our escape from the tyranny 
of philosophy is by means of ordinary language, but once language itself becomes 
problematic there is no straight-forward means of escaping from the fly-bottle. One way of 
reading the Investigations is to see it as a work of self-questioning.84 Rather than viewing the 
Investigations as a book which seeks to offer a single solution for our philosophical ills, it can 
be read as resisting the temptation to offer a single key to our problems. There is no single 
means of achieving an overview of language, such that philosophical problems dissolve; 
rather Wittgenstein sets out to “assemble reminders for a particular purpose.”85 
Wittgenstein’s purpose is to show what lies in open view before us: “Philosophy simply puts 
                                                 
82 Philosophical Investigations, §109. “Diese Problem warden gelöst, nicht durch Beibringen neuer Erfahrung, 
sondern durch Zusammenstellung des längst Bekannten. Die philosophie ist ein Kampf gegen die Verhexung 
unsres Verstandes durch die Mittle unserer Sprache. ” Philosophische Untersuchungen. In Tractatus Logico-
Philosopicus, Ludwig Wittgenstein Werkausgabe Band 1, §109. 
83 Philosophical Investigations, §111. “sie wurzeln so tief in uns wie die Formen unserer Sprache, und ihre 
Bedeutung ist so groß wie die Wichtigkeit unserer Sprache.” Philosophische Untersuchungen. In Tractatus 
Logico-Philosopicus, Ludwig Wittgenstein Werkausgabe Band 1, §111. 
84 Stephen Mulhall develops such a reading under the influence of Stanley Cavell. I am indebted to Mulhall’s 
modernist influenced reading, although I will take it in a direction (of encounter with metaphysics) which he 
does not. I will return to Mulhall’s reading of Wittgenstein in chapter 5. Stephen Mulhall, Inheritance and 
Originality : Wittgenstein, Heidegger, Kierkegaard (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2001). 
85 Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, §127. “ein Zusammentragen von Erinnerungen zu einem 
bestimmten Zweck.” Philosophische Untersuchungen. In Tractatus Logico-Philosopicus, Ludwig Wittgenstein 
Werkausgabe Band 1, §127. 
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everything before us, and neither explains nor deduces anything.”86 What philosophy does is 
simple, but that does not mean that it is simple to achieve. Thus Wittgenstein adds: “The 
aspects of things that are most important for us are hidden because of their simplicity and 
familiarity. (One is unable to notice something – because it is always before one’s eyes.)”87 
Wittgenstein’s task is to help us see what lies before our eyes, but this cannot be achieved 
through a one-step solution; rather, he makes things perspicuous through the various 
techniques and practices which he develops in his later works. This is not incompatible with a 
therapeutic reading of Wittgenstein’s later philosophy as the following passage makes clear: 
“There is not a philosophical method, though there are indeed methods, like different 
therapies.”88 The therapy on offer is not, however, easy to achieve. 
Constant questioning lies at the heart of the later Wittgenstein’s philosophical 
practice. His arguments are no longer set out as the development of a thesis (such as we find 
in the Blue Book), but through opposing voices which prevent us from making the mistake of 
prematurely thinking that we have reached our final goal. An example of these opposing 
voices can be seen in the following passage: 
The real discovery is the one that makes me capable of stopping doing philosophy 
when I want to. –The one that gives philosophy peace, so that it is no longer tormented 
by questions which bring itself in question. –Instead, we now demonstrate a method, by 
examples; and the series of examples can be broken off. –Problems are solved 
(difficulties eliminated), not a single problem.89 
 
                                                 
86 Philosophical Investigations, §126. “Die Philosophie stellt eben alles bloß hin, und erklärt und folgert nichts.” 
Philosophische Untersuchungen. In Tractatus Logico-Philosopicus, Ludwig Wittgenstein Werkausgabe Band 1, 
§126. 
87 Philosophical Investigations, §129. “Die für uns wichtigsten Aspekte der Dinge sind durch ihre Einfachheit 
and Alltäglichkeit verbogen. (Man kann es nicht bemerken, - weil man es immer vor Augen hat).” 
Philosophische Untersuchungen. In Tractatus Logico-Philosopicus, Ludwig Wittgenstein Werkausgabe Band 1, 
§129. 
88 Philosophical Investigations, §133. “Es gibt nicht eine Method der Philosophie, wohl aber gibt es Methoden, 
gleichsam verschiedene Therapien.” Philosophische Untersuchungen. In Tractatus Logico-Philosopicus, 
Ludwig Wittgenstein Werkausgabe Band 1, §133. 
89 Philosophical Investigations, §133. “Die eigentliche Entdeckung ist die, die mich fähig macht, das 
Philosophieren abzubrechen, wann ich will. – Sondern es wird nun an Beispielen eine Methode gezeigt, und die 
Reihe dieser Beispiele kann man abbrechen. – Es werden Probleme gelöst (Schwierigkeiten beseitigt), nicht ein 
Problem.” Philosophische Untersuchungen. In Tractatus Logico-Philosopicus, Ludwig Wittgenstein 
Werkausgabe Band 1, §133. 
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At first this passage seems to lament our inability to find a single solution to our 
philosophical problems. If we read the passage in the context of its surrounding remarks, 
however, we can see it in a different light (the proposition is understood against an unsaid 
background). Previously in remarks §112-114 (following the remark at §111 on philosophical 
problems lying deep in our language) Wittgenstein criticizes his earlier search for the general 
form of the proposition in the Tractatus. This leads into the more general criticism found in 
remark §116 concerning how philosophers seek to understand things by grasping their 
essences. Remark §116 then closes with Wittgenstein stating his purpose: “What we do is to 
bring words back from their metaphysical to their everyday use.”90 The temptation is to 
image that this “bringing back” can be achieved by making some kind of discovery, the kind 
of discovery through which philosophy will no longer bring itself into question. But this is an 
illusion; there is no one discovery which allows us to escape from our human practices. There 
are no one-step general solutions to our philosophical problems, but this is no loss once we 
see that the search for such solutions is an illusion. All the same, Wittgenstein does not give 
up the aim of finding rest; of releasing the fly from the bottle. There may be no single 
solution, but there are solutions. The self-questioning of the later works reveals a restless 
spirit, but there is also the hope of peace. Moreover, Wittgenstein’s self-questioning has a 
purpose; it is to prevent the fly from false consolation. The fly sitting on the inside of the 
glass-bottle has the illusion of freedom as it looks out and surveys the world. In his search for 
the general form of the position Wittgenstein believed he was freeing the self from the world 
of facts by showing what things are, but he came to realise that: “One thinks that one is 
                                                 
90 Philosophical Investigations, §116. “Wir führen die Wörter von ihrer metaphysischen, wieder auf ihre 
alltägliche Verwendung zurück.” Philosophische Untersuchungen. In Tractatus Logico-Philosopicus, Ludwig 
Wittgenstein Werkausgabe Band 1, §116. 
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tracing the outline of the thing’s nature over and over again, and one is merely tracing round 
the frame through which we look at it.”91 
In his later works Wittgenstein set out to develop a series of practices through which 
the temptation to false consolation and the illusion of a single step solution are resisted. He 
does not, however, give up his objective of leading the fly out of the bottle. He asks us to 
trust him as he guides us through the twisting streets of our linguistic practices: “Our 
language can be seen as an ancient city: a maze of little streets an squares, of old and new 
houses, and of houses with additions from various periods; and this surrounded by a 
multitude of new boroughs with straight regular streets and uniform houses.”92 As I am led 
through a city my natural reaction is one of trust unless I have reason not to doubt my 
guide.93 This does not mean I carry on trusting no matter what happens, but it is the basic 
reaction which enables me to be guided. In order to see whether we should follow 
Wittgenstein we need to return to the contexts of trust within which we follow the teachings 
of another person. Here there is no one determining factor, but rather the development of a 
relationship which occurs over time, and we can initially be guided by the fruits which 
Wittgenstein’s philosophy has born in a variety of areas from the philosophy of mind to 
theological ethics.  
In accepting guidance we should not, however, be uncritical of Wittgenstein’s 
philosophy. Although Wittgenstein can be read as standing in a tradition from Plato it would 
be wrong to treat him as an unproblematic inheritor of this tradition. Despite arguing that 
Wittgenstein can be read in the tradition of Plato, Anscombe is cautious about following him 
                                                 
91 Philosophical Investigations, §114. “Man glaubt, wieder und wieder der Natur nachzufahren, und fährt nur 
der Form entlang, durch die wir sie betrachten.” Philosophische Untersuchungen. In Tractatus Logico-
Philosopicus, Ludwig Wittgenstein Werkausgabe Band 1, §114. 
92 Philosophical Investigations, §18. “unsere Sprache kann man ansehen als eine alte Stadt: Ein Gewinkel von 
Gäßchen und Plätzen, alten und neuen Häusern, und Häusern mit Zubauten aus verschiedenen Zeiten; und dies 
umgeben von einer Menge neuer Vororte mit geraden und regelmäßigen Straßen und mit einförmigen Häusern.” 
Philosophische Untersuchungen. In Tractatus Logico-Philosopicus, Ludwig Wittgenstein Werkausgabe Band 1, 
§18. 
93 In On Certainty trust is central to Wittgenstein’s account of belief (Glaube). See Ludwig Wittgenstein On 
Certainty, trans. Denis Paul and G. E. M. Anscombe (Oxford,: Blackwell, 1969). 
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in a manner which implies that his philosophy is beyond criticism. She recounts how: “I once 
heard someone ask Wittgenstein what it all came to, what was, so to speak, the upshot of the 
philosophy he was teaching in the 1940’s. He did not answer. I am disposed to think that 
there wasn’t an answer he could give. … I therefore depreciate attempts to expound 
Wittgenstein’s thought as a finished thing.”94 No philosopher can be said to finally have 
finished her work, but with Wittgenstein the sketchy nature of his work invites further 
development, which does not necessarily create problems, so long as these developments are 
seen for what they are and not passed off as “attempts to expound Wittgenstein’s thought as a 
finished article.” Nor is it clear that Wittgenstein if given more time would have produced 
something more than a sketch. Even the greatest of thinkers need guides, and it could be 
argued that Wittgenstein’s general mistrust of the metaphysical tradition deprived him of a 
valuable source of guidance. Furthermore, it deprived him of a wider context of 
interpretation, making the task of interpreting his work more difficult and leaving him open 
to a wide variety of interpretations. 
 Anscombe’s own way of reading Wittgenstein was to see him in relation to her other 
guides in philosophy. This enabled her to read Wittgenstein critically and to place his 
writings in the context of broader philosophical concerns. Of particular importance for this 
thesis is Anscombe’s understand of Wittgenstein as attempting to develop a realism which 
avoids: “the falsehoods of idealism and the stupidities of empiricist realism.”95 In relation to 
the question of human nature, and particularly the relationship between the pre-conceptual 
and the conceptual, we will argue that Wittgenstein offers us a way towards seeing our nature 
which avoids the danger of either reducing the conceptual to the pre-conceptual (empiricism) 
or of subsuming the pre-conceptual into the conceptual (idealism). These seemingly opposed 
dangers both arise from the temptation to find a one-step solution to answer the question of 
                                                 
94 Anscombe, From Plato to Wittgenstein : Essays by G.E.M. Anscombe, 169. 
95 "The Question of Linguistic Idealism," in From Parmenides to Wittgenstein (Oxford: Blackwell, 1981), 115. 
Earlier we noted how Diamond reads Wittgenstein as a realist, and in this she is influenced by Anscombe. 
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our human nature. The practice of philosophy which Wittgenstein develops in his later 
writings, with its self-questioning and its attempt to find solutions to philosophical problems 
by approaching them from several directions, throws light on our human nature while itself 
being an exercise which aims to restore us to that nature. The Investigations both in their 
form and in their content can be read as primarily concerned with the question of what it is to 
be human: a creature who is bodily and who uses signs to communicate. If there is continuity 
with the tradition of Plato and Aristotle it is to be found in this. Far from distancing us from 
our human nature, the metaphysical tradition places the question of what it means to be 
human at the centre of its concerns, and Wittgenstein, insofar as he shares in this tradition, 
uses various of its tools (grammar and dialectic) at the service of humanity. 
 
1.3.3 Conclusion: Laying the Groundwork for Dialogue 
In this chapter we began by acknowledging our debt to the work those philosophers 
and theologians who read Wittgenstein as sharing something in common with the 
philosophical tradition beginning with Plato. This led us to examine the nature of 
metaphysics and how Wittgenstein relates more broadly to the metaphysical tradition. Our 
purpose here was to lay the groundwork for a dialogue between Wittgenstein and moral 
theology, because in the Catholic tradition metaphysics lies at the heart of the dialogue 
between philosophy and theology. We also touched upon the question of human nature, 
another of the key dialogue partners in Catholic moral theology. In chapter two we will 
examine the development of Wittgenstein’s thought from the Tractatus to the Remarks on the 
Foundations of Arithmetic with the goal of seeing how his understanding of the relationship 
between nature and grammar develops. We have seen that in his later works Wittgenstein 
came to question the logical system developed in the Tractatus. Chapter two examines in 
greater depth the changes and developments in Wittgenstein’s thought. We will see that 
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Wittgenstein came increasingly to appreciate the basis of our linguistic behaviour in our 
natural human practices, and the pre-linguistic reactions which are the initial basis for our 
linguistic practices. At the centre of these developments we find Wittgenstein developing a 
dialectical style of writing which seeks to hold together the tensions present in the human 
being in a manner which opens us to the question of our nature
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2 NATURE, LOGIC AND GRAMMAR 
 The Development of Wittgenstein’s Thought: Application and Practice 2.1
In this chapter we shall examine the development of Wittgenstein’s thought from the 
Tractatus to the Remarks on the Foundation of Mathematics. This covers the period from 
1921-1944 and brings us up to a point just prior to the completion of Part I of the 
Investigations in 1945. Our aim will be to cast light upon the Investigations. Most of our 
discussion will relate to Part I of the Investigations, however, the discussion on ‘seeing as’ in 
chapter two (2.3.6) concerns Part II, which “was written between 1947 and 1949.”1 The 
guiding theme for this examination will be the question of application, and how Wittgenstein 
develops his understanding of application by drawing attention to the practices within which 
we apply concepts.  
In chapter one, section 1.3.1, we noted how in the Remarks on the Foundations of 
Mathematics Wittgenstein argues that outside its application a mathematical proposition does 
not have meaning; if we connect this argument with Wittgenstein’s observation that 
understanding a mathematical proposition requires a wider context of practice, then we begin 
to see how Wittgenstein connects meaning, application and practice. Another central theme in 
the development of Wittgenstein’s notion of application emerges in his argument that 
underlying our mathematical practices there are non-mathematical uses of signs which make 
the mathematical uses possible: “It is use outside mathematics, and so the meaning of the 
signs, that makes the sign-game into mathematics.”2 Here we find Wittgenstein’s turn to the 
ordinary, in which he seeks to help us re-connect with the everyday practices from which our 
                                                 
1 Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, Editors' Note. The completed text produced by Wittgenstein of the 
Investigations is standardly designated as ‘Part I’. We will use the standard designation of the remarks of the 
philosophy of psychology which were later attached to this original text of the Investigations as ‘Part II’. 
2 Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, V, §2. “Es ist der Gebrauch außerhalb Mathematik, also, die 
Beseutung der Zeichen, was das Zeichenspiel zur Mathematik macht.”Bemerkung Über Die Grundlagen Der 
Mathematik, Ludwig Wittgenstein Werkausgabe Band 6, V, §2. 
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mathematical concepts develop. This notion of the ordinary can easily be misunderstood to 
imply a general theory of meaning in which the ordinary plays a foundational role. Such a 
reading of Wittgenstein ignores the self-questioning nature of his later works. He aims to 
provide a perspicuous view of language, but this involves a constant struggle with the 
temptations our ordinary forms of language put before us: “To this end we shall constantly be 
giving prominence to distinctions which our ordinary forms of language easily make us 
overlook.”3 We will see how in his later thought Wittgenstein does see our ordinary practices 
as providing foundations, but we are misled by the form of language if we begin to use ‘the 
ordinary’ as the foundation for all our practices. 
This examination of Wittgenstein’s notion of application will develop the reading of 
his relationship to the metaphysical tradition outlined in chapter one. We argued that despite 
his remarks condemning metaphysics there are various connections between Wittgenstein and 
the metaphysical tradition. How to understand the unity of grammar is a central concern of 
Wittgenstein; avoiding either the assumption of an immediate grasp of a pre-given essence, or 
the reduction of that unity to empirical generalizations (idealism verses empiricism). Through 
the notion of application Wittgenstein seeks to show how there is unity in diversity. The 
notion of application roots our concepts in human practices while avoiding their reduction to 
the status of empirical generalizations of those practices. If grammar provides a measure for 
reality it can only do so because concepts require application: “Every sign by itself seems 
dead. What gives it life?—In use it is alive. Is life breathed into it there?—Or is the use its 
life?”4 It is in using (applying) concepts that they have life. 
                                                 
3 Philosophical Investigations, §132. “We werden zu diesem Zweck immer wieder unterscheidungen 
hervorheben, die unsre gewöhnlichen Sprachformen leicht übersehen lassen.” Philosophische Untersuchungen. 
In Tractatus Logico-Philosopicus, Ludwig Wittgenstein Werkausgabe Band 1, §132. 
4 Philosophical Investigations, §432. “Jedes Zeichen schein allein tot. Was gibt ihm Leben? – Im Gebrauch lebt 
es. Hat es da den lebenden Atem in sich? – Oder ist der Gebrauch sein Atem?” Philosophische Untersuchungen. 
In Tractatus Logico-Philosopicus, Ludwig Wittgenstein Werkausgabe Band 1, §432. 
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This chapter will trace the development of Wittgenstein’s notion of application from 
the earlier logico-syntactic account of the Tractatus to the later emphasis on the uses we give 
to words in the variety of our human practices. Throughout this development we will see that 
Wittgenstein holds onto the distinction between the logical (or later grammatical) and the 
empirical. This is also a key distinction for the metaphysical tradition (where it is essential for 
understanding unity and diversity). For both Wittgenstein and that tradition there is a constant 
tension in maintaining this distinction while showing how concepts find application in our 
lives. If we read Wittgenstein as attempting in his later works a philosophical realism which 
avoid the dangers of idealism and empiricism, then his account of human nature must 
overcome two dangers: on the one hand falling into an interpretative circle in which language 
is autonomous and has no basis in our nature, while on the other hand avoiding the 
assumption of a pre-given account of human nature (whether an account of the ordinary or a 
reduction to a pre-conceptual animal nature).  
The relevance of these discussions for moral theology will be brought out in chapters 
five, six and seven. The development of Wittgenstein’s thought can be read as the evolution 
of his understanding of what it is to be human. The theme of application, which we will use 
to structure our presentation of his philosophy, enables us to understanding the development 
of Wittgenstein’s account of human agency. We will argue in chapter seven that his later 
account of human agency provides a situated account of human freedom. As Michael 
Sherwin argues, human freedom is not that of a disembodied angel, but the freedom of a 
material creature and as such: “Although we are born with the spiritual principles of freedom 
(intellect and will), freedom is something we must achieve; it is something we must grow into 
with the aid of a community and God’s grace.”5 The development of Wittgenstein’s thought 
from the Tractatus to the later writings involves situating his account of human 
                                                 
5 Michael S. Sherwin, O.P., By Knowledge & by Love : Charity and Knowledge in the Moral Theology of St. 
Thomas Aquinas (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 2005), 215. 
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understanding and action in the context of our natural human practices. Whereas the 
Tractatus offers a perspective beyond the realm of facts, his later philosophy seeks to 
reconnect us with our embodied human nature. In chapter five we will argue that 
Wittgenstein, far from denying human freedom and transcendence, in his later philosophy 
opens the way for an understanding of our freedom which shows how freedom (to quote 
again from Sherwin): “permeates every fibre of our animal nature.”6 
Although Wittgenstein published little during his life, he left behind a large corpus of 
work. When assessing the development of Wittgenstein’s thought a commentator must make 
choices as to the relative weight given to the different documents contained in this large and 
varied body of writing. These writings range from the painstakingly selected and arranged 
remarks of the first part of the Investigations7 to unedited manuscripts. There are also notes 
taken from Wittgenstein’s lectures and personal remarks recorded by various students and 
friends. In assessing the weight of these various sources the guiding principle of this thesis 
will be to give greatest weight to those writings Wittgenstein himself most carefully and 
deliberately worked upon. We will thus begin with the Tractatus, which was published in 
1921. In regard to the period from Wittgenstein’s return to Cambridge in 1929 to the 
completion of Part I of the Investigations in 1945, we will read Wittgenstein’s various works 
in relation to that finished 1945 text. In the period after 1945, when Wittgenstein was 
concerned with questions of psychology, we will give more weight to the remarks published 
in Part II of the Investigations, but since these were not edited by Wittgenstein in the same 
manner as Part I we will draw more heavily upon their sources.8 
                                                 
6 Ibid. 
7 Although the in the Editors’ Note it is conjectured that Wittgenstein: “would have suppressed a good deal of 
what is in the last thirty pages or so of Part I and worked what is in Part II, with further material, into its place.” 
See Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, Editors' Note. 
8 Although Wittgenstein published little in his lifetime his writings are copious. The edited selections we will 
draw upon are taken from sources running to several thousand pages. Schulte’s notes, for example, that between 
May 1946 and March 1949 Wittgenstein wrote more than 1,900 pages. See Joachim Schulte, Experience and 
Expression : Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Psychology (Oxford England New York: Clarendon Press ; Oxford 
University Press, 1993), 5.  
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 The Tractatus and Application: Sign, Symbol and Object 2.2
2.2.1 The Form and Content of a Proposition 
Although the principle of application is most readily associated with Wittgenstein’s 
later thought it plays an essential role in the Tractatus. In the Tractatus Wittgenstein sought 
to develop a perspicuous representation of the logical symbolism he believed underlies 
language. His aims was to clarify the structure of thought, and thus to prevent us from falling 
into the confusions produced by everyday language. To this end he distinguished between the 
perceptible signs we use in language and the symbolism which these signs express: “3.32 A 
sign is what can be perceived of a symbol.”9 Whereas the everyday use of signs is messy and 
confusing, Wittgenstein’s aim was to produce a sign-language in which all ambiguity is 
excluded and thus the symbolism expressed is clearly exhibited: 
3.325 In order to avoid such errors we must make use of a sign-language that excludes 
them by not using the same sign for different symbols and by not using in a 
superficially similar way signs that have different modes of signification: that is to say, 
a sign-language that is governed by logical grammar–by logical syntax. 
 (The conceptual notation of Frege and Russell is such a language, though, it is true, it 
fails to exclude all mistakes.)10 
 
The requirement that this sign-language is governed by logical grammar entails that the 
meaning of a sign has no role to play in its determination: “3.33 In logical syntax the meaning 
of a sign should never play a role. It must be possible to establish logical syntax without 
                                                 
9 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, trans. D. F. Pears and B. F. McGuinness, Revised ed. 
(London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1974), 18. “3.32 Das Zeichen ist das sinnlich Wahrnehmbare am 
Symbol.”Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung. In Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, Werkausgabe Band 1 
(Sinzheim, German: Suhrkamp, 1984), 22.  
10 Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, 18-19. “3.325 Um diesen Irrtümern zu entgehen, müssen wir eine 
Zeichensprache verwenden, welche sie ausschließt, indem sie nicht das gleiche Zeichen in verschiedenen 
Symbolen, und Zeichen, welche auf verschiedene Art bezeichnen, nicht äußerlich auf die gleiche Art verwendet. 
Eine Zeichensprache also, die der logicsche Grammatik – der logischen Syntax – gehorcht. (Die Begriffsschrift 
Freges und Russels ist eine solche Sprache, die allerdings nicht alle Fehler ausschließt.)” Logisch-
Philosophische Abhandlung. In Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, Werkausgabe Band 1, 22-23. 
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mentioning the meaning of a sign: only the description of expressions may be presupposed.”11 
Are we thus to conclude that Wittgenstein is offering a purely formal account of this sign-
language? As Fogelin notes, remark 3.33: “expresses the formalist’s working rule,”12 and it is 
clear that there are formalist aspects to Wittgenstein’s project of producing a perspicuous 
logical notion. Where Wittgenstein differs from formalism, however, is shown in the 
preceding remark: “3.328 If a sign is useless, it is meaningless. That is the point of Occam’s 
maxim. (If everything behaves as if a sign had meaning, then it does have meaning).”13 This 
use of a sign is its logical employment: “3.327 A sign does not determine a logical form 
unless it is taken together with its logico-syntactic employment.”14 A sign which lacks 
application is meaningless: it does not hook onto the world.  
Central to Wittgenstein’s concerns in the Tractatus is the question of how thought 
hooks onto the world. What he wishes to avoid is the idea that we have a way of accessing 
the world independent of our manner of representing it, onto which our forms of 
representation are mapped. The connection between thought and the world must be internal to 
our forms of representation, and not established by an external relationship: “4.023 a 
proposition describes reality by its internal properties.”15 Does this not collapse reality into 
thought? Here we can see the danger of falling into idealism in an attempt to avoid 
empiricism. Wittgenstein is aware of this danger and observes that: “3.04 If a thought were 
                                                 
11 Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, 19. “3.33 In der logischen Syntax darf nie die Bedeutung eines Zeichens 
eine Rolle spielen; sie muß sich aufstellen lassen, ohne daß dabei von der Bedeutung eines Zeichens die Rede 
wäre, sie darf nur die Beschreibung der Ausdrückte voraussetzen.” Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung. In 
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, Werkausgabe Band 1, 23. 
12 Fogelin, Wittgenstein, 59. 
13 Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, 19. “3.328 Wird ein Zeichen nicht gebraucht, so ist es 
bedeutungslos. Das ist der Sinn der Devise Occams. (Wenn sich alles so verhält als hätte ein Zeichen 
Bedeutung, dann hat es auch Bedeutung.)” Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung. In Tractatus Logico-
Philosophicus, Werkausgabe Band 1, 23.  
14 Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, 19. “3.327 Das zichen bestimmt erst mit seiner logisch-syntaktischen 
Verwendung zusammen eine logische Form.” Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung. In Tractatus Logico-
Philosophicus, Werkausgabe Band 1, 23. 
15 Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, 25. “4.023 so beschreibt der Satz die Wirklichkeit nach ihren internen 
Eigenschaften.” Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung. In Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, Werkausgabe Band 1, 
28. 
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correct a priori, it would be a thought whose possibility ensured its truth.”16 The internal 
structure of a proposition does not determine whether the proposition is true or false; this is 
only achieved by comparing the proposition to reality: “2.223 In order to tell whether a 
picture is true or false we must compare it with reality.”17  
If the possibility of such a comparison is internal to thought, we need to show how 
thought is distinguished from reality while at same time able to represent how things are. In 
the Tractatus Wittgenstein developed two related tools for this purpose: firstly, his picture 
theory of meaning, which provides an account of how we project signs,18 and secondly his 
theory of simple signs by which he sought to show the basis upon which we are able to 
picture the world. Through these two tools he sought to show us the logical-syntactic 
application of signs in a manner which brings out the internal nature of representation, while 
avoiding the implication that thought is correct a priori. Before we go on to examine the 
picture theory of the Tractatus we will first examine the account Wittgenstein gives of 
projection, as the account of picturing given in the Tractatus is essentially an account of 
projection.  
Projection is central to Wittgenstein’s account of how we represent reality through 
propositions. It is easy to miss in the complex treatment of logical symbolism given by the 
Tractatus the importance which the sensible nature of signs plays in Wittgenstein’s theory. 
Wittgenstein follows Frege in arguing that propositions are the primary syntactical units 
through which thought is expressed. For Wittgenstein, however, propositions are not abstract 
object but rather: “3.1 In a proposition a thought finds an expression that can be perceived by 
                                                 
16 Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, 13. “3.04 Ein a priori richtiger Gedanke wäre ein solcher, dessen 
Möglichkeit seine Wahrheit bedingte.” Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung. In Tractatus Logico-
Philosophicus, Werkausgabe Band 1, 17. 
17 Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, 12. “2.223 Um zu erkennen, ob das Bild wahr oder falsch ist, müssen wir es 
mit der Wirklichkeit vergleichen.” Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung. In Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, 
Werkausgabe Band 1, 17. 
18 As Anscombe notes Wittgenstein is here using a “metaphorical extension of the mathematical use.” 
Anscombe, An Introduction to Wittgenstein's Tractatus, 69. 
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the senses.”19 More exactly the proposition is the expression of a sign as it is projected in 
relation to the world: “3.12 I call the sign with which we express a thought a propositional 
sign. –And a proposition is a propositional sign in its projective relation to the world.”20 In 
this projective relationship: “3.13 A proposition contains the form, but not the content, of its 
sense.”21 The distinction between form and content provides Wittgenstein with the means of 
showing how the projective relationship between sign and world is internal to the proposition 
(the form of the proposition), while distinguishing the projected sign from the reality it 
represents (content). In distinguishing form and content Wittgenstein illuminate the remark 
that: “3.13 A proposition includes all that the projection includes, but not what is projected”22 
and thus to help us see how the internal properties of a proposition must be distinguished 
from its content: “3.13 A proposition, therefore, does not actually contain its sense, but does 
contain the possibility of expressing it. (‘The content of a proposition’ means the content of a 
proposition that has sense.)”23 But how do we distinguish between those applications of signs 
which have sense and those which lack sense? When we project signs how can we distinguish 
between those applications that are empty and those which have content? In other words, 
what is it about the form of a proposition which enables it to represent reality, and thus to 
hook onto the world? Wittgenstein answers this question in the Tractatus by developing his 
                                                 
19 Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, 13. “3.1 In Satz drückt sich der Gedanke sinnlich 
wahrnehmbar aus.” Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung. In Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, Werkausgabe 
Band 1, 17. 
20 Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, 13. “3.12 Das Zeichen, durch welches wir den Gedanken ausdrücken, nenne 
ich das Satzzeichen. Und der Satz ist das Satzzeichen in seiner projecktiven Beziehung zur Welt.” Logisch-
Philosophische Abhandlung. In Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, Werkausgabe Band 1, 18. 
21 Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, 13. “3.13 Im Satz ist die Form seines Sinnes enthalten, aber nicht dessen 
Inhalt.” Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung. In Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, Werkausgabe Band 1, 18. 
22 Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, 13. “3.13 Das Satz gehört alles, was zur Projecktion gehört; aber nicht das 
Projizierte.” Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung. In Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, Werkausgabe Band 1, 18. 
23 Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, 13. “3.13 Im Satz ist also sein Sinn noch nicht enthalten, wohl aber die 
Mölichkeit, ihn auszudrücken. (‘Der Inhalt des Satzes’ heißt der Inhalt des sinnvollen Satzes.) Logisch-
Philosophische Abhandlung. In Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, Werkausgabe Band 1, 18. 
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picture theory of meaning, which seeks to show how the projective relationship is internal to 
a proposition: “2.2 A picture has logico-pictorial form in common with what it depicts.”24 
 
2.2.2 Logical Picturing and Simple Objects 
In his biography of Wittgenstein Raymond Monk recounts how in a conversation with 
G. H. Von Wright later in his life Wittgenstein described how the idea for the picture theory 
came to him while he was serving on the front in the Austrian army in 1914.25 The inspiration 
came from a newspaper article, which gave an account of how a model was used in a Parisian 
law court to recreate a motor accident. Wittgenstein saw how the correspondence between the 
elements of the model and the elements of reality enabled it to picture reality. He extended 
this notion of correspondence to argue that it is the logical correspondence between the 
elements of a proposition and the elements of reality which enable it to represent reality: 
“2:18 What any picture of whatever form, must have in common with reality, in order to be 
able to depict is–correctly or incorrectly–in any way at all, is logical form, i.e. the form of 
reality.”26 The role that projection plays in the Tractatus is to be understood in the context of 
this picture theory; the projection of the elements of the propositional–sign onto the elements 
of reality. Anscombe sums this up in the following passage: 
It is we who ‘use the sensibly perceptible signs as a projection of a possible state of 
affairs’; we do this by using the elements of the proposition to stand for the objects 
whose possible configuration we are reproducing in the arrangement of the elements of 
the proposition. This is what Wittgenstein means by calling the proposition a picture. It 
is at any rate clear enough that we could use a picture in this way.27 
 
                                                 
24 Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, 11. “Das Bild hat mit dem Abgebildeten die logischen Form der Abbildung 
gemein.” Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung. In Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, Werkausgabe Band 1, 16. 
25 Ray Monk, Ludwig Wittgenstein : The Duty of Genius, 1st American ed. (New York: Free Press : Maxwell 
Macmillan International, 1990), 118. 
26 Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, 11. “2.18 Was jedes Bild, welcher Form immer, mit der 
Wirklichkeit gemein haben muß, um sie überhaupt – richtig oder falsch – abbilden zu können,ist die logische 
Form, das ist, die Form der Wirklichkeit.” Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung. In Tractatus Logico-
Philosophicus, Werkausgabe Band 1, 16. 
27 Anscombe, An Introduction to Wittgenstein's Tractatus, 69. 
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In order to achieve this correspondence of elements we need to determine what are the 
essential elements of the perceptible signs we use, and how those essential elements 
correspond to the elements of reality.  
In regard to the essential elements of propositional-signs Wittgenstein observes: 
3.34 A proposition possesses essential and accidental features. 
Accidental features are those that result from the particular way in which the 
propositional sign is produced. Essential features are those without which the 
proposition could not express its sense28 
 
How are we to distinguish between the essential and the accidental features of a proposition? 
Wittgenstein offers an analogy with spatial objects: 
3.1431 The essence of a proposition sign is very clearly seen if we imagine one 
composed of spatial objects (such as tables, chairs, and books) instead of written signs. 
 Then the spatial arrangement of these things will express the sense of the 
proposition.29 
 
This analogy is followed by a passage in the Tractatus which Anscombe notes: “has been 
found as obscure,”30 but which she considers to be not particularly opaque. Like many 
sayings in Wittgenstein its very simplicity can be deceptive. If we keep in mind the spatial 
analogy of the previous remark we can gain a clearer idea of what Wittgenstein is getting at: 
“3.1432 Instead of, ‘The complex sign “aRb” says that a stands to b in the relation R’, we 
ought to put, ‘That “a” stands to “b” in a certain relation says that aRb.’”31 The first 
alternative envisages the situation in which you definine a sign for someone who does not 
know how to use it. It is like explaining the figures used in an instruction manual to someone 
who does not know what they represent. The problem with this explanation is that it gets 
                                                 
28 Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, 20. “3.34 Der Satz besitz wesentliche und zufällige Züge. 
Zufällig sind die Züge, die von der besonderen Art der Hervorbringung des Satzzeichens herrühren. Wesentlich 
diejenigen, welche allein den Satz befahigen, seinen Sinn auszudrücken.” Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung. 
In Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, Werkausgabe Band 1, 24. 
29 Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, 14. “Sehr klar wird das Wesen des Satzzeichens, wenn wir es uns, statt aus 
Schriftzeichen, aus räumlichen Gegenständen (etwas Tishen, Stühlen, Büchern) zusammengesetzt denken. Die 
gegenseitige räumliche Lage dieser Dinge drückt dann den Sinn des Satzes aus.” Logisch-Philosophische 
Abhandlung. In Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, Werkausgabe Band 1, 18. 
30 Anscombe, An Introduction to Wittgenstein's Tractatus, 89. 
31 Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, 14. “3.1432 Nicht: ‘Das komplex Zeichen “aRb” sagt, daß a in 
der Beziehung R zu b steht’, sonder: Daß “a” in einer gewissen Beziehung zu “b” steht, sagt, daß aRb.” 
Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung. In Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, Werkausgabe Band 1, 18. 
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things the wrong way round.32 Such practices of explanation presuppose that we have already 
mastered the use of various signs, those which form the language of explanation. If in turn we 
are required to give an explanation of these signs we end up in a vicious regress. The second 
alternative assumes that the symbol aRb is one that does not require the kind of explanation 
given in the first. This is because its essence is already expressed in the application of its 
sign, as the following remark makes clear: “3.262 What signs fail to express, their application 
shows. What signs slur over, their application says clearly.”33 To return to the analogy of 
explaining an instruction manual, such explanations can only be successful because there is a 
prior application of signs which expresses what is essential in them. It is important, however, 
not to be misled by this analogy, for as Anscombe observes in regard to Wittgenstein’s use of 
application here: “by ‘application’ he did not mean ‘role in life’, ‘use’, ‘practice of the use’ in 
the sense of Philosophical Investigations; he meant ‘logico-syntactic application.’”34 
The ‘logico-syntactic application’ of a sign expresses its essential nature; if further 
signs were required for this we would end in a regress of signs interpreting signs. This 
explains why Wittgenstein next introduces the notion of a simple sign: 
3.2 In a proposition a thought can be expressed in such a way that elements of the 
propositional sign correspond to the objects of thought. 
 
3.201 I call such elements ‘simple signs’, and such a proposition ‘completely 
analysed.’35 
 
To avoid a regress Wittgenstein must fix the sense of a proposition by assigning the elements 
within it to objects, such that it cannot be further interpreted. He does this through identifying 
                                                 
32 That is to say if we are seeking to develop a general theory of symbolism of the type Wittgenstein develops in 
the Tractatus. In his later works we will see that Wittgenstein will make a parallel point, but since he abandons 
the search for a general theory it is expressed by saying that the problem is in applying one model of use as a 
general model for all. 
33 Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, 16. “3.262 Was in den Zeichen nicht zum Ausdruck kommt, 
das zeigt ihre Anwendung. Was die Zeichen verschlucken, das spricht ihre Anwendung aus.” Logisch-
Philosophische Abhandlung. In Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, Werkausgabe Band 1, 20. 
34 Anscombe, An Introduction to Wittgenstein's Tractatus, 91. 
35 Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, 14. “3.2 Im Satz kann der Gedanke so ausgedrückt sein, daß 
den Gegenständen des Gedankens Elemente des Satz zeichens entsprechen. 3.201 Diese Elemente nenne ich 
‘einfache Zeichens’ und den Satz ‘vollständig analysiert.’ ” Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung. In Tractatus 
Logico-Philosophicus, Werkausgabe Band 1, 19. 
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simple signs as names employed in propositions, which have corresponding simple objects. 
For these simple signs there is no distinction between sense and reference. Thus, at 3.203 he 
asserts: “A name means an object. The object is its meaning. (‘A’ is the same sign as ‘A’.)”36 
This fixes the sense of the propositions which contain such names, allowing Wittgenstein at 
3.23 to state: “The requirement that simple signs be possible is the requirement that sense be 
determinate.”37 Wittgenstein, in seeking to distinguish meaningful from meaningless 
propositions, sets himself the task of finding the common form of all meaningful 
propositions. This search for the general form of the proposition lies at the heart of the 
logico-syntactic system he develops in the Tractatus. 
The logico-syntactic employment of signs is achieved through the theory of simple 
signs with their corresponding objects. This achievement has, however, come at a high cost. 
What are these simple signs and what are their corresponding objects? Wittgenstein argues 
that simple signs are names, but for what kind of name is sense and reference identical? One 
answer is to adopt Russell’s epistemological theory of acquaintance, according to which 
simple signs name those objects we are immediately acquainted with (e.g. sense data). Such 
an interpretation of the simple objects of the Tractatus influenced the development of logical 
positivism. Anscombe notes that the strongest support for this interpretation occurs in the 
following passage in the Tractatus: 
 3.263 The meaning of primitive signs can be explained by means of elucidations. 
Elucidations are propositions that contain the primitive signs. So they can only be 
understood if the meanings of those signs are already known.38 
 
                                                 
36 Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, 15. “3.203 Der Name bedeutung den Gegenstand. Der Gegenstand ist seine 
Bedeutung. (‘A’ ist dasselbe Zeichen wie ‘A’.)” Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung. In Tractatus Logico-
Philosophicus, Werkausgabe Band 1, 19. 
37 Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, 15. “3.23 Die Forderung der Mölichkeit der einfachen Zeichen ist die 
Forderung der Bestimmtheit des Sinnes.” Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung. In Tractatus Logico-
Philosophicus, Werkausgabe Band 1, 19. 
38 Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, 16. “3.263 Die Bedeutungen von Urzeichen können durch Erläuterungen 
erklärt weden. Erläuterungen sind Sätze, welche die Urzeichen enthalten. Sie können also nur verstanden 
werden, wenn die Bedeutungen dieser Zeichen bereits bekannt sint.” Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung. In 
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, Werkausgabe Band 1, 20. 
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In the different translation which Anscombe uses for this passage the German bereits bekannt 
sind is translated as ‘acquainted’ as opposed to the more literal translation given above, 
adding weight to the argument that Wittgenstein intends something along the lines of 
Russell’s theory. Anscombe also conjectures that: “it is quite possible that Wittgenstein had 
roughly this sort of thing rather vaguely in mind.”39 Yet despite this evidence Anscombe 
rules out identifying Wittgenstein’s simple names with objects of acquaintance for two 
reasons. Firstly, there is no evidence that Wittgenstein’s simple names (here Anscombe uses 
the term elementary names) require elementary propositions (e.g. observational statements) to 
elucidate them. Secondly, Wittgenstein’s elementary propositions cannot be observational 
statements as can be seen from the following remark, which comes in a parenthesis at the end 
of 6.3751 in the Tractatus: 
It is clear that the logical product of two elementary propositions can neither be a 
tautology not a contradiction. The statement that a point in the visual field has two 
different colours at the same time is a contradiction.40 
 
Since for any observational statement it is possible to come up with another which is of the 
same logical form, but which is contradictory to it, observational statements cannot play the 
role of elementary propositions in the Tractatus. Anscombe observes that in general 
epistemology concerns are not treated in the Tractatus, which is shown in the remark at 
4.1121 “Psychology is no more closely related to philosophy that any other natural science. 
Theory of knowledge is the philosophy of psychology.”41 
We have ruled out an epistemological interpretation of Wittgenstein’s simple signs, 
but we are no closer to knowing what they are or the nature of their corresponding objects. 
                                                 
39 Anscombe, An Introduction to Wittgenstein's Tractatus, 26-27. 
40 Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, 86. “6.3751 Es ist klar, daß das logische Produkt zweier 
Elementarsätze weder eine Tautologie noch eine Kontradiktion sein Kann. Die Aussage, daß ein Punkt des 
Gesichtsfeldes zu gleicher Zeit zwei verschiedene Farben hat, ist eine Kontadiktion.” Logisch-Philosophische 
Abhandlung. In Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, Werkausgabe Band 1, 82. 
41 Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, 30. “4.1121 Die Pschologie ist der Philosophie nicht verwandter als 
irgendeine andere Naturwissenschaft. Erkenntnistheorie ist die Philsophie der Psychologie.” Logisch-
Philosophische Abhandlung. In Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, Werkausgabe Band 1, 32. 
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Anscombe argues that Wittgenstein believed we are able to arrive at simple signs as they are 
combined in elementary propositions by a process of analysis, and that evidence for this is 
given at 4.221 in the Tractatus: “It is obvious that the analysis of propositions must bring us 
to elementary propositions which consist in names in immediate combination.”42 In speaking 
here of “bringing us (kommen mussen) to elementary propositions” it is easy to think that 
Wittgenstein has epistemological concerns in mind, but the analysis he carries out in the 
Tractatus is the logical analysis of thought, and therefore what he seeks to bring us to is an 
understanding of the logical role of elementary propositions and simple names. The theory 
laid out in the Tractatus does not require that Wittgenstein actually supplies examples of 
simple names nor of their corresponding objects, but rather to show their role in the logic of 
thought. 
 
2.2.3 The Demand for Clarity and the Requirements of Logic 
The logical solution to understanding Wittgenstein’s simple names and objects is 
attractive insofar as it provides an alternative to the foundational epistemology of Russell’s 
theory of acquaintance. It goes too far, however, in seeking to remove epistemological 
concerns from philosophy. We will see that in the development of his later work Wittgenstein 
is concerned with epistemological questions, although he maintains the distinction between 
philosophy and the empirical sciences. More generally, although Wittgenstein will not 
abandon the distinction between conceptual and the empirical investigations, this distinction 
will no longer be determined through laying down general logical requirements.  
                                                 
42 Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, 36. “4.221 Es ist offenbar, daß wir bei der Analyse der Sätze auf 
Elementarsätze kommen müssen, die aus Namen in ummittelbarer Verbindung bestehen.” Logisch-
Philosophische Abhandlung. In Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, Werkausgabe Band 1, 38. 
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In the preface to the Tractatus Wittgenstein states the aim of the book as drawing: “a 
limit to thought, or rather–not to thought, but to the expression of thoughts.”43 He adds that 
this must be done within language, for otherwise we imply that we can think both sides of the 
limit; which is not possible as beyond the limit of thought there is only nonsense. Thus, from 
the outset of the Tractatus Wittgenstein sets himself against accounts of content which 
assume direct access to a pre-conceptual given (classical empiricism). Wittgenstein wishes to 
break the grip of the picture which assumes we can move across a boundary from inside 
thought to that which is outside it. At the same time he is not denying that there is a world to 
which thought corresponds; only that it is an illusion to think that we can step outside thought 
to gain direct access to this world. But how are we to distinguish between thoughts which 
have content and those which are empty? We have seen how the theory of simple signs and 
objects provides Wittgenstein with a means of determining whether a thought has content; the 
problem is that it does so at the cost of forcing language into a logical straight-jacket.  
In his later works (as we argued in chapter one) Wittgenstein continues to be guided 
by the intention of developing a realistic philosophy which avoids empiricism without falling 
into idealism. He came to see that his mistake in the Tractatus was not in its realistic 
intentions, but in the logical requirements it lays down for language in its pursuit of these 
intentions. This is not because language has no logical requirements, but that there is no 
general set of requirements of the kind proposed in the Tractatus which hold for all uses of 
language. The mistake occurs at the beginning when we are misled by language into speaking 
of the boundary of what is thinkable. We are tempted to construct a general theory of the 
thinkable, rather than examining the various ways in which thoughts are bounded. In the 
preface to the Tractatus Wittgenstein famously states: “The whole sense of the book might be 
summed up in the following words: what can be said at all can be said clearly, and what we 
                                                 
43 Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, 3. “dem Denken eine Grenze ziehen, oder vielmehr – nicht dem Denken, 
sondern dem Ausdruck der Gedanken.” Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung. In Tractatus Logico-
Philosophicus, Werkausgabe Band 1, 9. 
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cannot talk about we must pass over in silence.”44 The logical requirements of the Tractatus 
aim to establish clarity, but this assumes that there is one general notion of clarity which is 
required in all contexts.45 It was precisely this requirement which Wittgenstein came later to 
reject in the Investigations; as the following passage demonstrates, in which he describes the 
conflict between the requirements we place on language and our actual linguistic practices: 
The more narrowly we examine actual language, the sharper becomes the conflict 
between it and our requirement. (For the crystalline purify of logic was, of course, not a 
result of investigation: it was a requirement.) The conflict becomes intolerable; the 
requirement is not in danger of becoming empty. –We have got on to slippery ice where 
there is no friction and so in a certain sense the conditions are ideal, but also, just 
because of that, we are unable to walk. We want to walk: so we need friction. Back to 
the rough ground!46 
 
The development of Wittgenstein’s later work can be seen as an attempt to return to the rough 
ground of our actual linguistic practices. This does not involve a complete rejection of the 
Tractatus: we have noted how he continued to distinguish between conceptual and empirical 
questions. In the next section we will trace how the principle of application is developed by 
Wittgenstein; such that the logico-syntactic account of the Tractatus turns to an examination 
and description of the various practices within which the application of concepts occurs. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
44 Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, 3. “Mann könnte den ganze Sinn des Buches etwa in die Worte fassen: Was 
sich überhaupt sagen läßt, läßt sich klar sagen; und wovon man nicht reden kann, darüber muß man schweigen.” 
Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung. In Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, Werkausgabe Band 1, 9. 
45 Josef Pieper makes this very criticism of the Tractatus’ search for clarity: See Pieper, In Defense of 
Philosophy : Classical Wisdom Stands up to Modern Challenges, 96. 
46 Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, §107. “Je genauer wir die tatsächliche Sprache betrachten, desto 
stärker wird der Widerstreit zwischen ihr und unsrer Forderung. (Die Kristalltreinheit der Logik hatte sich mir ja 
nicht ergeben; sondern sie war eine Forderung.) Der Widerstreit wird unerträglich; die Forderung droht nun, zu 
etwas Leerem zu werden. – Wir sind aufs Glatteis geraten, wo die Reibung fehlt, also die Bedingungen in 
gewissem Sinne ideal sind, aber wir eben deshalb auch nicht gehen können. Wir wollen gehen; dann brauchen 
wir die Reibung. Zurück den rauhen Boden!” Philosophische Untersuchungen. In Tractatus Logico-
Philosopicus, Ludwig Wittgenstein Werkausgabe Band 1, §107. 
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 Back to the Rough Ground: System, Language and Use 2.3
2.3.1 Grammar and the System of Propositions in Philosophical Remarks 
After his return to Cambridge in 1929, Wittgenstein, from February of that year until 
April 1930, wrote various manuscripts from which he produced a bulky typescript. He 
handed this typescript, entitled the Philosophische Bemerkungen (Philosophical Remarks), to 
Russell and it later came into the possession of G. E. Moore, who kept it until after 
Wittgenstein’s death.47 This work in many ways signals a transition from the Tractatus to the 
principles and concerns which are expressed in the Investigations. It is notable that 
application is a central theme throughout the text, and Wittgenstein loosens the grip of the 
logico-syntactic requirements of the Tractatus by turning to our actual use of language. To 
this end, the perspicuous overview of language provide by logic in the Tractatus is supplied 
by grammar in the Philosophical Remarks: “A proposition is completely logically analysed if 
its grammar is made completely clear: no matter what idiom it may be written or expressed 
in.”48 Wittgenstein’s turn to grammar has the objective of distinguishing the essential from 
the inessential in “our language.”49 He stresses that logic is not concerned with the 
requirements of an ideal language, but with actual language use.50 We saw how the logical 
requirements of the Tractatus involved positing simple signs with corresponding simple 
objects; one consequence of this is that elementary propositions must be logically 
independent of each other. By contrast, in the Philosophical Remarks Wittgenstein argues 
that it is systems of propositions which we use as rulers to lay against reality, as opposed to 
                                                 
47 Philosophical Remarks, trans. Raymond Hargreaves and Roger White (Oxford: Blackwell, 1975), 347. 
48 Ibid., §1. “Der Satz ist Vollkommen logishe analysiert, dessen Grammatik vollkommen klargelegt ist. Er mag 
in welcher Ausdrucksweise immer hingeschreiben oder ausgesprochen sein.” Philosophische Bemerkungen, 
Werkausgabe Band 2 (Sinzheim, Germany: Suhrkamp, 1984), §1. As the quotation here makes clear it is not so 
much that Wittgenstein is rejecting the objective of displaying the logic of language, but rather broadening his 
conception of the requirements of that logic. 
49 Philosophical Remarks, §1. “unserer Sprache” Philosophische Bemerkungen, Werkausgabe Band 2, §1. 
50 Philosophical Remarks, §1.  
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logically independent elementary propositions: “It isn't a proposition which I put against 
reality as a yardstick, it's a system of propositions.”51 
 Wittgenstein came to see that many kinds of statements, including colour statements, 
cannot be accounted for according to the theory of simple signs. We noted earlier how for 
any observational statement it is possible to come up with one of the same logical form which 
contradicts it. Whereas in the Tractatus this leads to the conclusion that colour statements are 
not elementary propositions, now Wittgenstein questions the requirements he earlier placed 
on elementary propositions: “This is how it is, what I said in the Tractatus doesn't exhaust the 
grammatical rules for ‘and’, ‘not’, ‘or’ etc.; there are rules for the truth functions which also 
deal with the elementary part of the proposition.” 52 In other words, the logical independence 
of the elementary propositions is not to be determined according to a pre-given theory of 
simple signs, but is to be described as it functions in actual systems of propositions. 
The requirements of an ideal language give way before our actual linguistic practices. 
For example, we will not find an underlying logical essence beneath our use of observational 
statements; rather their logical essence is given when we describe the system which uses such 
statements, which excludes ascribing different colours to the same object. In the following 
passage we see how Wittgenstein extends logical syntax to include the system wherein colour 
statements are determined: 
Syntax prohibits a construction such as ‘A is green and A is red’ (one's first feeling is 
that it's almost as if this proposition had been done an injustice; as though it had been 
cheated of its rights as a proposition), but for ‘A is green’, the proposition ‘A is red’ is 
not, so to speak, another proposition—and that strictly is what the syntax fixes—but 
another form of the same proposition. 
In this way syntax draws together the propositions that make one determination.53 
                                                 
51 Ibid., §82. “Ich lege nicht den Satze als Maßstab an die Wirklichkeit an, sondern das System von Sätzen.” 
Philosophische Bemerkungen, Werkausgabe Band 2, §82. 
52 Philosophical Remarks, §82. “Es ist so: Die grammatischen Regeln über ‘und’, ‘nicht’, ‘oder’etc. sind eben 
nicht damit erschöpft, was ich in der Abhandlung gesagt habe. Sondern es gibt Regeln über die 
Wahreitsfunktionen, die auch von dem elemenaren Teil des Satzes handeln.” Philosophische Bemerkungen, 
Werkausgabe Band 2, §82. 
53 Philosophical Remarks, §86. “Die Syntax verbietet eine Bildung wie ‘A ist grün und A ist rot’ (das erste 
Gefühl ist, als geschähe da mit diesem Satz ein Unrecht; als wäre er dadurch in den rechten des Satzes verkürzt), 
aber für ‘A ist grün’ ist der Satz ‘A ist rot’sozusagen kein anderer Satz – und das ist es eigentlich, was die 
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This extension of logical syntax enabled Wittgenstein to see that: “propositions turn out to be 
even more like yardsticks than I previously believed.”54 In the Tractatus he had argued that a 
picture is: “laid against reality like a measure” (2.1512).55 He was misled, however, in 
thinking that there is a general form of the proposition which constitutes a measure fixed by 
the requirements of logic. Now he came to see that there is no one underlying general 
proposition; rather, we establish measures by applying them to reality. It is in doing so that 
we exclude other measures, and not by any underlying requirement of logic: “The fact 
that one measurement is right automatically excludes all others.”56 The systems of 
propositions we lay against reality provide the measure of reality, not the requirements of 
logic. In the Tractatus, by ensuring that sense is determinate, simple names played an 
essential role in application. In his later works Wittgenstein changes his direction of enquiry 
from determining the requirements of logic to examining our actual linguistic practices. From 
this point onwards he will abandon the task of finding an underlying form of language, and 
focus upon the actual applications we make with language. Wittgenstein gives up the project 
of developing a general account of application in favour of seeing how particular types of 
application throw light on the question of application. One kind of application which will 
continue to fascinate him is that of colour concepts,57 but the two primary fields of 
application which will shape his later works are psychology and mathematics. These are both 
represented in the Philosophical Remarks, and the application of mathematical concepts is 
the dominant theme.  
                                                                                                                                                        
Syntax festhält -, sondern eine andere Form desselben Satzes. Die Syntax zieht dadurch die Sätze zusammen, 
die eine Bestimmung sind.” Philosophische Bemerkungen, Werkausgabe Band 2, §86. 
54 Philosophical Remarks, §82. “Die Sätze warden in diesem Fall noch ähnlicher Maßstäben, als ich früher 
gelaubt habe.” Philosophische Bemerkungen, Werkausgabe Band 2, §82. 
55 Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, 9. “2.1512 es ist wie ein Maßstab an die Wirklichkeit angelegt.” Logisch-
Philosophische Abhandlung. In Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, Werkausgabe Band 1, 15. 
56 Philosophical Remarks, §82. “Das Stimmen eines Maßes schließt automatisch alle anderen aus.” 
Philosophische Bemerkungen, Werkausgabe Band 2, §82. 
57 His post-1945 remarks on colour are collected in: Remarks on Colour, trans. Linda L. McAlister and 
Margarete Schättle, 1 vols. (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1977). 
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This focus upon the philosophy of mathematics reveals the influence of Frege and 
Russell, and at first sight would not appear to be a promising field for gaining insights into 
our actual use of language. In addition to the technical complexities involved in 
understanding mathematical concepts, it could be argued that if any field of human discourse 
approximates to an ideal language surely it is mathematics? But the identification of 
mathematics with an ideal language is the very thing which Wittgenstein seeks to challenge. 
Firstly, he wishes to demystify mathematics, to show that it does not consist in insights into a 
mysterious hidden realm accessible only to the initiated.58 If mathematics is technically 
demanding this is not due to the complexities of a mysterious underlying code which only the 
mathematician can crack, but due to the twist and turns that we invent. Secondly, he sets out 
to show that mathematics is not reducible to an underlying general form, but consists in the 
application of a multiplicity of systems of propositions:  
On the one hand it seems to me that you can develop arithmetic completely 
autonomously and its application takes care of itself, since wherever it's applicable we 
may also apply it. On the other hand a nebulous introduction of the concept of number 
by means of the general form of operation—such as I gave—can't be what's needed.59 
 
Rather than searching for an underlying general form which guarantees application 
Wittgenstein came to realize that “application takes care of itself.”60 The very fact that we do 
use language in a determinate manner shows that there is no need to posit the existence of 
simple names to avoid indeterminacy. 
                                                 
58 Wittgenstein argues that it is because we fail to command a clear view of what we are doing that mathematics 
seems mysterious to us: “I want to say: ‘We don't command a clear view of what we have done, and that is why 
it strikes us as mysterious.’” Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, II, §8. “Ich will sagen: ‘Wir haben 
keinen Überblick über das, was wir gemacht haben, und deshalb kommt es uns geheimnisvoll vor.”Bemerkung 
Über Die Grundlagen Der Mathematik, Ludwig Wittgenstein Werkausgabe Band 6, II, §8. 
59 Philosophical Remarks, §109. “Einerseits, kommt es mir vor, kann man die Arithmetik ganz selbstständig 
entwickeln und ihre Anwendung sorgt für sich selbst, denn wo immer sie anwendbar ist, dort darf man sie auch 
anwenden. Anderseits kann eine nebulose Einführung des Zahlbegriffes mit Hilfe einer allgemeinen 
Operationsform – wie ich es machte – nicht nötig sein.” Philosophische Bemerkungen, Werkausgabe Band 2, 
§109. 
60 Philosophical Remarks, §109. “Anwendung sorgt für sich selbst.” Philosophische Bemerkungen, 
Werkausgabe Band 2, §109. 
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In speaking here of the autonomy of arithmetic Wittgenstein could be mistaken as 
holding a purely formalist conception of mathematics. We noted earlier that Wittgenstein 
shares a good deal in common with formalists, but differs in his understanding of the 
application of mathematical concepts. Although he abandoned the account of application 
given in the Tractatus, application continued to be central to his account of mathematical 
concepts. More generally application remained central to his account of language, but he 
began to see that the words we use have many applications with a variety of purposes as wide 
as human life. In the Philosophical Remarks he illustrates this variety by introducing the idea 
that the words of language are like tools:  
Just as the handles in a control room are used to do a wide variety of things, so are the 
words of language that correspond to the handles. One is the handle of a crank and can 
be adjusted continuously; one belongs to a switch and is always either on or off; a third 
to a switch which permits three or more positions; a fourth is the handle of a pump and 
only works when it is being moved up and down, etc.; but all are handles, are worked 
by hand.61 
 
This analogy is one he will return to in his later writings,62 and is central to understanding the 
development of his notion of application: “A word only has meaning in the context of a 
proposition: that is like saying only in use is a rod a lever. Only the application makes it into 
a lever.”63 In the Philosophical Remarks Wittgenstein came to see that there can be no single 
account of application, such as that which he sought with the picture theory of meaning. In 
place of such a unitary account Wittgenstein turns to our actual use of words, and begins to 
observe how the words of language have a variety of roles: similar to the variety of handles in 
a control room. The outward similarity between words masks the very different roles they 
                                                 
61 Philosophical Remarks, §13. “Wie in einem Stellwerk mit Handgriffen die verschiedensten Dinge ausgeführt 
werden, so mit den Wörtern der Sprache, die Handgriffen entsprechen. Ein Handgriff ist der einer Kurbel und 
diese kann kontinuierlich verstellt werden; einer gehört zu einem Schalter und kann nur entweder umbelegt oder 
aufgestellt werden; ein dritter gehört zu eimem Schalter, der drei oder mehr Stellungen zuläßt; ein vierter ist der 
Handgriff einer Pumpe und wirkt nur, wenn er auf – und abbwegt wird, etc. : aber alle sind Handgriffe, werden 
mit der Hand angefaßt.” Philosophische Bemerkungen, Werkausgabe Band 2, §13. 
62 See Philosophical Investigations, §23. 
63 Philosophical Remarks, §14. “Ein Wort hat nu rim Satzverband Bedeutung: das ist, wie wenn man sagen 
würde, ein Stab ist erst im Gebrauch ein Hebel. Erst die Anwendung macht ihn zum Hebel.” Philosophische 
Bemerkungen, Werkausgabe Band 2, §14. 
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play in our language. Our task in philosophy is to gain a perspicuous view of this wide 
variety of uses, rather than to lay down logical requirements. There is still, however, a long 
way to go before we arrive at the developed philosophy of the Investigations, in which 
Wittgenstein shows how our use of words originates from our natural human reactions and 
practices. In the next section we will trace this development in Wittgenstein’s reflections 
upon the connections between application and human life.  
 
2.3.2 From Calculus to Game: Connecting Application with Life 
The change in approach signally by the Philosophical Remarks was continued and 
developed in a typescript which was probably completed in 1933, before being revised later 
that year and in early 1934. This typescript forms the most important source for the collection 
of Wittgenstein’s writings edited under the title Philosophical Grammar.64 This collection 
contains many passages also to be found in the Philosophical Remarks, the Philosophical 
Investigations and Zettel.65 Of particular relevance for the development of Wittgenstein’s 
notion of application is the analogy he draws between the application of language and the 
playing of games. This analogy developed via the idea that language consists in systems of 
propositions which operate like a calculus. Wittgenstein compares such a calculus to the rules 
of a game. Just as the rules of a game form the background against which the game is played, 
Wittgenstein argues that the calculus of language forms the background against which the 
sentences expressed in language gain meaning:  
The understanding of language, as of a game, seems like a background against which a 
particular sentence acquires meaning.—But this understanding, the knowledge of the 
language, isn't a conscious state that accompanies the sentences of the language. Not 
even if one of its consequences is such a state. It's much more like the understanding or 
mastery of a calculus, something like the ability to multiply.66 
                                                 
64 See Philosophical Grammar, trans. A. J. P. Kenny, 2 vols. (Oxford Eng.: Blackwell, 1974), 487. 
65 Ibid., 491. 
66 Ibid., §11. “Das Verständnis der Sprache, quasi des Spiels, scheint wie ein Hintergrund, auf dem der einzelne 
Satz erst Bedeutung gewinnt. – Aber dieses Verständnis, die Kenntnis der Sprache, ist nicht ein 
Bewußtseinszustand, der die Sätze der Sprache begleitet. Selbst wenn es einen sochen Zustand im Gefolge hätte. 
59 
 
The insistence that meaning is not given through states of consciousness is consistent with the 
anti-psychologism of the Tractatus, but also signals the development of Wittgenstein’s 
critique of theories of meaning which mistake a picture of the mental for the actual 
application of language. Just as it is a mistake to imagine that there is a general form for 
mathematical concepts, it is equally erroneous to imagine a general form for psychological 
concepts through which language acquires meaning. In both cases an ideal general form is 
mistaken for the actual application of concepts. The mistake arises from taking one particular 
concept, with its particular application, and generalizing it so that its application no longer 
has any bounds.  
This is the substance of Wittgenstein’s critique of Augustine’s theory of language 
acquisition, the earlier version of which is to be found in Philosophical Grammar. Here 
Wittgenstein argues that Augustine mistakes acts of naming for a general account of 
language: “When Augustine talks about the learning of language he talks about how we 
attach names to things, or understand the names of things. Naming here appears as the 
foundation, the be all and end all of language.”67 There is nothing wrong with naming, the 
problem arises when it replaces all other applications of language: “Augustine does describe 
a calculus of our language, only not everything that we call language is this calculus.”68 
Wittgenstein continues his criticism of Augustine in the following passage, where the game 
analogy is prominent: “It is as if someone were to say ‘a game consists in moving objects 
about on a surface according to certain rules...’ and we replied: You must be thinking of 
board games, and your description is indeed applicable to them. But they are not the only 
                                                                                                                                                        
Vielmehr ist es von der gleichen Art wie das Vestehen, Beherrschen eines Kalküls, also wie: multiplizieren 
können.” Philosophische Grammatik, Werkausgabe Band 4 (Sinzheim, Germany: Suhrkamp, 1984), §11. 
67 Philosophical Grammar, §19. “Augustinus, wenn er vom Lernen der Sprache redet, redet nur davon, wie wir 
den Dingen Namen beilegen, oder die Namen der Dinge verstehen.Das Benennen scheint hier das Fundament 
und Um und Auf der Sprache zu sein.” Philosophische Grammatik, Werkausgabe Band 4, §19. 
68 Philosophical Grammar, § 19. “Augustinus beschreibt einen Kalkül unserer Sprache, nur ist nicht alles, was 
wir Sprache nenne, dieser Kalkül.” Philosophische Grammatik, Werkausgabe Band 4, §19. 
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games.” 69 Many of the analogies used in the Investigations by Wittgenstein to help us see the 
multiplicity of applications present within language follow this passage. 
The game analogy signals the development of another idea which will run throughout 
Wittgenstein’s later works: family resemblance. Wittgenstein argues that there is no 
underlying essence which all games have in common; rather there are overlapping 
resemblances similar to the resemblances between members of a family. This follows on 
from his rejection of any attempt to find the general form of language and his stressing the 
multiplicity of application given in language. Furthermore, it is important to note how the 
game analogy placed pressure on Wittgenstein’s understanding of language as a calculus. 
This can be seen in the following passage, which is to be found in The Blue Book and in 
which Wittgenstein repudiates the notion that language is a calculus: 
In practice we very rarely use language as such a calculus. For not only do we not think 
of the rules of usage—of definitions, etc.—while using language, but when we are 
asked to give such rules, in most cases we aren't able to do so. We are unable clearly to 
circumscribe the concepts we use; not because we don't know their real definition, but 
because there is no real 'definition' to them. To suppose that there must be would be 
like supposing that whenever children play with a ball they play a game according to 
strict rules.70 
 
The game analogy is instrumental in this passage and it enables Wittgenstein to break free of 
the constricting notion that language is a calculus. It also points the way towards seeing how 
language is not primarily a set of rules which are subsequently applied to reality, but that the 
rules of grammar arise out of our natural human reaction to the world. 
The Blue Book originates from 1933-34, and thus shows that the move away from 
seeing language as a calculus in favour of the analogy with games happened during this 
period. This is not to say, however, that further work was not needed to bring out the 
implications of this change. In his preface to The Blue and Brown Books, Rush Rhees argues 
                                                 
69 Philosophical Grammar, §19. “Es ist so, als erklärte jemand: ‘spielen besteht darin, daß man Dinge, gewissen 
Regeln gemäß, auf ainer Fläche verschiebt....’ und wir ihm antworden: Du denkst da gewiß an die Brettspiele, 
und auf sie ist diene Beschreibung auch anwendbar. Aber das sind nicht die einzigen Spiele.” Philosophische 
Grammatik, Werkausgabe Band 4, §19. 
70 The Blue and Brown Books, 25. 
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that Wittgenstein’s thinking in regard to language games was not fully developed until the 
Investigations. Rhees identifies two significant features contributing to this development 
which can be found in The Brown Book, the text Wittgenstein at one time considered 
publishing, but which he gave up on (after a final revision of the German version in August, 
1936) prior to beginning work on the Investigation.71 Firstly, Rhees argues, it was not until 
The Brown Book that Wittgenstein came to see that learning a language game does not 
necessarily involve mastering concepts in such a manner that the competent language user is 
able to give an explanation of the meaning of those concepts. Rather, Rhees observes: “he 
[Wittgenstein] emphasizes that learning a language game is something prior to that. And what 
is needed is not explanation but training—comparable with the training you would give an 
animal.”72 Secondly, in The Brown Book Wittgenstein finally broke with the idea that the task 
of philosophy is the analysis of language. The Blue Book presents the idea that the purpose of 
philosophy is to uncover the primitive forms of language which underlie our more 
sophisticated language games, and from which those more sophisticated uses are built up: 
“We see we can build up the complicated forms from the primitive ones by gradually adding 
new forms.”73 Whereas in The Brown Book Wittgenstein asserts that he is: “not regarding the 
language games which we describe as incomplete parts of a language, but as languages 
complete in themselves.”74 The purpose of language games is not to provide an analysis of 
language into more primitive underlying forms, but to throw light on our actual linguistic 
practices. Wittgenstein moves away from the idea that there is some underlying mechanism 
of explanation, and helps us see that there can be no general account of language and 
understanding. 
                                                 
71 See ibid., v-vi. 
72 Ibid., vi. 
73 Ibid., vii. 
74 Ibid. 
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Although The Brown Book signalled the development of language games, and the end 
of characterizing philosophy as primarily linguistic analysis, Rhees argues that it failed to 
show why we are constantly tempted to look for an underlying essence for language. In 
chapter one, section 1.3.2 we argued that Wittgenstein’s concern in the Investigations is to 
help us overcome the temptations into which language leads us. This concern is present in 
The Brown Book, but what is lacking is any attempt to help us understand why these 
temptations arise. Rhees argues that in the Investigations Wittgenstein faces this question, 
and in doing so sheds light not just on: “various aspects of language,” but uses language 
games as, “stages in a discussion leading up to the big question of what language is (in par. 
65).” 75 This discussion will not result in a general theory of language, but in Wittgenstein 
helping us to see our actual linguistic practices. 
 
2.3.3 The Autonomy of Language and Two Types of Practice 
We have seen that Wittgenstein abandoned his search for the general form of the 
proposition, and thus any attempt to provide a general account of application. In the Tractatus 
the internal nature of the relationship between proposition and reality entailed a distinction 
between form and content, which was fixed for all applications by Wittgenstein’s theory of 
simple signs. After the Tractatus Wittgenstein never abandoned the idea that the relationship 
between proposition and reality is internal to the proposition; so much is evident from his 
assertion of the autonomy of grammar. In the game analogy he also points to the internal 
nature of the relationship between language and the world. The difference is that in 
abandoning the logico-syntactic requirements of the Tractatus Wittgenstein came to argue 
that language can take care of itself. The distinction between the form and content of a 
                                                 
75 Ibid., viii. 
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proposition is not given through a general theory, but by observing the particular contexts of 
application in which we use words.  
It is important to note, however, that Wittgenstein’s assertion of the autonomy of 
language does not entail that we are free to use whatever tool we desire for a given 
application; language is not autonomous in this sense. In the following passage from 
Philosophical Grammar Wittgenstein argues that the calculi which we adopt result from our 
natural reactions to the world: 
What counts as a reason for an assumption can be given a priori and determines a 
calculus, a system of transitions. But if we are asked now for a reason for the 
calculus itself, we see that there is none. 
So is the calculus something we adopt arbitrarily? No more so than the fear of fire, or 
the fear of a raging man coming at us.76  
 
Here it is essential to see that Wittgenstein in comparing reasons for adopting a calculus with 
natural reactions is seeking to rule out two misunderstandings of such reasons. The first 
misunderstanding is to give an empirical casual account of reasons. Wittgenstein rejects such 
accounts as they reduce all reasons to empirical generalizations: 
What does man think for? What use is it? Why does he calculate the thickness of the 
walls of a boiler and not leave it to chance or whim to decide? After all it is a mere fact 
of experience that boilers do not explode so often if made according to calculations. But 
just as having once been burnt he would do anything rather than put his hand into the 
fire, so he would do anything rather than not calculate for a boiler.”77  
 
My belief that fire will burn me is not based upon an inductive empirical argument, but is a 
natural reaction in the same way that my fear of fire is natural: 
What the thought of the uniformity of nature amounts to can perhaps be seen 
most clearly when we fear the event we expect. Nothing could induce me to put 
                                                 
76 Philosophical Grammar, §68. “Was als Grund einer Annahme gilt, kann von vorherein angegaben werden, 
und bestimmt einer Kalkül; ein System von Übergängen. Wird nun aber nach einem Grund dieses Kalküls 
gefragt, so sehen wir, daß er nicht vorhanden ist. Ist der Kalkül also willkürlich von uns angenomen? So wenig, 
wie die Furcht vor dem Feuer, oder einem wütenden Menschen, der sich uns nähert.” Philosophische 
Grammatik, Werkausgabe Band 4, §68. 
77 Philosophical Grammar, §67. “Wozu denkt der Mensch? Wozu ist es nütze? Warum berechnet er die 
Wandstärke eines Dampfkessels und läßt nicht den Zufall, oder die Laune, sie bestimmen? Es ist doch bloß 
Erfahrungstatsache, daß Kessel, die berechnet wurden, nicht so oft explodieren. Aber, wie er alles eher täte, als 
die Hand in Feuer strcken, das ihn früher gebrannt hat, so wird er alles eher tun, als den Kessel nicht 
berechnen.” Philosophische Grammatik, Werkausgabe Band 4, §67. 
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my hand into a flame—although after all it is only in the past that I have burnt 
myself. 
The belief that fire will burn me is of the same nature as the fear that it will burn 
me.”78 
 
The second misunderstanding is to make concepts unbounded by removing them from the 
contexts in which they have application. An example of this is the one with which we began 
this thesis in which Anscombe removed colour concepts from their context of application to 
provide an explanation of colour ascriptions. In the example given above the mistake would 
be to remove my belief that fire will burn me from the context of my everyday encounters 
with fire; giving an account of my concept of fire based upon my acquaintance with an 
abstract concept. 
In seeking to avoid these two misunderstandings we can see that Wittgenstein is again 
walking the tightrope between empiricism (causal accounts) and idealism (removing concepts 
from their context of application). In speaking of language as autonomous the danger of 
ignoring application and lapsing into idealism emerges. On the other hand a causal account of 
language collapses the distinction between the empirical and the conceptual. Wittgenstein’s 
solution to this impasse is to compare reasons with our fear of fire: both are natural reactions 
human beings have to the world. It is important to keep this in mind when interpreting 
remarks such as the following which stress the autonomy of language: “The connection 
between ‘language and reality’ is made by definitions of words, and these belong to grammar, 
so that language remains self-contained and autonomous.”79 In emphasising the autonomy of 
grammar here Wittgenstein is seeking to reinforce the distinction between the conceptual and 
the empirical made in the Tractatus. There is a significant development in his thought, 
                                                 
78 Philosophical Grammar, §67. “Was es mit dem Gedanken an die Gleichförmigkeit des Geschehens auf sich 
hat, wird vielleicht am larsten, wenn wir Furcht vor dem erwarteten Ereignis empfinden. Nichts könnte mich 
bewegen, meine Hand in die Flamme zu stecken, obwohl ich mich doch nur in der Vergangenheit verbrannt 
habe. Der Glaube, daß mich das Feuer brennen wird, ist von der natur der Furcht, daß es mich brennen wird.” 
Philosophische Grammatik, Werkausgabe Band 4, §67. 
79 Philosophical Grammar, §56. “Die Verbindung zwischen ‘Sprache und Wirklichkeit’ ist durch die 
Worterklärungen gemacht, - welche zur Sprachlehre gehören, so daß die Sprache in sich geschlossen, autom, 
bleibt.” Philosophische Grammatik, Werkausgabe Band 4, §56. 
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however, insofar as he sees that our concepts arise through our natural human reactions to the 
world: this will be the key to understanding the development of Wittgenstein’s notion of 
application. 
In speaking of the connection between natural human reactions and our developed 
linguistic practices we face two opposing dangers. On the one hand there is the risk of 
reducing linguistic practices to a pre-given natural measure, and of thus giving a purely 
pragmatic account of language.80 On the other hand, there is the challenge of maintaining the 
autonomy of language while avoiding the risk of removing concepts from their context of 
application (subliming grammar). The key to finding a path between these opposing dangers 
is to be found in the following remark taken from Philosophical Grammar, which compares 
the rules of grammar with the rules of cookery. This comparison has the purpose of helping 
us to see that language is a practice, but not a practice which is accountable to a reality 
external to it in the same manner as a particular practice such as cookery: 
Why don't I call cookery rules arbitrary, and why am I tempted to call the rules of 
grammar arbitrary? Because I think of the concept ‘cookery’ as defined by the end of 
cookery, and I don't think of the concept ‘language’ as defined by the end of language. 
You cook badly if you are guided in your cooking by rules other than the right ones; but 
if you follow other rules than those of chess you are playing another game; and if you 
follow grammatical rules other than such and such ones, that does not mean you say 
something wrong, no, you are speaking of something else.81 
 
If we add to this passage Wittgenstein’s rejection of his earlier understanding that language is 
a calculus, together with the extension of the game analogy which is found in The Blue and 
                                                 
80 Here in speaking about the pragmatic I am following Wittgenstein in bringing out the modern connotations 
according to which practice involves the most efficient means of brings about a given result. Josef Pieper 
provides a good overview of how the Thomistic notion of prudent practice differs from this: see Josef Pieper, 
The Four Cardinal Virtues: Prudence, Justice, Fortitude, Temperance, 1st ed. (New York,: Harcourt, 1965). It 
is arguable that Wittgenstein’s notion of a language game has been influential in helping to recover something 
of the lost richness of the ancient and mediaeval understandings of practice.  
81 Wittgenstein, Philosophical Grammar, §133. “Warum nenne ich die Regeln des Kochens nicht willkürlich; 
und warum bin ich versucht, die Regeln der Grammatik willkürlich zu nennen? Weil ich den Begriff ‘Kochen’ 
durch den Zweck des Kochens definiert denke, dagegen den Begriff ‘Sprache’ nicht durch den Zweck der 
Sprache. Wer sich bei Kochen nach andern als den richtigen Regeln richtet kocht schlecht; aber wer sich nach 
andern Regeln als denen des Schach richtet, spielt ein anderes Spiel; und wer sich nah andern grammatischen 
Regeln richtet, als etwa den üblichen, spricht darum nichts Falsches, sondern von etwas Anderem.” 
Philosophische Grammatik, Werkausgabe Band 4, §133. 
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Brown Books, we can see how in his later writings Wittgenstein came to distinguish between 
two types of practice. The first type of practice is given its goals by something external to it. 
The second type of practice is one which is not defined according to an external goal, but the 
point of which is given within itself. It is important, however, not to read this distinction as 
one which is hard and fast. To do so is again to assume that there is an external perspective 
from which we can survey all our practices and distinguish them into externally answerable 
and internally defined. A distinction is once again being made prior to examining the actual 
practices. Cookery may be judged by its results, but the practice of cooking transforms our 
expectations of those results. On the other hand playing chess makes sense within the context 
of a wider set of human practices and consideration; if these were to change then we may no 
longer be able to see what the point of playing chess is. Chess makes sense in a world where 
competition between two individuals in a test of intelligence and skill is part of our way of 
living. In a world where such contests did not happen, or were even looked upon as 
abhorrent, then chess would no longer make sense. 
We will see that Wittgenstein in his later works (particularly the post Investigations 
writings) will battle the temptation on the one hand to reduce human practice to an external 
given standard; while on the other hand avoiding the temptation to speak of language games 
as completely self-contained, lacking connection to the rest of our lives. Again the task of not 
falling into idealism while avoiding empiricism will be central to Wittgenstein’s 
philosophical research. The remarks in the Tractatus concerning the internal nature of 
representation find their counterpart in that which is internal to a practice; and although 
Wittgenstein abandoned the Tractatus solution to the question of application it remained 
central to his concerns. 
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2.3.4 The Application of Mathematical Concepts: Finding Friction 
Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics is the edited selection of Wittgenstein’s 
writings on the philosophy of mathematics from “the period September 1937-April 1944.”82 
These writings date from the after The Brown Book when Wittgenstein was working on the 
Investigations, and thus provide valuable insights into the development of Wittgenstein’s 
thought leading up to the completion of the text for Part I of the Investigations.83 In chapter 
one, section 1.3.1 we saw how in the Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics 
Wittgenstein draws our attention to the wider context of interpretation within which proof of 
mathematical propositions takes place. This emphasis on the wider context of interpretation, 
together with Wittgenstein’s assertion that the application of a mathematical concept is rooted 
in non-mathematical human practice, provides the basis for understanding his remarks 
concerning meaning as use. There is a temptation to present Wittgenstein’s remarks on 
meaning as use as a general theory of meaning, but it is better understood as the development 
of the various insights we have been tracing through which Wittgenstein investigates the 
nature of application.  
The question of application remains a central concern in the Remarks on the 
Foundation of Mathematics. In the following passage Wittgenstein argues that we do not 
understand a mathematical proposition unless we can apply it: 
Everything that I say really amounts to this, that one can know a proof thoroughly and 
follow it step by step, and yet at the same time not understand what it was that was 
proved. 
And this in turn is connected with the fact that one can form a mathematical 
proposition in a grammatically correct way without understanding its meaning. 
Now when does one understand it?—I believe: when one can apply it. 
It might perhaps be said: when one has a clear picture of its application. For this, 
however, it is not enough to connect a clear picture with it. It would rather have been 
better to say: when one commands a clear view of its application. And even that is bad, 
                                                 
82 Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, 29.  
83 As mentioned above, Wittgenstein originally intended to include some of this material on the philosophy of 
mathematics in the Investigations. Part I of the Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics is formed on the 
basis of an edited selection of remarks taken from a typescript which originally was intended to be the second 
half of the Investigations.  
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for the matter is simply one of not imagining that the application is where it is not; of 
not being deceived by the verbal form of the proposition.84 
 
One of Wittgenstein’s prime targets here is Russell’s attempt to reduce mathematical 
propositions to logical propositions. We have seen how Wittgenstein rejected the Tractatus 
account of application on the grounds that there can be no such general account; rather, 
application is given within the various language games we play. The clear view which 
Wittgenstein seeks does not involve looking beneath or beyond our linguistic practices in 
order to discover the crystalline logic they are founded upon. The clarity Wittgenstein seeks 
is one by which we avoid: “being deceived by the verbal form of the proposition.”85 We aim 
at clarity, but that is not to say that what we come to see must conform to some pre-given 
standard of clarity. The temptation to avoid is that of reducing the actual application of 
concepts to simple underlying forms: “I should like to say: mathematics is a MOTLEY of 
techniques of proof.—And upon this is based its manifold applicability and its importance.”86 
Mathematics is not an ideal language, but a range of techniques which find application in our 
lives. 
The breakthrough which according to Rhees occurs in the Investigations, whereby 
Wittgenstein not only shows that we have a tendency to be misled by grammar, but also why 
we are liable to be deceived, is also present in the Remarks on the Foundations of 
Mathematics. We are tempted to reduce the motley of our actual human practices to simple 
                                                 
84 Wittgenstein, Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, V, §25. “Alles was ich sage, kommt eigentlich 
darauf hinaus, daß man einen Bewies genau kennen und ihm Schritt für Schritt folgen kann, und dabei doch, 
was bewiesen wurde, nicht versteht. Und das hängt wieder damit zusammen, daß man einen mathematischen 
Satz grammatisch richtig bilden kann ohne seinen Sinn zu verstehen. Wenn versteht man ihm nun? – Ich glaube: 
wenn man ihn anwenden kann. Man könnte vielleicht sagen: wenn man ein Klares Bild von seiner Anwendung 
hat. Dazu aber genügt es nicht, daß man ein klares Bild mit ihm verbindet. Vielmehr wäre besser gewessen, zu 
sagen: wenn man eine klare Übersicht von seiner Anwendung hat. Und auch das ist sclecht, denn es handelt sich 
nur darum, daß man die Anwendung nicht dort vermutet, wo sie nicht ist; daß man sich von der Wortform des 
Satzes nicht täuschen läßt.” Bemerkung Über Die Grundlagen Der Mathematik, Ludwig Wittgenstein 
Werkausgabe Band 6, V 25. 
85 Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, V, §25. “daß man sich von der Wortform des Satzes nicht 
täuschen läßt.” Bemerkung Über Die Grundlagen Der Mathematik, Ludwig Wittgenstein Werkausgabe Band 6, 
V, §25. 
86 Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, III, §46. “Ich möchte sagen: Die Mathematik ist ein BUNTES 
Gemisch von Beweistechniken. – Und darauf berauf ihre mannigfache Anwendbarkeit und ihre Wichtigkeit.” 
Bemerkung Über Die Grundlagen Der Mathematik, Ludwig Wittgenstein Werkausgabe Band 6, III, §46. 
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underlying forms, because we desire to grasp the essence of things. Rather than carrying out 
the patient and piecemeal work of assembling reminders which enable us to gain a clear view 
of the applications we make of our concepts, we are seduced by the promise of a one-step 
solution which brings assurance and control in the midst of the motley of language. In the 
Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics Wittgenstein constantly challenges us to look at 
the actual practices within with we apply mathematical concepts, and thus to avoid reducing 
them to a frictionless logic. On the other hand he constantly draws distinctions between 
mathematical and empirical concepts. Mathematical concepts are not derived from 
experience; rather in their application they provide a measure for experience: “‘Calculating, if 
it is to be practical, must be grounded in empirical facts.’—Why should it not rather 
determine what empirical facts are?”87 
By walking the line between idealism and empiricism in the Remarks on the 
Foundations of Mathematics Wittgenstein returns us to the natural human practices within 
which the application of concepts takes place. These natural practices are the basis of the 
contexts within which interpretation can occur. As we have seen in our examination of The 
Brown Book, application involves training and thus recalls us to our pre-conceptual nature, to 
the boundary between our linguistic and pre-linguistic nature. Wittgenstein constantly probes 
the question of our origin as linguistic creatures. Here again lies the danger of either falling 
into idealism by producing an account of training which presents application as already given 
(this is the fault Wittgenstein finds in Augustine’s picture of language acquisition), or the 
error of mistaking empirical generalizations for application. The first mistake is to begin on 
the linguistic side of the boundary and present the person being trained as already possessing 
those concepts they are being trained to acquire. The second mistake is to start on the pre-
linguistic side of the boundary and to attempt to build our concepts out of empirical 
                                                 
87 Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, VII, §8. “‘Das Rechnen um praktish sein zu können, muß auf 
empirischen Tatsachen beruhen.’ - Warum soll es nicht lieber bestimmen, was empirische Tatsachen sind?” 
Bemerkung Über Die Grundlagen Der Mathematik, Ludwig Wittgenstein Werkausgabe Band 6, VII, §8. 
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propositions. The question of human nature is tied up with this boundary (a sign using 
animal). In chapter four we will follow Mulhall’s reading of the Investigations in which he 
argues that it is a work about origins; and particularly about our origins as linguistic 
creatures. 
For our present purposes it is important to draw attention to two themes which we 
find in the Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics and which become central to 
Wittgenstein’s thought as it develops in the 1940’s: following a rule, and ‘seeing as’. These 
two themes provide a bridge to the discussion of language and grammar Wittgenstein carries 
out in the Investigations. More specifically, these themes help us examine the boundary 
between the conceptual and the pre-conceptual, since both following a rule and ‘seeing as’ 
are rooted in our pre-conceptual practices and reactions, and yet essentially involve the 
application of concepts. 
 
2.3.5 Following a Rule, Training and Our Natural Reactions 
We have seen that throughout the development of his later works Wittgenstein is 
concerned with the application of concepts. Central to this topic is an investigations of the 
rules according to which applications are governed. These are not rules which merely 
describe the application, but are rules which determine application. The distinction between 
these two kinds of rule is brought out in the following passage from The Blue Book, in which 
Wittgenstein also makes a connection between rules and teaching:  
The teaching may have supplied us with a rule which is itself involved in the processes 
of understanding, obeying, etc.; “involved”, however, meaning that the expression of 
this rule forms part of these processes. 
We must distinguish between what one might call “a process being in accordance with 
a rule”, and, “a process involving a rule” (in the above sense).88 
 
                                                 
88 The Blue and Brown Books, 12-13. 
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Wittgenstein makes this distinction in the context of distinguishing between two types of 
teaching: teaching a drill and teaching a rule (as in the above case). Whereas teaching a rule 
involves the ability to apply concepts according to the rule, teaching a drill sets up causal 
connections through which words are applied in a regular pattern: “The drill of teaching 
could in this case be said to have built up a psychical mechanism. This, however, would only 
be a hypothesis or else a metaphor. We could compare teaching with installing an electric 
connection between a switch and a bulb.”89 Wittgenstein argues that it is conceivable for a 
person to undergo this mechanical type of training such: “that all the processes of 
understanding, obeying, etc., should have happened without the person ever having been 
taught the language. (This, just now, seems extremely paradoxical.)”90 
The contrast between teaching by drill and teaching by a rule brings out the difference 
between empiricist accounts of concept acquisition and the kind of account Wittgenstein is 
seeking to develop through his remarks on following a rule. It remains at the heart of his 
understanding of following a rule as this develops in his later works, and can be seen as 
central to his aim of realism without empiricism. Furthermore, the example of rule following 
given after these remarks in The Blue Book involves being taught to square cardinal numbers, 
and as such is typical of the kind of example Wittgenstein will return to in his later 
discussions. This use of mathematical examples helps to break the temptation of falling into 
empiricist accounts of concept formation, because mathematics is an area in which the 
autonomy of language is more clearly seen. In mathematics, however, the opposing 
temptation towards idealism is strong, and the development of Wittgenstein’s account of 
following a rule is also central to his overcoming this temptation. 
In The Brown Book Wittgenstein develops his account of following a rule, and many 
of the examples of rule following given in the Investigations are also to be found here. There 
                                                 
89 Ibid., 12. 
90 Ibid. 
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are two developments which are of particular relevance for the relationship between the 
conceptual and the pre-conceptual, and which thus cast light on the question of how to 
provide a realist account of concept formation. The first development is Wittgenstein’s 
argument that the acquisition of concepts requires training. The training he has in mind here 
is not reducible to one particular technique, such as the use of drills, but draws on the natural 
reaction of the learner, to encourage the learner to develop the application of the concept 
taught. In the following passage Wittgenstein compares the reaction of a pupil who is 
encouraged to develop the use of a table of figures (e.g. one in which signs are written 
opposite pictures of various objects), to the reactions of cats and dogs who are encouraged to 
retrieve: 
The pupil will now be encouraged to make use of the new picture and word without the 
special training which we gave him when we taught him to use the first table. These 
acts of encouragement will be of various kinds, and many such acts will only be 
possible if the pupil responds, and responds in a particular way. Imagine the gestures, 
sounds, etc., of encouragement you use when you teach a dog to retrieve. Imagine on 
the other hand, that you tried to teach a cat to retrieve. As the cat will not respond to 
your encouragement, most of the acts of encouragement which you performed when 
you trained the dog are here out of the question.91 
 
It is because human beings have a particular nature that we react naturally to encouragement 
and can be trained in particular ways, and thus that the acquisition and use of concepts is 
possible. From the above example it may appear that this kind of training is relevant only for 
the extension of concepts, not for their initial acquisition. The “special training” that 
Wittgenstein refers to when the pupil first learnt to use the table is not, however, of a purely 
mechanical kind. What he wants us to see is that even the most basic of human reactions lose 
their sense when we image them as causally explained. In order to help us see that at the most 
primitive level our human reactions are rule governed he develops the primitive language 
games which we find repeated in the Investigations; drawing our attention to primitive human 
practices in his discussion of rule following, such as the rules for following an arrow: 
                                                 
91 Ibid., 89. 
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How does one explain to a man how he should carry out the order, “Go this way!” 
(pointing with an arrow the way he should go)? Couldn't this mean going the direction 
which we should call the opposite of that of the arrow? Isn't every explanation of how 
he should follow the arrow in the position of another arrow? What would you say to 
this explanation: A man says, “If I point this way (pointing with his right hand) I mean 
you to go like this” (pointing with his left hand the same way)? This just shows you the 
extremes between which the uses of signs vary.92 
 
The point Wittgenstein makes is that training someone to follow an arrow relies on the person 
reacting as we expect them to react; without such reactions even the most basic of human 
practices can be interpreted in various ways. An account of this training which characterizes 
it as purely mechanical cannot explain why we react naturally as we do in following arrows. 
Of course we can create machines which follow arrows, but that assumes there is an inventor 
who already understands these conventions and has learnt them.93 
 The discussion of rule following in the Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics 
is found predominantly in books VI and VII, which dates them from 1941-1944. These 
remarks develop the discussion of rule following and training begun in The Brown Book and 
stress that the natural reactions which allow human beings to be trained take place within a 
wider context of life: “But this is important, namely that this reaction, which is our guarantee 
of understanding, presupposes as a surrounding particular circumstances, particular forms of 
life and speech. (As there is no such thing as a facial expression without a face.)”94 Here 
Wittgenstein uses the phrase ‘forms of life’, a notion which will be influential on 
interpretation of the later Wittgenstein, but which he used sparingly.95 The Remarks on the 
                                                 
92 Ibid., 97. The corresponding passage in the Investigations makes things more explicit: “The arrow points only 
in the application that a living being makes of it.” Philosophical Investigations, §454. “Der Pfeil zeigt nur in der 
Anwendung, die das Lebewesen von ihm macht.” Philosophische Untersuchungen. In Tractatus Logico-
Philosopicus, Ludwig Wittgenstein Werkausgabe Band 1, §454. 
93 We end up in a regress if we then imagine an inventor of the inventor etc. Somewhere interpretation has to 
come to an end. 
94 Wittgenstein, Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, VII, §47. “Das aber ist wichtig, daß diese 
Reaction, die uns das Verständnis verbürgt, bestimmte Umstande, bestimmte Lebens- und Sprachformen als 
Umgebung, voraussetzt. (Wie es keinen Gesichtsausdruck gibt ohne Gesicht).” Bemerkung Über Die 
Grundlagen Der Mathematik, Ludwig Wittgenstein Werkausgabe Band 6, VII, §47. 
95 Graham notes that: “In the whole of the Philosophical Investigations the expression appears only five times.” 
Graham, Wittgenstein and Natural Religion, 42. Of course, as Graham adds, a lack of frequency does not in 
itself entail that an expression is not central to a text.  
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Foundations of Mathematics draw out two important implications for Wittgenstein’s account 
of following a rule. Firstly, when we seek to explain how we learn to use a rule there is the 
temptation to look for an explanation beyond our training: 
To what extent can the function of a rule be described? Someone who is master of 
none, I can only train. But how can I explain the nature of a rule to myself? 
The difficult thing here is not, to dig down to the ground; no, it is to recognize the 
ground that lies before us as the ground. 
For the ground keeps on giving us the illusory image of a greater depth, and when we 
seek to reach this, we keep on finding ourselves on the old level. 
 
Our disease is one of wanting to explain.96 
 
This develops the argument found in The Brown Book that interpretation is grounded in prior 
primitive human reactions. Now Wittgenstein brings out the implication that the search for 
explanations beyond our ordinary human practices is the illness characteristic of philosophy, 
and in so doing he uses the analogy of reaching ground: an analogy which he develops in his 
later works.97 
The second and related implication which Wittgenstein brings out concerning 
following a rule is that such practices require agreement not only in definitions, but also in 
judgements: 
We say that, in order to communicate, people must agree with one another about the 
meanings of words. But the criterion for this agreement is not just agreement with 
reference to definitions, e.g., ostensive definitions—but also an agreement in 
judgements. It is essential for communication that we agree in a large number of 
judgements.”98 
 
                                                 
96 Wittgenstein, Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, VI, §31. “Wie kann man die Funktion der Regel 
beschreiben? Wer noch keine beherrsht, den kann ich nur abrichten. Aber wie noch keine beherrscht, den kann 
ich nur abrichten. Aber wie kann ich mir selbst das Wesen der Regel erklären? Das Schwere ist hier, nicht bis 
auf den Grund zu graben, sondern sen Grund, der vor uns lieght, als Grund zu erkenne. Denn der Grund spiegelt 
uns immer wieder eine größere Tiefe vor, und wennwir diese zu suchen, finden wir uns immer wieder auf dem 
alten Niveau. Unsere Krankheit ist die, erklären zu wollen.” Bemerkung Über Die Grundlagen Der Mathematik, 
Ludwig Wittgenstein Werkausgabe Band 6, VI, §31. 
97 We find this notion as early as The Blue Book in a passage which asks why someone’s holding their cheek is 
seen as a sign that the person has toothache: “here we strike rock bottom, that is we have come down to 
conventions.” The Blue and Brown Books, 24. 
98 Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, VI, §39. “Wir sagen, die Mechshen, um sich miteinander zu 
verständigen, musten über die Bedeutungen der Wörter mit einander ubereinstimmen. Aber das Kriterium für 
diese Übereinstimmung ist nicht nur eine Übereinstimmung in Bezug auf Definitionen, z.B. hinweisende 
Definitionem, - sondern auch eine Übereinstimmung in Urteilen.” Bemerkung Über Die Grundlagen Der 
Mathematik, Ludwig Wittgenstein Werkausgabe Band 6, VI, §39. 
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This agreement in judgements is something basic and given in human life, without which 
human life would not be possible. The various language games which use examples of tribes 
differing in key respects to ourselves developed by Wittgenstein in the Remarks on the 
Foundations of Mathematics have the purpose of helping us to see how our lives depend 
upon agreement in judgements. Such agreements do not occur on the level of opinion or 
conviction, but are prior to these: “The agreement of humans that is a presupposition of logic 
is not an agreement in opinions, much less in opinions on questions of logic.”99 They are the 
development of our natural reactions, which takes place in the wider context of our lives, and 
which forms the ground of our understanding. For Wittgenstein this development is the 
natural history of human beings, and he thus concludes: “that logic belongs to the natural 
history of man.”100 
Wittgenstein in developing his concept of application moves from the hard demands 
of logic present in the Tractatus to the contingencies of our natural human history. Does this 
imply that logic is itself contingent, that the hard crystalline purity of the Tractatus gives way 
to the shifting sands of human history? To the challenge that placing logic in the context of 
natural human history: “is not combinable with the hardness of the logical ‘must,’” 
Wittgenstein responds by simply pointing out that the propositions of logic are “not 
propositions of human natural history.” 101 Once again Wittgenstein draws the distinction 
between the grammatical and the empirical. The rules of grammar are part of the natural 
history of humanity, but this does not entail that they themselves are empirical rules, any 
                                                 
99 Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, VI, §49. “Die Übereinstimmung der Menschen, die eine 
Voraussetzung des Phänomens der Logik ist, ist nicht ein Übereinstimmung der Meinungen, gescheige denn 
Meinungen über die Fragen der Logik.” Bemerkung Über Die Grundlagen Der Mathematik, Ludwig 
Wittgenstein Werkausgabe Band 6, VI, §49. 
100 Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, VI, §49. By the natural history of human beings Wittgenstein 
has in mind the story of how we come to develop the complex linguistic practices which characterize human 
life. “Logik zur Naturgeschichte des Menschen gehort.” Bemerkung Über Die Grundlagen Der Mathematik, 
Ludwig Wittgenstein Werkausgabe Band 6, VI, §49. 
101 Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, VI, §49. “Und daß ist ncht vereinbar mit der Härte des 
logischen ‘muß’. Aber das logische ‘muß’ ist ein Bestandteil der Sätze der Logik and diese sind nicht Sätze der 
menschlichen Naturgeschichte.” Bemerkung Über Die Grundlagen Der Mathematik, Ludwig Wittgenstein 
Werkausgabe Band 6, VI, §49. 
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more than the fact that the rules of chess where historically invented entails that chess is 
governed by empirical rules. Earlier we saw how Wittgenstein observes that changes in the 
rules of chess entail that the game we are playing is no longer chess, now he extends this 
argument to logic in general: “If what a proposition of logic said was: Human beings agree 
with one another in such and such ways (and that would be the form of the natural-historical 
proposition), then its contradictory would say that there is here a lack of agreement. Not, that 
there is an agreement of another kind.”102 Logic governs our practices, and thus what is to 
count as agreement is determined by logic. A change in logic brings about a change in what 
counts as agreement and is as such not a move within the game (to use the analogy with 
chess), but a change of game. 
Wittgenstein’s description of logic as part of the natural history of human beings can 
be more clearly understood if we return to the analogy we looked at earlier between the use 
of words in language and the use of tools. Let us take for example the development of 
hammers. Think of the huge variety and complexity of historical circumstances which came 
together for the development of hammers: the fact that human beings are able to manipulate 
tools, the shaping and use of various materials, the development of forms of human life 
which require the use of tools such as hammers. We can continue with this list, but no matter 
how extensive we make the list it does not explain what a hammer is. Of course it all throws 
light on this question, but to understand what a hammer is we need to know how hammers are 
used in human life. Similarly, a book on the history of the development of chess can throw 
light on what chess is, but it is only by learning how to play chess that we understand what it 
is.  
                                                 
102 Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, VI, §49. “Sagte ein Satz der Logik: die Menschen stimmen in 
der Weise miteinander überein (und das ware die Form des naturgeschichtlichen Satzes), dann sagte sein 
Gegenteil, es bestehe hier ein Mangel an Übereinstimmung. Nicht, es bestehe eine Übereinstimmung anderer 
Art.” Bemerkung Über Die Grundlagen Der Mathematik, Ludwig Wittgenstein Werkausgabe Band 6, VI, §49. 
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Earlier we saw how Wittgenstein contrasts practices which are defined by an external 
goal from those which contain their own application. The two examples we have chosen to 
illustrate how language is shaped within natural human history demonstrate this contrast: 
whereas a hammer is shaped to fulfil an externally given goal, the rules of chess are not 
answerable in this sense to an external goal. However, it is important, as we argued earlier, 
not to overstate this contrast. A hammer may be shaped for a particular purpose or set of 
purposes, but in being so shaped it makes possible new techniques and ways of shaping the 
world. This is why the historical account cannot explain what a hammer is. On the other 
hand, although the rules of chess are autonomous to a degree that the use of a hammer is not, 
they were shaped by the history of human beings. 
Earlier we noted how in the Philosophical Remarks Wittgenstein denies that the 
adoption of calculus is any more arbitrary than our reaction to fire. Now we can add that 
although logic is part of the natural history of human beings this does not entail that it is any 
more arbitrary than our other natural human reactions. Our conceptual abilities are grounded 
in our pre-conceptual human capabilities and develop from them in our natural history. The 
purpose of the various language games Wittgenstein develops in his later works is not so 
much to convince us of the arbitrary nature of our concepts, but to help us see what is 
essential to human life. Once the grip of the logical ideal is loosened, and we turn our 
attention to the actual application of concepts, we begin to see something of the human nature 
in response to which concepts are shaped and applied. Which of our human capabilities and 
reactions are essential, such that without them we would no longer be living a life which is 
recognizably human?103 Wittgenstein, as we would expect, offers no general theory of what is 
essential to human beings; rather he presents us with a series of examples to help us see what 
is essential: 
                                                 
103 Here it is important to see that this is not a question of whether a particular human being lacking such 
capacities is human or not, but of what is characteristic of human life.  
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Can you imagine having absolute pitch, if you don't have it? Can you imagine it, if you 
do?—Can a blind man imagine the seeing of red? Can I imagine it? Can I imagine 
spontaneously reacting in such-and-such a way if I don't do so? Can I imagine it better, 
if I do do so? 
 
But can I play the language-game, if I don't react in this way?104 
 
If our natural human capacities and reactions are lacking then there are aspects of the world 
to which we are blind to, like the person without perfect pitch who cannot inhabit the world 
of sound available to those with perfect pitch. For Wittgenstein our ability to see aspects of 
the world is not merely added on to our conceptual capacities, but is essential for the 
acquisition and use of concepts. This brings us to the second theme developed in the later 
works which helps us to understand the relationship between the conceptual and the pre-
conceptual: the phenomenon of ‘seeing as’. This is a central theme in his post-1945 writings, 
and by making us aware of the pre-conceptual human capacities and reactions upon the basis 
of which following a rule is made possible, it helps us to overcome any lingering temptation 
to reduce rule following to a mechanical process, or to detach rules from their contexts of 
application. 
 
2.3.6 ‘Seeing As’: The History of our Human Nature 
An early discussion of ‘seeing as’ is found in The Brown Book in a section in which 
Wittgenstein, in the course of a discussion on the nature of recognizing and familiarity, 
investigates what it is to see a picture in a particular way or to read a sentence in a particular 
manner. He uses the example of a line drawing of a face, and urges us: “Let this face produce 
an impression on you. You may then feel inclined to say: ‘Surely I don’t see mere dashes. I 
                                                 
104 Wittgenstein, Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, VII, §55. “Kannst du dir absolutes Gehör 
vorstellen, wenn du es nicht hast? Kannst du es vorstellen, wenn du es hast? – Kan ein Blinder sich das Sehen 
von rot vorstellen? Kann ich mir es vorstellen? Kann ich mir vorstellen, daß ich so und so spontan reagiere, 
wenn ich’s tue? Kann ich mir’s besser vorstellen, wenn ich’s tue? Kann ich aber das Sprachspiel spielen, wenn 
ich nicht so reagiere?” Bemerkung Über Die Grundlagen Der Mathematik, Ludwig Wittgenstein Werkausgabe 
Band 6, VII, §55. 
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see a face with a particular expression’.”105 When we see the line drawing of a face as having 
a particular kind of expression (e.g. sad or happy etc.), we do not first see a series of lines 
which we subsequently interpret as a face with a particular expression; as if we could detach 
the sad expression from the face and compare it with a paradigm sad expression. The 
expression is not something which can be removed from the face and replaced with another. 
Similarly, when we read a sentence as having a particular meaning, we do not first grasp the 
basic meaning of the sentence and add to it a particular interpretation. Here Wittgenstein 
draws a comparison between understanding a sentence and grasping a musical theme. There 
is a temptation to imagine the grasp of a musical theme as involving an interpretation which 
can be detached from the theme and compared to a paradigm: “the idea suggests itself that 
there must be a paradigm.”106 Whereas it is in actually playing the theme with that particular 
expression that we grasp it, not by a subsequent act of interpretation. Wittgenstein next 
returns to the theme of recognizing and familiarity to argue that the experience of reading is 
not one in which a subsequent interpretation (our familiar reading of the text) is added to a 
basic account of understanding. Rather, “an experience of an intimate character”107 is 
essential to our reading of the text, just as seeing a line face as happy or sad is essential to 
how we see that face. 
We have seen how in The Brown Book Wittgenstein draws our attention to the 
training which is required in learning the use of words. There is a danger, as noted above, that 
such training will be misunderstood to involve purely mechanical drills. Against this danger 
Wittgenstein concludes that following a rule is founded upon our human capacities and 
reaction. Now we can add that his discussion of ‘seeing as’ helps us to see that these human 
capacities and reactions are as familiar and subtle as the whole lived experience of our lives. 
They are what enable us to inhabit our familiar human world. Wittgenstein continues the 
                                                 
105 The Blue and Brown Books, 163. 
106 Ibid., 166. 
107 Ibid., 167. 
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discussion of ‘seeing as’ in The Brown Book by returning to a theme familiar from the 
Tractatus: “‘the relation of name and object.’”108 Here he repeats the point made in the 
Tractatus that this is not a purely external relationship, but adds: “it is clear that there is no 
one relation of name to object, but as many as there are uses of sounds or scribbles which we 
call names.”109 Continuity with the Tractatus is seen here, but also Wittgenstein’s criticism of 
his earlier work. There is no one general account of the relationship between names and 
objects, the multitude of uses we make of names cannot be reduced to any general theory; 
rather, we must examine the familiar and subtle uses we make of names, through which we 
come to see the world in the richness of its various aspects. 
This discussion of the name-object relationship comes in the midst of Wittgenstein’s 
examination of examples in which the same thing (e.g. the famous example of duck-rabbit 
found in the Investigations) is seen under two aspects. The use of such examples enables 
Wittgenstein to draw attention to the subtlety of the phenomenon of ‘seeing as’: to show us 
that all seeing involves the drawing of fine distinctions. This finesse extends even to the use 
of mathematical and logical propositions. In the Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics 
Wittgenstein argues that the application of a mathematical or logical proposition involves 
seeing the world according to a particular aspect: “It is true enough that I changed the aspect 
of the logical calculation by introducing the concept of the number of negations [e.g. ~ 10p]: 
‘I never looked at it like that’—one might say. But this alteration only becomes important 
when it connects with the application of the sign.”110 Here Wittgenstein draws out the other 
side of the relationship between seeing aspects and application. The application of concepts 
requires making fine distinctions, but the drawing of aspects makes no sense unless it finds 
                                                 
108 Ibid., 173. 
109 Ibid. 
110 Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, III, §47. “Es ist schon wahr, daß ich durch das Hineinbringen 
des Begriffs der Anzahl der Negationen den Aspekt der logischen Rechnung geändert habe: ‘So habe ich es noch 
nicht angeschaut’ – könnte man sagen. Aber wichtig wird diese Änderung erst, wenn sie in die Anwendung des 
Zeichens eingreift.” Bemerkung Über Die Grundlagen Der Mathematik, Ludwig Wittgenstein Werkausgabe 
Band 6, III, §47. 
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application in human life. Not every way of playing a musical theme makes sense to us. 
There are ways of reacting to the human face which we find incomprehensible. 
The extension of the phenomenon of ‘seeing as’ to mathematical and logical 
propositions reminds us that for Wittgenstein even the most autonomous areas of human 
discourse are rooted in our natural capacities and reactions. Here it is important to keep in 
mind his remarks on language as part of the natural history of human beings, together with 
his insistence that language is autonomous, but that concepts require application in our lives. 
In regard to the question of the relationship between the conceptual and the pre-conceptual, 
although mathematics clearly lies on the conceptual side of the boundary it would not be 
possible without various pre-conceptual capacities and reactions. It is arguable, however, that 
if we wish to examine the boundary between the conceptual and the pre-conceptual a richer 
field is provided by the study of psychological concepts. Perhaps this is one of the reasons 
why Wittgenstein after 1945 wrote little concerning mathematics and logic and dedicated 
himself to the philosophy of psychology. Here it is less clear what lies on the side of the 
conceptual and what is pre-conceptual. By turning his attention to psychological concepts 
Wittgenstein sets himself the task of showing how they are rooted in our pre-conceptual 
capacities and reactions, while avoiding the temptation of reducing the conceptual to the pre-
conceptual. In chapter four we will examine how Wittgenstein relates the conceptual and pre-
conceptual in this post-1945 writings, but for now it is important to note that while writing 
these remarks on psychology he was reading Gestalt psychology. 
Schulte observes that Wittgenstein mentions the name of Wolfgang Köhler “relatively 
frequently”111 in manuscripts 130-8, which Wittgenstein completed during the period May 
1946 to March 1949 (with the exception of the first fifty or so pages of manuscript 130, 
which probably date from early 1945). These manuscripts deal with psychological concepts 
                                                 
111 Schulte, Experience and Expression : Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Psychology, 8. 
82 
 
and show the influence of Köhler’s book Gestalt Psychology.112 In addition Schulte notes 
that: “Several of Köhler’s theses are discussed in Wittgenstein’s last lectures in Cambridge,” 
and that although there is no direct evidence in Wittgenstein’s works of wider reading in 
gestalt theory, “we may be confident that at least from conversations and perhaps through his 
own reading he knew a good deal more about gestalt psychology than can be found in 
Köhler’s book.” 113  
The central tenant of Gestalt psychology is that our perception of the world involves 
taking in the world as a whole, and that the whole cannot be reduced a sum of its parts. It 
stands against theories which seek to analyse the world into components from which the 
whole is built.114 The attractions of this theory are clear for the later Wittgenstein, with his 
move away from the Tractatus methodology of analysis, and his desire to show us how the 
application of concepts takes place in the wider context of our lives. Wittgenstein’s 
discussion of ‘seeing as’ is clearly influenced by Gestalt psychology, as is evident from the 
illustrations (such as a line drawing of a cube) he uses in his writings on psychology. In 
chapter four we will further examine the influence of Gestalt theory on Wittgenstein, and ask 
in particular how his readings in Gestalt psychology influenced his account of the 
relationship between the conceptual and the pre-conceptual. On the one hand it is clear that 
Wittgenstein is critical of Gestalt psychology, which he accuses of reducing the conceptual to 
the complex. On the other hand the emphasis in the Gestalt account of perception placed 
upon taking in complexes helped to provide Wittgenstein with a richer sense of the pre-
conceptual. 
 
 
                                                 
112 Wolfgang Köhler, Gestalt Psychology : An Introduction to New Concepts in Modern Psychology, Black and 
Gold Library (New York: Liveright Publishing Corporation, 1947). 
113 Schulte, Experience and Expression : Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Psychology, 8. 
114 For an overview of Kohler’s gestalt theory see ibid., 80-85. 
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2.3.7 The Application of Ethical and Religious Expressions 
Before concluding this chapter an examination is opportune of two works by 
Wittgenstein which are of relevance for understanding the development of his notion of 
application, and which directly relate to the topic of this thesis. The first, A Lecture on 
Ethics,115 dates from 1929 and concerns the application of ethical concepts. The second, 
Remarks on Frazer’s Golden Bough,116 consists in two sets of remarks: the first date from 
1931, whereas the second set were probably written after 1948. Both sets of remarks concern 
the application of religious concepts. 
A Lecture on Ethics pre-dates the developments in Wittgenstein’s later thought traced 
in this chapter, and in many ways recalls the worldview set out in the Tractatus. Wittgenstein 
stresses the distinction between factual propositions and ethical expressions: “Now what I 
wish to contend is that, although all judgements of relative value can be shown to be mere 
statements of facts, no statement of fact can ever be, or simply imply, a judgement of 
absolute value.”117 There is, however, an important development of the doctrine found in the 
Tractatus which holds that: “6.421 It is clear that ethics cannot be put into words.”118 In A 
Lecture on Ethics, although Wittgenstein upholds the principle that there can be no 
propositions in ethics, and thus that ethical statements are nonsensical, he nevertheless seeks 
to find contexts in our lives in which such statements find application. In looking for such 
contexts Wittgenstein holds that they must respect the absolute nature of what we try to 
express in ethical statements. Where are we to look for such uses of ethical expressions? 
Wittgenstein reflects that when asked to consider the use made of an expression: “it is natural 
                                                 
115 Printed in Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Occasions, 1912-1951 (Indianapolis: Hacket Pub. Co., 1993), 
36-44. A Lecture on Ethics was delivered in English by Wittgenstein. 
116 Ibid., 115-55. 
117 Ibid., 39.  
118 Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, 86. “6.421 Es ist klar, daß sich die Ethik nicht aussprechen läßt.” Logisch-
Philosophische Abhandlung. In Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, Werkausgabe Band 1, 83. 
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that I should recall cases in which I would certainly use these expressions.”119 He thus sets 
about recalling those situations in which he has been prompted to use expressions of absolute 
value, among which: “one particular experience presents itself to me which therefore is, in a 
sense, my experience par excellence.”120 The experience he refers to here is that in which: “I 
wonder at the existence of the world. And I am then inclined to use such phrases as “how 
extraordinary that anything should exist.”121 He adds to this another experience, that of 
“feeling absolutely safe.”122 Wittgenstein is aware that in speaking of experiences he opens 
the path to those who seek to give a scientific account of experience. He does not deny the 
possibility of such accounts, but argues that they fail to see the absolute value expressed. In a 
similar manner he argues that science cannot disprove there are miracles, for: “the scientific 
way of looking at a fact is not the way to look at it as a miracle.”123 
Although the emphasis Wittgenstein places here on first person experience is replaced 
in his later works with the third person perspective of human practice, and the contrast 
between the relative and the absolute will no longer form an overarching category,124 the 
importance Wittgenstein sets on the context of use of an expression signals an important 
breakthrough in his thought. It also opens the question of how to give an account of the use of 
ethical expressions which is not merely an empirical description.125 The account of 
application given in the Tractatus concerns finding the general form of the proposition and as 
such its purpose is to draw a boundary around the world of facts (of what can be clearly said). 
At first sight it may appear that Wittgenstein draws this boundary in the name of science in 
                                                 
119 Philosophical Occasions, 1912-1951, 40. 
120 Ibid., 41. 
121 Ibid. 
122 Ibid. 
123 Ibid., 43. 
124 Although Cyril Barrett argues that the saying/showing distinction (which involves a distinction between the 
relative and the absolute) found in A Lecture on Ethics and in the Tractatus remains throughout Wittgenstein’s 
later work. See Cyril Barrett, Wittgenstein on Ethics and Religious Belief (Oxford, UK ; Cambridge, Mass.: B. 
Blackwell, 1991). 
125 Paul Johnston draws attention to this distinction in his account of Wittgenstein and ethics, see Paul Johnston, 
Wittgenstein and Moral Philosophy (London ; New York: Routledge, 1989).  
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order to deliver us from the obscurity of those areas of discourse which cannot be clearly 
defined. His real motivation, however, is the very opposite of this. It springs from his desire 
to preserve all that is most important of life from the incursion of science: “4.113 Philosophy 
sets limits to the much disputed sphere of natural science.”126  
In A Lecture on Ethics Wittgenstein maintains a strict boundary around the world of 
facts, with the corresponding distinction between that which is of relative value and that 
which has absolute value. As his later thought developed he never abandoned the distinction 
between the empirical and the grammatical; it was no longer held, however, within the 
overarching distinction between the relative and the absolute. This is a result of the change in 
his notion of application. The distinction between relative and absolute is no longer to be 
founded upon a general theory which fixes application once and for ever, but is given within 
the various practices in which application occurs. What are we to make then of 
Wittgenstein’s earlier insistence that ethics concerns the absolute? If this implies an 
overarching metaphysical distinction then it is clear that Wittgenstein abandons this idea, but 
if it concerns those uses of language in which we talk about the absolute we need to ask what 
application they have in our lives. 
This brings us to the second work we will examine before the conclusion of this 
chapter, Wittgenstein’s Remarks on Frazer’s Golden Bough. Just as in A Lecture on Ethics 
Wittgenstein criticises theories in which ethical expressions are treated as factual statements, 
in these remarks he criticises Frazer for mischaracterizing the use of religious language as a 
primitive form of scientific explanation. For Wittgenstein what is characteristic about 
religious language is not that it seeks scientific explanations, but that it expresses something 
                                                 
126 Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, 30. “4.113 Die Philosophie begrenzt das bestreitbare Gebiet 
der Naturwissenschaft.” Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung. In Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, Werkausgabe 
Band 1, 33. For an examination of how Wittgenstein’s attitude to science differed from that of the logical 
positivists see Russell Nieli, Wittgenstein : From Mysticism to Ordinary Language : A Study of Viennese 
Positivism and the Thought of Ludwig Wittgenstein, Suny Series in Philosophy (Albany: State University of 
New York Press, 1987). 
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which lies deep within us: “Here one can only describe and say: this is what human life is 
like.”127 The distinction which Wittgenstein drew in his later philosophy between the 
empirical and the grammatical is given shape in the context of human religious practice, as 
the distinction between scientific hypothesis and symbolic religious ceremony.128 We saw 
earlier in this chapter how in the Tractatus Wittgenstein sought to find the logical symbolism 
which underlies our use of signs. Now he abandons this search for an underlying logical 
essence, and turns to the actual symbolic practices within which we express what is essential 
to human life. Furthermore, he characterizes his own: “observations about ‘object’ and 
‘complex’”129 as being rooted in the mythology which “is stored within our language.”130 
Whereas in the Tractatus Wittgenstein offers a mystical perspective, one which seeks to 
transcend the world of facts, now he locates the mystical within our ceremonial practices: 
“One could almost say that man is a ceremonial animal. That is, no doubt, partly wrong and 
partly nonsensical, but there is also something right about it.”131 
In Wittgenstein’s Remarks on Frazer’s Golden Bough we see how his thought 
develops from the logical–syntactic theory of application developed in the Tractatus to an 
understanding of application as rooted in our human practices.132 Does Wittgenstein therefore 
abandon the objectivity of the Tractatus in favour of an account of application which 
relativizes our concepts to the particular practices within which they find a use? An answer to 
this question turns on what relativity here implies. We have seen throughout this chapter that 
                                                 
127 Wittgenstein, Philosophical Occasions, 1912-1951, 121. “Nur beschreiben kann man hier und sagen; so ist 
das meschliche Leben.” Bermerkunden Über Frazers Golden Bough. In Vortrag Über Ethik Und Andere Kleine 
Scriften. (Norderstedt, Germany: Suhrkamp, 1989), 31. 
128 For a reading of Wittgenstein’s Remarks on Frazer’s Golden Bough which although largely in agreement 
questions whether Wittgenstein goes too far in ascribing no causal intent to religious language see John 
Churchill, "Something Deep and Sinister," Modern Theology 8, no. 1 (1992): 15-37. 
129 Wittgenstein, Philosophical Occasions, 1912-1951, 135. “ Betrachungen über ‘Gegentand’ und ‘Komplex’?” 
Bermerkunden Über Frazers Golden Bough. In Vortrag Über Ethik Und Andere Kleine Scriften., 38. 
130 Philosophical Occasions, 1912-1951, 133. “In unserer Sprache ist eine ganze Mythologie niedergelegt.” 
Bermerkunden Über Frazers Golden Bough. In Vortrag Über Ethik Und Andere Kleine Scriften., 38. 
131 Philosophical Occasions, 1912-1951, 129. “Man könnte fast sagen, der Mensche sei ein zeremonielles Tier. 
Das ist wohl teils falsch, teils unsinnig, aber es ist auch etwas Richtiges daran.” Bermerkunden Über Frazers 
Golden Bough. In Vortrag Über Ethik Und Andere Kleine Scriften., 35. 
132 I am grateful to Fergus Kerr, who in a conversation with me expressed his insight that Wittgenstein’s 
Remarks on Frazer’s Golden Bough is of key important for understanding the development of his later thought. 
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although Wittgenstein abandoned the quest for the general form of the proposition he 
continued to hold that there is a distinction between the empirical and the logical 
(grammatical). The urge to explain the application of concepts through empirical 
generalizations lies at the heart of the illness we are liable to when doing philosophy: the 
relativity of our concepts to our practices is not the relativity of a scientific observation or 
hypothesis. At the same time concepts are empty unless they find application within our lives. 
The crystalline mythology of the Tractatus gives way to the embodied, breathing myth of the 
ceremonial animal. The search for the form of the proposition is transformed into the 
question of who we are: what is essential to human life?  
Wittgenstein argues that our symbolic religious practices are not replaceable in a more 
sophisticated scientific age by empirical hypotheses; rather they are basic to us as human 
beings. Any attempt to explain mythical beliefs and practices goes wrong unless it relates 
them to what lies deep in our human nature: “Indeed, if Frazer’s explanations did not in the 
final analysis appeal to a tendency in ourselves, they would not really be explanations.”133 In 
the remarks which he probably wrote after 1948, Wittgenstein expands this argument when 
he observes that those religious ceremonies which strike us as deep and sinister do not do so 
merely because they originated in gruesome practices (e.g. human sacrifice), but rather 
because there is something within us that they speak to: “the deep and the sinister do not 
become apparent merely by our coming to know the history of the external action, rather it is 
we who ascribe them from an inner experience.”134 If Wittgenstein’s account of ‘seeing as’ 
provides a means of understanding the autonomy of language which also connects it with life, 
then his Remarks on Frazer’s Golden Bough characterizes religion as essential to how we see 
                                                 
133 Wittgenstein, Philosophical Occasions, 1912-1951, 127. “Ja, Frazers Erklärungen wären überhaupt keine 
Erklärungen, wenn sie nicht letzten Endes an eine Neigung in uns selbst appellierten.” Bermerkunden Über 
Frazers Golden Bough. In Vortrag Über Ethik Und Andere Kleine Scriften., 34. 
134 Philosophical Occasions, 1912-1951. “dies Tiefe und Finstere versteht sich nicht von selbst wenn wir nur die 
Geschichte der äußeren Handlung erfahren, sondern wir tragen es wieder hinein aus einer Erfahrung in unserm 
Innern.” Bermerkunden Über Frazers Golden Bough. In Vortrag Über Ethik Und Andere Kleine Scriften., 43. 
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the world. The relativity of religious concepts to our lives is therefore one which is relative to 
our human nature: if our nature were other than it is we would not be religious, but then we 
would not be human.  
For Wittgenstein the denial of our religious nature makes us less human: “Frazer is 
much more savage than most of his savages, for they are not as far removed from the 
understanding of a spiritual matter as a twentieth-century Englishman.”135 In chapter one we 
saw how Wittgenstein in his later philosophy seeks to reconnect us with our humanity. Now 
we can add that central to this task is returning us to those aspects of our life which find 
expression in religious practices, but which are explained away in our modern scientific 
world. There is, however, no one-step way of doing this. In returning to our nature we: “must 
find the path from error to truth.”136 There is no simple way of stepping outside our human 
practices to grasp the nature which forms their basis. Yet at the same time everything lies 
open before us. In his Remarks on Frazer’s Golden Bough Wittgenstein helps us to see what 
lies before us: we are a ceremonial animal, breathing myth and a mystery to ourselves. In 
attempting to grasp our own essence we create myths, far more sinister than the myths of 
“savages.” In his later writings Wittgenstein battles his own tendencies to grasp at the 
mystery of who we are. In his Remarks on Frazer’s Golden Bough, we see his desire to 
return to the primitive simplicity of our natural human reactions to the world around us. 
 
 Conclusion: From Logical Univocity to the Pluralism of Life 2.4
In this chapter we have traced the development of Wittgenstein’s philosophy from the 
Tractatus up to 1945, when the text for Part I of the Investigations was completed. In 
                                                 
135 Philosophical Occasions, 1912-1951, 131. “Frazer ist viel mehr savage, als die meistern seiner savages, denn 
diese werden nicht so weit vom Verständnis einer geistigen Angelegenheit entfernt sein, wie ein Engländer des 
20sten Jahrhunderts.” Bermerkunden Über Frazers Golden Bough. In Vortrag Über Ethik Und Andere Kleine 
Scriften., 36. 
136 Philosophical Occasions, 1912-1951, 119. “man muß den Weg vom Irrtum zur Wahrheit finden. 
Bermerkunden Über Frazers Golden Bough. In Vortrag Über Ethik Und Andere Kleine Scriften., 29. 
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particular we have examined how Wittgenstein’s conception of application developed during 
this period, from the logico-syntactic account of the Tractatus to the remarks on meaning as 
use which are found in his later works. This examination has enabled us to establish the 
continuities and discontinuities between Wittgenstein’s early and later writings. On the side 
of continuity we find no change in Wittgenstein’s argument that the relationship between 
language and the world is internal to language. The internal relationship between the 
proposition and reality of the Tractatus develops into the account of language as autonomous 
in the later works; in which language consists of various interconnected measures laid out 
against reality. Wittgenstein never gave up the conviction that the logical (the grammatical) 
and the empirical must be distinguished; this conviction runs powerfully through his later 
works, and witnesses to the continuing influence of Frege on Wittgenstein’s thought.137  
What changes in Wittgenstein’s philosophy is how he distinguishes the logical and the 
empirical. In the Tractatus Wittgenstein searches for the form of the general proposition. As 
it is the internal properties of a proposition which determine how it represents reality, 
Wittgenstein sought the common formal properties of all meaningful propositions in order to 
distinguish them from meaningless propositions. It is this common form which guarantees 
that propositions can be applied to reality. Within the system of the Tractatus the theory of 
simple signs with their concomitant simple objects ensures that application is possible, as 
without these simple objects sense would be indeterminate. The logical and the empirical are 
clearly distinguished, but this clarity comes at a cost.  
In the period after his return to Cambridge in 1929 Wittgenstein began to question the 
logio-syntactic system he had put in place in the Tractatus. He abandoned the search for the 
general form of the proposition, and in place of the logico-syntactic requirements of the 
Tractatus he turned to the actual (grammatical) uses we make of words in our ordinary 
                                                 
137 For an introduction to Wittgenstein which traces the influence of Frege see Anthony Kenny, Wittgenstein, 
Rev. ed. (Malden, MA ; Oxford: Blackwell Pub., 2006). 
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language. He came to see that application does not require a general theory; rather, we need 
to observe how application occurs within various uses of language. The distinction between 
meaningful and meaningless expressions is not given once and for all by drawing a tight 
boundary around what can be clearly said. In the Philosophical Remarks the general form of 
the proposition gives way to systems of propositions (calculi), which determine what it 
meaningful according to the measure they apply to reality in a given context. Later 
Wittgenstein gave up this emphasis on systems of propositions in favour of his analogy 
between language and games. This analogy breaks the vestige, still present in the notion of 
language as a calculus, of the Tractatus emphasis on logical rules, and opens the path to 
Wittgenstein’s later concern with the pre-conceptual human practices which form the basis of 
our conceptual abilities. 
We have argued that Wittgenstein sought to develop a realistic philosophy which 
avoids empiricism without falling into idealism; to this end the notion of application is a key 
component of Wittgenstein’s thought. In the Tractatus the account of application has the 
purpose of showing how representation is internal to propositions, but also that: “3.13 A 
proposition contains the form, but not the content, of its sense.”138 In the later works, 
Wittgenstein’s concern is to maintain the autonomy of language while showing how language 
finds application in human life. Here the analogy between words and tools is instructive, 
helping us to see how concepts find application in life. This in turn throws light on our human 
nature. We are sign using animals, and understanding human beings involves seeing how we 
use signs. Here the dangers of empiricism and idealism again appear: either we begin with a 
pre-determined empirical account of human nature and subsume our account of sign using 
into it, or we develop a theory of the use of signs with no reference to the applications signs 
find within our lives. In section 2.3.3 we examined how Wittgenstein distinguishes between 
                                                 
138 Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, 13. “Im Satz ist die Form sines Sinnes enthalten, aber nicht 
dessen Inhalt.” Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung. In Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, Werkausgabe Band 1, 
18. 
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practices with an external goal and those which internally define their objectives. In 
comparing language to games Wittgenstein seeks to rule out external accounts of language of 
the kind which start with a pre-determined notion of human nature. At the same time, he is 
aware that games can lack application. He seeks to throws light on human nature (a sign 
using animal) by showing how various language-games find application in life. 
The path between empiricism and idealism is not easy to walk. In chapter one we 
noted how Wittgenstein’s later thought involves constant self-questioning. Rhees argues that 
in the Investigations Wittgenstein shows not just where we go wrong in misuse of language, 
but also why we are tempted to make such mistakes. Our propensity to grasp at essences lies 
deep with us, and is reflected in our linguistic practices. There is no easy one-step answer to 
the question of our human nature, and we: “must find the path from error to truth.”139 In 
searching for a path from error to truth, Wittgenstein developed the various techniques, 
analogies and perspectives of this later works.140  
The development of Wittgenstein’s notion of application can be understood as a 
development in his understanding of the unity of our language. In the Tractatus this role is 
given to the general form of the proposition, which gives way to the calculus of language in 
the Philosophical Remarks. With the shift to the analogy between language and games, the 
practices which comprise various language-games provide this unity. These practices are not, 
however, self-contained units. They find application in the wider context of our lives. Thus it 
is life itself, the whole of human life, which provides the unity of our grammar. This 
emphasis on human life as a whole presents the danger of imagining we can survey life and 
subsequently see how grammar fits into it. This danger is present when Wittgenstein speaks 
of the ordinary as the given basis for distinguishing sense form nonsense. On the other hand, 
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Bermerkunden Über Frazers Golden Bough. In Vortrag Über Ethik Und Andere Kleine Scriften., 29. 
140 For a comparison of the various techniques Wittgenstein develops in his later works with the Christian 
mystical tradition as a path to truth see, Peter Tyler, The Return to the Mystical : Ludwig Wittgenstein, Teresa of 
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if we hold that there is no such thing as human nature, that human life is nothing more than 
the play of changing signification, then sense becomes indeterminate. To avoid these dangers 
Wittgenstein attempted to develop a way of doing philosophy which holds in balance the 
dialectical tension between the unity and plurality in our practices. As such, Wittgenstein can 
be seen as sharing something in common with the metaphysical tradition handed down from 
the Greeks, which mediates between unity and diversity. 
In chapter one we followed Anscombe in making Wittgenstein a conversation partner 
with philosophers who practice metaphysical thinking. Another contemporary defender of the 
metaphysical tradition who sees parallels in Wittgenstein to the dialectical thinking of Plato is 
William Desmond. In his article ‘Are We All Scholastics Now? On Analytic, Dialectical and 
Post-Dialectical Thinking,’ Desmond contrasts the emphasis on univocity which shapes the 
early Wittgenstein with his later emphasis on the variety of our linguistic practices.141 
Desmond argues that this later emphasis on the plurality of our linguistic practices together 
with Wittgenstein’s intention of teaching us differences heralds something of a return to the 
metaphysical practices of Plato: “For me Wittgensteinian pluralism recalls an earlier practice 
of dialectic already mentioned, namely, the Socratic-Platonic approach, an approach with 
promise of an openness to otherness suggestive of trans-dialectical thinking.”142 This is the 
situated account of human freedom which we mentioned at the beginning of this chapter. The 
trans-dialectic thinking to which Desmond refers is not the thinking of a disembodied angelic 
form. It is the living, embodied dialogue of a material creature and as such takes place within 
the practices of communities. Furthermore, it is not a merely technical dialogue, but that 
practice of wisdom which Hibbs sees as integral to metaphysics. As such it requires the 
                                                 
141 William Desmond, "Are We All Scholastics Now?," Yearbook of the Irish Philosophical Society (2010), ed. 
Julia, Hynes (Dublin: Irish Philosophical Society, 2011). 
142 Ibid., 1-24, 22. Desmond’s writings on metaphysics are influential on the presentation of metaphysics given 
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development of virtues. In chapters five, six and seven we will examine how Wittgenstein’s 
writings throw light on contemporary developments in action theory and its relationship to 
virtue ethics. In particular, we will argue that an account of human agency must root the 
exercise of our rational capacities in an account of our embodied human nature. Russell 
Hittinger, in his A Critique of the New Natural Law argues that: “by affording more attention 
to the role of the virtues” we can avoid the danger of “an ethico-religious positivism in which 
the principles governing our relationship not only to the person of God, but to all other 
persons, are drawn from outside the sphere of practical rationality.”143 In the next two 
chapters we will continue the discussion of this present chapter by examining how 
Wittgenstein develops an understanding of practical rationality which connects with the 
virtue tradition and allows us to avoid the ethico-religious positivism Hittinger here warns 
against. 
In the next chapter we will ask whether the practice of philosophy developed by 
Wittgenstein in his later works maintains the dialectical tension required to avoid empiricism 
without falling into idealism. Wittgenstein dropped his project of assimilating language to the 
crystalline purity of logic, but at the same time he continued to hold onto the distinction 
between the grammatical and the empirical. We will assess Charlton’s criticisms of 
Wittgenstein and ask whether he maintains a dialectical tension which prevents his account of 
grammar descending into a confused pragmatism. We will add to this a criticism Rhees’ 
makes of Wittgenstein: that his emphasis on the analogy between games and language leads 
him to neglect the dialogical nature of our understanding. Both Charlton and Rhees accuse 
Wittgenstein of failing to account for our language use by ignoring key features of the 
metaphysical tradition. These criticisms will have the purpose not only of helping us to assess 
Wittgenstein’s philosophy, but also of bring to light the relevance of his writings for an 
                                                 
143 Russell Hittinger, A Critique of the New Natural Law Theory (Notre Dame, Ind: University of Notre Dame 
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account of human nature. As such they will provide a bridge for the dialogue between the 
reading of Wittgenstein we have developed in this chapter and contemporary questions in 
moral theology. 
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3 GRAMMAR, TELEOLOGY AND ESSENCE 
 Two Metaphysical Challenges 3.1
In this chapter we will develop the dialogue between Wittgenstein and the 
metaphysical tradition by examining the arguments of two philosophers who criticise 
Wittgenstein for his failure to engage with metaphysics. The first criticism is Charlton’s, who 
levels the charge that in the absence of a teleological conception of nature Wittgenstein’s 
account of language collapses into pragmatism. This entails that despite intending to develop 
an account of our linguistic practices which avoids empiricism Wittgenstein reduces the 
employment of words to their causal effects. The second criticism comes from Rhees, who 
accuses Wittgenstein of being misled by the analogy between language and games into 
neglecting the basis of our linguistic practices in the human search for universal 
understanding. Although the game analogy can cast light on various aspects of our linguistic 
practices, Rhees argues that it fails to show how those practices are more than techniques. For 
Rhees language is first and foremost the growth in dialogue between human beings: “If you 
understand anything in language, you must understand what dialogue is, and you must see 
how understanding grows as the dialogue grows. How understanding the language grows. 
For the language is discourse, is speaking. It is telling people things and trying to follow 
them. And that is what you try to understand.”1 Charlton and Rhees can be seen as accusing 
Wittgenstein of misunderstanding what it is to be a rational animal. Charlton’s criticism 
points to the need for an account of human agency to show how our practices are shaped by 
our animality; whereas Rhees’ arguments highlight the danger of confusing human 
understanding with the accomplishment of various techniques. We will ask whether these 
criticisms of Wittgenstein are fair and what they teach us about human agency and nature. 
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To this end the criticisms of Charlton and Rhees will enable us to examine the basis 
for Wittgenstein’s understanding of human agency in natural principles. The relevance of 
these investigations for moral theology will become clearer in chapter five. For our present 
purposes the importance of natural principles is summed up by Sherwin in the following 
passage in which he explains how natural principles are essential in Aquinas’ account of 
human agency: “To understand how one avoids an infinite regress in the description of 
practical reasoning, where every cognitive act presupposes a voluntary act and vice versa, St. 
Thomas appeals to the level of nature and the action of the Author of nature.”2 Natural 
principles enable Aquinas to avoid: “two opposite objections. . . On the one hand, some hold 
that if we regard the will as having a role in shaping reason’s practical judgements we 
inevitability fall into voluntarism and moral relativism. On the other hand, others maintain 
that if we regard the will’s act as always presupposing an act of the intellect we inevitably fall 
into psychological determinism.”3 These two objections are analogous to the dangers of 
falling into idealism or empiricism, against which we have argued that Wittgenstein 
developed the realism of his later thought. The criticisms of Charlton and Rhees question 
Wittgenstein’s realism, and whether his account of human agency is sufficiently grounded in 
a wider account of nature to avoid the disembodied account of agency implied by idealism, or 
the determinism of empiricism.  
 
3.1.1 Syntax, Lexicography and Practice: Charlton’s Reading of Wittgenstein 
In spite of Charlton’s criticisms Wittgenstein’s influence is clear to see on how he 
understands the rules of syntax, and in the following passage he uses Wittgenstein’s analogy 
between linguistic rules and the rules of a game to explain how syntax works: 
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53. 
3 Ibid. 
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Rules of syntax, as I understand the term, do not tell us how to form sentences that will 
be merely structures of written marks or spoken sounds. They tell us how to say things, 
how to perform definite linguistic acts. There are acts which can be performed only in a 
game, like trumping and castling. You castle in chess, by complying with the rules of 
chess and you trump in bridge and whist, by complying with the rules of those games.4 
 
Where Charlton differs from Wittgenstein is in drawing a distinction between grammar and 
lexicography: “Wittgenstein has been credited with an explicit rejection of the traditional 
distinction between grammar and lexicography.”5 For Charlton the task of the metaphysician 
is to understand how language works, and in particular he draws attention to: “a distinction 
which was not recognized in the twentieth century between ideas expressed by words for 
things, and ideas expressed by constructions.”6 The former of these has traditionally been the 
remit of lexicography, whereas the latter is properly speaking the work of grammarians. 
Lexicography is concerned with how words gain their meaning by representing things, in 
contrast to which grammar: “proceeds by examining a different way in which words function, 
namely by determining forms of speech.”7 Charlton argues that it is this distinction which 
enables us to distinguish between syntax and semantics in a manner which respects their 
complex interrelations. To this end he positions himself between Wittgenstein and Noam 
Chomsky. Whereas Wittgenstein, according to Charlton, collapses syntax into semantics, 
Chomsky not only: “distinguishes sharply between syntax and semantics; he says that 
grammar has nothing to do with meaning whatever.”8 Charlton uses the distinction between 
grammar and lexicography to show how syntax is not reducible to semantics and thus that it 
has autonomy, while at the same time showing how the rules of syntax are not: “merely 
structures of written marks or spoken sounds,” but rather, “tells us how to say things, how to 
perform definite linguistic acts.”9 This is the role which is played by Wittgenstein account of 
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5 Ibid., 45. 
6 Ibid., 11. 
7 Ibid. 
8 Ibid., 45-46. 
9 Ibid., 39. 
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application, and therefore it is important to understand why Charlton believes his account 
succeeds whereas Wittgenstein’s fails. We must therefore begin by examining Charlton’s 
account of application, and in particular the role which the distinction between grammar and 
lexicography plays in showing how the rules of syntax tell us how to say things. 
Charlton’s account of application draws upon another analogy which he shares with 
Wittgenstein, the analogy between words and tools. In the following passage Charlton argues 
that metaphysics only became possible once the Greeks had fashioned words to express 
grammatical concepts: “They [the Greeks] were, of course, literate, but literacy alone would 
not have been enough; they also needed basic grammatical concepts – which, indeed, they 
had to make for themselves rather as early craftsmen must make tools for themselves. In the 
arts, the making of tools and innovation cannot be separated.”10 The analogy here between 
concepts and tools is given specifically by Charlton to draw parallels with the connection 
between metaphysics and grammar, and we can extend these parallels by further exploring 
the analogy between fashioning tools and applying concepts. 
In chapter two, section 2.3.3 we saw how Wittgenstein distinguishes between 
practices with an external goal and those which have their goal within them, and we argued 
that the analogy between words and tools must be carefully employed if Wittgenstein is to 
avoid the reduction of language to pre-given external goals. If Charlton’s account of syntactic 
rules is to show how they maintain their autonomy, while at the same accounting for “how to 
perform definite linguistic acts,” he must avoid the danger of reducing them to pragmatic 
rules for obtaining external goals. He does this by arguing that the distinction between 
lexicography and grammar entails two distinct types of rule for using words: “There are rules 
that tell us what words to use for what, and rules that tell us how to perform the various 
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different linguistic acts.”11 The former kinds of rules are those which are used in 
lexicography, whereas the latter are the rules of syntax (grammar). These two types of rules 
are distinct, but they do not work independently: “these rules complement each other.”12 This 
complementarity entails that the autonomy of language is maintained through the rules of 
syntax, which tell us how to make various kinds of linguistic acts, while the rules of 
lexicography provide the application for these linguistic acts by telling us what words are 
used for (e.g. the semantical properties of words).  
If the distinction between syntax and lexicography is ignored, and their 
complementarity thus lost, accounts of our linguistic practices either emphasise the formal 
syntactical properties of language at the expense of the semantic, or collapse the syntactical 
into the semantic. The first mistake overstates the autonomy of language and removes it from 
any application, whereas the second results in a pragmatic account of language. In the 
absence of an account of linguistic forms (syntax) an account of the semantic properties of 
words is reduced to that of their pragmatic employment. Charlton argues that Chomsky is 
guilty of the first of these mistakes, whereas the second is committed by Wittgenstein. He 
accuses Wittgenstein in his comments on meaning as use of assimilating grammatical rules to 
lexicographical rules, entailing that Wittgenstein is not able to draw the: “distinction between 
what, in speaking, I mean to say, and what I mean to achieve by saying this.”13 In the absence 
of this distinction Wittgenstein, according to Charlton, offers a pragmatic theory of meaning 
which bypasses acts of saying and goes directly to the use we make of linguistic 
constructions. The problem this creates, as we noted above, is that it is only when we 
understand what kind of linguistic act a person is using that we know what they are trying to 
achieve with this linguistic act. Unless we can distinguish what kind of speech act is being 
                                                 
11 Ibid., 55. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Ibid., 57. 
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made we do not know what is being said, and we cannot determine this by attending to the 
use of the sentence uttered, because what is said is distinct from what is achieved in saying it. 
Charlton goes so far as to argue that outside certain limited contexts talk about using 
sentences makes no sense: “it seems to me incorrect to speak of using sentences except in the 
‘context’ of a libel action or a philosophy seminar.”14 The account of meaning as use which 
Charlton accuses Wittgenstein of developing is thus one in which the autonomy of language 
is subsumed into a pragmatic account of language use, in which the meaning of sentences is 
determined according to their role in achieving externally given goals. By contrast, Charlton 
sees himself as returning to the medieval distinction between grammar and rhetoric, in which 
students first learn the grammatical forms (forms of saying) before studying how these are 
used for certain purposes: 
Now this notion of saying seems to be absent from Wittgenstein’s later work. He goes 
straight to the practical purpose an utterance has. For him practical meaning does not 
presuppose linguistic; it supersedes and supplants it. Wittgenstein urges us to replace 
talk of meaning by talk of use: ‘If we had to name anything which is the life of the sign, 
we should have to say that it was its use’ (BB, p. 4; PI 432).15 
 
In order to illustrate this point Charlton examines the primitive language-game given by 
Wittgenstein in the Investigations, in which builders co-ordinate their actions through the use 
of words. He reads Wittgenstein as here offering an account of how words gain their meaning 
through their use in a practice; the problem for Charlton with such accounts of meaning 
acquisition is that the practices of human co-operation which they pre-suppose require 
linguistic abilities: 
Making statements and giving orders or advice are social practices in which we engage 
for practical purposes; but they are linguistic practices, practices of saying, which do 
not count as Wittgensteinian language-games. Perhaps they could have grown up only 
in societies in which there was already cooperative practical activity, but as things are 
at present, understanding them and, in general, being able to speak the real language of 
your society, is a prerequisite of taking part in such practices as building projects and 
religious festivals.16 
                                                 
14 Ibid., 60. 
15 Ibid., 58. 
16 Ibid., 60. 
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Charlton thus accuses Wittgenstein of developing precisely the kind of external account of 
meaning which he sought to avoid through his emphasis on the autonomy of grammar. 
 
3.1.2 Grammar, Essence and Teleology 
In the last section we presented Charlton’s charge against Wittgenstein. In this section 
we will ask whether he offers a fair interpretation of Wittgenstein’s account of meaning as 
use. The first thing to note in assessing Charlton’s interpretation of Wittgenstein is that 
although Wittgenstein offers remarks on meaning as use he does not develop a theory of 
meaning. His intention is to throw light on the complex and varied ways in which we speak 
of meaning, rather than to put forward a theory which explains meaning. The primitive 
language-games used in the Investigations do not offer an explanation of language 
acquisition.17 These language-games play a variety of roles in Wittgenstein’s later writings, 
involving the use of language-games as objects of comparison to throw light on our actual 
linguistic practices: “For we can avoid ineptness or emptiness in our assertions only by 
presenting the model as what it is, as an object of comparison—as, so to speak, a measuring-
rod; not as a preconceived idea to which reality must correspond. (The dogmatism into which 
we fall so easily in doing philosophy.)”18 The primitive language-games developed by 
Wittgenstein are not to be taken as theoretical re-creations of how language is acquired. Their 
                                                 
17 Although, as we argued in chapter two, section 2.3.5, the primitive language-games do throw light on 
language acquisition by showing us how our use of concepts depends upon pre-linguistic natural human 
practices and reactions. In his article “Very General Facts of Nature” Lars Hertzberg observes that: “The theme 
of primitive or unmediated reactions is brought up by Wittgenstein primarily, in two different connections: on 
the one hand, in connection with learning the use of psychological expressions (particularly pain language); and 
on the other hand in connection with acquiring an understanding of causality.” Lars Hertzberg, "Very General 
Facts of Nature," in The Oxford Handbook of Wittgenstein, ed. Oskari Kuusela and Marie McGinn (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2011), 351-72. 
18 Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, §131. “Nur so nämlich können wir der Ungerechtigkeit, oder 
Leere unsere Behauptungen entgehen, indem wir das Vorbild als das, was ist, als Vergliechsobjekt – sozusagen 
also Maßstab – hinstellen; und nicht als Vorurteil, dem die Wirklichkeit entsprechen müsse. (Der Dogmatismus, 
in dem wir beim Philosophieren so leicht verfallen.)” Philosophische Untersuchungen. In Tractatus Logico-
Philosopicus, Ludwig Wittgenstein Werkausgabe Band 1, §131. 
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purpose is to help us see through those illusions with which language bewitches us and to see 
something of our actual use of language which otherwise would lie hidden. 
When we first read Wittgenstein’s account of the builders’ language-game we are 
tempted to interpret it as offering an external account of how words gain their meaning 
through use. The purpose of the Investigations is to help us to overcome this temptation. The 
various strategies and arguments offered by Wittgenstein, such as his discussion on following 
a rule, are given to help us see through such false pictures of language. Just as we distinguish 
between a yardstick and the reality it is used to measure, so we begin to see the builders’ 
language-game as distinct from the actual linguistic practices it throws light upon. In 
particular, we begin to see that the practices described in the builders’ language-game pre-
suppose a whole form of life: the complex life of a community of language users. Far from 
offering an external account of language acquisition the builders’ language-game is offered to 
help us see through such pragmatic theories of language, and to see that the use of words in 
language is not determined according to external measures: “Grammar does not tell us how 
language must be constructed in order to fulfil its purpose, in order to have such-and-such an 
effect on human beings. It only describes and in no way explains the use of signs.”19 
It is clear that Charlton in his criticism of Wittgenstein’s account of language as use 
misreads what Wittgenstein is doing with the primitive language-games. Are we thus to 
dismiss Charlton’s attack on Wittgenstein? To answer this question we must return again to 
the question of application. In chapter two we argued that in developing this principle 
Wittgenstein’s purpose is to show how concepts find application in our lives in a manner 
which maintains the distinction between the grammatical and the empirical. This entails that 
externalist accounts of meaning are avoided, while at the same time the danger of an idealism 
                                                 
19 Philosophical Investigations, §496. “Grammatik sagt nicht, wie die Sprache gebaut sein muß, um ihren 
Zweck zu erfüllen, um so und so auf Menschen zu wirken. Sie beschreibt nur, aber erklärt in keiner Weise, den 
Gebrauch ser Zeichen.” Philosophische Untersuchungen. In Tractatus Logico-Philosopicus, Ludwig 
Wittgenstein Werkausgabe Band 1, §496. 
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in which concepts lack application is resisted: “The confusions which occupy us arise when 
language is like an engine idling, not when it is doing work.”20 Charlton’s argument against 
Wittgenstein turns on the assertion that in the absence of a distinction between grammar and 
lexicography any account of meaning will fail to show how grammar (the rules of syntax) has 
application in our lives. In order to assess this argument we first need to examine further the 
basis upon which Charlton establishes the distinction between grammar and lexicography, 
and then ask why he asserts that in the absence of this basis grammar cannot find application. 
We saw above how Charlton argues that developing grammatical tools was essential 
in enabling philosophers to distinguish between the use of words as standing for things, and 
the expression of ideas in linguistic constructions. For Charlton, this linguistic distinction 
rests upon the metaphysical distinction between those entities which exist in nature and those 
which are real, but are relative to our human capacities.21 This entails that any account of 
grammar must assume the existence of entities with essences, or it will be incapable of 
distinguishing between those linguistic construction which have a basis in nature and those 
which do not. Underlying Charlton’s linguistic argument against Wittgenstein is a 
metaphysical argument, in which he accuses Wittgenstein of ignoring the distinction between 
grammar and lexicography due to his rejection of a realist metaphysics. We can add to 
Charlton’s charge that this rejection concerns both human nature and the nature of the entities 
human beings interact with; a distinction which is implicit in Charlton, but which requires 
further investigation. If Wittgenstein’s account does indeed deny that there are natural entities 
                                                 
20 Philosophical Investigations, §132. “Der Verwirrungen, die uns beschäftigen, entstehen gleichsam, wenn die 
Sprache leerläuft, nicht wenn sie arbeitet.” Philosophische Untersuchungen. In Tractatus Logico-Philosopicus, 
Ludwig Wittgenstein Werkausgabe Band 1, §132. 
21 This is the classic scholastic Aristotelian distinction between those properties which are in the nature of things 
(ens naturae), and those properties which arise on the basis of our apprehension of things (ens rationis). 
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which have essences then his well-known dictum that “Essence is expressed by grammar”22 
is to be interpreted as saying that essence is created by grammar. 
In order to understand the grounds upon which Charlton attributes a rejection of 
natural essences to Wittgenstein it is important to observe the connection between essence 
and end (telos). In his account of the four causes in the Physics Aristotle draws attention to 
the intrinsic link between essence and telos.23 It is according to the nature of a thing that we 
specify its telos. In the absence of an account of natural essences the world also lacks natural 
ends, and such accounts of nature reduce it to a realm of purpose free facts. This sets up a 
philosophical problem which David Hume highlights: how to bridge the gap between the 
realm of human purpose and the realm of purpose free facts.24 One solution (often attributed 
to Hume) is to argue that all teleological language is reducible to a description of efficient 
causal interactions, which in turn can be analysed as the regular conjunction of objects. It is 
precisely such an account of intentional language which Charlton accuses Wittgenstein of 
developing with his conception of meaning as use: “He could not have used teleological 
connectives to analyse saying, I suspect, because he did not consider explanations in terms of 
purpose a genuine alternative to causal explanation.”25 
Charlton, however, misreads Wittgenstein when he accuses him of explaining 
teleological connectives in causal terms. Wittgenstein’s purpose throughout the Investigations 
is to show us that human intentional behaviour cannot be reduced to a purely external account 
of efficient causation. In the following passage Wittgenstein illustrates the argument that the 
use of words is not explained according to the external effects they bring about: “When I say 
                                                 
22 Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, §371. “Das Wesen ist der Grammatik ausgesprochen.” 
Philosophische Untersuchungen. In Tractatus Logico-Philosopicus, Ludwig Wittgenstein Werkausgabe Band 1, 
§ 371. 
23 See Aristotle, Physics, trans. Robin Waterfield, Oxford World's Classics (Oxford ; New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2008), 49, II,7. 
24 For an introduction to Hume in which examines how he develops the notion of the two realms see Barry 
Stroud, Hume, The Arguments of the Philosophers (London ; New York: Routledge, 1999). 
25 Charlton, Metaphysics and Grammar, 195. By causal explanations Charlton here has in mind efficient 
causation, not the wider notion of cause found in Aristotle.  
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that the orders ‘Bring me sugar’ and ‘Bring me milk’ make sense, but not the combination 
‘Milk me sugar’, that does not mean that the utterance of this combination of words has no 
effect.”26 When Wittgenstein argues that grammar describes, but does not explain the use of 
signs,27 he is attacking precisely the kind of causal explanation Charlton accuses him of 
holding: “if it were shewn how the words, ‘Come to me’ act on the person addressed, so that 
finally, given certain conditions, the muscles of his legs are innervated, and so on—should 
we feel that the sentence lost the character of a sentence?”28 Wittgenstein places these 
remarks on human intentional behaviour in the wider context of his discussion of the nature 
of grammar and meaning. Hence, in his next remark Wittgenstein urges: “I want to say: It is 
primarily the apparatus of our ordinary language, of our word-language, that we call 
language; and then other things by analogy or comparability with this.”29 We have seen how 
for Wittgenstein language is autonomous as it is not answerable to an exterior goal, but that 
the rules of grammar are internal analogously to the way in which the rules of games are 
internal. The account which Wittgenstein gives of human intentional behaviour is also 
grammatical; he argues that goal directed human behaviour is not explained causally, but 
grammatically. This description of human behaviour does not begin by assuming a set of pre-
given ends, which act as efficient causes explaining human behaviour; rather, it is only by 
describing the grammar of human behaviour that we can see the reasons why human beings 
act as they do. 
                                                 
26 Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, §498. “Wenn ich sage der Befehl ‘Bring mir Zucker!’ und ‘Bring 
mir Milch!’ hat Sinn, aber nicht die Kombination ‘Milch mir Zucher’, so heißt das nicht, daß das Aussprechen 
dieser Wortverbindung keine Wirkung hat.” Philosophische Untersuchungen. In Tractatus Logico-Philosopicus, 
Ludwig Wittgenstein Werkausgabe Band 1, §498. 
27 See Philosophical Investigations, §496. 
28 Ibid., §493. “Wenn aber gezeigt würde, in welche Weise die Worte ‘Komm zu mir!’ auf den Angesprochenen 
einwirken, sodaß am Schlußunter gewissen Bedingungen seine Beinmuskeln innerviert werden, etc. – würde 
jener Satz damit für uns den Charakter des Satzes verlieren.” Philosophische Untersuchungen. In Tractatus 
Logico-Philosopicus, Ludwig Wittgenstein Werkausgabe Band 1, §493. 
29 Philosophical Investigations, §494. “Ich will sagen: Der Apparat unserer gewöhnlichen Sprache, unserer 
Wortsprache, ist vor allem das, was wir ‘Sprache’ nennen; und dann anderes nach seiner Analogie oder 
Vergleichbarkeit mit ihr.” Philosophische Untersuchungen. In Tractatus Logico-Philosopicus, Ludwig 
Wittgenstein Werkausgabe Band 1, §494. 
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3.1.3 Teleology and Universal Understanding 
So are we to dismiss Charlton’s criticism of Wittgenstein or is there something he is 
getting at despite his misreading of Wittgenstein’s account of intentional language? Although 
Charlton misreads Wittgenstein his charge still has some purchase, because it turns on the 
argument that lacking a wider context of natural teleologies any attempt to show how 
grammatical rules have application in our lives will fail. Wittgenstein’s emphasis on the 
autonomy of language, coupled with his lack of commitment to a realist metaphysics, risks 
setting forth a picture of human behaviour as consisting in self-contained practices which 
float free of nature. If we return to the contrast Wittgenstein makes between practices with 
external goals and those whose goals are internal, then it is clear that he regards human 
intentional behaviour as consisting in the later kind of practice. We argued in chapter two, 
however, that this distinction is not hard and fast, insofar as practices with external goals can 
alter our conception of those goals through shaping tools to obtain those goals. Conversely, 
practices with internal goals need to be understood in the wider context of human life. At the 
end of chapter two we argued that the unity of grammar is given through the unity of human 
life, which is rooted in human nature. The interpretation we have been developing of 
Wittgenstein supports this argument, but the question arises as to how we understand the 
unity of human life. If we stress the analogy between language and games then we have a 
way of understanding the unity of human practices which highlights their autonomy, but 
which fails to do justice to their connection to a wider context of human life. It could 
therefore be argued that too strong an emphasis on the analogy between language and games 
can be misleading. 
Rhees, one of the early commentators on Wittgenstein makes this very point in the 
following passage: “The unity of the language is not the unity of a system. It is not the unity 
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of a game either. It is the unity of a common intelligibility; that is all. We can understand one 
another, we can understand what is said. The language hangs together.”30 Rhees argues that 
by focusing on the application of technical uses of language, such as mathematics, 
Wittgenstein gives too thin an account of the form of human life: “a form of life or way of 
living is not a way of working, and it is not an institution.”31 For Rhees language is not 
something which involves a particular application of human understanding, such as a game; 
rather it is that through which human growth takes place: “a language is something that can 
have a literature. This is where it is so different from chess. It must be a language of people; 
and in which people develop; in which people develop their own lives, their own ideas their 
own literature. (Which is possible to speak ‘with a face of one’s own’.)”32 
We will discuss in the next chapter whether Wittgenstein’s emphasis on the analogy 
between language and games led him to hold a narrow conception of language. In chapter 2, 
section 2.3.6, we noted how Wittgenstein’s reflections on ‘seeing as’ challenge reductive 
visions of human life. At the same time it is clear that the misuse of the language/game 
analogy, stressing the autonomy of rules while ignoring their application in human life, can 
blind us to the wider context of understanding within which particular uses of language find 
their application. If Wittgenstein in the development of his later works sought to root our 
conceptual abilities in our natural human capacities and reaction, then Rhees’ charge against 
Wittgenstein turns on the accusation that he reduces our natural human capacities and 
reactions to “a way of working.” Like Charlton he accuses Wittgenstein of offering a 
pragmatic conception of language, and illustrates his accusation with a reference to the 
builders’ language-game: “the builders could not say anything to one another, since they 
could not ask one another for an explanation of what has been said.”33 For Rhees, 
                                                 
30 Rhees, Wittgenstein and the Possibility of Discourse, 135. 
31 Ibid., 51. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Ibid., 50. 
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Wittgenstein’s mistake is his failure to place this language game into the context of a wider 
context of understanding, without which the practice of the builders makes no sense. 
In defending Wittgenstein against Charlton’s accusations we argued that he uses 
language-games as objects of comparison, rather than as theoretical re-constructions of our 
linguistic practices. The purpose of the builders’ language-game is not to give an explanation 
of meaning, but to point to the wider context within which such practices find application. 
Insofar as he fails to see how Wittgenstein points to the wider context of human 
understanding Rhees is also guilty of misunderstanding his use of language-games. As with 
Charlton, however, the wider charge which Rhees brings against Wittgenstein is not 
dependent upon his particular reading of the language/game analogy. Just as Charlton 
concludes that Wittgenstein’s account of teleological terms requires a wider context of 
natural teleologies, Rhees argues that Wittgenstein’s account of following rules in a game 
only makes sense in the wider context of the human search for understanding.34 For both 
Charlton and Rhees, Wittgenstein account of language gets things the wrong way round. 
Rather than beginning with the wider contexts within which particular uses of language make 
sense, they argue that Wittgenstein makes the mistake of starting with particular practices (for 
Charlton this is Wittgenstein’s account of use, for Rhees his application of specialized uses of 
language), and thus misunderstands the nature of language.35 In seeking to avoid the mistake 
of giving an external account of the use of words Wittgenstein goes too far in the opposite 
direction of stressing the autonomy of language. He places too strong an emphasis on the 
internal nature of grammar, leaving the question of the role played by grammar in human life 
opaque.  
                                                 
34 This is not to say that Rhees would agree with Charlton’s account of natural teleologies.  
35 Again what is required is a dialectical tension which moves between particular applications of language and 
the wider context of our human nature. Charlton and Rhees can be seen as accusing Wittgenstein of failing to 
respect this tension by placing too much emphasis on particular applications.  
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Charlton and Rhees argue that a much richer conception of our natural human 
capacities and reactions is required than that provided by Wittgenstein. The aspects of our 
human nature to which they draw attention can be seen as complementing each other. The 
natural teleologies without which Charlton argues we cannot make sense of our teleological 
practices include both the teleology of the entities we encounter in the world and our own 
natural human inclinations (including those pre-concpetual inclinations we share with other 
animals). We risk misunderstanding these natural inclinations, however, if we fail to see how 
they are transformed by human understanding.36 It is this growth in understanding which is 
the goal of human life. On the other hand, if the role of our natural inclinations is ignored 
then we fail to see how this growth in understanding is that of the particular kind of creature 
we are. Any account of human nature must wrestle with the dialectical tension between the 
conceptual and the pre-conceptual. This is precisely the tension which in chapter two we 
argued Wittgenstein struggles with in his later works. At the same time the accusation still 
remains that lacking a metaphysics of natural teleologies, Wittgenstein, despite his intention 
of avoiding idealism, developed an account of grammar which spins free of any application 
in our lives. In order to further investigate this accusation we will turn in the next section to 
the criticism O’Callaghan develops of certain Wittgensteinian accounts of the relationship 
between the linguistic and the extra-linguistic, notably that developed by John McDowell.37 
 
 
                                                 
36 I am not suggesting here that Charlton makes this mistake, but it is important to place his account of natural 
human teleologies in this wider context. This context is implicit in the complementarity which Charlton sees 
between syntax and lexicography, but placing this complementarity into a wider dialectical context of 
understand helps to bring out its implications. 
37 There is a distinction between the pre-linguistic and the extra-linguistic, insofar as the former implies 
reactions and practices which are prior to our linguistic behaviour, whereas the extra-linguistic lies outside the 
linguistic sphere. In the following discussions it is important to keep this distinction in mind, as our argument 
will turn on the assertion that the pre-linguistic is not equivalent to the extra-linguistic as McDowell understands 
(and criticises) it. 
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 First and Second Nature: Distinguishing the Conceptual from the 3.2
Natural? 
In Mind and World John McDowell sets out to show that the conceptual and the 
empirical are not externally connected as two separate spheres, but rather: “conceptual 
capacities, capacities that belong to spontaneity, are already at work in experiences 
themselves.”38 McDowell rejects the idea that empirical content consists in: “bare presences 
that are supposed to constitute the ultimate grounds of empirical judgement.”39 Conversely, 
McDowell argues against characterizations of our conceptual abilities which present them as 
unconstrained by the empirical, resulting in: “a coherentism which threatens to disconnect 
thought from reality.”40 To this end McDowell is influenced, through the work of Peter 
Strawson, by Kant,41 and in particular Kant’s dictum that: “Thoughts without content are 
empty,”42 which must be read together with: “the other half of Kant’s remark: ‘intuitions 
without concepts are blind.’”43 The other philosopher whose influence McDowell singles out 
is Wilfred Sellars and in particular Sellars’ essay Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind.44 It 
is in this essay that Sellars develops his critique of the myth of the given, which is the myth 
that empirical content consists of bare presences. McDowell uses Kant and Sellars to argue 
that without receptivity to empirical content the spontaneity of our conceptual abilities results 
in empty concepts, while conversely experience conceived as lying outside the conceptual is 
blind. In response to these opposed dangers McDowell sets his task as developing a third 
option which avoids the mistake of an empty coherentism, while at the same time enabling us 
                                                 
38 John Henry McDowell, Mind and World : With a New Introduction, 1st Harvard University Press paperback 
ed. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1996), 24. 
39 Ibid. 
40 Ibid. 
41 Ibid., viii. For Strawson’s reading of Kant see, P. F. Strawson, The Bounds of Sense : An Essay on Kant's 
Critique of Pure Reason, University Paperbacks 572 (London New York: Methuen ; distributed by Harper & 
Row, Barnes & Noble Import Division, 1975). 
42 Immanuel Kant, Immanuel Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Norman Kemp Smith (London: Macmillan, 
1929), A51/B75. 
43 McDowell, Mind and World : With a New Introduction, 4. 
44 Wilfrid Sellars, Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1997). 
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(without falling into the myth of the given) to: “acknowledge that independent reality exerts a 
rational control over our thinking.” 45 As such, he can be seen as attempting to accomplish 
what Anscombe describes as steering in that narrow channel which avoids: “the falsehoods of 
idealism, and the stupidities of empiricist realism.”46 McDowell identifies a kindred spirit in 
Wittgenstein, and quotes the following passage from the Investigations as evidence that 
Wittgenstein rejects the myth of the given: “When we say, and mean, that such-and–such is 
the case, we—and our meaning—do not stop anywhere short of the fact; but we mean: this—
is—so.”47 McDowell reads Wittgenstein here as confirming that empirical reality is not 
located “outside the conceptual sphere,”48 and as thus expressing the idea that there is no gap 
between thought and the world. 
McDowell, however, sees himself as working within the tradition of idealism, and is 
influenced in particular by the absolute idealism of Hegel. Although Kant provides 
McDowell with the key to reconciling the rational with the empirical, he argues that in 
drawing a boundary around the conceptual and thus recognizing: “a reality outside the sphere 
of the conceptual,”49 Kant betrayed his own intentions by slighting, “the independence of the 
reality to which our senses give us access.”50 If the reality which lies beyond our senses is the 
true independent reality, then that which is given through the senses is not truly independent. 
By contrast, McDowell argues that the picture given by Hegel of the conceptual as 
unbounded: “is not offensive to common sense, but precisely protective of it.”51 If the 
conceptual realm has no outer boundary then there is no contrast between that which is given 
within this realm and that which lies beyond it, and without this contrast there is no obstacle 
                                                 
45 McDowell, Mind and World : With a New Introduction, 27. 
46 Anscombe, "The Question of Linguistic Idealism," 115. 
47 McDowell, Mind and World : With a New Introduction, 27. This quotation is taken from Wittgenstein, 
Philosophical Investigations, §95. 
48 McDowell, Mind and World : With a New Introduction, 26. 
49 Ibid., 44. 
50 Ibid. 
51 Ibid. 
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to the common sense notion: “that independent reality exerts a rational control over our 
thinking.”52 
There is, however, a key difference between McDowell and Hegel. Whereas for 
Hegel there is ultimately a unity between the conceptual realm of human understanding and 
the empirical realm of science,53 for McDowell modern natural science describes a realm 
which is distinct from the conceptual: “We must sharply distinguish natural-scientific 
intelligibility from the kind of intelligibility something acquires when we situate it in the 
logical space of reasons.”54 This distinction is developed by McDowell in the Aristotelian 
contrast he makes between first nature and second nature. Whereas first nature consists in the 
law bound realm of science, second nature is the development of human capacities for 
reasoning: “Human beings acquire a second nature in part by being initiated into conceptual 
capacities, whose interrelations belong in the logical space of reasons.”55 McDowell draws 
upon Aristotle’s writings on ethics and virtue to argue that the development of our capacities 
for practical reasoning is part of our human nature, and that nature should not be confined 
only to the law bound realm of science.56 He seeks to combine the Kantian notion that 
practical rationality is autonomous, with the Aristotelian emphasis on human nature as the 
basis for our reasoning capacities. 
The task which McDowell sets himself is akin to the one which we ascribed to 
Wittgenstein in chapter two: attempting to preserve the autonomy of grammar, while at the 
same time showing how the use of words in rooted in our natural human reactions and 
capacities. McDowell is aware that an emphasis on the autonomy of ethics which fails to 
                                                 
52 Ibid., 27. 
53 For an account of how for Hegel logic and science are ultimately united see: Stanley Rosen, The Idea of 
Hegel's Science of Logic (Chicago, Illinois : The University of Chicago Press, 2014). 
54 McDowell, Mind and World : With a New Introduction, xix. 
55 Ibid., xx. 
56 In a Wittgensteinian spirit, McDowell develops his understanding of how the autonomy of ethics combines 
with a renewed conception of human nature, see: ‘Non-Cognitivism and Rule Following” printed in Crary and 
Read, The New Wittgenstein, 38-52. 
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show how our ethical practices are rooted in human nature is open to the charge of “rampant 
Platonism.”57 He argues that his own Aristotelian account of practical rationality avoids this 
charge and that his account of second nature: “gives human reason enough of a foothold in 
the realm of law to satisfy any proper respect for modern natural science.”58 He does not, 
however, develop his understanding of the relationship between first and second nature, and 
how this distinction is to be drawn remains a problem. In drawing a strict boundary between 
first nature and second nature McDowell needs to assume an overall perspective from which 
to view what lies within and outside this boundary. This perspective cannot be provided from 
within the realm of the conceptual, as this is unbounded and even talk of that which is 
“within” this realm is liable to mislead. On the other hand the boundary cannot be drawn 
from the side of the natural sciences, as this would involve the very encroachment of science 
into the autonomous realm of reason which McDowell seeks to avoid. 
In the background of McDowell’s argument in Mind and World is the challenge 
which Richard Rorty issues when he deconstructs: “the reconciling of subject and object, or 
thought and world.” 59 In response to Rorty, McDowell characterizes his own project as 
attempting to: “reconcile reason and nature, and the point of doing that is to attain something 
Rorty himself aspires to, a frame of mind in which we would no longer seem to be faced with 
problems that call on philosophy to bring subject and object back together.”60 The question is 
whether the terms by which McDowell understands the relationship between reason and 
nature are such that their reconciliation is possible. There is a danger of conflating the 
distinction between the grammatical and the empirical with that between mental content and 
extra-mental content. In particular, in speaking of the conceptual, it is important to avoid 
intending something analogous to the realm of the mental, with a corresponding contrast 
                                                 
57 McDowell, Mind and World : With a New Introduction, 84. 
58 Ibid. 
59 Ibid., 86. For Rorty’s challenge see: Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Thirtieth-
anniversary ed. (Princeton, N.J. ; Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2009). 
60 McDowell, Mind and World : With a New Introduction, 86. 
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between this realm and that which lies beyond it. Does McDowell, despite his attempts to 
reconcile reason and nature, present first nature in a manner which implies the modern 
opposition between subject and object? 
In order to answer this question we need first to examine briefly how subject and 
object became opposed in modern philosophy. In his article “Justice after Virtue” Charles 
Taylor follows MacIntyre in tracing the theological origins of the split between fact and 
value. 61 Taylor argues that with Occam the conception of the world as a value free realm: 
“waiting to have purpose given to it by sovereign fiat,” took shape. 62 Although this picture of 
the world initially developed to guarantee the sovereignty of God, Taylor argues that: “Later 
something of this conception of freedom is transferred on to man.”63 Just as God has been set 
over and against nature, now it is human beings who are characterized as autonomous 
subjects. The autonomous subject is not constrained by external nature, which is governed by 
laws which are objective and discoverable. The contrast between human autonomy and 
objective, law governed nature is central to the modern dichotomy between reason and 
nature, which sets up the opposition between subject and object McDowell wishes to 
overcome. 
Taylor’s arguments mirror those of other philosophers who criticise the tendencies of 
modern thought which instrumentalize reason and nature, such as those developed by Etienne 
Gilson. In The Unity of Philosophical Experience Gilson places his critique of modernity in 
the context of the kind of metaphysical questions we touched upon in chapter one, section 
1.2. 64 Gilson points to the dialectical nature of metaphysical enquiry by noting that the unity 
of being is given in all concrete sensible perceptions, but that we do not thereby grasp the 
whole science of being. Rather, we move towards the first principle of knowledge, which is 
                                                 
61 Charles Taylor, "Justice after Virtue," in After MacIntyre : Critical Perspectives on the Work of Alasdair 
MacIntyre, ed. John Horton and Susan Mendus (Cambridge: Polity, 1994). 
62 Ibid, 18. 
63 Ibid. 
64 Etienne Gilson, The Unity of Philosophical Experience (San Francisco, CA: Ignatius Press, 1999). 
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the end point of our enquiry as opposed to a given content from which we analytically deduce 
metaphysical principles: 
The first principle brings with it, therefore, both the certitude that metaphysics is the 
science of being as being, and the abstract laws according to which that science has to 
be constructed. Yet the principle of a certain knowledge is not that knowledge; and the 
first principle of human knowledge does not bring us a ready-made science of 
metaphysics, but its principle and its object.65 
 
Gilson here sets the abstract nature of metaphysical laws within the context of the unity of 
being towards which metaphysics is directed. The temptations to which we fall prey when 
doing metaphysics occur when its dialectical nature is ignored and we seek to grasp the 
whole science of being through particular concrete manifestations. Our desire for unity 
tempts us to ignore differences, and thus to mistake the unity present in the concrete 
particular experience for the whole of being. Gilson argues that this mistake has repeatedly 
occurred throughout the history of philosophy: 
That which is but a particular determination of being, or a being, will be invested with 
the universality of being itself. In other words, a particular essence will be credited with 
the universality of being, and allowed to exclude all the other aspects of reality. This is 
precisely what happened to Abailard, to Ockham, to Descartes, to Kant and to Comte.66 
 
The account of first nature given by McDowell as the realm of law does not go wrong 
in presenting an abstraction of reality, but rather in identify reality, or at least that realm 
which is first nature, with that abstraction.67  McDowell’s purpose is to safeguard the 
sovereignty of the realm of reason from the incursions of scientism, while avoiding a 
dichotomy between reason and nature. What he fails to see is that his account of first nature 
must be seen as an abstraction, and not as a full description of physical reality, if it is to have 
any application in relation to his account of second nature. It is only by finding a place within 
a wider account of our physical interactions with the world that the abstract notion of the 
physical as the realm of law can find application in our lives. O’Callaghan argues that the gap 
                                                 
65 Ibid., 253. 
66 Ibid., 254. 
67 Which is not to say that the particular conception of science he presents is beyond question. 
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which McDowell places between first and second nature secures the autonomy of language at 
the cost of failing to show how our linguistic abilities are rooted in our nature:  
Rather than there being an organic and developmental unity between first and second 
nature, as in Aristotle’s account, in McDowell’s account they appear just as 
disconnected as when one was “in the head.” Though he has managed to project the 
mind out there into the world through one’s capacities for proper socialization, calling 
one of the natures “second” does not eliminate the problem; it simply reasserts the 
dualism of what is in second nature, and what is external to it — what is inside the 
space of reasons and what is outside of it.68 
 
In contrast to this dualism between the worlds of first and second nature O’Callaghan argues 
that: “For Aristotle and St. Thomas our mental lives take place where our lives take place, the 
world of our first nature, the world of animals, plants, and inanimate beings.”69 This entails 
that any account of our human rational capacities must show how we are rational animals, 
and thus that we encounter and interact with the world “not just qua animal, and not just qua 
rational, but specifically qua rational animal.”70 In chapter 2, section 2.3 we argued that in his 
later writings Wittgenstein came increasingly to see that our conceptual abilities are rooted in 
our pre-conceptual reactions and capacities. In order to avoid the reduction of the conceptual 
to the pre-conceptual (naïve empiricism) or the opposite danger of subsuming the pre-
conceptual into the conceptual (idealism) we argued that Wittgenstein developed a dialectical 
way of doing philosophy through which he sought to maintain the dialectical tension between 
the conceptual and the pre-conceptual. This returns us to the criticism Wittgenstein makes of 
accounts of meaning which fail to show how our concepts have application in our lives. Like 
Gilson, Wittgenstein challenges us to avoid mistaking the abstraction of the concepts which 
we use to measure reality with reality itself, and points to the wider context of our lives 
within which our concepts find their application. The question we shall ask in the next 
chapter is whether he succeeds in maintaining the dialectical tension required to avoid such 
                                                 
68 O'Callaghan, Thomist Realism and the Linguistic Turn : Toward a More Perfect Form of Existence, 163. 
69 Ibid., 280. 
70 Ibid., 279. 
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mistakes, or if Wittgenstein, like McDowell with his notion of (first) nature, is guilty of 
mistaking an abstraction for reality. 
 
 Conclusion: Grammar, Nature and Dialectic 3.3
The interpretation of Wittgenstein given in chapter one, which highlights the constant 
self-questioning nature of his later works, sees Wittgenstein as fighting against one-step 
solutions to the question of our human nature, and as thus seeking to maintain the dialectical 
tension necessary for any genuine attempt to understand our nature. In chapter two we 
continued our reading of Wittgenstein by attempting to show how through the development 
of his principle of application he sought a realistic understanding of human nature which 
avoids idealism and empiricism. Our intention in developing this reading of Wittgenstein was 
to follow Anscombe in drawing out parallels between Wittgenstein’s philosophy and the 
metaphysical tradition. In this present chapter we have examined the challenges of various 
philosophers who see themselves as sitting in the metaphysical tradition to our reading of 
Wittgenstein. 
The first challenge considered is that issued by Charlton, who argues that 
Wittgenstein fails to distinguish between lexicography and grammar. This results, according 
to Charlton, in Wittgenstein developing an idiosyncratic understanding of grammar and 
adopting a pragmatic theory of meaning. We acquitted Wittgenstein of the charge of holding 
the pragmatic conception of meaning Charlton accuses him of, but at the same time we noted 
that Wittgenstein is vulnerable to the wider charge that in the absence of a teleological 
account of nature any account of meaning will fail. The second challenge we considered was 
that of Rhees, who accuses Wittgenstein of failing to grasp the basis of our linguistic 
practices in the search for universal understanding. O’Callaghan argues that the account of 
human knowledge developed by Aristotle and Aquinas is dialogical in this sense: “Aristotle 
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and St. Thomas took the linguistic expression of understanding to be the normal case, as 
when they discuss taking the nominal definition of a term from the ordinary use of the 
community as the first stage in the process of scientific understanding.”71 It is this notion of 
growth in human understanding through dialogue which Rhees accuses Wittgenstein of 
lacking in his use of the analogy between language and games. In the next chapter we will 
respond to Rhees’ charge by pointing to the dialogical nature of Wittgenstein’s later work. 
This response will not only show the dialogical nature of Wittgenstein’s later philosophy, but 
also indicate whether his dialectical practice is one which brings about a growth in human 
understanding.  
We noted that the challenges which Charlton and Rhees issue to Wittgenstein concern 
what they perceive as a lack of richness in Wittgenstein’s understanding of human nature. 
Charlton points to the need to root any understanding of human nature in an account of the 
concrete experience we have of our physical interactions with the world, while Rhees 
reminds us that in this concrete experience human understanding is already operative and is 
that which human practices both presuppose and have as their goal. As such Charlton and 
Rhees represent the two aspects of metaphysical practice (as understood by Gilson) which 
explain the dialectical nature of metaphysics: the concrete nature of metaphysics, which 
begins with particular determinations of being, and the unity which forms the end point 
towards which all human knowledge tends.72 The question is whether Wittgenstein’s 
dialectical practice can hold together both these aspects; to be rooted in our concrete human 
practices while at the same time showing how those practices pre-suppose and are directed 
towards a growth in human understanding. 
                                                 
71 Ibid., 281. 
72 For a Thomistic account of the dialectical nature of metaphysics see: Alasdair C. MacIntyre, First Principles, 
Final Ends, and Contemporary Philosophical Issues, The Aquinas Lecture (Milwaukee: Marquette University 
Press, 1990). 
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In order to help clarify this question we examined McDowell’s account of the 
relationship between the conceptual and the natural. Here we followed O’Callaghan in 
arguing that the account McDowell gives of the relationship between Aristotelian first and 
second nature does not provide the basis for his claim that our conceptual abilities are rooted 
in our human nature. McDowell’s failure is consequent upon the mistake he makes in 
identifying (first) nature with the abstract measure given by a conception of science as 
concerned with general laws. This mistake results from his failure to see that any account of 
the relationship between the conceptual and the natural must be essentially dialectical, if it is 
to avoid the reduction of conceptual to the natural or subsuming the natural into the 
conceptual. This is to walk in the narrow channel which Anscombe describes as lying 
between idealism and empiricism. It is the path of our human nature, the path of a rational 
animal, by which we seek the whole of being through the concrete reality of the world as we 
interact with it. It is through dialectic that a rational animal seeks knowledge. As O’Callaghan 
notes, for Aquinas it involves progressing: “from a general and confused act based upon 
sense experience to a more general and precise act.”73 In chapter one, section 1.2 we followed 
Hibbs’ argument that theory and practice are held together in dialectic practices. We can now 
add that dialectic itself is both theory and practice, and as such those who practice dialectic 
must constantly ask how they are holding these together in tension. A failure to do so results 
in a one-sided emphasis on either practice or theory, which results in a distorted presentation 
of human nature. Gilson helps us to see how ignoring the dialectical nature of metaphysics 
results in the kind of physicalist, abstracted understanding of nature which McDowell 
identifies with first nature. This is the other side of the argument which Charlton advances. 
For Charlton any account of our linguistic practices which denies their basis in natural 
teleologies reduces them to the level of efficient causality, and thus fails to account for their 
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dialogical nature. In the next chapter we will ask whether in his later writings Wittgenstein 
succeeded in maintaining a dialectical tension between the pre-conceptual and the conceptual, 
by developing a play on the border between them and thus avoiding a reductive, abstract 
characterization of the pre-conceptual. 
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4 RECOVERING NATURE, LEARNING TO SEE 
 How Dialectical is Wittgenstein? Two Challenges. 4.1
The aim of this thesis is to examine the relevance of Wittgenstein’s writings for a 
renewal of moral theology. In order to narrow the scope of this enquiry we have focused 
upon the question of nature, and argued that in his later philosophy Wittgenstein attempts to 
return us to our natural ways of being human: his aim is to free the fly from the fly-bottle. In 
chapter one, section 1.3.2 we noted how Wittgenstein is critical of metaphysics insofar as it 
involves the adoption of false pictures which mislead us into thinking that there are one-step 
solutions to our philosophical problems: “There is not a philosophical method, though there 
are indeed methods, like different therapies.”1 Metaphysics, however, is not the source of our 
imprisonment. Wittgenstein came to see that it is our misuse of language which results in bad 
metaphysics, and that any attempt to return us to our natural human practices must address 
our more general human tendencies to misuse language.2 To this end the various strategies 
which he developed in his later work can be seen as therapies through which he attempts to 
help us see our sickness, and to find a cure by returning to our natural ways of acting. 
The therapeutic nature of Wittgenstein’s later thought sits comfortably with the 
contemporary move away from metaphysics and grand narrative, enabling those who 
emphasis this side of his thought to preserve a role for philosophy while avoiding 
metaphysical commitments. There is certainly textual support for a therapeutic reading of 
Wittgenstein, and we have seen how in his post-1945 writings he was influenced by Gestalt 
theory. The self-questioning nature of Wittgenstein’s later thought, however, evades any 
                                                 
1 Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, §133. “Es gibt nicht eine Method der Philosophie, wohl aber gibt 
es Methoden, gleichsam verschiedene Therapien.” Philosophische Untersuchungen. In Tractatus Logico-
Philosopicus, Ludwig Wittgenstein Werkausgabe Band 1, §133. 
2 For an argument linking Wittgenstein’s understanding of the misuse of language with more general human 
wrong doing see Philip R. Shields, Logic and Sin in the Writings of Ludwig Wittgenstein (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 1993). 
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attempt to offer a single interpretation of what he is doing. The comparison with the 
metaphysical tradition which following Anscombe we have developed in this thesis provides 
another perspective on what Wittgenstein is trying to achieve in this later works. Here the 
therapeutic nature of his thought calls to mind Plato’s objective of freeing us from that which 
blinds us to the truth.3 There are those, such as Victor Preller, who have read Wittgenstein in 
this tradition, particularly drawing parallels with the Platonism of St Augustine.4 
We have argued that understanding the dialectical nature of Wittgenstein’s later work 
is central to both interpreting what he is doing and in drawing parallels with the metaphysical 
tradition. In chapters one and two we offered a reading of Wittgenstein’s philosophy as 
attempting a realism which avoids empiricism and idealism. Chapter three examined two 
challenges to Wittgenstein which placed in question his success in achieving realism in 
philosophy; in particular, the suspicion remains that despite his attempts to overcome the 
modern dichotomy between subject and object the manner in which he draws a boundary 
between grammatical and empirical questions reinforces the modern picture of the mind as a 
realm of self-contained content. 
In this chapter we will conclude our interpretation of Wittgenstein and the parallels 
between his philosophy and the metaphysical tradition by asking whether in his later writings 
he succeeds in developing a dialectical form of philosophy which avoids idealism and 
empiricism. To this end we will examine two related challenges which place in question the 
dialectical nature of Wittgenstein’s later work. The first challenge concerns the relationship 
between the conceptual and the pre-conceptual. The problem here is how to understand these 
two realms and the interaction between them without lapsing into idealism or falling into 
                                                 
3 Josef Pieper argues that central to Plato’s philosophy was his attempt to overcome sophistical abuses of 
language. See Josef Pieper, Abuse of Language, Abuse of Power (San Francisco, Calif.: Ignatius Press, 1992). 
Later in this chapter, however, we will examine how Rhees argues that Wittgenstein’s therapies fail to do justice 
to Plato’s insight that philosophy concerns the common human search for understanding.  
4 For a collection of essays dedicated to Victor Preller which draws connections between Augustinism, 
Thomism and Wittgenstein see Jeffrey Stout and Robert MacSwain, Grammar and Grace : Reformulations of 
Aquinas and Wittgenstein (London: SCM, 2004). 
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empiricism. How are we to avoiding reducing one to the other, while respecting the 
dialectical tension in the boundary between them? In answering this question we will turn to 
Mulhall’s reading of Wittgenstein as concerned with the question of origins, and in particular 
how we acquire language on the boundary between the conceptual and the pre-conceptual. 
We will follow Mulhall (who is influenced by Cavell) in arguing that the purpose of the 
various language-games Wittgenstein developes is to encourage us to enter into the play 
between the conceptual and the pre-conceptual. Such play helps us to overcome the 
deformation of our desires which takes place when we treat language as an instrument for 
realizing our will. 
The examination of the boundary between the pre-conceptual and the conceptual 
brings us to Wittgenstein’s post-1945 writings on psychology, and the central importance the 
phenomenon of seeing aspects has in throwing light on that border. Wittgenstein’s interest in 
seeing aspects is part of his engagement with Gestalt psychology and we will examine the 
similarities and differences between Wittgenstein’s remarks on psychology and Köhler’s 
Gestalt psychology, before asking whether Wittgenstein’s way of distinguishing between the 
grammatical and the empirical is consistent with his understanding of the relationship 
between the conceptual and the pre-conceptual. We will argue that Wittgenstein requires (and 
shows evidence of developing) a richer sense of the pre-conceptual than his comments 
concerning the empirical will allow. In dividing human enquiry into the grammatical and 
empirical, identifying the former with conceptual clarification and the later with the 
discovery of efficient causes, Wittgenstein leaves no room for an investigation of physical 
nature which allows us to characterize nature as anything other than a realm of efficient 
causation. His own dialectical practices, however, open the path to the use of various 
grammatical devices such as analogy and negation in characterizing the pre-conceptual in a 
manner which is not reductive. At the same time we will argue that these practices are still 
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some distance from an adequate understanding of the pre-conceptual, such as that attempted 
by Aristotle in his Physics. In particular Wittgenstein does not allow for the pre-conceptual 
physical play through which we first learn about the physical world. 
The second challenge to the dialectical nature of Wittgenstein’s philosophy follows 
on from the first and concerns the teleological basis for dialectic. In chapter three we 
examined Charlton’s charge against Wittgenstein. Charlton argues that in the absence of a 
teleology of nature Wittgenstein’s account of language collapses the distinction between 
grammar and rhetoric to produce a purely pragmatic account of language as use. We noted 
that there are two related aspects of teleology which are relevant for Charlton’s argument, 
although he does not tend to distinguish between them. Firstly, there is the teleological nature 
of natural kinds in general, which Charlton argues is essential to making the distinction 
between grammar and lexicography. Secondly, there is the teleological nature of our 
linguistic practices themselves. Here the question of the end (or ends) of our linguistic 
practices is raised, and Charlton argues that in the absence of such a teleological account our 
linguistic practices are characterized in pragmatic terms. The question here concerns the 
nature of human desire, and the danger of accounts which give a mechanical understanding of 
desires as purely efficient causes.  
Both these aspects of teleology are required in any account of language which is to 
avoid the reduction of meaning to pragmatic use. The first aspect concerns the interplay 
between human beings and the world, and the dialectical character of this interplay. The 
second opens us to the questions raised by Rhees concerning the dialogical nature of our 
linguistic practices, which he argues presupposes a search for common understanding prior to 
particular language-games. These two aspects of teleology combine the two aspects of 
dialectic which Gilson describes in the practice of metaphysics. The second aspect 
corresponds to the search for the first principle of all enquiry; whereas the first corresponds to 
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the concrete nature of metaphysical questioning. In order to prevent dialectic prematurely 
closing in a false unity it is essential to keep both these aspects in mind. In his attempt to 
develop realism in philosophy Wittgenstein can be read as trying to keep these two aspects of 
dialectic in tension: avoiding the false unity which reduces meaning to the level of efficient 
physical causes (empiricism), while at the same time guarding against subliming logic in an 
account of our linguistic practices which floats free of any basis in our nature (idealism).5 
We will examine the light cast upon both aspects of teleological by Wittgenstein’s 
later thought. Concerning the first aspect (natural teleology in general) we will argue 
(drawing on the discussion of the relationship between the conceptual and the pre-conceptual 
in section 4.2) that although Wittgenstein shows signs of developing a non-reductive account 
of the pre-conceptual, this is still some distance from the kind of account developed by 
Aristotle in the Physics. In the absence of such an account of physical nature it is 
questionable whether Wittgenstein succeeded in developing the kind of realism he sought. 
Despite this deficiency, however, we will argue that by directing our attention to the 
boundary between the conceptual and the pre-conceptual Wittgenstein engages with that 
concrete reality which Gilson characterizes as the starting point for metaphysics. In 
particular, the dialectical tension Wittgenstein develops in his investigations into this 
boundary helps us to avoid the danger of reducing what is on one side of the boundary to the 
other.  
A respond to the second aspect of teleology (the teleological nature of human 
practices) will involve an examination of Wittgenstein’s remarks on human will and desire. 
                                                 
5 Mulhall discusses Wittgenstein’s remarks in the Investigations §§89-108 on logic as sublime. He notes how 
Wittgenstein does not directly state what he means by the sublime in these remarks, but offers chains of images 
and metaphors (see Mulhall, Inheritance and Originality : Wittgenstein, Heidegger, Kierkegaard, 87-93. These 
include the sublime as the basis or foundation of the empirical, the sublime as a refinement of experience, the 
sublime as the exalted or ideal and the counter-side of this as that which is: “a limitation, as fencing us off from 
something-even if only a void inimical to human life and its conditions.” Ibid., 89. Through the use of these 
images and metaphors Wittgenstein seeks to rid us of the notion that logic is a structure underlying our 
experience, which can be refined and presented as the transcendent basis of life. It is in this context that he states 
his purpose of returning us to the rough ground of our actual linguistic practices, see Wittgenstein, 
Philosophical Investigations, § 107. 
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Rhees charges Wittgenstein with over reliance on the language-game analogy, which 
prevents him from seeing that the search for common understanding is prior to any particular 
application of language. This common search entails that there is a desire for understanding 
which precedes the realization of our particular desires in particular uses of language. In 
chapter three we argued that the criticisms made by Rhees and Charlton turn on the question 
of whether Wittgenstein, in stressing the autonomy of language, places too much emphasis on 
the internal nature of the rules of grammar and on the analogy between language and games. 
The danger lies in overstating the internal nature of grammar language, such that grammar 
floats free of our natural human capacities. A parallel problem emerges with Wittgenstein’s 
account of human desire. In seeking to avoid an account of human desire which reduces it to 
a pre-given set of particular desires, there is the danger of cutting desire away from any basis 
in our nature. This risks an account of desire which emphasises autonomy to such a degree 
that the language becomes merely an instrument for the realization of our will.  
We have followed Mulhall in understanding the various language-games and 
strategies Wittgenstein develops in his later writings as helping us to overcome the 
deformation of our desires which occurs when we see language purely in instrumental terms. 
This reading is in part a response to Rhees and stresses the dialectical and self-questioning 
nature of Wittgenstein’s later works. In particular it opens a reading of Wittgenstein as 
seeking to avoid the reduction of desire to a pre-given set of particular desires, while at the 
same time overcoming the temptation of turning language into merely an instrument for our 
will. It also provides a link between our responses to the first and second challenges. The 
question of the relationship between the pre-conceptual and the conceptual is also the 
question of the relationship between our pre-conceptual desires and the desire for common 
understanding. This brings us back to the question of realism without empiricism or idealism, 
and whether the dialectical practices developed by Wittgenstein in his later works can be read 
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in continuity with the dialectical practice which Hibbs argues is central to metaphysics. Does 
Wittgenstein avoid or succumb to the temptations which Gilson shows philosophers falling 
into?  
In the next section (4.2) we will examine how, from the resources of Wittgenstein’s 
later philosophy, a response may be made to the first challenge: does Wittgenstein maintain a 
dialectical tension between the conceptual and the pre-conceptual? Section (4.3) will then 
attempt to respond to the second challenge: in the absence of an explicit teleology of nature 
does Wittgenstein’s account of language collapse into pragmatism? These two sections will 
cover interrelated themes, and in the course of the discussion we will attempt to bring out 
how Wittgenstein’s account of meaning also entails certain things about the nature of human 
desire. In both sections there is no intention of implying that Wittgenstein would have 
responded to these challenges in such a manner, but following Anscombe we hold that a 
fruitful dialogue between Wittgenstein and the metaphysical tradition is possible. The 
relevance of these discussions for contemporary questions in moral theology will be 
developed in chapters five, six and seven. Again, a guiding theme will be how Wittgenstein 
in his later works develops an account of situated freedom which avoids the empty formalism 
of idealism, while at the same time not falling into the physical determinism of empiricism. 
In these chapters we will argue that there are various parallels between Wittgenstein’s 
account of situated freedom and that of moral theologians such as Jean Porter and Servais 
Pinckaers. These parallels will provide the basis for a dialogue between Wittgenstein and 
moral theology, which throws light on both conversation partners. 
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 Dialectical Tension: The Conceptual and the Pre-Conceptual 4.2
4.2.1 The Conceptual and the Empirical.  
In chapter three we examined how the distinction Wittgenstein draws between the 
grammatical the empirical is understood by commentators such as McDowell to entail a clear 
division between the conceptual world and the non-conceptual world. McDowell 
characterises the conceptual world along Aristotelian lines, but draws a sharp distinction 
between it and the non-conceptual world of nature which is investigated by the modern 
natural sciences.6 This raises the question of how these two worlds are connected, and 
prompts O’Callaghan’s criticism of McDowell that his impoverished account of first nature 
cannot act as the basis for the development of second nature. Gordon Baker and Peter Hacker 
also provide a thin conception of the non-conceptual abilities which are required for the 
development of our conceptual abilities: “Conceptual abilities rest on brute, preconceptual 
abilities.”7 These brute abilities consist for Baker and Hacker in our ability to be trained, and 
involve our basic human reactions: “the linguistic training undergone prior to teaching and 
explaining takes place within the framework of the natural order of things. It assumes a wide 
variety range of natural human discriminatory abilities, recognitional reactions, imitative 
propensities and behavioural patterns.”8 The range of abilities Baker and Hacker here refer to 
seem to involve more than just “brute” reactions and the question arises as to whether they 
can be characterized in the reductive terms Baker and Hacker’s division between the 
conceptual and the non-conceptual realm implies. In particular, it is questionable whether 
such abilities can be given non-teleological descriptions. For example, our ability to imitate 
involves copying others as they act to achieve certain goals. The mistake is to identify the 
                                                 
6 For Hacker’s Aristotelian account of human nature see P. M. S. Hacker, Human Nature : The Categorial 
Framework (Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010). Throughout this work Hacker is insistent that he is making 
grammatical remarks and not indulging in physics or metaphysics. 
7 Gordon P. Baker and P. M. S. Hacker, Wittgenstein [Electronic Resource] : Understanding and Meaning. Part 
2 Exegesis Exegesis 1-184, (Oxford, UK Malden, MA: Oxford, UK Malden, MA : Blackwell Pub., 2005). 305. 
8 Wittgenstein [Electronic Resource] : Understanding and Meaning. Part I, Essays, (Oxford, UK Malden, MA: 
Oxford, UK Malden, MA : Blackwell Pub., 2005). 30-31. 
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pre-conceptual with a given non-conceptual content. Through thus fixing the pre-conceptual 
the illusion is given that the autonomy of language is preserved, but this comes at the price of 
positing a realm of nature which has little, if any, connection with the conceptual realm. 
MacDowell, Hacker and Baker aim to protect the autonomy of grammar from the misuse of 
science. This is something, as we have seen, which lies at the heart of Wittgenstein’s work. 
The cost of this protection, however, is to reintroduce the kind of pre-given characterization 
of nature as a realm of facts which Wittgenstein abandoned after the Tractatus. 
The confusions which we find in McDowell, Baker and Hacker are a result of how 
they distinguish between the form and the content of concepts. We saw in chapter two that 
the task of showing how the form and content of propositions are held together is at the 
centre of Wittgenstein’s notion of application in the Tractatus. This is achieved in the 
Tractatus through the theory of simple objects. After he had rejected this theory the challenge 
lying before Wittgenstein was how to avoid reducing form to content (empiricism) or content 
to form (idealism), while at the same time showing how they are related. The realism which 
Wittgenstein sought in his later works can be seen as turning upon this challenge. In their 
desire to preserve the autonomy of language McDowell, Baker and Hacker fall into the trap 
of splitting reality into two realms, the sum of which does not equal the whole. On the one 
had there is the realm of grammar, which is autonomous and not determined according to 
anything beyond itself. On the other hand there is the realm of nature as law given 
regularities. Form and content are clearly distinguished, but at the cost of creating two limited 
wholes, the connection between which is minimal. The picture is further complicated by the 
distinction which McDowell introduces between first nature and second nature, and in a 
parallel manner by Hacker’s distinction between nature as articulated by grammar and nature 
as discovered by the natural sciences.9 Again the motive is to safe-guard the autonomy of 
                                                 
9 See Hacker, Human Nature : The Categorial Framework, 7. 
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grammar, but this comes at the cost of swallowing empirical content into the conceptual 
realm.10 
In contrast to this dichotomy between the empirical and the conceptual Gilson points 
to the dialectical nature of philosophy, in which the distinction between form and content is 
maintained, but there is no once and for all way of fixing this division; and thus we avoid the 
error that a: “particular essence will be credited with the universality of being, and allowed to 
exclude all the other aspects of reality.” 11 Rather, there is a constant dialectical tension within 
which the boundary between the empirical and the conceptual is maintained, without the need 
for recourse to a pre-determined characterization of the empirical. This entails that the pre-
conceptual is not to be identified with an abstracted realm of law or brute regularities, but is 
the familiar world of entities which we encounter in our everyday interactions with the world. 
The distinction between that which exists in itself prior to being cognized and that which 
results from our cognitive activity is expressed in the Scholastic distinction between ens 
naturae and ens rationis. Our ability to make this distinction does not, however, depend upon 
the adoption of a pre-given ontology. 
 
4.2.2 A Return to Origins and Dialectical Play 
In chapter three we argued that in his post-1945 works Wittgenstein began to develop 
a richer account of the pre-conceptual. It would be wrong to think, however, that this richer 
account consisted in the replacement of one pre-given ontology with another, such that an 
account of the pre-conceptual as the realm of brute facts was replaced by one in which facts 
are seen as more complex. The reading of Wittgenstein we have been developing stresses the 
dialectical nature of the practice of philosophy he developed, through which he sought to 
                                                 
10 In his introduction to Adorno Simon Jarvis mentions McDowell along with Sellars as examples of analytical 
philosophers who follow Hegel in arguing against any sense of the empirical which is not given within the 
conceptual, and who thus set up the problem which motivated Adorno concerning how to return to the real. See 
Simon Jarvis, Adorno : A Critical Introduction, Key Contemporary Thinkers (Cambridge: Polity, 1998), 149. 
11 Gilson, The Unity of Philosophical Experience, 254. 
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avoid one-step solutions to our philosophical problems and to achieve a realism which avoids 
the traps of empiricism and idealism. This entails that the question of the relationship 
between the conceptual and the pre-conceptual is not one that can be resolved through the 
drawing of a neat boundary between them. In chapter two we saw how Wittgenstein 
abandoned the Tractatus’ search for the general form of the proposition and with it the notion 
that a general account can be given of the distinction between the grammatical and the 
empirical. Wittgenstein came to see that any account of the application of concepts must look 
to the particular subject area and context of application. This moved him in the dialectical 
direction which is characteristic of the Investigations. 
The Investigations can be seen as dialectical in two related dimensions. Firstly, it 
seeks to maintain the tension between the conceptual and the pre-conceptual without reducing 
one to the other. Secondly, the varying voices and perspectives offered open the work to 
dialogue and discussion through which we may grow together in understanding. Both these 
dimensions speak against approaches to philosophy which begin with the individual subject 
grasping either principles or empirical content, from which reality is constructed. They also 
tell against the mistake of assuming that in seeking to return our ordinary linguistic practices 
we have a pre-given overview of these practices. Wittgenstein’s dialectical practices aim to 
prevent us from grasping at simple one-step solutions to philosophical problems. As such 
they open up the question of origins, enabling us to pose this question in a way which helps 
us to overcome the temptation to snatch at answers which Gilson warns against. 
In chapter one we followed Mulhall in highlighting the self-questioning nature of 
Wittgenstein’s later work. Mulhall argues that Wittgenstein’s choice to begin the 
Investigations with a passage from Augustine which concerns the acquisition of language 
raises the question of origins. Augustine’s Confessions is a work about origins, and in 
choosing the passage from the Confessions which deals with the origins of childhood speech 
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Wittgenstein can be read as also turning our attention to origins: “Wittgenstein plainly shares 
Augustine’s sense of beginnings as questionable, as posing problems.”12 Wittgenstein uses 
Augustine’s account as an example of how we misunderstand the origins of linguistic 
practices, but he can also be seen as bringing into question any simple solution to this 
question. The boundary between infant and child, where the child first learns to talk, is one 
which evades any direct attempt to grasp it. The mistake made by Augustine is that of an 
adult language user projecting adult linguistic abilities back onto the boundary between the 
conceptual and the pre-conceptual. How language originates is understood through the eyes 
of the adult; fully developed competences, such as giving ostensive definitions, are assumed 
to exist prior to learning language. The adult comes with readymade solutions to the question 
of language acquisition, reducing language to a set of adult linguistic competences, and 
failing to see how language emerges in the dialectical play of childhood between the 
conceptual and the pre-conceptual.13 
Mulhall is influenced by Cavell in reading Wittgenstein as concerned in a self-
questioning dialectic with the question of the origin of our linguistic behaviour. As adults we 
seek to grasp this origin, to give an account of what it is to be a language user which stresses 
our linguistic control over the world, and in doing so we deform the relationship between 
                                                 
12 Mulhall, Inheritance and Originality : Wittgenstein, Heidegger, Kierkegaard, 34. 
13 In A Mind So Rare Merlin Donald examines the question of language acquisition through the account given 
by Helen Keller, see Merlin Donald, A Mind So Rare : The Evolution of Human Consciousness, 1st ed. (New 
York: Norton, 2001), 232-39. Keller, born in 1880, lost both sight and hearing at the age of eighteen months, 
and subsequently regressed in her development. It was not until Keller’s family hired Annie Sullivan to be her 
teacher in 1887 that she began to make progress again. What is interesting in the methods used by Sullivan is 
that they involved an initial stage of pre-linguistic training, which enabled Keller to develop the discipline and 
habits required to gain language. Keller’s progress was remarkable and she went on to attend Radcliffe: “one of 
the most academically demanding women’s colleges in the United States.” Ibid., 234. Donald uses the account 
given by Keller of how she learnt language to provide evidence for his own theory of the mind, which stresses 
the importance of consciousness as a category for understanding the mental. There are features of Keller’s case, 
however, which militate against using it as a general account of language learning. Firstly, Keller had begun to 
learn to speak before she lost her hearing and sight. It is not clear whether Keller would have been able to 
develop her linguistic abilities without this earlier heritage. Secondly, although Keller’s description of her world 
prior to her development under Annie Sullivan is valuable in giving some insight into the pre-linguist human 
world, her account is given through the eyes of a language user. Furthermore, her development prior to losing 
her hearing and sight may have had a continuing effect on her manner of experiencing the world. Thirdly, we 
need to be aware of the unspoken assumptions through which we read Keller’s account. We may not have the 
theoretical framework Donald is working with, but our adult assumptions can bewitch our understanding. 
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language and desire. Augustine is right to see a connection between language and desire, but 
he provides a false account of the relationship between them. Mulhall argues that 
Wittgenstein followed Augustine in emphasising the connection between desire and 
language, but sought to divorce this insight from Augustine’s understanding of the 
acquisition of language: “It is as if Wittgenstein wishes to drive a wedge between 
Augustine’s sense of a fundamental connection between language and desire, and his vision 
of human beings as driven and mastered by the need to submit the world to their will.”14 In 
contrast to the adult account of the relationship between language and desire given by 
Augustine, Wittgenstein seeks in the Investigations to return us to a sense of the play of 
language which takes place when we are children. Augustine is not wrong in seeing a 
connection between language and desire, but his adult reading of language acquisition 
deforms the relationship by stressing the instrumental role of language as a tool for bringing 
about what we will.  
Mulhall sees Wittgenstein as returning us to the linguistic play of childhood through 
the various strategies and language-games of the Investigations. Here we are offered the 
possibility of overcoming the deformation of our desire and returning to the innocence of our 
childhood play, in which desires are not deformed into the will to dominate. Such a ‘therapy’ 
is painful, for as Cavell observes it involves change: 
Why do we take it that because we then must put away childish things, we must put 
away the prospect of growth and the memory of childhood? The anxiety in teaching, in 
serious communication, is that I myself require education. And for grownups this is not 
natural growth, but change. Conversion is a turning of our natural reactions; so it is 
symbolized as rebirth.15 
 
In section 4.3 we will examine more fully Wittgenstein’s understanding of the relationship 
between language and desire. For the present it is important to note that the language-games 
of the Investigations can also be seen as games which have the purpose of returning us to the 
                                                 
14 Mulhall, Inheritance and Originality : Wittgenstein, Heidegger, Kierkegaard, 51. 
15 Stanley Cavell, The Claim of Reason : Wittgenstein, Skepticism, Morality, and Tragedy (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1999), 125. 
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play of childhood on the boundary between the conceptual and the pre-conceptual. Our adult 
seriousness, the refusal to enter into play, is a giving into the temptation to seek ready-made 
solutions to philosophical problems. The recovery of our humanity involves learning to play. 
 
4.2.3 The End of Play. A Return to Physics?  
Mulhall argues that the various language-games developed by Wittgenstein in his 
later writings have the purpose of helping us to return to the play of childhood, something 
which, as Cavell points out, requires change in adults. Play, however, although it involves 
games with language, also involves on a pre-conceptual level physical play as the child 
interacts with its environment. In his investigation of the relationship between the pre-
conceptual and the conceptual does Wittgenstein neglect this type of play? With the emphasis 
he places upon language-games does he risk losing sight of the importance of physical play in 
the pre-conceptual, such that his account of the pre-conceptual reduces it to a realm of 
efficient causation? 
We have seen that Wittgenstein continued to draw a distinction between grammatical 
and empirical enquiry throughout his works. In the Investigations he draws a contrast 
between empirical investigations, which are concerned with particular causal connections, 
and logical investigation which “explores the nature of all things,” and thus “takes its rise, not 
from an interest in the facts of nature, nor from a need to grasp causal connexions: but from 
an urge to understand the basis, or essence, of everything empirical.”16 Wittgenstein wishes to 
avoid characterizing logic as something sublime, a mistake he made in the Tractatus with his 
search for the general form of the proposition. At the same time he does not abandon the 
distinction between the grammatical and the empirical, but continues to see his work as 
                                                 
16 Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, §89. “erforscht das Wesen aller Dinge, - Sie entspringt nicht 
einem Interesse für Tatsachen des Naturgeschehens, noch dem Bedürfnisse, kausale Zusammenhänge zu 
erfassen, sondern einem Streben, das Fundament, oder Wesen, alles Erfahrungsmäßigen zu verstehen.” 
Philosophische Untersuchungen. In Tractatus Logico-Philosopicus, Ludwig Wittgenstein Werkausgabe Band 1, 
§89. 
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logical: “Our investigation is therefore a grammatical one. Such an investigation sheds light 
on our problems by clearing misunderstandings away.”17 On the one side Wittgenstein places 
the grammatical, which stems from: “an urge to understand the basis, or essence, of 
everything empirical,” while on the other side he places the empirical, which is concerned 
with facts of nature and causal connections. 
We have argued that the dialectical self-questioning approach to philosophy 
developed by Wittgenstein in his later work entailed that there is no simple one-step solution 
to the question of how the boundary between the grammatical and the empirical is to be 
drawn. This follows from Wittgenstein’s abandonment of the search for the general form of 
the proposition, because this also entails that there is no general account of relationship 
between the grammatical and the empirical. The passages quoted from the Investigations 
above imply, however, that the boundary is readily given by the identification of grammar 
with essence, and the empirical with causal connections. This contrast is reinforced in several 
remarks from the Investigations in which causal accounts of behaviour are contrasted with 
grammatical investigations. We saw in chapter three how Wittgenstein argues that accounts 
of human behaviour make no sense if we give a causal account of language use. The 
intentionality of human behaviour cannot be reduced to an external account of cause and 
effect: “if it were shrewn how the words ‘Come to me’ act on the person addressed, so that 
finally, given certain conditions, the muscles of his legs are innervated, and so on—should 
we feel that the sentence lost the character of a sentence?”18 Here Wittgenstein is drawing a 
boundary between grammar, which concerns the intentional nature of human behaviour, and 
empirical investigations, which concern the realm of efficient causal interactions. This 
                                                 
17 Philosophical Investigations, §90. “Unsere Betrachtung ist eine grammatische. Und diese Betrachtung bringt 
Licht in unser Problem, indem sie Misverständnisse wegräumt.” Philosophische Untersuchungen. In Tractatus 
Logico-Philosopicus, Ludwig Wittgenstein Werkausgabe Band 1, §90. 
18 Philosophical Investigations, §493. “Wenn aber gezeigt würde, in welche Weise die Worte ‘Komm zu mir!’ 
auf den Angesprochenen einwirken, sodaß am Schlußunter gewissen Bedingungen seine Beinmuskeln innerviert 
werden, etc. – würde jener Satz damit für uns den Charakter des Satzes verlieren.” Philosophische 
Untersuchungen. In Tractatus Logico-Philosopicus, Ludwig Wittgenstein Werkausgabe Band 1, §493. 
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distinction is seemingly reinforced in the following passage in which Wittgenstein 
characterizes empirical investigation as the establishment of causal connections through 
repeated experiments: “Causation is surely something established by experiments, by 
observing a regular concomitance of events for example.”19 If we look, however, at the wider 
context of this remark it is by no means clear that Wittgenstein holds this conception of 
causation. The remark is part of a section of the Investigations which concerns the nature of 
reading, which is itself part of a longer discussion concerning the nature of meaning and 
understanding. Wittgenstein contrasts our experience of reading aloud in a language we know 
with that of looking at a series of random symbols: “Can’t one feel that in the first case the 
utterance was connected with seeing the signs and in the second went on side by side with the 
seeing without any connection.”20 It is here that Wittgenstein offers the above description of 
causation, and asks: “So how could I say that I felt something which is established by 
experiment?”21 He immediately adds, in parenthesis, the concession that: “It is indeed true 
that observation of regular concomitances is not the only way we establish causation.”22 This 
concession opens the path to understanding causation in less mechanical terms, and of 
challenging the notion that the distinction between the grammatical and the empirical can be 
established by a general characterization of the empirical as a realm of efficient causal 
interaction. 
Wittgenstein also challenges the notion that the grammatical can be established as a 
purely realm of reason which floats free of causation. He acknowledges that rather than 
                                                 
19 Philosophical Investigations, §169. “Verursachung ist doch das, was wir durch Experimente feststellen; 
indem wir, z.B., das regelmäßige Zusammentreffen von Vorgängen beobachten.” Philosophische 
Untersuchungen. In Tractatus Logico-Philosopicus, Ludwig Wittgenstein Werkausgabe Band 1, §169. 
20 Philosophical Investigations, §169. “Ist es nicht fühlbar, daß im ersten Fall das Sprechen mit dem Anblick der 
Zeichen verbunden war um im zeiten ohne Verbindung neben dem Sehen der Zeichen herläuft?” Philosophische 
Untersuchungen. In Tractatus Logico-Philosopicus, Ludwig Wittgenstein Werkausgabe Band 1, §169. 
21 Philosophical Investigations, §169. “Wie könnte ich den sagen, daß ich das, was so durch Versuche 
festgestellt wird, fühle?” Philosophische Untersuchungen. In Tractatus Logico-Philosopicus, Ludwig 
Wittgenstein Werkausgabe Band 1, §169. 
22 Philosophical Investigations, §169. “Es ist wohl wahr, daß wir Verursachung nicht nur durch die 
Beobachtung eines regelmäßigen Zusammentreffens feststellen.” Philosophische Untersuchungen. In Tractatus 
Logico-Philosopicus, Ludwig Wittgenstein Werkausgabe Band 1, §169. 
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characterizing the experience of being influenced by the letters of a familiar language when 
we read them as one of causation: “One might rather say, I feel that the letters are the reason 
why I read such-and-such.”23 While not denying that the language of reasons is used 
appropriately here Wittgenstein immediately challenges the notion that by talking of reasons 
we are thus excluding talk of causes: “This justification, however, was something that I said, 
or thought: what does it mean to say that I feel it?”24 Wittgenstein is challenging the neat 
division between a world of reason, which is the concern of grammatical investigations, and 
the world of causes (including feelings) which is the province of empirical science. He can 
also be seen as challenging the equation of the conceptual with the realm of reason and the 
pre-conceptual with that of efficient causal interactions.  
Such an equation is the result of applying a particular kind of picture to our 
experience of reading. Firstly, the contrast between reading a familiar language and an 
arbitrary set of symbols prompts us to: “think that we felt the influence of the letters on us 
when reading.”25 He adds that without this comparison the notion of influence: “would never 
have occurred to us.”26 Secondly we interpret this feeling of being influenced as a mechanical 
process: “when I speak of the experiences of being influenced, of causal connexion, of being 
guided, that is really meant to imply that I as it were feel the movement of the lever which 
connects seeing the letters with speaking.”27 The problem here is that one particular 
experience of being influenced, of being guided, is used to establish a general account for all 
                                                 
23 Philosophical Investigations, §169. “Eher noch könnte man sagen, ich fühle, daß die Buchstaben der Grund 
sind, warum ich so und so lese.” Philosophische Untersuchungen. In Tractatus Logico-Philosopicus, Ludwig 
Wittgenstein Werkausgabe Band 1, §169. 
24 Philosophical Investigations, §169. “Aber was sol les heißen, diese Begründung, die ich ausgesprochen, 
gedacht habe, zu fühlen?” Philosophische Untersuchungen. In Tractatus Logico-Philosopicus, Ludwig 
Wittgenstein Werkausgabe Band 1, §169. 
25 Philosophical Investigations, §170. “auf den Gedenken gekommen, wir fühlten den Einfluß der Buchstaben 
auf uns beim Lesen.” Philosophische Untersuchungen. In Tractatus Logico-Philosopicus, Ludwig Wittgenstein 
Werkausgabe Band 1, § 170. 
26 Philosophical Investigations, §170. “Wir wären ja nie auf den Gedanken gekommen.” Philosophische 
Untersuchungen. In Tractatus Logico-Philosopicus, Ludwig Wittgenstein Werkausgabe Band 1, §170. 
27 Philosophical Investigations, §170. “Denn wenn ich vom Erlebnis des Einflusses, der Verursachung, des 
Geführtwerdens rede, so soll das ja hießen, daß ich sozusagen die Bewegung der Hebel fühle, die den Anblick 
der Buchstaben mit dem Sprechen verbinden.” Philosophische Untersuchungen. In Tractatus Logico-
Philosopicus, Ludwig Wittgenstein Werkausgabe Band 1, §170. 
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cases. To break the spell of this dominant picture Wittgenstein asks his readers to consider 
different experiences of being guided and lists five different experiences ranging from being 
forcefully led to walking “along a field-track, simply following it.”28 This discussion of being 
guided challenges any neat division between the grammatical and the empirical as between a 
realm of reasons and a realm of causes. It also brings us to the boundary between the 
conceptual and the pre-conceptual, and the relationship between our pre-conceptual practices 
of being guided and our conceptual practices of acting for reasons. In chapter two, section 
2.3.5 we examined Wittgenstein’s discussion of rule following and its basis in our pre-
conceptual practices. His reflections on being guided provide the groundwork for these 
discussions on following a rule, and show that although Wittgenstein continued to distinguish 
the grammatical from the empirical he saw that there is a dialectical tension and play between 
them. In particular, the various experiences of being guided he outlines open the path towards 
an understanding of the pre-conceptual in terms of physical interaction and play.  
Wittgenstein, however, also continued to draw a distinction between the grammatical 
and the empirical according to whether we are dealing with a conceptual or a causal question. 
We have already noted the danger present in speaking of the conceptual, now we can add that 
a similar danger lies in speaking of the grammatical and the empirical. Charlton, as we noted 
in chapter one, argues that a distinction between empirical enquiry and other types of enquiry 
was present form the beginnings of metaphysics. This does not, however, imply that there are 
two separate realms, but rather that there are different types of enquiry. In speaking of the 
grammatical and the empirical the mistake may be made of imagining that these refer to two 
realms each with its own content. Philosophers throughout the history of philosophy have 
been liable to make this mistake, and in the case of Wittgenstein there is a tendency to treat 
the empirical as a realm of efficient causal interaction. It is clear that Wittgenstein makes 
                                                 
28 Philosophical Investigations, §172. “du gehst einen Feldweg entlang, last dich von ihm führen.” 
Philosophische Untersuchungen. In Tractatus Logico-Philosopicus, Ludwig Wittgenstein Werkausgabe Band 1, 
§172. 
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such an identification when he distinguishes philosophy as conceptual enquiry from science 
as empirical discovery. Thus, when reflecting on the phenomenon of seeing aspects he states: 
“Our problem is not a causal but a conceptual one.”29 Such statements go directly against the 
interpretation offered above of Wittgenstein’s account of being guided, which would seem to 
challenge the equation of causation with efficient causality. They also provide the basis for 
such interpretations of Wittgenstein as those offered by McDowell, Baker and Hacker. How 
are we to reconcile these two interpretations? 
The first and most obvious response is that Wittgenstein is inconsistent. Wittgenstein 
in his latter works did not set out to develop a systematic philosophy, and came to see that the 
nature of his enquiry entailed that he could never succeed in wielding his remarks: “into such 
a whole.”30 In chapter one we argued, following Mulhall, that Wittgenstein’s later works are 
essentially self-questioning. If we treat them as the finished article, as providing a measure of 
orthodoxy in philosophy, we fail to see what Wittgenstein was trying to do. Secondly, we can 
add that the inconsistencies in Wittgenstein’s writings are magnified due to the eclectic 
nature of the sources he used and his lack of engagement with important elements of the 
philosophical tradition. Anscombe provides a reading of Wittgenstein as continuous with the 
Platonic tradition, but at the same time she is no apologist for him. In regard to Wittgenstein’s 
distinction between the grammatical and the empirical the question is whether he viewed this 
distinction through the modern lens of conceptual verses empirical content, or as two forms 
of distinct but interrelated enquiry.  
In speaking of the conceptual we run the risk of adopting the modern model of 
subjectivity, such that a realm of conceptual content is contrasted with that which is non-
conceptual. When Wittgenstein distinguishes between grammatical and empirical enquiry by 
                                                 
29 Philosophical Investigations, 203e. “Unser Problem ist kein kausales, sondern ein begriffliches.” 
Philosophische Untersuchungen. In Tractatus Logico-Philosopicus, Ludwig Wittgenstein Werkausgabe Band 1, 
534. 
30 Philosophical Investigations, Preface. “zu einem solchen Ganzen zusammenzuschweißen.” Philosophische 
Untersuchungen. In Tractatus Logico-Philosopicus, Ludwig Wittgenstein Werkausgabe Band 1, Vorwort. 
140 
 
identifying the former as conceptual and the latter with the discovery of causes, he is drawing 
just such a boundary between the conceptual and the non-conceptual. At the beginning of this 
chapter we argued that throughout his works Wittgenstein was concerned with the 
relationship between the form and content of our concepts. The abandonment of the search 
for the general form of the proposition entailed that there could be no one-step solution to the 
question of how to understand the relationship between form and content, but that this must 
be established in each context of application. This follows from the dialectical nature of 
Wittgenstein’s later works; for although the distinction between the grammatical and the 
empirical is upheld there is no readily given solution to establishing it. To this end it is 
arguable that the various language-games and strategies which Wittgenstein develops in his 
later writings are intended to avoid a dichotomy between form and content, while at the same 
time showing how they are distinguished. In opposition to these dialectical practices the 
inconsistencies in Wittgenstein’s later works are brought about by his continuing to identify 
the empirical with a realm of efficient causes placed in opposition to the conceptual.31 
If we keep in mind the inconsistency in Wittgenstein’s work we can return to the 
question whether in his understanding of the relationship between the conceptual and the pre-
conceptual he allows for the physical play of the pre-conceptual. On the one hand 
Wittgenstein seeks to break the hold of the modern picture of the mind as a realm of 
introspectable content by returning us to the pre-conceptual basis on our concepts in our 
natural human actions and reactions. On the other hand he continues to operate within the 
envelope of a conceptual realm juxtaposed with the causal world which is investigated by the 
                                                 
31 The distinction Charlton draws between lexicography and grammar is not the same as Wittgenstein’s 
distinction between the empirical and the grammatical. The point we made in chapter three by developing 
Charlton’s argument is that in the absence of a distinction between lexicography and grammar Wittgenstein (and 
more generally most modern accounts of meaning) sets up a dichotomy between form and content. It is this 
dichotomy which results in the splitting the grammatical and the empirical into two realms with distinct 
contents.  
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natural sciences. The tension created by these clashing demands can be seen in Wittgenstein’s 
investigations into the philosophy of psychology. 
 
4.2.4 Seeing the Whole: A Non-Reductive Account of Nature? 
We noted in chapter two how Wittgenstein’s later writings on psychology were 
influenced by Gestalt theory and that during the writing of his remarks on psychology 
Wittgenstein was reading Köhler. In his presentation of Gestalt theory Köhler contrasts it 
with two seemingly opposed approaches to psychology: introspection and behaviourism. The 
former is based upon the idea that psychology begins with the examination of internal 
sensory experiences, which the subject of experience is able to isolate by attending to how 
things appear prior to interpretation. Thus, when looking at two objects, one of which is 
closer to us than the other, it may be the case that the internal images formed by the two 
objects are the same size, but through interpretation we think of the further object as larger 
than the closer.32 Köhler argues against such approaches, as they assume that there is a 
readily isolatable internal content to experience, which we build upon with our interpretations 
to form our picture of the world around us. Gestalt psychology by contrast begins with the 
whole of our experience, and does not seek to isolate an internal core prior to interpretation. 
Köhler is likewise critical of behaviourism, for although it is seemingly opposed to 
introspectionist accounts of mental content it also assumes that psychology is reducible to a 
number of simple functional patterns.33 He supports the behaviourist argument that 
psychology should not begin with the examination of internal contents of experience, but 
argues that it is unscientific when it excludes reports of internal experiences.34 Gestalt 
psychology seeks to show the full complexity of the relationship between human beings and 
                                                 
32 For Kohler’s criticism of introspectionism see chapter three of Köhler, Gestalt Psychology : An Introduction 
to New Concepts in Modern Psychology. This is the later revised edition of Kohler’s early 1929 work.  
33 For Kohler’s criticism of behaviourism see chapter one and four of ibid. 
34 See ibid., 31. 
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their environment by developing a more adequate description, which does not reduce these 
relationships to a simple mechanical core, but looks at the whole content of the 
psychological. 
It is clear that Wittgenstein in his remarks on psychology shares a great deal in 
common with the Gestalt approach to psychology put forward by Köhler. He also seeks a 
way of understanding human psychology which avoids positing internal access to a pure 
mental content given prior to interpretation. On the other hand, like Köhler, he resists the 
reduction of human behaviour to a set of pre-given functions. He is, however, critical of 
Köhler’s understanding of psychology as an empirical science which differs from the more 
advanced empirical sciences, such as physics, in the youth of its development. Wittgenstein’s 
remark concerning psychology as a young science: “The confusion and bareness of 
psychology is not to be explained by calling it a ‘Young science’”35 is a direct response to 
Köhler.36 It is aimed against the idea that psychological concepts can be given a causal, 
scientific analysis; even one which aims to reflect the whole of our experience. Moreover, 
Wittgenstein’s statement that: “Our problem is not a causal but a conceptual one,”37 comes in 
the midst of his discussion of seeing aspects and can be understood as disputing Köhler’s 
claim that the seeing of different aspects takes place on a pre-conceptual level of visual 
organisation into a whole (e.g. a Gestalt). In another remark Wittgenstein attacks Köhler for 
failing to understand that the different aspects seen when we look at a picture: “one time with 
one group, and then another time with another one”38 involve the use of different concepts, 
                                                 
35 Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 232e. “‘junge Wissenshaft’” Philosophische Untersuchungen. In 
Tractatus Logico-Philosopicus, Ludwig Wittgenstein Werkausgabe Band 1, 580. 
36 The second chapter of Gestalt Psychology is entitled “Psychology as a Young Science.” See Köhler, Gestalt 
Psychology : An Introduction to New Concepts in Modern Psychology, 34-66. 
37 Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 203e. “Unser Problem ist kein kausales, sondern ein 
begriffliches.” Philosophische Untersuchungen. In Tractatus Logico-Philosopicus, Ludwig Wittgenstein 
Werkausgabe Band 1, 535. 
38 Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe, 2 vols., vol. 1 (Chicago Oxford: 
University of Chicago Press ; Basil Blackwell, 1980), §868. “einmal, zusammen mit einer Gruppe von Bildern, 
ein andermal mit einer andern.” Bermerkungen Über Die Philosophie Der Psychologie Band 1. In 
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not merely differing organizations of perceptual complexes: “It is – contrary to Köhler – 
precisely a meaning that I see.”39 
Wittgenstein is not claiming that the organization of experience takes place only on 
the level of the conceptual. What he wishes to dispute is Köhler’s reduction of the conceptual 
content of experience to physiological processes. He thus acknowledges the variety of 
phenomena that constitute seeing aspects and notes that some lie predominantly on the side of 
the conceptual, whereas others are purely physiological: “I should like to say: there are 
aspects which are mainly determined by thoughts and associations, and others that are ‘purely 
optical’, these make their appearance and alter automatically, almost like after-images.”40 In 
this remark we clearly see Wittgenstein’s interest in seeing aspects as a phenomenon lying 
between the conceptual and the pre-conceptual. At the same time, in speaking of the “purely 
optical” nature of some experiences of seeing aspects, he seems to identify the pre-conceptual 
with the world of efficient causation investigated by the modern natural sciences. The 
dialectical play opened up between the conceptual and the pre-conceptual would seem to be 
immediately closed down by this one-step method of drawing the boundary between them. 
On the one hand Wittgenstein wishes to dispute Köhler’s claim that psychology is reducible 
to physiology, while at the same time he holds onto the modern reduction of the physical to 
the realm of efficient causality. Yet it is this modern reduction which lies at the heart of 
Köhler’s project. This inconsistency in Wittgenstein is caused by his continuing adherence to 
this modern reduction, while he probes the boundary between the conceptual and the pre-
conceptual in a manner which challenges it. 
                                                                                                                                                        
Bermerkungen Über Die Philosophie Der Pschologie, Werkausgabe Band 7. (Sinzheim, Germany: Suhrkamp, 
1984), §868.  
39 Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology, 1, §869. “Es ist – im Gegensatz zu Köhler – gerade eine 
Bedeutung, die ich sehe.” Bermerkungen Über Die Philosophie Der Psychologie Band 1. In Bermerkungen 
Über Die Philosophie Der Pschologie, Werkausgabe Band 7., §869. 
40 Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology, 1, §970. “Ich möchte sagen: Es gibt Aspekte, die hauptsächlich 
von Gedanken und Assoziationen bestimmt sind, und andere die ‘rein optisch’ sind, und automatisch eintreten 
und wechseln, beinahe wie Nachbilder.” Bermerkungen Über Die Philosophie Der Psychologie Band 1. In 
Bermerkungen Über Die Philosophie Der Pschologie, Werkausgabe Band 7., §970.  
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If the physical is reduced in to efficient causation what are the implications for our 
understanding of the conceptual? At first sight it may seem that Wittgenstein offers an 
account of our conceptual abilities which brackets the pre-conceptual, particularly when he 
speaks of seeing: “aspects which are mainly determined by thoughts and associations.”41 
Remarks such as this one may lead us to conclude that Wittgenstein envisages some kind of 
inner thought process, to which we have access through introspection. Wittgenstein’s 
arguments against such theories are well known, and in regard to the conceptual content of 
seeing aspects he argues that it is not through a process of introspection that we determine 
whether a particular concept is held, but by observing fine shades of behaviour. Thus, in the 
course of a discussion in which he reflects on various experiences of seeing aspects he urges 
us: “Do not try to analyse your own inner experience.”42 Rather, in determining the 
relationship between the conceptual and pre-conceptual aspects of our seeing aspects it is 
important to attend to the difference seeing an aspect makes to our behaviour.  
To illustrate this Wittgenstein turns to the limiting case when we are inclined to call 
seeing an aspect purely an act of knowing and not one of seeing: “For when should I call it a 
mere case of knowing, not seeing? —Perhaps when someone treats the picture as a working 
drawing, reads it like a blueprint. (Fine shades of behaviour. —Why are they important? 
They have important consequences.)”43 The limiting case helps us to see that in most other 
cases seeing aspects involves both seeing and knowing, bringing us to the boundary between 
the conceptual and the pre-conceptual. Our investigation of this boundary is thus not to be 
carried out through analysis of inner experiences, but by attending to: “fine shades of 
                                                 
41 Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology, 1, §970. “Aspekte, die hauptäschlich von Gedanken und 
Assoziationen bestimmt sind.” Bermerkungen Über Die Philosophie Der Psychologie Band 1. In Bermerkungen 
Über Die Philosophie Der Pschologie, Werkausgabe Band 7., §970.  
42 Philosophical Investigations, 204e. “Versuche nicht, in dir selbst das Erlebnis zu analysieren!” 
Philosophische Untersuchungen. In Tractatus Logico-Philosopicus, Ludwig Wittgenstein Werkausgabe Band 1, 
537. 
43 Philosophical Investigations, 204e. “Wann wurde ich’s den bloßes Wissen, kein Sehen, nennen? – Etwa, 
wenn Einer das Bild wie eine Werkzeichnung behandelt, es läse, wie eine Blaupause. (Feine Abshattungen des 
Benehmens. – Warum sind sie wichtig? Sie haben wichtige Folgen.)” Philosophische Untersuchungen. In 
Tractatus Logico-Philosopicus, Ludwig Wittgenstein Werkausgabe Band 1, 537. 
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behaviour.” Such attention is to be distinguished from the behaviourist reduction of human 
psychology to a pre-given set of reactions, but at the same time Wittgenstein points to the 
basis of our concepts in our: “many natural kinds of behaviour towards other human 
beings.”44 We saw how Mulhall argues that in his remarks on seeing aspects Wittgenstein 
directs our attention to the play between the conceptual and the pre-conceptual. We can now 
(again following Mulhall) add that our ability to distinguish aspects depends upon whether 
we are able (and willing) to enter into this play. Only those who are able to play with the fine 
shades of human behaviour are able to attend to such fine shades in others. It is only within 
such play, in which we re-connect with our natural behaviour towards others, that we can 
begin to see the fine shades of meaning our use of language makes possible. 
 
4.2.5 The Play of the Physical: Analogy and Nature 
We can now return to ask whether in his account of the play between the conceptual 
and the pre-conceptual Wittgenstein fails to acknowledge the importance of pre-conceptual 
physical play. In developing his account of application Wittgenstein came to see that our 
conceptual abilities are rooted in pre-conceptual abilities and reactions; at the same time, 
however, he continued to hold onto the empiricist reduction of the pre-conceptual to the 
realm of efficient causation. His motivation here can be seen as continuous with his intention 
in writing the Tractatus to draw a boundary around the factual, and thus prevent the incursion 
of science into that which is of value in life: “6.41 The sense of the world must lie outside the 
world.”45 It is this concern to prevent the incursion of science into question of human life 
which forms part of the background to Wittgenstein’s insistence that his investigations are 
grammatical, and his continuing to draw a sharp boundary around the factual realm which 
                                                 
44 Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology, 1, §151. “so viele natütliche Arten des Verhaltens zu den andern 
Menschen.” Bermerkungen Über Die Philosophie Der Psychologie Band 1. In Bermerkungen Über Die 
Philosophie Der Pschologie, Werkausgabe Band 7., §151.  
45 Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, 86. “6.41 Der Sinn der Welt muß außerhalb ihrer liegen.” Logisch-
Philosophische Abhandlung. In Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, Werkausgabe Band 1, 82. 
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science investigates. This sharp boundary was increasingly challenged by Wittgenstein’s 
post-1945 investigations into psychological concepts, which provided a rich context for 
investigating the relationship between the conceptual and the pre-conceptual. In the course of 
these investigations he came to understand more clearly the rootedness of the conceptual in 
the pre-conceptual, throwing into question his characterization of the physical as purely a 
realm of physical causation. This heightened the tension in his work between an approach to 
psychology which in many respects connects with the pre-modern understanding of human 
psychology as activity of the soul, and an approach which continues to hold to the modern 
dichotomy between the conceptual and the non-conceptual.  
Wittgenstein stresses the gap between the conceptual and the pre-conceptual in his 
well-known remark: “If a lion could talk, we could not understand him.”46 He makes this 
remark to illustrate the argument that understanding other people does not involve having 
access to internal thought processes, but requires sharing their way of life. It seems to bracket 
any reference to pre-conceptual animal behaviour from our understanding of the life of 
others. This does not rule out a role for the pre-conceptual as the basis for the conceptual, but 
it places it purely on the side of specific human abilities. It is certainly true that when we talk 
of the pre-conceptual we are specifically referring to human beings. This does not entail, 
however, that the pre-conceptual does not involve natural capacities and reactions we share 
with non-human animals.47 It is also true that human beings have an ability to acquire certain 
                                                 
46 Philosophical Investigations, 223e. “Wenn nein Löwe sprechen könnte, wir könnte ihn nicht verstehen.” 
Philosophische Untersuchungen. In Tractatus Logico-Philosopicus, Ludwig Wittgenstein Werkausgabe Band 1, 
568. 
47 In a reflection on Wittgenstein’s remark about lions Vicki Hearne expresses the surprised reaction of a lion 
trainer: “‘What does he mean? That if my lion Sudan started talking we would stop being able to understand 
each other?’” Vicki Hearne, Animal Happiness, 1st ed. (New York, NY: HarperCollins Publishers, 1994), 168. 
For Hearne Wittgenstein’s mistake is not a simple one, but an “almost miraculously exacting mistake.” Ibid. In 
contrast to philosophers such as Daniel Dennett, who simply refuse the possibility of entering into 
communication with animals, Hearne argues that Wittgenstein’s lion remains silent because: “he knows we 
could not understand him.” Ibid., 170. Here Hearne acknowledges she is going beyond Wittgenstein’s own 
thoughts, to read in the lion’s silence: “the reticence of all consciousness that is beyond ours, in some accounts 
of Creation.” Ibid. Hearne is influenced by Cavell when she sees in Wittgenstein’s lion an invitation to enter 
into a world which opens us to the pre-linguistic aspects of our own being, into a world which exists prior to the 
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pre-conceptual skills, but this is also true of other animals. In any case, in talking about the 
acquisition of pre-conceptual skills we are faced with the question of the natural basis upon 
which this acquisition takes place. Unless some account is given of the natural basis for our 
pre-conceptual acquisition of abilities they will float free of nature. The problem which 
O’Callaghan identifies in McDowell’s account of the relationship between first and second 
nature is merely shifted from the border between the conceptual and the non-conceptual, to a 
dichotomy within the pre-conceptual realm between human acquired abilities and the natural 
basis for these abilities in our animality. 
When Wittgenstein talks about our natural pre-linguistic human behaviour, he does 
not confine this to that which is acquired. The problem he has is finding a way of speaking 
about pre-conceptual behaviour which does not reduce it to the level of efficient causal 
interaction, while at the same not identifying it purely with human acquired abilities. This 
problem forms the context for an extended remark in which Wittgenstein discusses Köhler’s 
experiments involving monkeys; which comes during a discussion of the concept of thinking, 
in which Wittgenstein wishes to refute the notion that thinking is an internal conscious 
process. Firstly, Wittgenstein describes the experiment: “imagine a human being, or one of 
Köhler’s monkeys, who wants to get a banana from the ceiling, but can’t reach it, and 
thinking about ways and means finally puts two sticks together, etc.”48 The question he is 
                                                                                                                                                        
noise of language. This is not the romanticized world of pure nature, but the world of training which is central to 
the life of animals: “something happens in lion training that is in part possible because of the trainer’s literacy, 
his capacity for mediated knowledge, but is nonetheless a transcendence of the noise and scepticism that are the 
inevitable accompaniments of mediated awareness.” Ibid., 173. Hearne does not bring out how Wittgenstein’s 
remarks can be read as pointing to the dialectical play on the boundary between the linguistic and the pre-
linguistic, and she tends to see these as two separate spheres. Her concluding remarks, however, show that 
dialectical play is central to her own philosophy, in which she contrasts the silence of Wittgenstein’s lion’s with 
the voluble lions presented by the animal trainer Hubert Wells: “Wittgenstein has a lion of towering beauty who 
is not talking to us. I think that we court more than one kind of tragedy when we dismiss either the volubility of 
Well’s lions or the tremendous silence of the lion of the Investigations.” Ibid., 174. The reference here to 
tragedy recalls Cavell’s reading the Investigations, in which he argues that central to Wittgenstein’s concerns is 
the tragedy of refusing to enter into communication with others. 
48 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology, trans. C. G. Luckhardt and M. A. E. Aue, 2 
vols., vol. 2 (Chicago Oxford: University of Chicago Press ; Basil Blackwell, 1980), §224. “Nun denke dir 
einem Menschen, oder einen von Köhlers Affen, der eine Banane von der Decke holen will, sie nicht erreichen 
kann, auf Mittel und Wege sinnt, endlich zwei Stöcke aneinander setz.” Bermerkungen Über Die Philosophie 
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interested in is what it means here to say that the monkey is thinking. Wittgenstein concedes 
that although it would be too much to say that the monkey: “must have some process before 
its mental eye,” he nevertheless wants, “the monkey to reflect on something.”49 But how are 
we to understand this reflection? If on the other hand we assume the use of the sticks is: “a 
propitious accident, the question is: How can he learn from the accident?”50  
Wittgenstein’s purpose here is not to argue that monkeys can think in the same way 
that humans think: “But here of course we wouldn’t have the complete employment of 
‘think’. The word would have reference to a mode of behaviour. Not until it finds its 
particular use in the first person does it acquire the meaning of mental activity.”51 At the 
same time he is drawing attention to the pre-conceptual basis for thought in a manner which 
seeks to avoid reducing the pre-conceptual purely to the level of efficient causation. The gulf 
which Wittgenstein places between humans and lions is not evident in this discussion of 
monkeys. This difference cannot be explained merely by the fact that monkeys are closer to 
human beings biologically, nor by observing that the comment on lions is general in nature, 
whereas those on monkeys regards a particular experiment. The context of both discussions 
concerns how we understand the concept of thinking, and although monkeys are closer to 
humans biologically this does not entail that we have nothing relevant to our pre-conceptual 
nature in common with lions.52 
                                                                                                                                                        
Der Pschologie, Band 2. In Bermerkungen Über Der Psychologie, Werkausgabe, Band 7. (Sinzheim, Germany: 
Suhrkamp, 1984), §224. 
49 Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology, 2, §224. “müsse den Vorgang vor dem geistigen Aug gesehen 
haben. … der Affe solle sich etwas überlegen.” Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung. In Tractatus Logico-
Philosophicus, Werkausgabe Band 1, §224. 
50 Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology, 2, §224. “einen günstigen Zufall an! Die Frage ist dann: wie kann 
er aus dem Zufall lernen?” Bermerkungen Über Die Philosophie Der Pschologie, Band 2. In Bermerkungen 
Über Der Psychologie, Werkausgabe, Band 7., §224. 
51 Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology, 2, §230. “Aber hier hätten wir freilich nicht die volle Verwendung 
von ‘denken’. Das Wort bezöge sich auf ein Benehmen. Die Bedeutung der seelischen Tätigkeit erhält er erst 
durch die besondere Verwendung in der ersten Person.” Bermerkungen Über Die Philosophie Der Pschologie, 
Band 2. In Bermerkungen Über Der Psychologie, Werkausgabe, Band 7., §230. 
52 For a contemporary examination of how Primatology can inform our understanding of human morality see F. 
B. M. de Waal et al., Primates and Philosophers : How Morality Evolved, The University Center for Human 
Values Series (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2006). De Waal is reacting to reductive accounts of 
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In his discussion of Köhler’s experiments with monkeys it is arguable that 
Wittgenstein opens a path to understanding the pre-conceptual basis of thinking in physical 
play. The problem he now faces is finding ways to talk about this pre-conceptual behaviour 
which avoid reducing it to purely efficient causation, while not subliming it in an account of 
thought as an inner mental process. We have seen that the conceptual work which 
Wittgenstein carries out in his later works involves making fine distinctions in human 
behaviour. In making such distinctions Wittgenstein returns us to the boundary between the 
conceptual and the pre-conceptual; where we first learnt to use language through play. The 
development of our conceptual abilities presupposes, however, the pre-conceptual play 
through which we interact with the world around us. Wittgenstein draws our attention to the 
pre-conceptual, as his discussion of Köhler’s monkeys demonstrates, but the insistence that 
his investigations are grammatical and not empirical would seem to exclude any way of 
describing pre-conceptual physical play. 
 The question is whether Wittgenstein is here carrying out a grammatical 
investigation. Grammatical investigations begin with our linguistic behaviour, and although 
they can be widened to point to the pre-conceptual abilities which form the basis for our 
language use, they cannot directly describe these abilities. In his discussion of Köhler’s 
monkeys Wittgenstein’s description of the monkeys’ behaviour is hedged around with 
qualifications, negations and the use of analogy. It is true to say that this is a grammatical 
investigation insofar as Wittgenstein is seeking to help us see the grammar of the verb ‘to 
think’. The behaviour described, however, is not linguistic behaviour. Nor does the fact that 
we use various grammatical devices to describe this pre-linguistic behaviour entail that it is 
ultimately grammatical, for we use grammar in the natural sciences without thereby implying 
that what we are talking about is ultimately grammatical. 
                                                                                                                                                        
primate behaviour, such as those developed by advocates of the selfish gene hypothesis. He seeks to develop a 
richer conception of the animal world, which can be used to help us better understand the human world. 
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The question now arises as to what Wittgenstein is doing in his attempts to describe 
the pre-conceptual if his investigations are neither grammatical nor empirical (at least not 
empirical in the sense he understands modern sciences to be empirical). If we turn to the 
Aristotelian tradition for an answer to this question, then it could be argued that what 
Wittgenstein is trying to do is physics, or more specifically biology, the division of physics 
which deals with animals. When Charlton accuses Wittgenstein of lacking a teleology of 
nature it is precisely the absence of this physical level of pre-conceptual behaviour that he 
argues is missing from Wittgenstein’s account of meaning. In identifying science with the 
discovery of efficient causes and limiting his investigations to the making of conceptual 
remarks Wittgenstein closes off any possibility of understanding the pre-conceptual. The self-
questioning dialectic nature of his thought led him to push beyond these self-imposed limits 
to a richer understanding of the physical, but he was still some distance from developing an 
adequate way of understanding the pre-conceptual. It can be argued, nevertheless, that 
Wittgenstein helps us to see the dialectical nature of any such understanding.  
In restricting science to the study of efficient causality Wittgenstein can be read as 
protecting what is important in life from the encroachment of science; heading off the danger 
of giving a causal account of our linguistic practices by making a clear distinction between 
conceptual and empirical investigations. If we lift this restriction can the distinction between 
the empirical and the grammatical be maintained? Does Aristotelian biology reduce the 
human being to a set of pre-determined ends such that grammar is merely the linguistic 
expression of the biologically determined? Here the importance of dialectical play between 
the conceptual and the pre-conceptual is essential to avoid any such reduction. 
When attempting to describe our pre-conceptual behaviour it is essential to keep in 
mind the use of analogy and negation. This is particular important at the boundary between 
the conceptual and the pre-conceptual, where we on the one hand wish to maintain that there 
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is a real distinction, while on the other hand showing their intimate connection. When we 
speak of purpose on the level of the pre-conceptual we are trying to get at something which is 
akin to, while distinct from, our conceptual understanding of purpose. Thus, when 
Wittgenstein says of one of Köhler’s monkeys: “Thinking gives him the possibility of 
perfecting his methods,”53 the kind of thinking and perfecting that he is talking about here is 
understood through analogy with our conceptual understanding of thinking and perfecting. 
Wittgenstein is developing a dialectical interplay between the pre-conceptual as understood 
by analogy and negation with the conceptual, and the light that the pre-conceptual casts upon 
the conceptual. Once we allow for the development of this dialectical interplay the path is 
opened for an understanding of the pre-conceptual which is physical, but which does not 
involve the reduction of the physical purely to the level of efficient causation. 
 
 The End of Desire: Subliming Our Desires 4.3
In this section we will examine the second aspect of the teleological basis for our 
linguistic practices: the question of human desire. This will involve an account of how 
Wittgenstein understands human desire; keeping in mind the basis for our desires in the pre-
conceptual, while guarding against the danger of reducing human desire to a set of pre-given, 
pre-conceptual desires. Rhees accuses Wittgenstein of failing to appreciate how our linguistic 
practices originate in our search for common understanding. This search is not limited to 
particular ends, but involves a desire for universal understanding. When we speak of the basis 
for human desire we are referring to desire on the pre-conceptual physical (biological) level, 
but also to the metaphysical question of the origin of desire and the search for unity. Rhees 
                                                 
53 Wittgenstein, Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology, 2, §224. “Das Denken gibt ihm die Möglichkeit zur 
Vervolkommung seiner Methoden.” Bermerkungen Über Die Philosophie Der Pschologie, Band 2. In 
Bermerkungen Über Der Psychologie, Werkausgabe, Band 7., §224. 
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criticises Wittgenstein for failing to see that prior to any particular application of language 
there is a given unity of understanding: 
We cannot say that a discussion has no sense except in connexion with some 
application. 
The unity of understanding is found in dialogue. This is what makes growth possible – 
in the dialogue of the soul with itself, for instance, though that is not the whole story. It 
is also the unity that there is when we have different people participating in discussion 
or in discourse.54 
 
Is Rhees here fair in his criticism of Wittgenstein, or does he fail to appreciate the wider 
dialectical interplay which permeates Wittgenstein’s later writings? We argued in chapter two 
that Wittgenstein situates particular uses of language in the context of the wider abilities and 
reactions which make such applications possible. It can be argued that in returning us to 
particular applications of language, and raising the question of the relationship between the 
conceptual and the pre-conceptual, Wittgenstein wishes to help us see the basis of our mutual 
understanding in pre-linguistic nature. At the same time, in seeking to avoid the reduction of 
the conceptual to the pre-conceptual he acknowledges that any account of human 
understanding must go beyond an account of our pre-linguistic interrelationships. 
Does Wittgenstein go far enough, however, in his characterization of how human 
understanding goes beyond the pre-conceptual? In the previous section we argued that 
although Wittgenstein opens the path for a more adequate understanding of the pre-
conceptual, he continues to hold a reductive understanding of the physical. Similarly, in this 
section we will argue that the manner in which Wittgenstein separates the grammatical from 
the empirical removes dialectic from its basis in human desire. The relationship between 
metaphysics, dialectic and desire is one which is attested by Plato, and Hibbs argues that 
contemporary approaches to the metaphysics of Aquinas fail to do justice to the erotic nature 
of dialectic: 
                                                 
54 Rhees, Wittgenstein and the Possibility of Discourse, 91. 
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What is lost, say, in the case of Aquinas’s metaphysics, amid contemporary abstractions 
is the erotic appeal of metaphysics and its pervasive deployment of aesthetic language. 
Metaphysics is rooted in the natural human desire to know, the longing to behold and 
participate in the beautiful, to find one’s place within, and to conceive all one’s 
activities in relation to, the whole. Metaphysics is at once about being, truth, goodness, 
and beauty.55 
 
In seeking to return us to the basis for our linguistic practices in human nature the dialectical 
nature of Wittgenstein’s later philosophy returns us to this older metaphysical tradition. We 
thus find again in Wittgenstein an inconsistency between his adherence to the modern picture 
which informs his understanding of the relationship between the grammatical and the 
empirical, and the development of a dialectical form of philosophy which places this modern 
picture in question and points towards a pre-modern understanding of the world. 
 
4.3.1 World and Will: The Tractatus Account of Desire 
Rhees argues that the emphasis placed by Wittgenstein on the analogy between 
language and games stresses the autonomy of linguistic practices in a manner which cuts 
them off from any basis in human nature. This criticism gains support if we examine 
Wittgenstein’s understanding of human desire.56 In the Tractatus there is no direct treatment 
of desire; rather Wittgenstein’s interest is in the relationship between the world and the will.57 
In chapter two we saw how in the Tractatus Wittgenstein attempted to draw a boundary 
around that which can be said, leaving beyond the boundary that which must be passed over 
in silence. By drawing this boundary Wittgenstein was able to limit science to the factual, and 
to place beyond the boundary all that is most important in life. But where do we as human 
beings stand in regard to this boundary? How according to this boundary are we to 
understand what it is to be human? In the Tractatus Wittgenstein splits the human being into 
                                                 
55 Hibbs, Aquinas, Ethics, and Philosophy of Religion : Metaphysics and Practice, xiii. 
56 In the English translations of Wittgenstein’s works the German Wunsch is generally translated as wish. In 
German, however, it also has the more general meaning of desire. 
57 For an account of how Wittgenstein’s understanding of the will developed, and how it relates to earlier and 
later accounts of the will see: Roger Teichmann, Wittgenstein on Thought and Will, Wittgenstein's Thought and 
Legacy (New York: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 2015). 
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the subject, which lies beyond the world, and the body which is part of the world. Since the 
subject is beyond the world we can say nothing about it, and it is only manifested as that 
which remains of us once we have subtracted all that can be described physically: 
5.631 There is no such thing as the subject that thinks or entertains ideas. 
If I wrote a book called The World as I found it, I should have to include a 
report on my body, and should have to say which parts were subordinate to my will, 
and which were not, etc., this being a method of isolating the subject, or rather of 
showing that in an important sense there is no subject; for it alone could not be 
mentioned in that book.58 
 
The influence of Schopenhauer on Wittgenstein’s understanding of the will is clear to see in 
his passage,59 and he continues to operate within the terms of the modern picture which splits 
human beings into a subject set over and against the physical world which contains the 
body.60 Where does human desire belong in such a picture? If Wittgenstein was to follow the 
Kantian tradition which informs Schopenhauer then desire would be placed on the side of the 
world, and thus would be of no interest to ethics, but would be studied by psychology. As 
such it would be akin to the phenomenal manifestations of the will: “It is impossible to speak 
about the will in so far as it is the subject of ethical attributes. And the will as a phenomenon 
is of interest only to psychology.”61 This split in the human being corresponds to the 
dichotomy between form and content which results from the requirements Wittgenstein 
                                                 
58 Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, 5.631. “5.631 Das denkende vorstellende, Subjekt gibt es 
nicht. Wenn ich ein Buch schreibe Die Welt, wie ich sie vorfand so wäre darin auch über meinen Leib zu 
berichten and zu sagen, welche Glieder meinem Willen unterstehen and zu sage, welche nicht, etc. Dies ist 
nämlich eine Methode, das Subjekt zu isolieren, oder vielmehr zu zeigen, daß es in einem wichtigen kein 
Subjekt gibt: Von ihm allein nämlich könnte in diesem Buche nicht die Rede sein. –” Logisch-Philosophische 
Abhandlung. In Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, Werkausgabe Band 1, 67-68. 
59 For an account of Schopenhauer’s influence on Wittgenstein see Brian McGuinness, Wittgenstein : A Life, 
Penguin Philosophy (London: Penguin, 1990), 39-40. 
60 In his article ‘Action and the Will’ John Hyman notes that in the Tractatus Wittgenstein follows 
Schopenhauer’s critique of empiricist account of the will. Hyman also traces the development of Wittgenstein’s 
notion of the will in his later works, observing how he rejected William James’ theory of the will and his own 
earlier Schopenhauer influenced theory. Although Wittgenstein enabled us to overcome various modern 
mistakes Hyman argues that he remained trapped by the modern failure to distinguish between action and 
motion, and succumbed to the modern identification of the voluntary/non voluntary distinction with the 
active/passive distinction. See John Hyman, "Action and the Will," in The Oxford Handbook of Wittgenstein, ed. 
Oskari Kuusela and Marie McGinn (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 451-71. 
61 Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, 6.423. “6.423 Von Willen als dem Träger des Ethischen kann 
nicht gesprochen werden. Und der Wille als Phänomen interessiert nur die Psychologie.” Logisch-
Philosophische Abhandlung. In Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, Werkausgabe Band 1, 83. 
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places upon logic in the Tractatus, with the crystal purity of logic finding its counterpart in 
the subject transcending the world. The attempt to develop a general account of application, 
and thus to exhibit the unity of the form of all thought through the discovery of the general 
form of the proposition, is mirrored in the following remark in which Wittgenstein explains 
the relationship between the world and the will: “6.43 If the good or bad exercise of the will 
does alter the world, it can alter only the limits of the world, not the facts—not what can be 
expressed by means of language.”62 Just as the general form of the proposition is seen as a 
framework for all propositions, but has no content itself, so the will frames the limits of the 
world, but has no effect within the world. 
In chapter two we traced how Wittgenstein abandoned the search for the general form 
of the proposition and sought to return to the rough ground of our actual linguistic practices. 
This transformation influenced his understanding of the will, and involved a study of the 
contexts within which we use volitional language. In The Brown Book Wittgenstein carries 
out a discussion concerning how we think about: “volition, deliberation and involuntary 
action.”63 He argues that philosophers make a mistake when they isolate certain experiences 
of these phenomena, and use these isolated experiences to create a general account of willing: 
“Think, say, of these examples: I deliberate whether to lift a certain heavyish weight, decide 
to do it, I then apply my force to it and lift it. Here you might say, you have a full-fledged 
case of willing and intentional action.”64 Such general accounts of willing fall into the 
mistake of positing an act of volition which precedes actual voluntary acts: “We speak of an 
‘act of volition’ as different from the action which is willed.”65 Here, it is clear that 
Wittgenstein also has in mind the Tractatus account of the will, which separates the will 
                                                 
62 Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, 6.43. “Wen das gute oder bose Wollen die Welt ändert, so kann es nur die 
Grenzen der Welt ändern, nicht die Tatsachen; nicht das, was durch die Sprache ausgedrückt werden kann.” 
Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung. In Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, Werkausgabe Band 1, 83. 
63 The Blue and Brown Books, 150. 
64 Ibid. 
65 Ibid., 151. 
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which transcends the world from human acts within the world.66 To avoid such mistakes 
Wittgenstein argues that it is essential to keep in mind the wide variety of experiences to 
which we apply volitional concepts. 
 
4.3.2 Situating Desire: The Investigation and the Contexts for Volitional 
Language 
In the Investigations Wittgenstein continues this discussion of the contexts within 
which we use volitional language and in the following passage he criticises the picture of the 
will as something self-contained which interacts with the world causally: “One imagines the 
willing subject here as something without any mass (without any inertia); as a motor which 
has no inertia in itself to move.”67 Wittgenstein seeks to return us to practices within which 
we use volitional language, contrasting the various ways in which we speak about the 
voluntary and the involuntary. The purpose of this is again to break the spell of the picture 
which identifies the voluntary with an undetermined act of volition and places all other 
human acts on the side of the involuntary. Wittgenstein is no longer bracketing off all that is 
of value from the world, but seeks to give an account of our linguistic practices which 
involves what is most important in life. In returning to the rough ground of our actual 
linguistic practices Wittgenstein wishes to provide an understanding of human beings which 
avoids the reduction of value to a pre-given set of human desires, while at the same time 
showing how value does not float free of desire. Once again the dialectic nature of 
Wittgenstein’s later thought is evident in the various strategies and language-games he uses 
to help us see the nature of volition and desire. 
                                                 
66 Although there is continuity in so far as in the Tractatus Wittgenstein’s purpose is to deny that the will can be 
understood in terms of causal interaction with the world, whereas in his later works he also denies that the will 
can be characterized primarily as a faculty which enters into efficient causal interaction with the world. 
67 Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, § 618. “Das wollende Subjekt stellt man sich hier als etwas 
Masseloses (Trägheitsloses) vor; als einen Motor, der in isch selbst keine Trägheitswiderstand zu überwinden 
hat.” Philosophische Untersuchungen. In Tractatus Logico-Philosopicus, Ludwig Wittgenstein Werkausgabe 
Band 1, § 618. 
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It is important to keep this dialectical interplay in mind in the following remark from 
the Investigations in which Wittgenstein contrasts his Tractatus view of the crystalline purity 
of logic with his later understanding of language as embodied in human practices: “The 
Preconceived idea of crystalline purity can only be removed by turning our whole 
examination around. (One might say: the axis of reference of our examination must be 
rotated, but about the fixed point of our real need.)”68 What is the “need” (in German 
Bedurfnis) that Wittgenstein here refers to? An initial reading might suggest that Wittgenstein 
is here offering a pragmatic account of meaning of the kind Charlton accuses him for holding. 
Our dialectical reading of Wittgenstein militates against such a reading, and if we follow 
Mulhall we can read the Investigations as calling into question ready-made solution to the 
question of human need. The strategies and language-games of the Investigations have the 
purpose of helping us to overcome distortions of desire, and to reconnect us with the play of 
desire on the boundary between the conceptual and the pre-conceptual. 
In seeking to return us to our human need, and thus overcoming the distortions of our 
nature which result in the splitting of the human being into a causally determined body and a 
transcendentally free subject, Wittgenstein can again be placed in continuity with the 
metaphysical tradition. Pieper argues that it is an account of eros such as that given by Plato 
in the Symposium, in opposition to the Sophists, which provides an integrated understanding 
of human beings: 
There is an implication to calling eros a mediative power that unites the lowest with the 
highest in man; that links the natural, sensual, ethical and spiritual elements; that 
prevents one element from being isolated from the rest and that preserves the quality of 
true humanness in all forms of love from sexuality to agape. The implication is that 
none of these elements can be excluded as inappropriate to man, that all of them 
“belong”.69 
 
                                                 
68 Philosophical Investigations, §108. “Das Vorurteil der Kristallreinheit kann nur so beseitigt werden, daß wir 
unsere ganze Betrachtung drehen. (Man könnte sagen: Die Betrachtung muß gedreht werden, aber um unser 
eigentliches Bedürfnis als Angelpunkt.)” Philosophische Untersuchungen. In Tractatus Logico-Philosopicus, 
Ludwig Wittgenstein Werkausgabe Band 1, §108. 
69 Pieper, The Four Cardinal Virtues: Prudence, Justice, Fortitude, Temperance, 260. 
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The interpretation of Wittgenstein we have developed which involves the play between the 
conceptual and the pre-conceptual sees in his later works an attempt to achieve something of 
this unity of “the lowest and the highest” in human beings. There is a crucial difference, 
however, between Plato and Wittgenstein. Whereas Plato argues that human desire only 
comes to rest in a union with that which transcends it (the good), Wittgenstein promises rest 
as the result of the “different therapies”70 which bring us philosophical peace.  
It is this difference which Rhees highlights in his criticism of Wittgenstein: “The 
reality of philosophy. That is what Plato was urging against the sophists. One might almost 
want to say: Philosophy is no more essentially therapeutic than music or poetry or any form 
of art is.”71 The search for understanding which lies at the heart of Plato’s philosophy is not 
brought to rest through the use of therapeutic techniques. There are clear parallels between 
Plato’s myth of the cave and Wittgenstein’s image of releasing the fly from the fly-bottle, but 
whereas Plato holds forth the promise of the ascent of human desire it is not clear how 
Wittgenstein envisages what lies outside the fly-bottle. It may be objected that Wittgenstein’s 
purpose is to not so much to offer a path of transcendence, but to clear the way for us to 
engage with the transcendent. This does not, however, answer the core of Rhees’ criticism 
that philosophy is not the same as therapy. 
In the last section we argued that Wittgenstein continued to understand the difference 
between the grammatical and the empirical in a way which prevented him from developing a 
more adequate understanding of the pre-conceptual. The picture he adopted in the Tractatus 
continued to exercise a hold over him even when the development of his later philosophy 
implied the abandonment of that picture. In a similar way the Tractatus continued to 
influence his understanding of philosophy, and although he abandoned the notion that all 
philosophical questions could be resolved by a perspicuous presentation of a crystalline logic, 
                                                 
70 Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, §133. “verschiedene Therapien.” Philosophische Untersuchungen. 
In Tractatus Logico-Philosopicus, Ludwig Wittgenstein Werkausgabe Band 1, §133. 
71 Rhees, Wittgenstein and the Possibility of Discourse, 19. 
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he maintained the promise of achieving a perspective which brings philosophical peace. This 
perspective, however, depends upon the distinction between the subject who transcends the 
world and our physical nature within the world. With the developments in Wittgenstein’s 
later philosophy this dualism was abandoned, but he continued to hold onto the promise of 
philosophical peace held in the Tractatus. This inconsistency helps to explain the wide 
variety of interpretations of Wittgenstein’s later thought, but also shows the limitation of his 
philosophy. 
 
 Conclusion: Wittgenstein, Dialectic and Metaphysics 4.4
In this chapter we have responded to two challenges to Wittgenstein’s later 
philosophy. The first challenge questions his understanding of the relationship between the 
conceptual and the pre-conceptual, whereas the second concern the teleological basis for 
dialectic. This second challenge was seen to have two interrelated aspects, firstly the question 
of the use of teleological language to describe the world we interact with, and secondly the 
teleological nature of our desires. Both of these challenges place a question mark over the 
claim that Wittgenstein succeeded in his later works in developing a dialectical form of 
philosophy which achieves realism while avoiding idealism and empiricism. In section 4.2 
we responded to the first challenge by arguing that Wittgenstein’s post-1945 focus on 
psychological concepts enabled him to investigate more fully the boundary between the 
conceptual and the pre-conceptual. Wittgenstein’s engagement with Gestalt psychology 
opened the path to a richer understanding of the pre-conceptual. Although he criticised 
Köhler’s reduction of psychology to physiology Wittgenstein was able to use various insights 
and tools from Gestalt psychology to examine the boundary between the conceptual and the 
pre-conceptual. Wittgenstein’s investigations into psychological concepts seek to maintain 
the dialectical tension between the conceptual and the pre-conceptual, avoiding the danger of 
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reducing one side to the other. To this end Wittgenstein opens a path for the use of 
grammatical tools such as analogy and negation to talk about the pre-conceptual, allowing a 
more adequate understanding of physical nature. The dominance of the modern picture which 
informs his understanding of the distinction between grammatical and empirical 
investigations prevented him, however, from fully taking this path. In particular he lacks a 
sense of the importance of pre-conceptual physical play in his understanding of the pre-
linguistic abilities and reactions which provide the basis for our conceptual abilities. 
There is a danger in using this Aristotelian understanding of our relationship with the 
world that the dialectical tension in the relationship between the conceptual and the pre-
conceptual (and also within the pre-conceptual between acquired abilities and the physical 
basis for them) will be ignored. It is perhaps in regard to this danger that Wittgenstein’s later 
work is of greatest value, and we saw how in his account of the development of our 
conceptual abilities Wittgenstein shows the interplay between the conceptual and the 
different levels of the pre-conceptual. More widely the various techniques and language-
games developed by Wittgenstein in his later works, and particularly his reflections on seeing 
aspects, can be understood as exercises in helping us to the play between the conceptual and 
the pre-conceptual. Through this play we return to our natural desires, overcoming the 
distortions of those desires which occur when we use language purely as a tool for control; 
freeing language as the expression of all that is most important in life. 
This brought us to the question of how Wittgenstein understands human desire and 
here we distinguished two aspects of desire. Firstly, there is the relationship between our 
conceptual and our pre-conceptual desires. Here we saw that Wittgenstein rejected the 
account of the will which is given in the Tractatus by returning us to the actual practices 
within which we use volitional language. The opens a path for understanding the pre-
conceptual basis for our desires which avoids characterizing it purely in terms of efficient 
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causation, and at the same time the danger of misunderstanding our voluntary behaviour as 
the causal result of a causally undetermined will is avoided. The second aspect of desire we 
examined concerns the metaphysical question of the origin and end of human desire. Here we 
followed Rhees’ criticism of Wittgenstein and concluded that although Wittgenstein opens 
the path towards the kind of account of desire which places the desire for understanding prior 
to particular applications of concepts, his continuing adherence to the Tractatus therapeutic 
understanding of philosophy, with its implicit notion of the subject, prevented him from 
developing the kind of account of human transcendence given by Plato. Here we may add, 
however, that the dialectical nature of Wittgenstein’s later thought helps to guard against too 
ready an account of the end of human desire in a unity of understanding. Although question 
marks can be placed over Wittgenstein’s understanding of eros, his dialectical practices can 
be seen as returning us in the manner Desmond suggests to the metaphysical practice of 
Plato. 
The question of origins lies at the heart of the metaphysical tradition, and Mulhall’s 
reading of the Investigations as a work concerned with origins deepens the dialogue between 
Wittgenstein and that tradition. In particular it raises the question of human nature, and the 
challenges we have brought against Wittgenstein in this chapter have had the purpose of 
probing his understanding of human nature. The dialectical practices Wittgenstein develops 
in his later works can be read in their form and content as throwing light on the question of 
what it is to be human. In the next chapter we will see how this light can help to illuminate 
questions in moral theology. The questions we have examine in this chapter such as the 
relationship between the conceptual and the pre-conceptual, and the nature of desire are of 
direct relevance for contemporary work in moral theology. Above all we will argue that 
Wittgenstein’s value to moral theology is in challenging modern conceptions of nature, 
paving the way for a renewal of our understanding of nature and its use in moral theology
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5 WITTGENSTEIN, NATURE AND MORAL THEOLOGY 
 Wittgenstein and the Renewal of Moral Theology 5.1
The first four chapters of this thesis have examined how Wittgenstein’s writings can 
help us to understand human nature for a renewal of moral theology. To this end we have 
offered a reading of Wittgenstein which places him in dialogue with the metaphysical 
tradition, and emphasises the dialectical nature of his later philosophy. In particular we have 
sought to determine how Wittgenstein’s philosophy provides an account of human freedom 
as situated, and as steering a course between the empty formalism of idealism and the 
physical determinism of empiricism. The influence of Wittgenstein on moral theology in the 
English speaking world has been considerable, and this thesis could have proceeded by 
offering an overview of how Wittgenstein has been used by theologians such as Stanley 
Hauerwas or Charles Pinches. Instead we chose to begin with an in-depth analysis of 
Wittgenstein’s thought on the subject of human nature. The advantage of this approach is that 
firstly it allows us to carry out a fuller dialogue between the work of moral theologians and 
Wittgenstein, and in particular provides the starting points for a conversation with those 
moral theologians who engage with metaphysics and the philosophy of nature in the Catholic 
tradition. Secondly, it has enabled us to develop a critical perspective on Wittgenstein, which 
not only draws attention to the limitation of using Wittgenstein’s writings in moral theology, 
but also provides critical perspectives relevant more generally for an account of human 
nature. Thirdly, and of particular relevance for this chapter and the next, it helps us to see 
how Wittgenstein’s writings can be used in developing an understanding of human nature 
which is open to theology. 
In this chapter we will begin to develop a dialogue between Wittgenstein and moral 
theology by providing a general overview of the relevance Wittgenstein’s philosophy has for 
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theology. In section 5.2 we will respond to the criticism that Wittgenstein in his later thought 
developed a form of finite pragmatism which cuts philosophy off from theology. This will 
lead to a more general discussion of the relationship between philosophy and theology. Here 
we will touch upon the contemporary re-evaluation of Henri de Lubac’s theology of grace 
and nature to argue that Wittgenstein’s philosophy enters most readily into conversation with 
theology through the mediation of the theology of creation:1 in raising the question of human 
nature Wittgenstein provides an opening for an encounter with divine wisdom. In keeping 
with this emphasis on the theology of creation section 5.3 will outline how over the last 
twenty-five years the concept of nature has made a return to the mainstream of moral 
theology. In section 5.4 we will examine parallels between Wittgenstein’s search for origins 
and Aquinas’ understanding of nature as origin, as this is presented in the works of Servais 
Pinckaers.2 Like Wittgenstein, Pinckaers sought to overcome the modern dichotomy which 
opposes the autonomy of reason to the heteronomy of anything which is external to it. 
Pinckaers’ concerns, however, are theological, and the question he faces is how to understand 
the relationship between grace and nature without opposing the heteronomy of grace to the 
autonomy of human agency. 
 
 How Open is Wittgenstein’s Philosophy to Theology? 5.2
Wittgenstein has been criticised for developing a form of pragmatism which cuts off 
any possibility of human transcendence. In his article “Words, Facts and God”3 Cornelius 
Ernst asks whether the Wittgenstein of the Investigations in unmasking false metaphysical 
idols and returning us to the: “common world of language-games embodied in the life of the 
                                                 
1 For a statement of de Lubac’s thesis see Henri de Lubac, The Mystery of the Supernatural, trans. Rosemary 
Sheed (London: Geoffrey Chapman, 1967). 
2 For a fuller statement of this project of renewal see Servais Pinckaers, The Sources of Christian Ethics, trans. 
Sr. Mary Thomas Nobel, O. P. (Washington DC.: Catholic University of America Press, 1995). 
3 Ernst, "Words, Facts and God," 13-27. 
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community”4 makes the question of human transcendence irrelevant: “For the finitude which 
is presented to us in the Investigations is no longer opposed to any sort of transcendence; it is 
merely one aspect of the Indefinite, the indefinite variety of human life.”5 In the Postscript to 
the second edition of Theology After Wittgenstein Kerr also acknowledges the challenge of 
showing how Wittgenstein remains open to the transcendent. Kerr is responding to Russell 
Reno’s criticism that his presentation of Wittgenstein forces a choice between: “radical 
transcendence in pursuit of an extraordinary goal discontinuous with, even hostile to, 
ordinary life, on the one hand, and, on the other, a pure immanence which forsakes the 
putatively alienating power of the extraordinary.”6 Kerr admits that “There is something to 
this charge” and regrets that in his presentation of Wittgenstein he emphasised a reading in 
continuity with Aristotle’s dictum: “that ‘being mortals, we should think mortal’, over against 
his [Aristotle’s] own insistence that ‘we ought, as far as in us lies, to make ourselves 
immortal.”7 Similarly, in response to Francesca Murphy’s criticism that his use of 
Wittgenstein reduces the self to a social construct removed from any sense of wonder through 
shared participation in being, Kerr responds by regretting that he failed to show how: 
“Wittgenstein’s philosophical writing is permeated by acknowledgement of what we might 
properly call ‘the wonder of being’. Indeed, the religious sensibility to which his work lends 
itself, as we shall see, can be described as a ‘sensibility of wonder’.”8 
Kerr is generous in his response to his critics, but it is important to note that he is not 
repudiating the central aim of Theology After Wittgenstein, which is to show the relevance of 
Wittgenstein’s writings in overcoming the dominance of modern misunderstandings of the 
                                                 
4 Ibid., 24. 
5 Ibid. 
6 Kerr, Theology after Wittgenstein, 199. For Reno’s criticism of Kerr see Russell R. Reno, The Ordinary 
Transformed : Karl Rahner and the Christian Vision of Transcendence (Grand Rapids, Mich: W.B. Eerdmans 
Pub. Co, 1995). 
7 Kerr, Theology after Wittgenstein, 199. 
8 Ibid., 197. The phrase ‘sensibility of wonder’ is attributed to John Churchill by Kerr. See Francesca Aran 
Murphy, Christ the Form of Beauty : A Study in Theology and Literature (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1995). 
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self within theology. To this end we have followed Kerr in showing how Wittgenstein 
attempted to develop a form of realism which avoids the dangers of idealism and empiricism. 
When theologians talk about immanence and transcendence, or of participation in being, what 
are the temptations they are liable to fall into? How are we to understand interiority and the 
contrast between the inner and the exterior? The realism which Wittgenstein sought involves 
a constant questioning of how we use such terms within theology, and the need to overcome 
the temptation to offer simple solutions to such complex questions. The dialectical nature of 
Wittgenstein’s later though entails he can be read as offering the dizzying perspective of the 
Indefinite, but such a perspective is as much a projection as the one which reduces God to a 
super entity standing over and against the world. Wittgenstein constantly probes our use of 
terms, teaching us how to avoid the misuses of language which embody false pictures of what 
it is to be human. In Theology After Wittgenstein Kerr emphasis the aspects of Wittgenstein’s 
philosophy which seek to overcome the disembodied rational self of modern thought by 
reconnecting us with our shared and embodied human practices. This is not to reduce human 
nature to a given immanence, but rather to bring into question how we understand 
immanence. Which pictures hold us captive when we think of the immanent and how do we 
overcome such pictures by returning to our actual human practices? Kerr draws a parallel 
between Wittgenstein and Aristotle, and opens the path to reading Wittgenstein in 
conversation with that tradition which characterizes human beings as rational animals: 
creatures living in the tension of the physical and the spiritual, between the reality of 
mortality and the desire for immortality. 
This is not to say that Wittgenstein is beyond criticism. Indeed, bringing Wittgenstein 
into dialogue with the metaphysical tradition enables us to show the tensions and limitations 
of his philosophy. As we begin a conversation between Wittgenstein and moral theology, we 
should keep these limitations in mind. In assessing the openness of any philosophy to 
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theology it is important to acknowledge its limitation, for this enables us to see how it can be 
transformed in the encounter with God’s revelation. Is a philosophy essentially closed to 
divine transcendence or is it open to the transforming grace of divine wisdom? Is its 
understanding of human nature (or denial of human nature) one which opens or closes the 
human to the divine? This raises the question of grace and nature, and throughout this chapter 
and the next we will keep this question in mind when examining the significance 
Wittgenstein’s understanding of human nature has for a renewal of moral theology. Reno’s 
criticisms of Kerr’s Wittgenstein turn on the charge that Wittgenstein’s understanding of 
human nature does not allow for that interplay of immanence and transcendence which 
enables us to understand the interaction between grace and nature. By contrast John Milbank 
sees Wittgenstein as a kindred spirit with Henri de Lubac and Martin Heidegger in 
overcoming the modern re-appropriation of a pagan ontology in which: “the primitive pagan 
ontological assumption that ‘capacity’ or ‘power’ rather than ‘desire’ will disclose reality to 
us.”9 This quotation is taken from Milbank’s book The Suspended Middle in which he aims to 
defend de Lubac’s theology of grace against recent criticisms of de Lubac made by Lawrence 
Feingold10 and Steven A Long.11 It would take us beyond the scope of this thesis to enter into 
this debate,12 but Milbank suggests that Wittgenstein’s later writings can help to overcome an 
understanding of nature as autonomous and set over and against the transcendent realm of 
grace.13 
                                                 
9 John Milbank, The Suspended Middle : Henri De Lubac and the Renewed Split in Modern Catholic Theology, 
Second edition. ed. (Grand Rapids, Michigan: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2014), 70. 
10 See Lawrence Feingold, The Natural Desire to See God According to St. Thomas Aquinas and His 
Interpreters, 2nd ed., Faith and Reason : Studies in Catholic Theology and Philosophy (Ave Maria, FL: 
Sapientia Press of Ave Maria University, 2010). 
11 See Steven A. Long, Natura Pura on the Recovery of Nature in the Doctrine of Grace, (Ashland, Ohio: 
Fordham University Press, 2010). 
12 For a balanced overview of this debate see Andrew Dean Swafford, Nature and Grace : A New Approach to 
Thomistic Ressourcement (Eugene, Oregon: Pickwick Publications, 2014). 
13 For an account of how Wittgenstein can be read as proving resources for overcoming the dualism between a 
realm of nature and a realm of grace see Terrance W. Klein, Wittgenstein and the Metaphysics of Grace 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007). Our reading of Wittgenstein differs from that of Klein insofar as Klein 
reads Wittgenstein through the lens of Transcendental Thomism with its notion that the philosophy of nature has 
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The question of grace and nature prompts us to examine the role of philosophy in 
theology. Theologians who use the work of any philosopher run the danger of presenting it as 
an autonomous system upon which theological concerns are clamped as an external dressing. 
On the other hand, there is the opposed peril of losing the integrity of a philosopher’s work 
through using it as an ornamentation which we gild onto pre-given theological categories. 
Milbank is aware of these opposed dangers and employs the work of Hans Urs von Balthasar 
to argue that both modern philosophy with its autonomous reason, and the radical theology of 
revelation developed by Karl Barth depend upon the paradigm of a self-enclosed nature to 
which grace is externally added: “Barth’s theology, for all its apparent innovation, remained 
confined within a Baroque contrast of nature with grace, and of reason with revelation.”14 In 
our interpretation of Wittgenstein we emphasised the constant self-questioning and dialectical 
nature of his later philosophy. It is this which Wittgenstein uses to break the spell of modern 
philosophy, with its myth of an autonomous reason, enabling us to place Wittgenstein in 
conversation with the ancient and medieval metaphysical tradition. Far from reducing 
philosophy to a realm of autonomous human practices Wittgenstein helps us to see the basis 
of human reason in nature. Again it is important to note the limitations of Wittgenstein’s 
philosophy, but perhaps its greatest merit is in constantly returning us to the question of who 
we are by showing us what lies in front of our eyes. We do not achieve this by forming an 
external perspective on our practices, but by reflectively entering into those practices. The 
fault of modern philosophy lies in seeking a perspective beyond our human practices from 
which to a construct self-contained model of reality. This is the substance of Gilson’s critique 
of modern philosophy.  
The dialectical reading we have developed of Wittgenstein attempts to show how his 
philosophy remains open for a concrete encounter with theology, enabling us to see how 
                                                                                                                                                        
been superseded by historical consciousness. By contrast we have read Wittgenstein as opening the way to a 
renewed philosophy of nature as part of our recovery of our human nature. 
14 Milbank, The Suspended Middle : Henri De Lubac and the Renewed Split in Modern Catholic Theology, 72. 
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human beings in all dimensions of their nature enter into the encounter with grace. This 
encounter will draw upon the reading of Wittgenstein we have developed in the first four 
chapters, and thus the dialogue between Wittgenstein and moral theology will be conducted 
in the company of another conversation partner, metaphysics. The relationship between 
theology and metaphysics is one attested to in the Catholic tradition, and although the use of 
metaphysics in theology has come under attack from various quarters it remains within the 
mainstream of theology.15 An example of this is the theology of truth and language developed 
by D. Stephen Long in his Speaking of God.16 This study is of particular interest, for in 
addition to defending the need for metaphysics in theology Long argues that Wittgenstein 
should be read as a philosopher who engages with and opens a path for metaphysics: 
“Wittgenstein does not bring metaphysics to an end; he critiques its improper uses and opens 
up the possibility for a kind of metaphysics that recognizes the limits of philosophy so that 
faith and reason no longer police one another.”17 
Long draws upon the work of Desmond in developing an understanding of a 
metaphysics which is open to theology, and the metaphor of policing a boarder is taken from 
the following passage from Desmond, which Long quotes at length: 
We can plot a border between territories and insist that faith and reason only travel to 
the other’s country under proper visa. Then they will enter illegally, without 
certification or passport. There are no univocal borders in mind and spirit which bar 
trespass or illegal entry; there is a porosity more elemental than all passports and 
academic policing . . . . Where is the pure faith relative to which thought is excluded? 
Where is there pure reason that entirely excludes all trust?18 
 
The porosity Desmond speaks of here does not entail collapsing all distinctions between faith 
and reason, grace and nature, or theology and philosophy; rather it directs us to the need for 
                                                 
15 For a defence of Aquinas’ metaphysics of creation from the attack made upon metaphysics by Heidegger see 
Fergus Kerr, O.P., After Aquinas : Versions of Thomism (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2002), 73-96. 
16 Long, Speaking of God : Theology, Language, and Truth. It is important to distinguish D. Stephen Long from 
the earlier mentioned Steven A. Long. 
17 Ibid., 213-14. 
18 William Desmond, Is There a Sabbath for Thought? : Between Religion and Philosophy, 1st ed., Perspectives 
in Continental Philosophy (New York: Fordham University Press, 2005), 98-99. The quotation is found in Long, 
Speaking of God : Theology, Language, and Truth, 19. 
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returning to those concrete practices in which grace and nature interact. This is not to rule out 
the use of general principles in making distinctions, so long as we member that principles do 
not apply themselves, but find their application within practices (this is one of the key lessons 
to draw from Wittgenstein’s examination of following a rule, and more generally from his 
account of application). Porosity does, however, imply a mutual influencing, which raises the 
question of how the encounter between metaphysics and theology changes both. Thus, Long 
argues that metaphysics is transformed through the incarnation of Christ: “In Christ, God, 
assumed human nature, which includes, as the fathers and councils teach, human reason and 
will, the very ‘stuff’ that makes philosophy possible.”19  
Our approach will differ from Long’s, not so much in denying that the incarnation 
transforms metaphysics, as in following the Catholic tradition which places more emphasis 
on the theology of creation in the encounter between philosophy and theology.20 It may be 
objected that emphasising the theology of creation leaves us firmly on the side of reason in 
the encounter between reason and revelation, raising the risk of developing an autonomous 
science of nature which cuts us off from revealed truth. But this is only the case if we already 
view the theology of creation through the lens of modern self-determining reason. In contrast, 
if we return to those currents of ancient and medieval thought which defer “to an unknown 
divine wisdom,”21 then the theology of creation provides a key context in which to 
understand the encounter between human reason and divine wisdom.22  
The porosity of the border between revelation and reason in the theology of creation 
plays at the limits of human reason. At the same time this porosity does not obliterate 
                                                 
19 Speaking of God : Theology, Language, and Truth, 15. 
20 For a classic statement of Aquinas’ philosophy/theology of creation see: Josef Pieper, The Silence of St. 
Thomas : Three Essays (South Bend, Ind.: St. Augustine's Press, 1999). 
21 Milbank, The Suspended Middle : Henri De Lubac and the Renewed Split in Modern Catholic Theology, 100. 
22 For an account of how Aristotelian science is transformed in an encounter with the theology of creation see 
Marie-Dominique Chenu, O.P., Nature, Man and Society in the Twelfth Century : Essays on New Theological 
Perspectives in the Latin West, trans. Jerome Taylor and Lester K. Little (Toronto ; London: University of 
Toronto Press, 1997). 
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distinctions, and the theology of creation enables us to acknowledge the integrity of nature 
while avoiding the risk of enclosing it in an autonomous realm. In the classic Christological 
definition of the Council of Chalcedon the relationship between the human and divine natures 
of Jesus Christ is asserted to be such that the two natures remain united: “without confusion 
or change, without division or separation.”23 In the encounter between the human and the 
divine which is the person of Jesus Christ the human remains fully integral. This is not to 
imply that the incarnation has no effect on our humanity; rather it is to acknowledge that what 
is transformed in the incarnation is human nature, and however we are to understand this 
transformation it cannot involve an essential change in that nature.24 
This emphasis on the theology of creation will become evident in chapter seven when 
we will examine how Catholic moral theologians working in the natural law and virtue 
traditions argue that an account of human agency must be grounded in natural principles. It 
also enables us to develop the conversation between Wittgenstein and moral theology. 
Wittgenstein, in returning us to natural human practices, opens the way for a theology of 
creation which throws light on the question of the origin and destiny of our human nature. In 
the next section we will trace the efforts of moral theologians over the last thirty years to 
develop a renewed concept of nature for use in moral theology. The purpose of this will be to 
provide the starting point for an engagement between the work of these moral theologians 
and Wittgenstein, building on the arguments of this present section concerning the 
relationship between philosophy and theology. 
 
 
                                                 
23 Josef Neuner and Jacques Dupuis, The Christian Faith in the Doctrinal Documents of the Catholic Church, 
6th rev. and enl. ed. (New York: Alba House, 1996), 203. 
24 There is the epistemological question of what knowledge we can have of our created human nature 
independent of revelation. Here Catholic theologians tend to allow a greater role for human reason, although this 
is not to say that in particular concrete circumstances a neat division between reason and revelation can always 
be given.  
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 The Revival of Nature as a Category in Moral Theology 5.3
5.3.1 Protestantism and Evolution: Two Unlikely Sources for a Revival of 
Nature in Moral Theology 
Wittgenstein’s concern in distinguishing the grammatical and the empirical is to 
prevent the intrusion of science into what is most important in life, and the reduction of 
human behaviour to empirical causal explanations. This is a concern which he holds 
consistently from the Tractatus through to his last writings. It is a concern which was shared 
by many Catholic theologians in the twentieth century, and prompted them to emphasis the 
rational and spiritual aspects of human nature at the cost of downplaying or even denying any 
basis for our rational practices in pre-rational nature. Jean Porter notes how due to the danger 
of imposing an oppressive morality on the basis of a static and outdated understanding of pre-
rational human nature, for many Catholic theologians moral arguments which establish 
conclusions on the basis of pre-rational human nature had become discredited. By contrast to 
this placing emphasis on the autonomy of human reason opened the path to a more 
historically dynamic notion of human nature and natural law, which is responsive to the 
contingencies of life: 
when we examine early twentieth-century Catholic accounts of the natural law, we find 
that they agree, with few exceptions, on a construal of the natural law tradition which 
emphasizes the rational character of the natural law and minimizes or even denies the 
normative significance of nature, except insofar as human nature is simply equated with 
rationality.25 
 
The shift in Catholic moral theology away from attributing any normative role to pre-rational 
human nature was so pervasive that up to the 1990’s, with the exception of lone voices such 
as Pinckaers, the predominant models of human agency used by Catholic moral theologians 
stressed the autonomy of reason and provided little or no normative role for pre-rational 
                                                 
25 Jean Porter, Nature as Reason : A Thomistic Theory of the Natural Law (Grand Rapids, Mich. ; Cambridge: 
W.B. Eerdmans, 2005), 35. 
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nature.26 This was true both of proportionalists and those who opposed them through the 
development of a new natural law theory.27 Despite this shift, nature as a normative category 
made a reappearance in moral theology from two unlikely sources: the writings of Protestant 
moral theologians, such as Oliver O’Donovan, and the work of evolutionary biologists.  
In his book Resurrection and Moral Order, published in 1986, O’Donovan argues that 
a conception of the order of creation is required in moral theology. Any account of what it is 
for a kind of thing to flourish will fail if it does not take account of the wider context of 
creation: “One cannot speak of the flourishing of any kind without implicitly indicating a 
wider order which will determine what flourishing and frustration within that kind consists 
of.”28 For O’Donovan this ordering includes both an ordering within creation, but also an 
ordering of the creation to the creator such that: “The only pure teleological relation, 
unqualified by any generic equivalence, is that between the creature and its Creator.”29 Thus, 
Donovan directs us to an understanding of human nature within the context of the theology of 
creation which stresses the need to place it within the wider order of creation. As the title of 
the book indicates, O’Donovan’s theology of creation is understood in the broader light of the 
theory of the resurrection, but within that theology it is not to be reduced to a mere place 
holder with an empty content.30 
                                                 
26 Stephen Pope observes that both personalism and liberation theology, the predominant trends in Catholic 
moral theology from the mid-fifties up until the early nineties, fail to engage with pre-rational human nature. 
See Stephen J. Pope, The Evolution of Altruism and the Ordering of Love, Moral Traditions & Moral Arguments 
(Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 1994), 19-49. 
27 Bernard Hoose notes how for Joseph Fuchs, one of the key figures in the development of Proportionalism: 
“We cannot find norms for concrete moral behaviour in mere conformity to physical nature as such. What 
matters is conformity to the human person in his or her totality.” Bernard Hoose, Proportionalism : The 
American Debate and Its European Roots (Washington: Georgetown University Press, 1987), 19. This does not 
rule out any role for pre-rational nature, but it minimizes its importance. In regard to New Natural Law Theory 
Russell Hittinger observes how Germain Grisez rejects classical natural law theory on the grounds that it 
reduces practical reasoning to: “a mere footnote to the conclusions of the speculative disciplines, which are 
principally interested in the invariant essences and structures of nature.” Hittinger, A Critique of the New 
Natural Law Theory, 15. 
28 Oliver O'Donovan, Resurrection and Moral Order : An Outline for Evangelical Ethics (Leicester: Inter-
Varsity, 1986), 34-35. 
29 Ibid., 33. 
30 For an overview of the use of nature in the works of two other Protestant theologians, James Gustafson and 
Reinhard Hütter see Porter, Nature as Reason : A Thomistic Theory of the Natural Law, 41-44. 
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Another unlikely source which has prompted a return to considering the normative 
role of nature in Catholic moral theology is the work of evolutionary biologists. Stephen Pope 
is notable as a Catholic moral theologian who in his 1994 book The Evolution of Altruism and 
the Ordering of Love argues for the need to engage with the work of evolutionary biology. 31 
Pope observes how at that time Catholic moral theologians seemed oblivious to work being 
done in evolutionary biology and its use in ethics. For Pope this is not merely a case of 
oversight, but a result of the dominant models of human agency in Catholic moral theology: 
“Recent Catholic authors thus unnecessarily separate the human person from human nature 
and the wider natural world.”32 Like O’Donovan, Pope argues that this separation results in 
an inability to understand the ordering of creation. In contrast to this splitting of the human 
person, Pope sees the work of evolutionary biologists as helping us to understand the natural 
ordering of human desires. Furthermore, he argues that Aquinas’ understanding of the 
ordering of human inclinations can enter into conversation with evolutionary biology, 
because his concept of human nature is grounded in Aristotelian science such that: “the 
collective activities of all individual substances harmoniously interlock and coordinate to 
comprise a hierarchically ordered universe.”33  
Porter also draws upon the work of evolutionary biologists in working towards a 
concept of human nature, but her use of it is limited and she concludes: 
Used with caution, the more careful and limited arguments of the evolutionary 
psychologists do offer valuable insights into the regularities of human nature, but I am 
convinced that other avenues of research, especially anthropological studies and 
comparative studies of the other primates, can be of more value in this respect.34 
 
                                                 
31 Pope, The Evolution of Altruism and the Ordering of Love. 
32 Ibid., 34. 
33 Ibid., 50. 
34 Porter, Nature as Reason : A Thomistic Theory of the Natural Law, 106. The two avenues of research Porter 
here mentions were both of interest to Wittgenstein. If our reading of Wittgenstein is correct his interest in these 
fields of study stems in part from the light they cast on the boundary between the linguistic and the pre-
linguistic. Primatologists and anthropologists present observations which despite their limitations point to the 
concrete reality of an animate nature. Wittgenstein may have rejected the rationalism present in Frazer’s 
anthropology, but was able to draw conclusions from the materials Frazer complied. 
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It is important to guard against the assumption that conclusions from evolutionary science 
can be given immediate normative status in an understanding of human nature. Here we can 
heed Wittgenstein’s warning against the picture of the “evolution of the higher animals and 
man” which sees consciousness awakening in the following manner: “Though the ether is 
filled with vibrations the world is dark. But one day man opens his seeing eye, and there is 
light.”35 It is not clear how we are to use such a picture, and yet it seems to: “spare us this 
work: it already points to a particular use.”36 Our reading of Wittgenstein, by stressing the 
dialectical nature of the relationship between the rational and the pre-rational, helps to 
overcome the risk of reducing the rational to the pre-rational or of subsuming the pre-rational 
into the rational. Pope avoids this risk by using Aristotelian science, as it is developed in the 
works of Aquinas, as a wider philosophy of nature within which to understand the results of 
evolutionary science. This allows him to use the findings of evolutionary science while 
respecting the analogical interplay between the pre-rational and the rational; avoiding the 
temptation to subsume an account of our rational behaviour into its pre-rational basis. 
 
5.3.2 Physics, Agency and Virtue 
In chapter four we argued that Wittgenstein requires something like an Aristotelian 
understanding of the physical world in order to overcome the modern dichotomy between the 
conceptual and the natural. Unless our (Aristotelian) second nature is rooted in first nature 
human action spins free from physical being. Stephen L. Brock in Action and Conduct, by 
calling attention to the need for such an Aristotelian understating of the physical world when 
developing an account of human agency, contributes to the recovery of nature as a central 
                                                 
35 Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 184. “Die Evolution der höheren Tiere und des Menchen . . . Die 
Welt ist, trotz aller Ätherschwingungen, die sie durchziechen, dunkel. Eines Tages aber macht der Mensch sein 
sehendes Auge auf, und es wird hell.” Philosophische Untersuchungen. In Tractatus Logico-Philosopicus, 
Ludwig Wittgenstein Werkausgabe Band 1, 505. 
36 Philosophical Investigations, 184. “dieser Arbeit zu überheben; es deutet schon auf eine bestimmte 
Verwendung.” Philosophische Untersuchungen. In Tractatus Logico-Philosopicus, Ludwig Wittgenstein 
Werkausgabe Band 1, 505. 
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category in moral philosophy and theology.37 Brock’s aim is to show the relevance of 
Aquinas’ account of human agency for contemporary debates within the philosophy of 
action, and to apply these results to questions of agency within moral philosophy and 
theology. At the centre of Brock’s thesis is the claim that Aquinas’ account of human action 
turns upon his understanding of the analogical equivocacy of the term ‘action’, such that an 
understanding of human agency requires the: “consideration of features common to being a 
human action and being a physical action.”38 Brock adds the warning that: “such a project 
must be very careful not to blur the distinction between these fundamentally diverse ways of 
being action.”39 He thus acknowledges the essential distinction between the rational and the 
pre-rational in a manner which avoids creating a dichotomy between them, and allows for 
their dialectical interplay. In chapter seven we will return to Brock’s account of human 
agency as we consider the light Wittgenstein’s writings shed upon the question of agency in 
moral theology. For our present purposes it is important to see how Wittgenstein can help us 
to understand the connection between an account of human nature and an account of human 
agency. 
Wittgenstein’s influence, either direct or indirect, has been considerable in the revival 
of action theology undertaken by analytical philosophers and the central role it now plays in 
moral philosophy and theology. The work of Anscombe is pivotal in this regard. In her 
influential paper “Modern Moral Philosophy”40 she argues that until we have developed an 
“adequate philosophy of psychology” terms used in moral philosophy such as “moral 
obligation and moral duty, that is to say – and of what is morally right and wrong, and of the 
                                                 
37 Stephen L. Brock, Action and Conduct : Thomas Aquinas and the Theory of Action (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 
1998). 
38 Ibid., 16. 
39 Ibid. 
40 Printed in G. E. M. Anscombe, Human Life, Action and Ethics : Essays, St Andrews Studies in Philosophy 
and Public Affairs (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2005), 169-94. 
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moral sense of ‘ought’, ought to be jettisoned if this is psychologically possible.”41 
Wittgenstein’s influence is clearly to be seen in Anscombe’s argument that use of moral 
terms must be reconnected to their basis in human practices. The “philosophy of psychology” 
she has in mind is not one which proceeds by describing the contents of consciousness. 
Rather, it is an account of human agency of the kind Wittgenstein developed, and which 
Anscombe connects with the philosophical psychology of Aristotle and Aquinas. Her call for 
a revival of virtue ethics is to be understood in this light, and Anscombe goes beyond 
Wittgenstein by drawing connections to the Aristotelian tradition which places an account of 
the virtues at the heart of its understanding of human nature. This is the tradition which is 
developed by Aquinas, for whom it is the theological virtues which provide the most 
comprehensive context for understanding human action, as it is transformed by divine 
grace.42 
Through drawing the connection between the use of moral terms and human practices 
Anscombe sought to overcome the modern disconnection between moral theory and moral 
practice. In chapter two we traced Wittgenstein’s rejection of the Tractatus’ picture theory of 
meaning, and his subsequent abandonment of the search for the general form of the 
proposition. What Wittgenstein came to understand is that propositions cannot be removed 
from the practices within which they are used without losing their meaning. Anscombe makes 
the same point for our use of moral terms. It is a mistake to begin with a model of moral 
agency, whether this is given through the positing of moral principles or the offering of an 
account of human nature, and to draw moral conclusions from the application of this model to 
reality. Rather, moral theory develops as reflection upon moral practice. 
                                                 
41 Ibid., 169. 
42 For a philosophical account of human action as it is developed by Aquinas in this tradition see Ralph 
McInerny, Aquinas on Human Action : A Theory of Practice (Washington, D.C: Catholic University of America 
Press, 1992). A theological account of Aquinas’ understanding of how divine grace transforms human action see 
Sherwin, By Knowledge & by Love : Charity and Knowledge in the Moral Theology of St. Thomas Aquinas. 
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How we are to understand theory as reflection on practice? Wittgenstein argues for 
the autonomy of our practices, and that the role of philosophy (and hence of theory) consist in 
conceptual clarification, through which we overcome confusions in our use of language. 
Those readings of Wittgenstein which interpret his stress on the autonomy of practice as 
precluding any but the most minimal basis for those practices in our pre-linguistic behaviour, 
such as that offered by Hacker and Baker, argue that there is no question of Wittgenstein 
reflecting upon the basis of those practices in a theory of human nature.43 Such reflections, 
they argue, are alien to Wittgenstein and arise from the philosophical confusion of imagining 
that human practices need an external foundation. The dialectical reading of Wittgenstein we 
developed challenged such interpretations, while acknowledging the inconsistencies in 
Wittgenstein’s later thought which give substance to them. To this end we developed our 
reading of Wittgenstein in conversation with an understanding of metaphysics in which 
theory and practice are not opposed.  
In chapter one (1.2.3) we followed Hibbs in arguing that metaphysis is primarily a 
practice. In this metaphysical practice nature is not presented as an external model or 
foundation, but as the basis for our human practices, which are not reducible to it in any 
deterministic way. Those interpretation of Wittgenstein which fail to understand the 
dialectical nature of his thought remain trapped within the modern dichotomy between theory 
of practice; their conception of practice forms one side of a dichotomy which retains its force 
despite their rejection of the opposed side (theory). Such is the grip of this modern dichotomy 
that the most influential response to Anscombe’s call for a revival of virtue ethics, 
MacIntyre’s After Virtue, makes no use of biology. This is not to say that MacIntyre set out to 
develop a practical ethics devoid of any theoretical basis, but in his account of virtue he lays 
emphasis on the cultural mediation of virtue with little acknowledgment of any basis for 
                                                 
43 Such is the interpretation of how to understand Wittgenstein in regard to the use of theory in moral philosophy 
offered by Johnston in Wittgenstein and Moral Philosophy. 
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virtue in physical human nature. By contrast, in his later work Dependent Rational Animals 
MacIntyre admits his earlier error in failing to appreciate the role of biology in ethics: 
“Although there is good reason to repudiate important elements in Aristotle’s biology, I now 
judge that I was in error in supposing an ethics independent of biology to be possible.”44  
The question of human agency and its basis in physical nature has brought us to the 
works of two leading moral philosophers, Anscombe and MacIntyre. This situates us over the 
border from moral theology in moral philosophy. The porosity of that border is such, 
however, that these developments in moral philosophy are not without interest for moral 
theology. At the same time it is important to take note of distinctions, particularly how the 
operation of the acquired moral virtues differs from that of the infused theological virtues.45 
We will return to this question in the next chapter, and conclude this present section by 
mentioning the work of a theologian who combines insights from Wittgenstein and Aquinas 
in his understanding of human nature and its relationship to divine grace. In his influential 
work Law, Love and Language McCabe, writing back in 1968, characterizes the human being 
as: “the linguistic animal.”46 Human beings are language using animals such that: “There is 
no such thing on earth as a purely linguistic community. Every linguistic community has 
biological grounds as well.”47 McCabe develops his understanding of human behaviour by 
determining what we share in common with other animals, while bringing out what is 
uniquely human: a project which is developed in his writings edited under the title The Good 
Life.48 We will return to McCabe’s work in the next chapter, when we will examine his 
understanding of how the linguistic animal is transformed in its encounter with divine grace. 
                                                 
44 Alasdair C. MacIntyre, Dependent Rational Animals : Why Human Beings Need the Virtues (London: 
Duckworth, 1999), x. 
45 Although it is important to note that for Aquinas there are also infused moral virtues. 
46 Herbert McCabe, O.P., Law, Love, and Language (London: Continuum, 2003), 68. 
47 Ibid., 46. 
48 The Good Life : Ethics and the Pursuit of Happiness (London: Continuum, 2005). 
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In this section we have traced how the concept of nature has made a return to moral 
theology. This is by no means an exhaustive survey, but it aims to provide the main contours 
of the revival of nature as a key concept in moral theology, and to relate that revival to the 
reading of Wittgenstein we developed in earlier chapters. 49 Central to this comparison is the 
claim that the revival of nature in moral theology entails the rejection of modern 
understandings of nature, and the recovery of nature understood by reflection upon human 
practices; overcoming the modern dichotomy between theory and practice. This opens the 
path for a return to virtue ethics, and an understanding of the pre-rational basis of human 
virtue which avoids the danger of subsuming ethics into a pre-given model of nature. It is 
through the exercise of the virtues that we return to the basis of that exercise in human nature; 
such that nature is not understood as an abstract model applied to form moral judgements, but 
as the dynamic source of our humanity. Wittgenstein’s concern with the question of origins, 
and his emphasis on our natural ways of acting, opens the path for a dialogue with virtue 
ethics. The influence, both direct and indirect, Wittgenstein has had on the revival of virtue 
ethics indicates that such a dialogue can be fruitful. 
 
 Wittgenstein and Pinckaers: Beginning a Conversation? 5.4
5.4.1 Nature as Source: Aquinas’ Concept of Nature 
In his article ‘Aquinas on Nature and the Supernatural’50 Pinckaers cautions that we 
cannot immediately grasp Aquinas’ concept of nature: “We cannot study his concept of 
nature as if we were living in the thirteenth century, because this fundamental notion has 
                                                 
49 Another source of the revival in interest in nature in ethical theory which we have not touched upon is the 
development of environmental ethics. For an examination of how to use the results of environmental science in 
moral theology see: Celia Deane-Drummond, The Ethics of Nature (Malden, Mass. ; Oxford: Blackwell, 2004). 
50 Servais Pinckaers, "Aquinas on Nature and the Supernatural," in The Pinckaers Reader: Renewing Thomistic 
Moral Theology, ed. John Berkman and Craig Steven Titus (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America 
Press, 2005).  
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undergone a profound evolution in modern times.”51 Between ourselves and Aquinas there 
lies several hundred years in which the concept of nature has evolved under the influence of 
late medieval nominalism, Renaissance theology and modern science. Moreover, Aquinas’ 
concept of nature is not a univocal general notion, but rather takes shape in various 
theological and philosophical contexts, and involves drawing upon Aristotle to distinguishing 
“four meanings of the word ‘nature’.”52 Nevertheless, Pinckaers does identify what he sees as 
a common feature of Aquinas’ various uses of nature: 
they belong together, and together bear on a concrete experience, that of birth, which 
should be understood not only as a biological act but as a primitive fact, the coming 
into existence of a being taken in its concrete totality, the human person with its form, 
that is, a soul or spirit, and its matter, a body. In the case of the birth of Christ, divinity 
itself will be involved; the problem is to know how. The term “nature” thus seems to 
designate an all-encompassing and dynamic reality.53 
 
This all-encompassing reality entails that nature, unlike technology, does not operate 
according to external principles, but involves “the dimension of interiority.”54 That which 
acts according to nature acts in a dynamic fashion from within itself, and in the case of 
human beings this inner dynamism goes beyond the “biological or psychological.”55 In this 
emphasis on the interiority of human agency, Pinckaers is careful to avoid the trap of 
assuming immediate access to an inner private self, and follows Aquinas in arguing that our 
understanding of the interiority of human nature follows from our encounter with external 
                                                 
51 Ibid., 359. “Nous ne pouvons pas étudier sa conception de la nature comme si nous étions au XIII siècle, 
parce que cette notion fondamentale a profoundèment évolué à l’époque moderne.” "Nature-Surnature Chez 
Saint Thomas D'aquin," in Ethique Et Natures, ed. Eric Fuchs and Mark Hunyadi (Genève: Labor et Fides, 
1992), 19. 
52 "Aquinas on Nature and the Supernatural," 360. “4 sens du mot ‘nature.’” "Nature-Surnature Chez Saint 
Thomas D'aquin," 20. 
53 "Aquinas on Nature and the Supernatural," 360-61. “Ils se tiennent et s’engendrent l’un l’autre à partir d’une 
expérience concrete, celle de la naisance, qu’il faut comprendre non comme un événement biologique 
seulement, mais comme un fait primitive, la mise à l’existence d’un être pris dans sa totalité concrete, l’homme 
avec sa forme, c’est-à-dire son âme ou son esprit, et avec son corps, sa matière. Dans le cas de la naissance du 
Christ, la divinité même y sera engage; le problème est de savoir de quelle manière. Le term de ‘nature’ nous 
apparaît ainsi comme désignant une réalité englobante et dynamique.” "Nature-Surnature Chez Saint Thomas 
D'aquin," 20-21. 
54 "Aquinas on Nature and the Supernatural," 361. “la dimension d’intériorité.” "Nature-Surnature Chez Saint 
Thomas D'aquin," 21. 
55 "Aquinas on Nature and the Supernatural," 361. “biologique ou psychologique.” "Nature-Surnature Chez 
Saint Thomas D'aquin," 21. 
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human acts: “The concept of nature invites our reflection, beginning with our experience of 
the way we produce acts and works, as though by a kind of generation, and going on to their 
intimate sources: our free will and our spiritual nature. We are thus led to the causes of 
human morality.”56 
Pinckaers’ reflections provide several points of contact with our reading of 
Wittgenstein. In our interpretation of Wittgenstein we followed Mulhall in reading the 
Investigations as a work which is concerned with origins. Wittgenstein seeks to reconnect us 
with the origin of our practices, and thus help us to return to our nature as something which is 
dynamic and whole. For both Wittgenstein and Pinckaers the path to the recovery of nature is 
a narrow one, and they battle against false philosophies (and theologies) which prevent us 
from seeing who we are. To this end both direct us to the concrete human practices which lie 
before our eyes as the means to understanding the inner dynamic principles of human nature. 
In drawing attention to the centrality of the question of origins in Aquinas’ concept of nature 
Pinckaers aims to show that there is no opposition in Aquinas between grace and nature. We 
have argued that the theology of creation provides the key for understanding the relationship 
between grace and nature; avoiding the danger of setting them in opposition as two opposing 
spheres. Now we can extend our comparison between Wittgenstein and Pinckaers by seeing 
both as raising the question of origins in a manner which provides an opening for dialogue 
with the theology of creation. This is an opening which Pinckaers follows Aquinas in making, 
bringing a transformation of the Aristotelian concept of nature. 
 
 
 
                                                 
56 "Aquinas on Nature and the Supernatural," 361. “La notion de nature invite notre réflexion à partir de 
l’experience que nous avons de la production de nos actes, de nos œuvres, comme d’une sorte de génération, et 
à remonter vers les sources intimes dont elles procèdent: notre volonté libre, notre nature spirituelle. Ainsi 
sommes-nous amenés à nous poser la question des causes de la moralité en l’homme.” "Nature-Surnature Chez 
Saint Thomas D'aquin," 21. 
182 
 
5.4.2 Beyond Heteronomy and Autonomy  
We have seen in section 4.3 how Wittgenstein attempted to overcome the modern 
splitting of the human being between a causal empirical account of human action and an 
empty formal account of the will. The question of our origins, and thus of human nature, 
oscillates in modern thought between the objectifying perspective of the scientific observer 
and the inner experience of the acting subject. This is evident in the philosophy of Kant, who 
contrasts the heteronomy of the empirical world of desire with the autonomy of the 
transcendent self which is subject to the moral law.57 In his article “Aquinas and Agency: 
Beyond Autonomy and Heteronomy?” 58 Pinckaers sets out to: “look into the question of 
autonomy and heteronomy in St. Thomas.”59 Pinckaers acknowledges that this is a modern 
question and notes that in the Kantian tradition it is formulated as entailing a dilemma: 
“either autonomy or heteronomy, with a leaning towards autonomy.”60 For Aquinas by 
contrast this dilemma does not arise. Commentators on Aquinas have found elements 
implying autonomy and others implying heteronomy. Aquinas places a stress on the 
autonomy of morality with: “his insistence on the legislative function of the human reason,” 
while at the same time holding that morality is heteronomous by: “placing outside the human 
person, in God, the ultimate end considered as the supreme criterion of morality, and his 
declaration that all legislation derives from the eternal law.”61 From the Kantian perspective 
this combination of autonomy and heteronomy is incomprehensible, because within the 
overall philosophical organization of Kant’s moral philosophy these terms exclude one 
                                                 
57 See Immanuel Kant, The Moral Law : Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals (London: Routledge, 2005). 
58 Printed in Servais Pinckaers, "Aquinas and Agency : Beyond Autonomy and Heteronomy?," in The Pinckaers 
Reader : Renewing Thomistic Moral Theology (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 2005). 
59 Ibid., 167. “de rechercher quelle réponse nous trouvons à la question de l’autonomie et ‘hétéronomie chez St 
Thomas.” "Autonomie Et Hétéronomie Selon Saint Thomas D'aquin," in Autonomie : Dimensions Éthiques De 
La Liberté, ed. Carlos Josaphat Pinto de Oliveira (Fribourg: Éditions Universitaires 1978), 104. 
60 "Aquinas and Agency : Beyond Autonomy and Heteronomy?," 167. “ou autonomie ou hétéronomie de la 
morale, avec un connotation en faveur de ‘autonomie.” "Autonomie Et Hétéronomie Selon Saint Thomas 
D'aquin," 104. 
61 "Aquinas and Agency : Beyond Autonomy and Heteronomy?," 168. “comme de placer en dehors de l’homme, 
en Dieu, la fin ultime considérée comme le critère supreme de la moralité, et de faire dériver toute legislation de 
la loi éternelle.” "Autonomie Et Hétéronomie Selon Saint Thomas D'aquin," 104. 
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another. By contrast, the overall organization of Aquinas’ moral theology does not imply 
such an opposition.62  
So how does Pinckaers go about showing that Aquinas offers an understanding of 
moral agency which takes us beyond the choice between autonomy and heteronomy? 
Pinckaers sets out to show how the Kantian understanding of agency which underlies the 
contrast between autonomy and heteronomy results from the fragmentation of a previously 
                                                 
62 Pinckaers does not in this article directly address the methodological issues involved in comparing two 
philosophies or theologies which differ in their overall organization. The terms ‘autonomy’ and ‘heteronomy’ 
are not found in Aquinas, and through posing the question of their application in his theology we risk imposing 
alien concerns which deform it. Likewise, importing perspectives from the theology of Aquinas into an 
interpretation of Kant’s moral philosophy runs the risk of changing Kant’s use of terms beyond recognition. So 
are we left with two incommensurable systems of thought which make sense in their own terms, but cannot be 
compared? This question lies in the background not only of Pinckaers’ comparison between Aquinas and Kant, 
but of the attempt in this chapter to develop a dialogue between Wittgenstein and moral theology. Furthermore, 
it is present in the earlier chapters of this thesis in our comparison between Wittgenstein and the metaphysical 
tradition. Have we been somewhat cavalier about such methodological questions? To answer this it is important 
first to take a step back and examine the basis upon which we formulate methodological questions in philosophy 
or theology. The notion that methodology can be formulated prior to our practices again falls into the modern 
mistake of seeking to assess those practices from a perspective beyond them. Philosophies and theologies are 
then characterized as autonomous systems, which can only be compared by adopting a neutral methodology. 
Once the possibility of such a neutral perspective is abandoned we are left with self-confined systems of thought 
with no rational basis for choosing between them. We remain enclosed in this dilemma unless we find a way of 
overcoming the external perspective which sets it up. To do this we must begin from an immersion in a practice 
of philosophy or theology and again dialectic is essential in ensuring that our practices do not close in on 
themselves. Furthermore, the dialectical understanding of rational practice we have been developing in this 
thesis is not a neutral method, but involves an understanding of the principles which form the basis for our 
practices. In the previous section we saw how these principles enable us to achieve a unity within the concrete 
reality of human nature between the pre-rational basis of our practices and the universal horizon of truth towards 
which they move. As there is no neutral perspective from which to assess the claims of differing philosophies or 
theologies any comparison must begin with the practice of a chosen one, but this does not entail that the choice 
is arbitrary. Nor are we caught in a vicious circle of interpretation, so long as we constantly return those practise 
to their basis in our natural human practices; this we learn from Wittgenstein (albeit that our understanding of 
the relationship between those practices and the metaphysical tradition departs from him). In moving beyond the 
choice between autonomy and heteronomy Pinckaers overcomes the methodological problem of how to bring 
differing conceptions of philosophy or theology into dialogue. This is not to say that the work of comparison is 
accomplished in one easy step; rather it takes place within the dialectical practice of a philosophy or theology 
such that we come to see how differing practices show the errors and limitations of their rivals, while learning 
from those rivals how to overcome their own errors and limitation. This implies an openness on both sides to 
dialogue, but it does not entail relativism. If a philosopher or theologian can show how a rival practice is 
limited, and how she is able to overcome those limitations, then she has made a case for adopting her own 
chosen practice over the rival one. This is not to say that her philosophy or theology is a finished system which 
will rebuff all challenges. To hold such is again to fall into the modern error of autonomous rationality. It is not 
merely the internal consistency of our philosophical or theological practices which determines their truth; rather 
it is whether they make sense in our lives and of our lives. Thus, Pinckaers brings the modern dichotomy 
between autonomy and heteronomy into question by arguing that it cannot find a home within our moral 
practices. He turns to Aquinas as providing an account of human agency which takes us beyond this dichotomy 
and reconnects with our natural human practices. (In this discussion I draw on the conception of rational enquiry 
developed by MacIntyre in: Alasdair C. MacIntyre, Whose Justice? Which Rationality? (Notre Dame, Ind.: 
University of Notre Dame Press, 1988). MacIntyre applies these principles to competing systems of moral 
enquiry in: Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry : Encyclopaedia, Genealogy, and Tradition Being Gifford 
Lectures Delivered in the University of Edinburgh in 1988 (London: Duckworth, 1990).) 
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unified tradition: in this case the Patristic tradition. He argues that this tradition was inherited 
by Aquinas, but later theologians failed to preserve it. Here he identifies: “three historical 
events in Catholic tradition intervening between Aquinas’ day and ours that had direct 
consequences for the systematization of morality and for our question.”63 The three events 
Pinckaers identifies are nominalism, the Protestant Crisis and the universalism of reason. He 
sets out to show how each of these brought about a fragmentation of the unified conception of 
the Christian life offered by the Fathers of the Church. At the centre of that unified 
conception lies an understanding of how human nature is transformed in its encounter with 
the truth of Jesus Christ revealed in Scripture. Therefore the particular aspect of Aquinas’ 
theology Pinckaers highlights is his: “treaties on the Evangelical Law, which is one of the 
high points, too often neglected, of the moral exposition in the Summa theologicae.”64 This 
moves us into theology, and raises the question of the relationship between theology and 
philosophy. 
Pinckaers uses Aquinas’ account of human agency and his understanding of the basis 
of that agency in natural principles, in order to overcome the division between philosophy 
and theology. He does this in a manner which does not involve collapsing the distinction 
between philosophy and theology, and they remain distinct discourses: philosophy takes its 
starting point from our natural reflection upon the world, whereas theology begins with 
revelation. These distinct discourses are not, however, self-contained autonomous practices. 
Philosophy, as we have argued throughout this thesis, involves an essential openness to the 
question of origins. Theology likewise poses the question of origins and thus the question of 
our human nature. Earlier in this chapter we suggested that philosophy and theology find a 
                                                 
63 Pinckaers, "Aquinas and Agency : Beyond Autonomy and Heteronomy?," 168. “trois événements historiques 
survenus entre S. Thomas et nous dans la tradition catholique, qui ont eu des conséquences directes sur la 
systématisation de la morale et sur notre question.” "Autonomie Et Hétéronomie Selon Saint Thomas D'aquin," 
105. 
64 "Aquinas and Agency : Beyond Autonomy and Heteronomy?," 168. “le traité de la Loi évangélique qui forme 
un des sommets, trop négligé, de la morale exposée dans la Somme théologique.” "Autonomie Et Hétéronomie 
Selon Saint Thomas D'aquin," 105. 
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place for dialogue in the theology of creation. Now we can add that in this space, where we 
ask the question of origins, theology is not an alien, heteronomous discourse, but is that 
which: “answers to the aspirations hidden in the heart of every person, even beyond what 
reason can grasp, while at the same time remaining in harmony with reason.”65 We also noted 
earlier that although the theology of creation provides the space for a dialogue between 
philosophy and theology this does not entail that our understanding of human nature remains 
unaffected by wider theological perspectives, such as the theology of the incarnation. In 
seeking to move beyond the choice between autonomy and heteronomy Pinckaers intends to 
show us how theological concerns are not alien to our natural understanding of who we are, 
but rather: “The more one surrenders to grace the more one is fulfilled, even on the natural 
level; the more fully one gives oneself to God, the more fully one becomes oneself.”66 For 
Pinckaers the question of moral autonomy is not that of our independence from anything 
beyond ourselves, but is the question of interiority; and that question returns us to our origins. 
If Mulhall is right, and Wittgenstein’s concerns in the Investigations involve an 
Augustinian questioning of origins, then Wittgenstein can also be seen as developing a sense 
of interiority which connects us with our origins. In this light the arguments Wittgenstein puts 
against introspectivist notions of the inner are not intended to imply that we have no inner 
life, but to help us overcome false notions of interiority which prevent us from returning to 
our origins. In his writings on the philosophy of psychology Wittgenstein constantly returns 
to the question of interiority. Wittgenstein maintains that there is a real distinction between 
the outer and the inner: “There are inner and outer couplets, inner and outer ways of looking 
at man. Indeed there are outer and inner facts – just as there are for example physical and 
                                                 
65 "Aquinas and Agency : Beyond Autonomy and Heteronomy?," 175. “répond aux aspirations cachée au cœur 
de tout homme de au-delà même de ce que peut saisir la raison, tout en demeurant en conformité avec elle.” 
"Autonomie Et Hétéronomie Selon Saint Thomas D'aquin," 113. 
66 "Aquinas and Agency : Beyond Autonomy and Heteronomy?," 170. “Plus l’homme se livre à la grâce, plus il 
s’accomplit dans sa nature même; plus que il se donne à Dieu, plus que il devient lui-meme.” "Autonomie Et 
Hétéronomie Selon Saint Thomas D'aquin," 107. 
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mathematical facts.”67 The distinction between the inner and the outer is not, however, that 
between two parallel realms, with the outer accessible to public observation while the inner is 
a private realm only accessible to the self. It is this very picture which Pinckaers also wishes 
to overcome with its dualism between the autonomous inner self, and that which is 
heteronomous and thus outside the self. In contrast to this dualistic understanding of the 
human being, Wittgenstein asserts: “The inner is tied up with the outer not only empirically, 
but also logically.” 68 For Pinckaers also the inner and the outer are tied together logically, but 
the key to understanding this logic is to be found in Aquinas’ theology of creation. To this 
end Pinckaers argues that for Aquinas our natural inclinations: “to truth for the intellect, to 
beatitude and goodness for the will” far from being heteronomous elements which limit our 
freedom and autonomy, “have opened the mind and the heart to infinite dimensions and 
conferred the ability to freely transcend every limited good.”69 This opening of the mind and 
the heart is not a denial of our human nature, but rather its perfection, such that we become 
more perfectly human through the inner transformation brought about through our encounter 
with divine grace. Pinckaers thus argues: “The fact that the first origin and ultimate end of 
morality transcends the human person and lies in God in no way hinders morality from 
having its source within the person, who having a spiritual nature is capable of sharing 
directly in the legislative action of God.”70 
                                                 
67 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Last Writings on the Philosophy of Psychology, Preliminary Studies for Part Ii of the 
Philosophical Investigations, 2 vols., vol. 2 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), 63e. “Es gibt innere 
und äußere Begriffe, innere und äußere Betrachtungsweisen des Menschen. Ja es gibt auch innere und äußere 
Tatschen – sowie es z.B. physikalische und mathematische Tatsachen gibt.” Ibid., 63. 
68 Ibid., 63e. “Inneres ist mit Äußerem nicht nur erfahrungsmäßig verbunden, sondern auch logisch.” Ibid., 63. 
We will develop this comparison between Pinckaers and Wittgenstein on the question of interiority in the next 
chapter, when we will attempt to show how Wittgenstein’s discussions of rule following and the phenomenon of 
‘seeing as’ are central to his attempts to help us regain a true understanding of the interior life.  
69 Pinckaers, "Aquinas and Agency : Beyond Autonomy and Heteronomy?," 169. “l’inclination à la vérité pour 
‘intelligence, au bonheur et au bien pour la volunté . . . qui lui ouvrent l’intelligence et le cœur à la dimension de 
l’infini et lui confèrent le pouvoir de dépasser librement tout bien limité.” "Autonomie Et Hétéronomie Selon 
Saint Thomas D'aquin," 106. 
70 "Aquinas and Agency : Beyond Autonomy and Heteronomy?," 169. “que la moralité ait son origine première 
et sa fin ultime au-dessus de l’homme, en Dieu, n’empêche nullement qu’elle ait aussi sa source à l’intérieur de 
l’homme, car celui-ci est capable de participer directément, par sa nature spirituelle, a l’action législative de 
Dieu.” "Autonomie Et Hétéronomie Selon Saint Thomas D'aquin," 107. 
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5.4.3 Evangelical Law: The Transformation and Perfection of Inner Nature 
In referring to ‘the legislative action of God’ Pinckaers is referring to the Evangelical 
Law, nevertheless, law in any form would not seem at first sight to be the most promising 
source for helping us to overcome the dichotomy between autonomy and heteronomy. In 
what sense is law interior to a human being? Surely law is addressed to us from a source 
outside the self which demands our conformity to an externally defined standard. 
Furthermore, is not this sense of exteriority intensified by starting with Evangelical Law? At 
least with human law we can argue for a basis in human reason, but Evangelical Law is given 
by God and beyond human reason. Pinckaers raises these concerns, and admits that there is 
“something of the truth” in them. 71 Nevertheless, he turns to Aquinas’ treaties on the 
Evangelical Law for his account of autonomy and interiority: “because it is the summit where 
all the themes of this moral theology converge, and because it shows so clearly the 
‘autonomy’ of action enjoyed by the Christian.”72 Pinckaers begins his examination of 
Aquinas’ theology of the Evangelical Law by clarifying how Aquinas used the term ‘law’. In 
contrast to our: “modern usage, expressing as it does the juridical nature of an external will 
restricting freedom by force,”73 Aquinas’ understanding of law draws upon: “the more serene 
ambience of the patristic and ancient philosophical tradition, which saw in law the expression 
of the dynamic wisdom of the lawmaker, eliciting as far as possible the collaboration of mind 
and spontaneous, willing assent of those subject to him.”74 It is this tradition within which we 
are to read Aquinas’ theology of the Evangelical Law, although he also stresses its radical 
                                                 
71 "Aquinas and Agency : Beyond Autonomy and Heteronomy?," 176. “Il y a évidemment du vrais.” 
"Autonomie Et Hétéronomie Selon Saint Thomas D'aquin," 114. 
72 "Aquinas and Agency : Beyond Autonomy and Heteronomy?," 176. “parce qu’il constitute un sommet et un 
point de convergence de toutes les lignes de sa morale, et parce qu’il montre avec claret quelle est ‘l’autonomie’ 
dont jouit le chrétien dans son agir.” "Autonomie Et Hétéronomie Selon Saint Thomas D'aquin," 114. 
73 "Aquinas and Agency : Beyond Autonomy and Heteronomy?," 176. “du sens moderne, comme l’expression 
de nature juridique d’une volunté extérieure s’imposant à la liberté par le contrainte.” "Autonomie Et 
Hétéronomie Selon Saint Thomas D'aquin," 115. 
74 "Aquinas and Agency : Beyond Autonomy and Heteronomy?," 177. “la ligne plus sereine de la tradition 
patristique et philosophique ancienne qui voit dans la loi l’expression de la sagesse impulsive du législateur, 
appelant la collaboration, autant que possible, de l’intelligence et de la volonté spontanée de ceux que lui 
soumis.” "Autonomie Et Hétéronomie Selon Saint Thomas D'aquin," 115. 
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new nature which: “will win for it the title of the New Law, different from all other laws.”75 
Pinckaers notes how Aquinas drew: “inspiration from St. Paul in the Letter to the Romans 
and from St. Augustine,” and thus distinguished “two elements in the New Law, a principal 
element and a secondary one.” 76 The principal element of the “Law in the New Testament is 
the grace of the Holy Spirit given through faith in Christ,” whereas the secondary element 
consists in: “the various things that dispose a person to receive the grace of the Holy Spirit or 
make use of it fittingly.”77 
It is the principal element of the New Law, the grace of the Holy Spirit, which entails 
that it is: “not a law that remains external but becomes interior, being inserted in the heart of 
believers by the presence and action of the Holy Spirit (lex indita).”78 The secondary element 
of the New Law consist of all those means which, although in themselves external elements, 
are taken up and used by the Holy Spirit dwelling within the person to deepen the interiority 
of the Spirit’s action. Amongst these means primacy is given to: “the Gospel text itself, and 
particularly the Sermon on the Mount,” for this is the “work of the Holy Spirit and 
corresponds precisely to his action.” 79 In his theology of the Evangelical Law Aquinas 
radicalizes the ancient and Patristic conception of law as inner conformity to the wisdom of a 
lawmaker, by emphasising the interior nature of the Evangelical Law as the work of the Holy 
Spirit dwelling within the believer. This interiority is not set in opposition to external 
                                                 
75 "Aquinas and Agency : Beyond Autonomy and Heteronomy?," 177. “qui lui mérite le titre de Loi nouvelle, 
différente de toute autre loi.” "Autonomie Et Hétéronomie Selon Saint Thomas D'aquin," 115. 
76 "Aquinas and Agency : Beyond Autonomy and Heteronomy?," 177. “en s’inspirant de S. Paul, dans l’épître 
aux Romains, et de S. Augustin.” "Autonomie Et Hétéronomie Selon Saint Thomas D'aquin," 115. 
77 "Aquinas and Agency : Beyond Autonomy and Heteronomy?," 177. “diverses choses qui disposent à recevoir 
la grâce de ‘Esprit-Saint ou à user convenablement.” "Autonomie Et Hétéronomie Selon Saint Thomas 
D'aquin," 116. 
78 "Aquinas and Agency : Beyond Autonomy and Heteronomy?," 177. “elle n’est pas de une loi qui reste 
extérieure, mais elle deviant l’intérieure, étant insérée dans le cœur des croyants par la présence et l’action de 
l’Esprit Saint (lex indita).” "Autonomie Et Hétéronomie Selon Saint Thomas D'aquin," 116. 
79 "Aquinas and Agency : Beyond Autonomy and Heteronomy?," 178. “Ce sera notamment le texte même de 
l’Evangile, en particulier le Sermon sue la montagne.” "Autonomie Et Hétéronomie Selon Saint Thomas 
D'aquin," 116. 
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obligation, but is distinguished from the exterior by a logic through which interior and 
exterior are tied together. 
If we return now to Wittgenstein’s remarks on how our understanding of the inner and 
the outer are logically tied together, we can observe that the various games and strategies he 
develops in this later writings have the purpose of overcoming false conceptions of interiority 
and exteriority, and returning us to the practices in which we come to use these terms. 
Pinckaers also wishes us to return to the practices in which we learn how the inner and the 
outer are logically connected, but he tends to use historical arguments to help us see through 
modern false conceptions of interiority. Unless, however, they are shown to have a basis in 
our actual practice, these historical arguments run the risk of re-introducing the external 
observer perspective. To this end Pinckaers locates Aquinas’ treaties on the New Law as the 
summit of his wider account of Christian belief and practice: “The treaties on the New Law 
thus connects directly with the entire treaties on law and the organism of the virtues and gifts, 
and relates equally to the study of the Trinity, through the Holy Spirit, and of Christ and the 
sacraments that give us grace.”80 It is in the concrete totality of the Christian life that we 
come to understand key theological notions such as grace and the virtues, and any account of 
that life which abstracts theological ideas and uses them as self-sufficient principles distorts 
our understanding of it. 
In the practice of the Christian life, therefore, the secondary elements should not be 
seen as consisting in things which form merely an external cladding to the inner action of the 
Holy Spirit. There is a unity to the Christian life in which the interior and exterior elements 
do not correspond to two separate realms, but are essentially (logically) interconnected. We 
return here to the central theme of this thesis, only now our concern is specifically 
                                                 
80 "Aquinas and Agency : Beyond Autonomy and Heteronomy?," 178. “Le traité de la Loi nouvelle entretient 
ainsi des connexions immédiates avec tout le traité des lois, avec tout l’organisme/des vertues et des dons, mais 
également avec l’étude de la Trinité par l’intermédiaire du Saint-Espirt, et avec celle du Christ et les sacraments 
qui nous procurent la grâce.” "Autonomie Et Hétéronomie Selon Saint Thomas D'aquin," 117. 
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theological. Our reading of Wittgenstein characterized him as seeking to overcome the choice 
between idealism and empiricism by developing a form of realism which re-connects us with 
our natural human practices. Now, in an analogous way, we can see how Pinckaers in his 
return to Aquinas’ treaties on the Evangelical Law seeks to overcome the modern dichotomy 
between autonomy and heteronomy by reconnecting us with the basis of the Christian life in 
the action of the Holy Spirit. Just as the path of realism in Wittgenstein’s philosophy is a 
narrow path, which requires constant self-questioning, so the path to developing a theology 
which connects us with the life of the Spirit is beset with temptations. On the one hand there 
is the danger of emphasising the exterior elements of the life of faith at the cost of reducing it 
to an external measure (analogous to imposing a purely causal account of human action in 
psychology); while on the other hand there is the temptation to stress the autonomy of the 
inner working of the Holy Spirit which risks losing the expression of faith in the outward 
actions of Christ, such as in the written text of Scripture, the sacraments and liturgy of the 
Church and the charitable activities of Christians (analogous to the denial of any basis for 
human practices in physical nature). In the next chapter we will develop this comparison, 
when we discuss how Wittgenstein’s writings on following rules and seeing aspects can 
throw light on the life of faith. 
It is important to emphasise that this comparison between Wittgenstein’s philosophy 
and Pinckaers’ retrieval of Aquinas’ theology of the Evangelical Law uses analogy. The 
analogy takes its starting point from the understanding of nature as origin which we examined 
earlier in this chapter; which entails that grace is not an alien imposition upon nature, but a 
perfecting and deepening of nature which involves an increase in interiority and freedom. At 
the same time there are crucial differences in the philosophical account we have developed 
from Wittgenstein and in the theology of the New Law set forth by Pinckaers. These 
differences all turn on the fact that God’s initiative through the work of the Holy Spirit is the 
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starting point for Aquinas’ account of the New Law, whereas Wittgenstein offers us 
philosophical tools to help us reconnect with our nature. The basis of the analogy in our 
nature, however, counsels against turning this difference into an opposition between two 
separate spheres: the realm of grace verses the realm of reason. The secondary element of the 
New Law includes all those external elements which can be used as tools for the growth of 
the inner life of the Spirit. This as we have seen, refers in the first instant to the Gospel text, 
but it encompasses all that can throw light on the mystery of the work of the Holy Spirit, 
including philosophy as it is transformed and purified through grace. 
 
5.4.4 Objective Virtue: Is Wittgenstein’s Philosophy Open to Theology? 
Christian theologians have used ideas borrowed from philosophy from the earliest 
times, and as such these ideas have been transformed and taken up into the life of faith. There 
is always the question whether a particular use of a given philosophy is compatible with 
Christian practice and belief, such as the controversy in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries 
concerning the use of Aristotle’s metaphysics and science.81 When assessing whether a 
particular philosophy is open to theology it is therefore important to ask how we can use that 
philosophy, or at least elements of it, to help us gain a deeper understanding of Christian 
belief and practice. This question cannot be answered by standing outside our theological 
practices, but only by doing theology, and within our practice of theology showing how a 
philosophy helps us to gain that deeper understanding. We again return to the dialectical 
nature of human understanding. It is essential, however, to keep constantly in mind the 
differences between the practice of philosophy and the practice of theology. In the dialogue 
between theology and philosophy, we are not dealing with two equal partners, although an 
openness to dialogue can be fruitful for both sides. Theology consists in reflection on the 
                                                 
81 See Chenu, Nature, Man and Society in the Twelfth Century : Essays on New Theological Perspectives in the 
Latin West. 
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elevation and perfection of our nature through the action of the Holy Spirit, and as such is the 
perfection and crowning of human wisdom as it is transformed in an encounter with divine 
wisdom. This encounter is not merely an external conversation, but involves the inner 
transformation of human nature, so that we come to participate in divine wisdom. 
Before we turn to the question of Wittgenstein’s philosophy and its relationship to 
theology it is instructive to examine an historical example of how a practice of theology has 
used and transformed philosophical ideas. In his article “Historical Perspectives on 
Intrinsically Evil Acts”82 Pinckaers draws on the work of Etienne Gilson and Knut Ragnar 
Holte to argue that the Church Fathers used ancient philosophers by transforming their key 
ideas. In particular they took two key ideas which lie at the heart of ancient ethical theories, 
happiness and virtue, and subjected them to: “a basic critique that makes it possible to 
integrate them in a new concept of the moral life, centred henceforth on faith in Christ and 
charity given by the Holy Spirit.”  83 To this end the Fathers identified happiness with 
beatitude, which is chiefly obtained through: “the interior ways of the virtues underlying 
good actions, as proposed particularly in the New Testament.”84  
The Fathers differed from ancient philosophers in their understanding of these central 
ideas in two key respects. Firstly, whereas for the ancient philosophers: “the end of the 
human person is wholly within the person, it is immanent,”85 for the Fathers beatitude is 
                                                 
82 Servais Pinckaers, "A Historical Perspective on Intrinsically Evil Acts," in The Pinckaers Reader : Renewing 
Thomistic Moral Theology, ed. John Berkman and Craig Steven Titus (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University 
Press of America, 2005). 
83 Ibid., 188. “une critique du fond qui permet de les intégrer dans une conception nouvelle de la vie morale, 
centrée désormais sur la foi au Christ et sur la charité donnée par l’Espirt Saint.” Ce Qu'on Ne Peut Jamais 
Faire : La Question Des Actes Intrinsèquement Mauvais, Histoire Et Discussion (Fribourg: Éditions 
Universitaires, 1986), 23.  
84 "A Historical Perspective on Intrinsically Evil Acts," 188-89. “les voies intérieures que sont les vertus à la 
source des actions bonnes, tells qu’elles sont proposes spécialiment dans le Nouveau Testament.” Ce Qu'on Ne 
Peut Jamais Faire : La Question Des Actes Intrinsèquement Mauvais, Histoire Et Discussion, 23. 
85 "A Historical Perspective on Intrinsically Evil Acts," 190. “la fin de l’homme est toute dans l’homme, 
l’immanente à l’homme.” Ce Qu'on Ne Peut Jamais Faire : La Question Des Actes Intrinsèquement Mauvais, 
Histoire Et Discussion, 24. 
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exterior to us and: “resides rather in the effective attainment of the divine object.”86 Secondly, 
and following on from the first, in the Fathers due to the Christian conception of wisdom 
there is a realism which is lacking in ancient philosophy. This conception of wisdom is found 
in the writings of St Paul and Pinckaers concludes: “according to St. Paul, the source of 
wisdom will be in God and will be communicated through the events of salvation history 
thanks to faith in Christ.”87 The limitations of ancient philosophers did not, however, led the 
Fathers to wholly reject them, and Pinckaers notes that: “the Fathers will not hesitate to treat 
of the classic virtues of prudence, justice, courage, and temperance,” although in doing so, 
“they make substantial changes in these in order to put them at the service of the properly 
Christian virtues of faith, hope, an charity, which are of another nature with their respective 
dimension in regard to divine action.”88 In the light of this transformation of ancient 
conceptions of virtue Pinckaers describes the theological virtues as opening: “the human 
mind and heart to the God of Jesus Christ.”89 
The degree to which a particular philosophy is open to theology thus turns upon the 
degree to which it can be used by theologians, even if this involves substantial changes in its 
key concepts. As such even philosophies which are in many aspects contrary to Christianity, 
such as Marxism, may provide important insights for theology. There is a difference, 
however, between taking a number of insights from a philosopher and using her philosophy 
more widely. Thus, Aquinas’ use of Aristotle is not just the appropriation of a few key ideas, 
                                                 
86 "A Historical Perspective on Intrinsically Evil Acts," 190. “réside bien plutôt dans l’obtention effective de 
l’objet divin.” Ce Qu'on Ne Peut Jamais Faire : La Question Des Actes Intrinsèquement Mauvais, Histoire Et 
Discussion, 24. 
87 "A Historical Perspective on Intrinsically Evil Acts," 191. “la source de la Sagesse sera en Dieu, comuniquée 
par les événements du salut grâce à la foi au Christ.” Ce Qu'on Ne Peut Jamais Faire : La Question Des Actes 
Intrinsèquement Mauvais, Histoire Et Discussion, 25. 
88 "A Historical Perspective on Intrinsically Evil Acts," 189. “les Pères n’hésiteront pas à reprendre les vertus 
classique de prudence, justice, force et temperance . . . ils leur feront subir des transfomations substantielles 
pour les mettre au service des vertus proprement chrétienes de foi, espérance et de charité, qui sont d’une autre 
nature, où l’emporte le côté receptif à l’égard de l’action divine.” Ce Qu'on Ne Peut Jamais Faire : La Question 
Des Actes Intrinsèquement Mauvais, Histoire Et Discussion, 23. 
89 "A Historical Perspective on Intrinsically Evil Acts," 191. “l‘intelligence et le cœur de l’homme au Dieu de 
Jésus-Christ. ” Ce Qu'on Ne Peut Jamais Faire : La Question Des Actes Intrinsèquement Mauvais, Histoire Et 
Discussion, 26. 
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but the transformation of whole areas of his philosophy, such as his physics, metaphysics and 
ethics. The key to this wider appropriation is, as we argued earlier, to be found in the 
theology of creation. Theologians will continue to question the degree to which Aquinas’ use 
of Aristotle is successful, but we can only determine this by engaging with Aquinas’ 
theological practice and whether within that practice his use of Aristotle involves importing 
elements contrary to the Gospel or elements which help to illuminate the life of faith.90  
As we noted at the beginning of this chapter there is a considerable literature which 
involves the use of ideas derived from Wittgenstein in theology. We also observed that some 
theologians have challenged the use of Wittgenstein in theology, arguing that he presents an 
immanentist understanding of human nature, which is cut off from any sense of 
transcendence. We challenged this reading of Wittgenstein by drawing points of comparison 
between his concern with the question of origins and Pincakers’ reflections on the concept of 
nature as origin. This comparison entails that there is an opening for dialogue between 
Wittgenstein’s philosophy and Christian theology such that the use of Wittgenstein in 
theology is more than just the appropriation of a number of insights. Furthermore, the 
purpose of the examination of Wittgenstein’s philosophy which was carried out in the first 
four chapters was to determine the degree to which Wittgenstein’s thought is open to 
dialogue with theology. To this end we developed a dialectical reading of Wittgenstein, 
which emphasised the self-questioning nature of his later writings. This self-questioning 
dialectic runs the risk of turning in on itself, and collapsing into the horizon of finitude Ernst 
detects in the later Wittgenstein. The reading of Wittgenstein we developed, however, sees 
him as seeking to return us to the basis of our practices in human nature, overcoming the 
temptation to reduce them to a pre-given measure, while at the same time avoiding the danger 
of subliming them in an account of their grammar which has no basis in human nature. 
                                                 
90 As we argued earlier in this chapter this does not entail we are locked within particular practices, but rather 
draws attention to the danger of imagining that we have a vantage point outside of practice. This is not to deny 
the possibility of transcendence, but to overcome false notions of transcendence and immanence.  
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Is this enough to entail that the philosophical practice and concepts Wittgenstein 
develops are themselves open to divine wisdom? If we recall Pinckaers’ argument that the 
pagan conceptions of virtue lack the objectivity of the Christian account of the life of virtue, 
then it is clear that in order to be open for use within theology philosophical practices and 
concepts need not in themselves be the kind of open practices which Pinckaers sees in the 
Christian virtues. What is required is that they are not self-enclosed practices of philosophy, 
cutting off the possibility of entering into dialogue with theology. To this end our reading of 
Wittgenstein has the more modest aim of showing that it is open to dialogue with theology, 
rather than showing that in itself it is an open practice in the sense Pinckaers describes for the 
Christian virtues. Moreover, it is important to keep in mind that these virtues are theological 
virtues and as such they go beyond philosophical practices, while using and perfecting such 
practices. Nevertheless, the reading of Wittgenstein put forward in the first four chapters, and 
the dialogue we have begun in this current chapter between moral theology and Wittgenstein, 
indicate that the use of Wittgenstein for theology can be more than just the appropriation of a 
number of insights. At the same time it is important to keep in mind that in this encounter 
with theology Wittgenstein’s philosophy has undergone a substantial transformation. 
 
 Conclusion: Nature, Law and Agency 5.5
In beginning a conversation between Wittgenstein’s later philosophy and moral 
theology a more general question was raised concerning the relationship between philosophy 
and theology. This highlights the issue of the relationship between grace and nature, and the 
contemporary renewal of interest in de Lubac’s work on grace and nature was briefly 
examined. We did not take sides in the debate between those who follow de Lubac and those 
who oppose him, but noted that for both sides it is essential to develop a conception of nature 
which overcomes modern dichotomies. We then outlines the revival of the concept of nature 
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as a central category in moral theology was then outlined. This revival involves a critique of 
modern notions of nature, and a return to the pre-modern concept of nature in which theology 
and practice are not opposed. Many twentieth-century moral theologians rejected the use of 
nature as they viewed it through modern eyes as a static category, which is known prior to 
our moral practices and can be misused to legitimate oppression in the name of conservatism. 
By contrast those revivals of moral theology which have drawn upon the pre-modern 
tradition open the way to overcoming the modern opposition between theory and practice, 
such that nature is not a category grasped outside our practices, but is discovered within those 
practices. The parallels with our reading of Wittgenstein as clearly to be seen and it is no con-
incidence that many of those philosophers and theologians (at least in the English speaking 
world) who have returned to virtue theory and natural law theory have been influenced by 
Wittgenstein. 
We next turned to the more specific question of the use of the concept of nature in 
moral theology, and found a connection between Pinckaers’ revival of Aquinas’ 
understanding of nature as origin and Mulhall’s Augustinian reading of Wittgenstein as 
concerned with the question of origins. The conversation with moral theology was deepened 
by developing a dialogue between Wittgenstein and Pinckaers’ use of Aquinas’ theory of 
agency to overcome the choice between autonomy and heteronomy. This opened again the 
question of the relationship between philosophy and theology, and we examined how 
Pinckaers finds in Aquinas’ theology of the Evangelical Law an account of human agency in 
relation to divine grace which overcomes the choice between autonomy and heteronomy. The 
conversation between Wittgenstein and Pinckaers was developed by comparing their notions 
of interiority and how both return us to the wider contexts within which human agency is to 
be understood. A key distinction between their accounts of human agency was noted insofar 
as Pinckaers’ concerns are primarily theological, and as such he argues that Christian 
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theology as it was developed by the Fathers contains an objectivity and realism lacking in 
ancient philosophies. This does not entail, however, that Wittgenstein’s philosophy is closed 
to theology, and we argued that the dialogue we have begun to carry out between 
Wittgenstein and moral theology shows that despite its limitations it is essentially open to 
theology. In the next chapter we will continue this dialogue between Wittgenstein and moral 
theology through using McCabe’s Wittgenstein inspired understanding of human beings as 
linguistic animals
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6 TRANSFORMING VIRTUE: SHARING IN GOD’S STORY 
 Law, Truth and Story 6.1
In this chapter we will develop the dialogue between Wittgenstein and moral theology 
by examining Herbert McCabe’s understanding of human beings as autobiographical 
creatures, and how through grace we are caught up in God’s autobiography. McCabe argues 
that we are invited to participate in the life of God through Jesus Christ, who is the enacted 
history of God. This involves a transformation of our natural human practices of story-telling, 
such that we are caught up in the story of God. With this theological account of the graced 
transformation of our nature in mind we will turn to MacIntyre’s understanding of the 
relationship between virtue and our animal dependencies in order to show how Wittgenstein’s 
conception of human beings as linguistic animals can help throw light on how we become 
friends of God through Jesus Christ. This will lead to a reflection on the Sermon on the 
Mount in which Jesus Christ preaches the Kingdom of God by giving us the shape of the 
perfect Christian life as the perfection of our human vulnerabilities. This reflection will draw 
on insights gained from Wittgenstein’s examinations of ‘following rules’ and ‘seeing as’ in 
order to help us understanding that life of virtue which is being caught up in the story of God. 
 
6.1.1 The Truth of Life: Language Using Animals 
The unity of human nature and human action is preserved and perfected through the 
exercise of the virtues. An account of human agency which places too much stress on the 
analysis of individual acts risks opposing the interior dimensions of human agency to its 
exterior effects, whereas an account which begins with the exercise of the virtues enables us 
to see the logical interconnection between the inner and outer dimensions of our acts. This 
does not entail, however, that we cannot analyse individual acts, rather, as Pinckaers argues, 
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virtue enables us to see how the inner dimensions of our acts are specified in definite external 
acts: “Virtue is altogether ordered to actions and to their excellence, as well as to the object 
that specifies them. One of the tasks of virtue is precisely to effect coordination between the 
interior and the exterior act, between our disposition to act and its realization in actions done 
and done well.”1 Another way of expressing this is to say that the exercise of the virtues 
enables us to see the reality of our actions, such that we find a resonance between our 
external acts and our inner intentions.  
Wittgenstein in his later philosophy can be understood as attempting to develop a 
form of realism which enables us to: “effect coordination between the interior and the 
exterior act.” This realism can only be achieved if we overcome the illusions which prevent 
us from seeing the basis of what we do in our natural human reactions. This is not merely the 
operation of various techniques, but a practice which is transformative of our human nature 
as a whole. Aquinas also points to the transformative nature of the human search for truth 
with his understanding of living the ‘truth of life’ as a virtue which underlies the exercise of 
the other virtues. Romanus Cessario sums up in the following passage: “the full development 
of true freedom and human flourishing requires a principle of rectitude. He [Aquinas] called 
this rectitude veritas vitae, the truth of life, a sort of general virtue which undergirds all the 
other virtues and, in fact, the whole of human existence.”2 This “truth of life”3 is placed by 
Aquinas in a theological setting when he argues that the measure of this truth is provided by 
                                                 
1 Servais Pinckaers, "The Role of Virtue in Moral Theology," in The Pinckaers' Reader : Renewing Thomistic 
Moral Theology, ed. John Berkman and Craig Steven Titus (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America 
Press, 2005), 292-93. “La vertu est toute ordonnée aux actes, à leur qualité, ainsi qu’à l’object qui les spécifie. 
Une des tâches de la vertu est précisément de faire la coordination entre l’acte intérieur et l’acte exterieur, entre 
nos dispositions à agir et leur realisation dans des actes faits et bien faits.” "Redècouvrir La Vertu " Sapientia 51 
(1996): 154. 
2 Romanus Cessario, O.P., The Moral Virtues and Theological Ethics (Notre Dame, Ind ; London: University of 
Notre Dame Press, 1991), 21. 
3 Cessario quotes from the Summa Theologica II-IIae q. 109, a. 2, ad 3 where Aquinas talks of the truth of life as 
the: “the kind of truth by which something exists as true, not by which someone speaks what is true.” Ibid. 
“veritas vitae est veritas secundum quam aliquid est verum, non veritas secundum quam aliquis dicit 
verum.”Thomas Aquinas, S.Thomae Aquinatis Opera Omnia, (Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Frommann-Holzboog, 
1980), http://www.corpusthomisticum.org/sth2074.html. II-IIae q. 109, a. 2, ad 3. 
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the divine law: “Life like anything else is said to be true, from the fact that it attains its rule 
and measure, namely, the divine law; since rectitude of life depends on conformity to that 
law. This truth or rectitude is common to every virtue.”4 We do not find such an explicit 
theological context in Wittgenstein’s attempt to develop realism in philosophy, but this is not 
to say that his philosophical exercises cannot help us to see the truth of life.  
Light on how Wittgenstein’s philosophical practices can help us to understand the 
truth of life is cast by Herbert McCabe’s Wittgenstein influenced conception of human beings 
as language using animals. McCabe observes that like other animals human beings use their 
senses to interact with their environment; unlike other animals, however, human beings: 
“deploy symbols, to live in the structure we can broadly call language.”5 Although other 
animals on the basis of their genetic inheritance: “interpret signals produced by other 
members of the species,” it is misleading to call these signals “‘animal language.’”6 Only 
human beings have the capacity to: make our own symbols” and as such “the characteristic 
activity of the human animal is the creative development of language.”7 This ability to 
creatively develop language entails that unlike other animals human beings can: “formulate 
aims and intentions for ourselves,”8 for we can ask and answer the question: “‘Why did you 
do that?’”9 It is our ability to ask and answer this question which is the basis of our human 
histories, for in answering this question we show how our actions are part of a story other 
human beings also can make sense of: “For an adequate account of human action it is 
necessary to refer to the intentions with which some activity is done – without that we do not 
                                                 
4 The 'Summa Theologica' of St. Thomas Aquinas, Tr. By Fathers of the English Dominican Province. [22 Vols. 
In 20] (Lond. &c.1911), II-IIae q. 109, a. 2, ad 3.” Dicitur autem vita vera, sicut etiam quaelibet alia res, ex hoc 
quod attingit suam regulam et mensuram, scilicet divinam legem, per cuius conformitatem rectitudinem habet. 
Et talis veritas, sive rectitudo, communis est ad quamlibet virtutem.” S.Thomae Aquinatis Opera Omnia. II-IIae 
q. 109, a. 2, ad 3. 
5 McCabe, The Good Life : Ethics and the Pursuit of Happiness, 67. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Ibid. 
8 Ibid., 69. 
9 Ibid., 70. 
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know what action has been done. Unless we know what story this action is part of, we do not 
know what it is – it may of course be part of many stories.”10 
The influence of Wittgenstein on McCabe is clear to see in this characterization of 
human beings as creatures who: “make our own symbols.” McCabe argues that this linguistic 
ability enables human beings to live a social existence in a manner which is not available to 
other animals: “So long as, like other animals, I am restricted to sensual experience my life is 
private.”11 It is language which gives us the ability to transcend our individual existences, 
thus freeing us from: “imprisonment in the isolated self.”12 The ability to craft symbols is also 
essential to the growth of our inner life, as the stories which we tell to explain our actions 
connects us to other human beings in a manner which also deepens our inner life. This logical 
connexion between the inner and the outer is one which McCabe takes from Wittgenstein, but 
it enables him to express the traditional notion of the human soul as immaterial in a manner 
which does not fall prey to metaphysical illusions. As such McCabe through his reading of 
Wittgenstein re-presents Aquinas’ conception of the human soul. Human beings are 
essentially creatures who are able to articulate their life-stories; to express the truth of life.  
 
6.1.2 God’s Autobiography 
McCabe moves beyond Wittgenstein and from philosophy into theology by arguing 
that human self-transcendence: “is seen to be complete in grace, in sharing divine life.”13 This 
sharing comes about through the articulation of a life-story, only this time we are not the 
author of this story; the author is God, and McCabe argues that we come to know God not by 
                                                 
10 Ibid. 
11 Ibid., 72. In describing animal life as private here McCabe must be understood as using analogy. He is not 
suggesting that animals do not share a common existence, but that the manner of that common existence does 
not reach the level of self-transcendence the use of language makes possible. Nor is he implying that the pre-
linguistic levels of common life humans share with animals are not in some sense the basis for our common 
existence. Angels are rational creatures, but they do not share the same kind of common human beings share. 
The common life of human beings is that of a material rational creature, and as such is that of a language user.  
12 Ibid., 73. 
13 Ibid. 
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being able to see God in such a manner that we can conceptualize God; rather: “we know 
God as we know the author of an autobiography – and this I will suggest is a very odd 
business.”14 The influence of Wittgenstein is again clear to see, and McCabe seeks to return 
us to the practices within which we come to learn of God. These are the practices through 
which we read Scripture, and are the human participation in the life of the Spirit which we 
described in chapter five. As such they are practices of the Christian community, and outside 
these practise Scripture becomes as dead letter: “To regard it as Bible is to read it in and with 
the community which sustains its existence.”15 
McCabe regards this reading of God’s autobiography as “a very odd business”. In 
order to help us understand the nature of this oddness McCabe reflects upon the paradoxes 
created by autobiographical literature. These paradoxes turn upon the fact that once ‘I’ am 
part of my story as a character in the story this character is no longer the ‘I’ who is the 
narrator: “‘I’ cannot function as a proper name. ‘I tell you’ is not part of a story in which ‘I’ 
is a character; it is the telling of a story. It is a sign of authority, of authorship as such (it is, as 
Aquinas would say, formal not material to the story).”16 Before we consider how a 
philosophical account of autobiography is transformed by theology it is important to see that 
the general paradoxes of autobiographical literature become all the more acute when we 
consider the Bible as God’s autobiography. This is because in himself God does not have a 
history: “There can be no life-story of the eternal God as such - to say 'eternal life’ is to say 
non-narrative life, an incomprehensible concept.”17 McCabe draws upon the Prologue of John 
to explain how the eternal God enters into narrative life through the incarnation of the Word 
of God, who will henceforth be called Son: “In the Prologue John first speaks of the Word, 
but then when the Word has been made flesh, he speaks only of the Son, and in this Son, God 
                                                 
14 Ibid. 
15 Ibid., 77. 
16 Ibid., 75. 
17 Ibid., 77. McCabe argues that this gap is the one Aquinas establishes as between the formal and material 
objects of faith.  
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has become enacted narrative.”18 The fact that God through his son Jesus Christ has entered 
into history must not, however, led us to make the mistake of abolishing the: “unbridgeable 
gap between author-as-author and author-as-character.”19  
McCabe does not attempt to resolve the general paradoxes of autobiography, nor the 
special problems which we encounter when we try to understand the Bible as God’s 
autobiography. His account of God as enacted narrative does nevertheless, through the use of 
analogy, enable us to throw some light on the interplay between God as author and God as 
character. We can use our reading of Wittgenstein to fill out McCabe’s account by noting that 
this analogy works on two levels.20 Firstly, there is the analogy of origins. In chapter five, 
following Pinckaers, we noted now in Aquinas the relationship between grace and nature is to 
be understood through the question of origins. Human beings are autobiographical animals, 
and in telling our stories we return to the question of origins, which brings us to ask the 
ultimate question of the origin of all that is. This question is articulated by Wittgenstein in the 
Tractatus: “6.44 It is not how things are in the world that is mystical, but that it exists.”21 In 
raising the question of our own authorship we are led to the question of the author of all that 
is. Although Wittgenstein abandoned the search for the general form of the proposition in his 
later works, he did not thereby collapse his account of meaning into a description of self-
contained autonomous practices. Rather, in returning us to the human practices within which 
our concepts find a home, he can be understood (albeit, as we have argued, with limitations) 
as helping us to develop an understanding of the inner life which opens us to the question of 
our origin. 
                                                 
18 Ibid., 73-74. 
19 Ibid., 76. 
20 These two levels correspond to what in the tradition of commentary on Aquinas are known as analogy of 
cause and analogy of proportion. 
21 Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, 88. “6.44 Nicht wie die Welt ist, ist das Mystische, sondern 
daß sie ist.” Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung. In Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, Werkausgabe Band 1, 84. 
204 
 
The second level on which the analogy works is through drawing an analogy between 
God as author and a general account of autobiography. This second level works due to the 
basis given by the first level, and as such it is important to keep in mind the respects in which 
these two accounts of authorship differ. We noted above that God in himself, unlike human 
authors, does not have a history. The converse of this is that human authors are themselves 
authored, for in order to have a history we have to be made part of a narrative. The analogy 
McCabe draws between the divine author and human authors turns on the fact that human 
authorship is a paradigmatic example of human creative activity. Humans are not, however, 
creative in the way that God is creative. Everything a human being does can be traced to an 
origin, which is not to say that humans are not capable of great creativity, but that human 
creativity is of a different order to divine creativity. This is why McCabe concludes that 
human self-transcendence: “is seen to be complete in grace, in sharing divine life.” 22 Grace is 
required for this completion because without grace human beings cannot share in the divine 
life. Without grace our story would remain just ‘our’ story, but through grace our story 
becomes a participation in the life of God: “just as our human life consists in enacted 
narrative so our divine life is just our participation in the enacted narrative of God. The 
revelation of God to us is nothing except our being taken up into that narrative, the human 
story that is the sacrament or image of the unseen and unseeable, incomprehensible God.”23 
When we are taken up through grace into the “enacted narrative of God” our human 
search for origins is transformed and perfected. This transformation and perfection bring 
about a healing of our broken nature and an elevation of that healed nature, so that we can 
participate in the life of God. We have been considering Wittgenstein’s philosophical 
exercises on the level of the natural operation of our human faculties, and as such they can be 
consider to have the aim of helping us to overcome the restlessness which results from our 
                                                 
22 McCabe, The Good Life : Ethics and the Pursuit of Happiness, 73. 
23 Ibid., 78. 
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human tendency to grasp at what is true and good. This is to return us to the childlike play of 
innocence where we first learn to speak our stories. It would be a mistake, however, to view 
this account as a naturalized surrogate for the theological account of healing and perfection of 
human nature brought about through grace. Equally the presentation of Wittgenstein we have 
offered should not be considered merely as offering a means of pre-disposing us to receive 
grace. Although it is essential to maintain the real distinction between grace and nature in the 
concrete practice of the Christian life there is no a priori way to separate grace and nature.24  
In the remainder of this chapter we will begin by examining the parallels between the 
situated account of human agency offered by Wittgenstein and the accounts offered by Pieper 
and MacIntyre. We will then use these comparisons as a starting point to show how 
Wittgenstein’s writings on following a rule and ‘seeing as’ can be used to throw light on the 
graced healing, transformation and perfection of our natural faculties as we come to 
participate in the life of God through: “our being taken up into that narrative, the human story 
that is the sacrament or image of the unseen and unseeable, incomprehensible God.”25 This 
discussion will involve a reflection on how our understanding of human nature with its 
account of situated freedom is transformed through our encounter with divine wisdom, such 
that we begin to see more clearly our dependence on others. In learning to see ourselves as 
dependent and vulnerable we learn to live the truth of life. 
 
 Dependent Virtues: Learning to See Through the Humanity of Christ 6.2
6.2.1 Pagan Virtue Transformed: Animal Dependence 
McCabe, when he brings out the continuities and discontinuities between human 
beings and other animals, situates human freedom in a manner which overcomes the modern 
                                                 
24 Which is not to say that we cannot use general principles in distinguishing between grace and nature. Such 
principles do not, however, apply themselves and it is within our concrete practices that their application is 
found.  
25 McCabe, The Good Life : Ethics and the Pursuit of Happiness, 73. 
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temptation to remove the human agent from the world. To this end, McCabe’s understanding 
of human agency, like that of the metaphysical tradition in general, draws upon the virtue 
tradition of ancient philosophy in this account of our situated freedom. In this McCabe is 
following in the footsteps of the long tradition of Christian theology going back to the fathers 
of the Church who drew upon ancient accounts of virtue in order to cast light on the Christian 
life.26 The fact that Christian theologians from the Fathers onwards have been able to draw 
upon the virtue tradition of ancient philosophy indicates that it presents a conception of 
human agency which despite its deficiencies provides more than just a number of principles 
which Christian theology can use. Ancient conceptions of virtue can open us to other human 
beings on the level of our natural tendency to find fulfilment in sharing our lives with 
others.27 Furthermore, although Pinckaers refers only to the theological virtues as ‘open’ 
virtues, our conception of those virtues which are natural is not left unchanged by our 
encounter with divine wisdom. 
This is not to say, however, that the pagan conception of virtue is without serious 
limitation. In telling our stories we have the tendency to forget the dialectical interplay 
between author and character, and in this forgetfulness the temptation emerges to subsume 
our self into the story or to place the self beyond any involvement in the story. Both of these 
tendencies involve a flight from our creatureliness. A return to our human nature involves 
learning to live in the interplay between author and character, in which we learn to see 
ourselves as both author and authored. This interplay enables us to see that our openness to 
that which transcends us is not compromised by our physical animal nature; the more we 
                                                 
26 For an account of the influence of virtue ethics on the development of Christian moral theology see: Cessario, 
The Moral Virtues and Theological Ethics, 12-33. 
27 For example, Aristotle’s account of friendship in chapter eight of the Nicomachean Ethics stresses that perfect 
friendship is between equals who are good and desire their friends good for the friends’ own sake, thus sharing 
in their lives: “Only the friendship of those who are good, and similar in their goodness, is perfect. For these 
people each alike wish good for the other qua good, and they are good in themselves. And it is those who desire 
the good of their friends for the friends’ sake that are most truly friends, because each loves the other for what 
he is, and not for any incidental quality” Aristotle, The Ethics of Aristotle : The Nicomachean Ethics, trans. J. A. 
K. Thomson, H.Tredennick, Revised translation ed. (London: Allen & Unwin, 1953; repr., 1976), 1156b2-23. 
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learn to live with the truth of our animal nature the greater becomes our openness to that 
which transcends us. The truth of life which Aquinas speaks of is the truth of the life of a 
rational animal, not a disembodied rational agent. The Christian conception of virtue with its 
underlying theology of creation enables us to see that the exercise of virtue is that of a 
rational animal, bringing out the openness of our whole nature to its divine author in a 
manner which transforms pagan notions of virtue. 
Although in our reading of Wittgenstein we argued that he lacks a philosophy of 
nature, the way in which his later writings return us to the pre-linguistic reactions which form 
the basis for our linguistic practices challenges accounts of human intentional agency which 
disconnect it from our animality. In this respect Wittgenstein offers an understanding of the 
truth of life which opens us to the reality of our dependence on that which is given prior to, 
and as a condition for, intentional agency. This dependence opens us ultimately to the author 
of life, but most immediately our dependency is that of an animal belonging to a particular 
species. There are two related dimensions to this biological dependency. Firstly, there is the 
physical inheritance we possess as human beings. Secondly, there is the interdependence 
human beings have upon each other as a particular kind of higher primate.  
We saw in chapter five how Pope brings attention to the significance of our biological 
nature for moral theology, and does so by drawing parallels between work by contemporary 
biologist and Aquinas’ understanding of the role of natural inclinations in moral reasoning. 
Aquinas is influenced by Aristotle in his account of human beings as rational animals and in 
his Dependent Rational Animals MacIntyre argues that we should return to Aristotle’s texts 
in order to learn about our animal nature: “if only because no philosopher has taken human 
animality more seriously.”28 Aristotle, however, according to MacIntyre, exemplifies: “two 
                                                 
28 MacIntyre, Dependent Rational Animals : Why Human Beings Need the Virtues, 5. 
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attitudes which are barriers to” acknowledging our human animality. 29 Firstly, Aristotle 
failed to draw upon the experience of those in his society who are most dependent due to 
their vulnerability: “in neither ethics nor politics did he give any weight to the experience of 
those for whom the facts of affliction and dependence are most likely to be undeniable: 
women, slaves, and servants, those engaged in productive labour of farmers, fishing crews, 
and manufacture.”30 Secondly, MacIntyre argues that there are: “two characteristics of 
Aristotle’s conception of masculine virtue,” which prevented him from understanding our 
human animality. 31 These characteristics are Aristotle’s assertion that men unlike women are 
“unwilling to have others saddened by their grief,” and the distain the magnanimous man has 
for being reminded of benefits he has received in contrast to his pleasure in remembering 
“what he has given.”32 Both these attitudes close human beings to understanding our origins 
in relationships of dependence. By contrast to this denial of our animality MacIntyre sets out 
to develop an account of virtue, and of why human beings need the virtues, by beginning with 
reflection upon our animal dependencies. In particular, MacIntyre argues it is in the 
experience of those who are most vulnerable that we learn what it means to be a rational 
animal: “the virtues that we need, if we are to confront and respond to vulnerability and 
disability both in ourselves and in others, belong to one and the same set of virtues, the 
distinctive virtues of dependent rational animals, whose dependence, rationality and animality 
have to be understood in relationship to each other.”33 
The ‘therapeutic’ exercises Wittgenstein develops in his later philosophy can be read 
in this light as an attempt to help us overcome our tendencies to forget or ignore our own 
dependencies. The play which he invites us to participate in recalls us to the innocence of 
childhood play before we are forced to join the serious world of the grown-ups from which 
                                                 
29 Ibid., 6. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Ibid., 7. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Ibid., 5. 
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the vulnerable are excluded. The truth of life does not exclude this play, but rather brings it to 
maturity in a manner which makes us at the same time more independent and more open to 
our vulnerabilities. Our discussion of Wittgenstein’s accounts of following and rule and 
‘seeing as’ will attempt to show how Wittgenstein in his later works helps us to grow in 
maturity and independence through making us aware of our animal dependencies. These 
concerns are theological, and as such will go beyond MacIntyre’s philosophical account of 
human dependence. MacIntyre provides an understanding of virtue, however, which is open 
to that which is our origin in a way which ancient conceptions of virtue lack. Thus, his 
understanding of how virtue develops through our animal dependencies and vulnerabilities is 
more open to transformation and perfection by grace than the ancient philosophical notion 
that: “the end of the human person is wholly within the person.”34 At the same time it will be 
important to keep in mind that when we talk of grace we are using analogy, and relevant 
distinctions between nature and grace need to be taken into account. 
 
6.2.2 Situated Freedom 
We have read Wittgenstein in relation to the metaphysical tradition as this is 
developed in the works of philosophers such as Hibbs, Desmond and Gilson. Each of these 
philosophers sees metaphysics as a practice in which the human desire for universal truth is 
rooted in our concrete experience of reality. As such they all develop accounts of human 
freedom which situates it in the context of human nature. Another philosopher whose 
influence lies in the background of our understanding of metaphysics, and of human freedom 
as situated in human practices, is Josef Pieper. In the following passage, in which he places 
human beings in the “middle” between animals and God, Pieper sums up many of the themes 
which have informed our reading of Wittgenstein: 
                                                 
34 Pinckaers, "Aquinas and Agency : Beyond Autonomy and Heteronomy?," 190. “la fin de l’homme est toute 
dans l’homme.” Ce Qu'on Ne Peut Jamais Faire : La Question Des Actes Intrinsèquement Mauvais, Histoire Et 
Discussion, 24. 
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The “middle” is the truly human sphere. The truly human thing is neither to conceive or 
comprehend (like God), nor to harden and dry up; neither to shut oneself up in the 
supposedly clear and enlightened everyday world, not to resign oneself to remaining 
ignorant; nor to lose the childlike suppleness of hope, the freedom of movement that 
belongs to those who hope.35 
 
This notion of the “middle” is taken by Pieper from Diotima’s reply to Socrates in the 
Symposium. It is interesting to note that Pieper, like Wittgenstein, takes us back to our 
childlike reactions, and the play which the hardened seriousness of adulthood takes from us. 
Pieper connects this childlike play to the virtue of hope, which is a theological virtue taking 
us beyond the philosophy of Plato to the transformation of our nature in the encounter with 
divine grace. Hope is central to Pieper’s philosophy, for although he respects the distinction 
between philosophy and theology his philosophy is transformed by the encounter with divine 
wisdom in revelation.36 Thus, for Pieper, it is through hope that we gain a freedom of 
movement which is the freedom characteristic of human beings. This is the freedom of 
creatures who are: “essentially viatores, on the way, being who are ‘not yet,’” and as such “it 
is because the structure of wonder is that of hope that it is so essentially human and so 
essential to a human existence.”37 
In a passage from the second part of the Investigations Wittgenstein distinguishes 
between human beings and other animals due to the human ability to hope: “One can imagine 
an animal angry, frightened, unhappy, happy, startled. But hopeful? And why not? . . Can 
only those hope who can talk? Only those who have mastered the use of a language.”38 There 
is no suggestion here that Wittgenstein has the theological virtue of hope in mind, but it is 
significant that he identifies hope as something which is distinct to the life of a creature who 
                                                 
35 Josef Pieper, The Philosophical Act, published in Josef Pieper, Leisure, the Basis of Culture, trans. Alexander 
Dru, Rev. ed. (New York,: Pantheon Books, 1964), 105. 
36 For an account of Pieper’s philosophy of hope see Bernard N. Schumacher, A Philosophy of Hope : Josef 
Pieper and the Contemporary Debate on Hope, trans. D. C. Schindler, Moral Philosophy and Moral Theology 
Series, (New York: Fordham University Press, 2003). 
37 Pieper, Leisure, the Basis of Culture, 104. 
38 Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 174e. “Mann kann sich ein Tier zornig, furchtsam, trauig, freudig, 
erschrocken vorstellen. Aber hoffend? Und warum nicht? . . . Kann nur hoffen, wer sprechen kann? Nur der, der 
die Verwendung einer Sprache beherrscht. ” Philosophische Untersuchungen. In Tractatus Logico-Philosopicus, 
Ludwig Wittgenstein Werkausgabe Band 1, 489. 
211 
 
has mastered the use of language. At the same time Wittgenstein is not cutting human beings 
off from any connection with other animals, the other emotions he lists are ones humans and 
other animals share. His interest is in helping us to see both the continuities and the 
differences between human and animal behaviour. It is questionable whether Wittgenstein is 
correct in saying that animals cannot hope, but if we ascribe the emotion of hope to animals it 
differs significantly from the human emotion: a dog may hope to receive a biscuit, but only a 
human being can hope that the ingredients are ethically sourced. 
The second part of the Investigations contains selections from Wittgenstein remarks 
on seeing aspects. In chapter four we noted how the phenomenon of ‘seeing as’ helps to 
throw light on the nature of human perception in general, and as such can be seen as enabling 
us to develop an account of perception which avoids reducing it to a purely physiological 
process, while at the same time preventing us assuming a Godlike view disconnected from 
any basis in our nature. The childlike suppleness of the play which is required to ‘see as’ 
entails that when we ask the question of origins we do so with a sense of wonder which opens 
into hope. We have seen how Kerr argues that Wittgenstein’s work lends itself to a 
‘sensibility of wonder’ and we can now add that the strategies he develops in his later works, 
including his discussions of ‘seeing as’, bring us to ask in wonder the question of origins. 
Pieper notes how for Aquinas the desire for knowledge is essential for the: “‘structure of 
wonder’ (corresponding to hope).”39 Human beings are unique as animals who desire to 
know, and the philosophical investigations Wittgenstein carries out can be seen as attempting 
to open up a sense of wonder. 
 
 
 
                                                 
39 Pieper, Leisure, the Basis of Culture, 104. 
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6.2.3 Following a Rule and Learning to Trust 
In the discussion of following a rule which was carried out in chapter two we read 
Wittgenstein’s remarks on rule following within the larger context of his developing 
understanding of the principle of application. In drawing attention to what happens when we 
follow a rule Wittgenstein seeks to throw light on the question of how we apply concepts. His 
use of examples from mathematics aims to rid us of the temptation to sublime our concepts in 
an account of application which lacks any friction in our actual practices, while his criticism 
of causal accounts of rule following helps us to overcome the temptation to reduce our 
practices to mechanical responses. The realism which Wittgenstein seeks is one which returns 
us to the natural human reactions which our ability to be trained in following rules requires. 
Wittgenstein contrasts the kind of training which human beings can undergo with that which 
is possible for other animals in a manner which draws out both the similarities and essential 
differences between human beings and other animals. These comparisons help us to see that 
although our ability to be trained cannot be reduced to our pre-linguistic animal reactions it 
has a basis in those reactions. 
We also observed how Wittgenstein’s account of rule following developed in his later 
works away from an understanding of rule following as the application of a calculus, to an 
account which sets rule following in the wider context of human life. This broadening of 
perspective enabled Wittgenstein to see that it is an illusion to search for a basis for our 
practices outside the contexts of training in which those practices develop. At first sight this 
would seem to rule out the claim that training has a basis in our pre-linguistic animal 
reactions, but it must be remembered that these reactions are not found outside our practices. 
In chapter five the question of how nature operates as a category in moral theology was 
examined, and we concluded that it is a mistake to see the use of nature in moral theology as 
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the application of a pre-given concept of nature to practice. Rather, it is through the exercise 
of the virtues that we come to understand what human nature is. 
Another result of Wittgenstein’s criticism of our tendency to look for foundations for 
our practices beyond those practices is his assertion that following rules relies not only on 
agreement in definitions, but that: “It is essential for communication that we agree in a large 
number of judgements.”40 Here we recall the analogy between logic and the rules of a game 
such as chess which Wittgenstein makes in order to argue that, just as changing the essential 
rules of chess entails that we are no longer playing chess, certain changes in the logic of our 
language would entail that what we are no longer talking about human life. Wittgenstein does 
not fall into the kind of relativism these remarks may at first sight imply. The logic which 
governs human life is not something we can just decide to change at will, for it finds its 
application through agreement: “in a large number of judgements” and if certain of these 
judgements change what is left is not recognizable as human life. Thus many of the language-
games which Wittgenstein develops in his later works have the purpose of showing us how 
changes in judgements bring us to question whether we would recognize ourselves as human. 
Throughout his later works Wittgenstein confronts the temptation to flee from what 
makes us human. In his discussion of rule following in the Investigations Wittgenstein 
reflects on the difficulty we have in accepting that our practices are not founded upon the 
certainty of a crystalline logic which removes all contingency from them, nor on the 
mechanical calculation of outcomes which determines each step in advance. Our practices 
seem insubstantial, liable to fall apart, when we view them against the demands of logic: “We 
want to say that there can’t be any vagueness in logic. The idea now absorbs us, that the ideal 
                                                 
40 Wittgenstein, Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, VI, §39. “Es ist für die Verständigung wesentlich, 
daß wir in einer großen Anzahl von Urteilen übereinstimmen.” Bemerkung Über Die Grundlagen Der 
Mathematik, Ludwig Wittgenstein Werkausgabe Band 6, VI, §39. 
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‘must’ be found in reality.”41 Wittgenstein continually urges us to give up this ideal and in 
doing so to see that what seems to be the fragility of our practices is essential to them. In 
particular, he continually returns us to the contexts within which we learn to use language, 
and our dependencies upon others in these contexts. A clear example of this is given in the 
account of being guided Wittgenstein offers in the Investigations. We followed this account 
in chapter four and now we will built upon our earlier observations. 
In his discussion of being guided in the Investigations §170-177 Wittgenstein draws 
our attention to various contexts within which have an experience of being guided. In Chapter 
four, section 4.2.4, we argued that these remarks provide a path towards understanding the 
pre-conceptual in terms of physical interaction and play. This enables us to understand the 
relationship between the conceptual and the pre-conceptual as one of dialectical interplay, 
and thus to overcome the modern dichotomy between the empirical realm of determinate 
causation and the conceptual realm of autonomous reason. Wittgenstein’s remarks on being 
guided have a particular relevance in helping us to understand the pre-conceptual basis of our 
concepts, because they bring to light the animal dependencies which are essential to our 
ability to learn. The pre-conceptual animal basis for our behaviour is not a causally 
determined realm which we must transcend in order to act rationally. The transcendence 
which we possess due to our ability to use language does not occur despite our animal nature, 
but is made possible through our animal dependencies. It is only by trusting in others, 
allowing ourselves to be guided, that we are able to grow to maturity as human beings. This 
trusting begins on the pre-linguistic level and the physical play which precedes the linguistic 
play at the boundary between the linguistic and the pre-linguistic. Our human animal 
vulnerabilities far from being an obstacle to the development of our rational independence are 
essential to it. In becoming independent rational agents we do not thereby leave our 
                                                 
41 Philosophical Investigations, §101. “Eine Vagheit in der Logik – wollen wir sagen – kann es nicht geben. Wir 
leben nun in der Ideee: das Ideal ‘müsse’ sich in der Realität finden.” Philosophische Untersuchungen. In 
Tractatus Logico-Philosopicus, Ludwig Wittgenstein Werkausgabe Band 1, §101. 
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vulnerabilities and dependence on others behind, but come to acknowledge and live our 
vulnerability ever more fully. 
The contexts of dependency which Wittgenstein draws attention to in his later works 
help us to loosen the grip of the temptation to assert our rational autonomy against the face of 
human vulnerability. Of the five experiences of being guided which Wittgenstein describes in 
§170 of the Investigations four of them involve being guided by someone. In chapter four we 
argued that these experiences of being guided are used by Wittgenstein to play with the 
boundary between the pre-conceptual and the conceptual. There is, nevertheless, something 
lacking in Wittgenstein’s overall account of our human dependencies. We have suggested 
that Wittgenstein requires a physics of the kind developed by Aristotle in order to describe 
more adequately the dialectical tension between the conceptual and the pre-conceptual, and 
thus to situate an account of human agency within a wider account of natural causation. In the 
absence of such a wider context there is a danger that Wittgenstein’s account of being guided 
by someone will either be reduced to the level of mechanical interaction, or be sublimed to 
the level of contractual agreement between autonomous agents. The wider context of physical 
causation enables us to see how these experiences of being guided are encounters of the 
whole human being, and are thus personal in a way which roots personhood in our animal 
dependencies (we will return to this topic in section 7.2). 
This wider physical context also opens us to the question of the ultimate cause, of the 
one upon whom we are ultimately dependent. Just as human growth depends upon trusting 
other human beings, so it also requires us to trust in the author of creation. This trusting is our 
sharing in God’s providence, which is our created participation in the eternal law through 
which he governs creation. It is brought to perfection through the Evangelical law and in 
chapter five we followed Pinckaers’ account of how Aquinas’ conception of the Evangelical 
law overcomes the modern choice between autonomy and heteronomy. We can now, 
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following McCabe, add that this perfecting of our natural human practices of trusting is made 
possible by our being taken up into the enacted history of God that is the revelation of Jesus 
Christ. Our natural human practices of trust enable us to see our story as part of the wider 
story of creation, as participants in the authorship of God.42 Through the Evangelical law God 
takes us up into his life, making us part of his story, we are not merely participants in this 
story but friends who come to share in the life of the author. 
Earlier in this chapter we noted that grace works through healing and perfecting our 
nature. The healing work of grace takes place where those contexts of trust which are 
essential for our human growth have broken down. This is the breakdown of our trust in other 
people, but also our trust in God. It is through the humanity of Jesus Christ that God restores 
this broken trust, for in Jesus Christ the vulnerability and dependence of human beings is 
most powerfully revealed. In Christ crucified we see vulnerable humanity betrayed and 
tortured, yet at this moment where trust seems to be at its end the Son places himself into the 
hands of his Father in an act of ultimate trust which will restore our broken relationships. In 
                                                 
42 In speaking here of our natural practices of trust we are touching on the question of faith; when we trust in 
someone we have faith in them. In English the use of the word ‘faith’ tends, however, to be distinguished from 
the use of the word ‘belief’ as implying a theological context for belief. This implies that talk of natural 
practices of faith can seem somewhat confused. In German the word for belief, glaube, is also the word for faith. 
This entails that speaking of glaube as natural to human beings does not necessarily imply a theological context 
for belief. In this work on faith Joseph Pieper draws connections between (while also distinguishing) natural 
human practices of faith and trust and the theological virtue of faith: see Josef Pieper, Faith, Hope, Love (San 
Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1997). In On Certainty Wittgenstein also draws upon the wider connotations of the 
German word glaube to show how our beliefs depend upon human practices of trust: “I am told, for example, 
that someone climbed this mountain many years ago. Do I always enquire into the reliability of the teller of the 
story, and whether the mountain did exist years ago? A child learns there are reliable and unreliable informants 
much later than it learns facts which are told it.” Wittgenstein, On Certainty, § 143. (“Es wird mir z. B. erzält, 
jemand sei vor Jahren auf diesen Berg gesiegen. Undersuche ich nun immer die Glaubwürdigkeit des Erzählers 
und ob dieser Berg vor Jarhren existiert habe? Ein kind lernt viel später, daß es glaubwürdige und 
unglaubwürdige Erzähler gibt, als es Fakten lernt, die ihm erzählt warden.” Zettel. In Wissenschaft 
Bemerkungen Über Die Farben ; Über Gewissheit ; Zettel ; Vermischte Bemerkungen, Ludwig Wittgenstein 
Werkausgabe Band 8, § 143.) When we talk about the perfection of our human practices of trust we are 
following Aquinas’ dictum that the order of grace follows the order of nature: “Nature is not done away, but 
perfected, by glory. Now the order of charity given above (Articles 2, 3 and 4) is derived from nature: since all 
things naturally love themselves more than others.” Aquinas, The 'Summa Theologica' of St. Thomas Aquinas, 
Tr. By Fathers of the English Dominican Province. [22 Vols. In 20], II-IIae q. 26, a. 13. (natura non tollitur per 
gloriam, sed perficitur. Ordo autem caritatis supra positus ex ipsa natura procedit. Omnia autem naturaliter plus 
se quam alia amant. S.Thomae Aquinatis Opera Omnia. II-IIae q. 26, a. 13.) This is not to say that it is merely a 
case of bringing human nature to its natural end, but that the order of nature is transformed by being taken up 
into the higher order of grace in a manner which perfects, rather than destroys it. It is important to add that 
although faith essential involves relationships of trust it also has a propositional content: we believe that certain 
things are true because those we trust in hold them to be true. 
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the resurrection the Risen Lord carries the wounds of his crucifixion, showing us that it is 
through the vulnerability of his humanity that we have been saved and raised to new life. The 
healing and perfection which take place through grace is not brought about in spite of our 
human animal dependency and vulnerability, but through it. 
 
6.2.4 ‘Seeing As’: The Perfection of Our Human Nature 
At the end of the section on following a rule in chapter two we saw how 
Wittgenstein’s emphasis on our natural reactions as the basis for following rules opens into a 
discussion of ‘seeing as’. Those who are incapable of reacting in certain ways are blind to 
aspects of human life rendering them incapable of grasping fully what it is to be human. In 
his account of ‘seeing as’ Wittgenstein argues that our ability to make fine grained 
distinctions is not something which is a mere addition to our perceptual abilities, but is 
essential to human life. Wittgenstein uses the phenomenon of seeing aspects to cast light on 
the nature of perception in general, showing that perception is neither reducible to a 
mechanical process nor is it an interpretation added to a basic set of visual data. As such 
Wittgenstein’s reflections on seeing aspects are central to his attempt to develop realism in 
philosophy. Like the account of situated freedom which we have developed in this present 
chapter Wittgenstein’s reflection on ‘seeing as’ can be seen as presenting an understanding of 
human capabilities which roots them in our animal nature, while avoiding reducing them to 
the pre-rational. 
In chapter two we noted how after 1945 Wittgenstein’s reflections turned to the 
application of psychological concepts. His earlier focus on mathematical concepts no longer 
took centre stage. This is not surprising once we consider that Wittgenstein came to see that 
there can be no general account of application, and therefore the investigation of application 
in more than one area helps to overcome the danger of drawing generalities from a one-sided 
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diet: “A main cause of philosophical disease—a one-sided diet: one nourishes one’s thinking 
with only one kind of example.”43 In concentrating upon the application of mathematical 
concepts Wittgenstein risked reducing the application of concepts to the mastery of 
mechanical techniques. It was this very danger that Wittgenstein sought to avoid in the 
development of the analogy between language and games by showing that mathematics is not 
a logical calculous, but rather involves playing various games which have differing degrees 
of resemblance. He also argued that the application of mathematical concepts rests upon the 
possession of various non-mathematical abilities and reactions. Wittgenstein sought to break 
the mythology of crystalline purity which he succumbed to in the Tractatus, through helping 
us to see that even the most rigid seeming areas of language are not determined through the 
application of a calculous. 
In seeking to break the hold of the mechanical model of application Wittgenstein 
wishes to return us to the natural human practices and reactions which our ability of follow 
rules pre-supposes. Mulhall argues that the in final passages in part one of the Investigations 
Wittgenstein helps us to see that inhabiting a language is more than just the mechanical 
application of rules, but involves making fine grained distinctions. Such distinctions are 
possible because human beings are by nature symbol using creatures, and learning to use 
symbols involves taking responsibility for our use of words. 44 Here we also recall McCabe’s 
characterization of the human being as a symbol using animal. It is in using these abilities 
that we take responsibility for who we are, and return to our natural ways of living. In chapter 
two we saw how from as early as the remarks found in Philosophical Grammar Wittgenstein 
argues that psychological states such as belief are akin to our natural pre-conceptual 
                                                 
43 Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, §593. “Eine Hauptursache philosophischer Krankheiten – ein 
seigige Diät: man nahrt sein Denken mit nur einer Art von Beispielen.” Philosophische Untersuchungen. In 
Tractatus Logico-Philosopicus, Ludwig Wittgenstein Werkausgabe Band 1, §593. 
44 Mulhall holds that in holding a mechanical conception: “to be exemplary of language as such, we satisfy a 
desire to deny our own responsibility for words—to think of the steps we take with them as really already taken 
by the words themselves.”  Mulhall, Inheritance and Originality : Wittgenstein, Heidegger, Kierkegaard, 142. 
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reactions. In the post-1945 remarks on psychology he develops this insight to argue that 
beliefs arise from our natural human reactions to the world and others we encounter: 
Believing that someone else is on pain, doubting whether he is, are so many natural 
kinds of behaviour towards other human beings; and our language is but an auxiliary to 
and extension of this behaviour. I mean: our language is an extension of the more 
primitive behaviour. (For our language-game is a piece of behaviour.)45 
 
The natural behaviour which Wittgenstein identifies here involves our pre-linguistic primitive 
behaviour. This conclusion is confirmed in another set of remarks in which Wittgenstein 
argues that our concern for the pain of others does not arise as a result of first attending to our 
own pain and then by analogy inferring that another person: “too had the experience of 
pain.”46 Rather, it is “a primitive reaction to attend to the pain-behaviour of another, as, also, 
not to attend to one’s own pain-behaviour.”47 Wittgenstein adds that the use of the world 
“primitive” here presumably means that “the mode of behaviour is pre-linguistic: that a 
language-game is based on it: that it is the prototype of a mode of thought and not the result 
of thought.”48 At the same time it is important to note that Wittgenstein is not saying that the 
“mode of thought” here under investigation can be reduced to the pre-linguistic. The 
“language-game is based on it,” but that is not to say that it is reducible to it. 
We have followed Mulhall in arguing that Wittgenstein’s discussion of seeing aspects 
is intended to break through our mechanical conceptions of language by “intimating 
                                                 
45 Wittgenstein, Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology, 1, §151. “Glauben, daß der Andere Schmerzen hat, 
zweifeln, ob er sie hat, sind so viele natürliche Arten des Verhaltens zu den andern Menschen; und unsere 
Sprache ist nur ein Hilfsmittel und ein weiterer Ausbau dieses Verhaltens. Ich meine: unser Sprachspiel ist ein 
Ausbau des primitiveren Benehmens. (Denn unser Sprachspiel ist Benehmen.)” Bermerkungen Über Die 
Philosophie Der Psychologie Band 1. In Bermerkungen Über Die Philosophie Der Pschologie, Werkausgabe 
Band 7., §151. 
46 Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology, 1, §917. “auch er habe ein Schmerzerlebnis.” Bermerkungen Über 
Die Philosophie Der Psychologie Band 1. In Bermerkungen Über Die Philosophie Der Pschologie, 
Werkausgabe Band 7., §917. 
47 Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology, 1, §915. “daß es seine primitive Reaktion ist, die schmerzende 
Stelle des Andern zu pflegen, zu behandeln, und nicht nur die eigene – also auf des Andern Schmerzbenehmen 
zu achten, wie auch, auf eigene Schmerzbenehmen nicht zu achten.” Bermerkungen Über Die Philosophie Der 
Psychologie Band 1. In Bermerkungen Über Die Philosophie Der Pschologie, Werkausgabe Band 7., §915. 
48 Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology, 1, §916. “daß die Verhaltungsweise vorsprachlich ist: daßein 
Sprachspiel auf ihr beruht, daß sie das Prototyp einer Denkweise ist und nicht das Ergebnis des Denkens.” 
Bermerkungen Über Die Philosophie Der Psychologie Band 1. In Bermerkungen Über Die Philosophie Der 
Pschologie, Werkausgabe Band 7., §916. 
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something so fine as to be beyond explanation.”49 This finesse emerges in the dialectical 
tension between the pre-conceptual and the conceptual. It is at this boundary that 
Wittgenstein seeks to return us to the childhood play, enabling us to overcome the 
deformation of our language which is caused by our adult tendency to determine meaning 
through the imposition of our will. This is the opening to our human animal vulnerabilities 
which makes us more fully human. The refusal to allow those who are most vulnerable and 
dependent to enter into our play blinds us to essential aspects of our humanity. The child who 
excludes the vulnerable from her play loses something of her own ability to play, until she is 
left with no friends but sees others merely as objects to be controlled. 
Once we have become desensitised to the vulnerability of others, and thus also to our 
own humanity, how can we learn to see again? In his proclamation of the Kingdom of God, 
which is summed up in the Sermon on the Mount, Jesus Christ opens the path to the renewal 
of our humanity through learning to see ourselves and others as called to friendship with 
God.50 Pinckaers argues the Sermon on the Mount: “has been one of the chief sources of 
spiritual renewal known to the Church through the ages,”51 and follows Augustine in seeing 
the sermon as: “the perfect rule of life for Christians. It could be called the charter of 
Christian life.”52 Pinckaers notes that for Augustine the Sermon on the Mount, which is 
summed up in the Beatitudes, was not to be seen in isolation from the rest of Scripture, but 
was: “a summit upon which all revealed moral teaching converged. The Sermon was said to 
                                                 
49 Mulhall, Inheritance and Originality : Wittgenstein, Heidegger, Kierkegaard, 154. 
50 For an account of our call to friendship with God which builds upon Aquinas’ theology of charity see: 
Romanus Cessario, O.P., The Virtues, or, the Examined Life, Amateca Handbooks of Catholic Theology 
(London: Continuum, 2002), 61-95. It is important to keep in mind that although God’s charity envelopes the 
whole of creation friendship is properly possible only for rational creatures (see ibid., 77). In highlighting the 
significance of human animal vulnerabilities for human friendship we do not mean to imply that friendship is 
possible for other animals in anything but an analogous sense. Rather, those vulnerabilities are the open us to a 
communion which is only possible for rational creatures. 
51 Pinckaers, The Sources of Christian Ethics, 135. “fut une des principales souces des renouveaux spirituels 
qu’a connus l’Eglise au cours des âges.” Les Sources De La Morale Chrétienne : Sa Méthode, Son Contenu, Son 
Histoire, 5e éd., ed. (Fribourg, Suisse: Academic Press Fribourg, 1985), 149. 
52 The Sources of Christian Ethics, 144. “la règle parfait des mœurs chrétiennes. On peur l’appeler la charte de 
la vie chrétienne.” Les Sources De La Morale Chrétienne : Sa Méthode, Son Contenu, Son Histoire, 157. 
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be the perfection of this teaching, in the sense that it contained and fulfilled all its precepts.”53 
Aquinas more than any other theologian took over this insight from Augustine and: “referred 
to it explicitly when he declared that the Sermon on the Mount was definitively the 
representative text of the New Law (IaIIae, 108 a 3).”54 The Evangelical law is summed up in 
the Sermon on the Mount, which is more than just a number of precepts for Christian living, 
but sets out the whole shape and pattern of the Christian life. 
In the Sermon on the Mount Jesus Christ invites us to find healing for our broken 
humanity in a way which will bring it to perfection.55 This involves entering into the play of 
his transforming words, and to allow him through those words to heal and perfect our human 
nature. It is an invitation to see the world anew, to recover aspects of our ability to see which 
have been lost through the hardening of our hearts. Each of the beatitudes reveals an aspect of 
human vulnerability and teaches us to embrace that vulnerability. The path of healing and 
perfection is one which far from removing us from our human dependencies is one which 
takes us through those dependencies to find perfection in learning to fully depend upon God. 
It is through learning to accept and embrace poverty, sorrow, meekness, hunger, mercy and 
purity of heart that we will become children of God through our discipleship of Jesus Christ, 
and be made ready to receive the perfection which comes to those who are persecuted for 
what is right. Christian discipleship involves becoming like a child and entering into the play 
of God’s Kingdom as it is revealed in Jesus Christ. This is God’s enacted history in which we 
are given divine riches through the poverty of him who for our sake accepted death on a 
cross. 
                                                 
53 The Sources of Christian Ethics, 144. “le sommet vers où monte et converge tout l’enseignement moral 
révélé. Le Sermon en est la perfection en ce sens qu’il l’assume et l’accomplit.” Les Sources De La Morale 
Chrétienne : Sa Méthode, Son Contenu, Son Histoire, 157. 
54 The Sources of Christian Ethics, 144. “la reprendra de façon explicite quand il fera du Sermon sur la 
Montagne le texte propre de la Loi nouvelle (Ia IIae, q. 108, a. 3).” Les Sources De La Morale Chrétienne : Sa 
Méthode, Son Contenu, Son Histoire, 158. 
55 Pinckaers describes how Augustine characterizes the beatitudes as stages of conversion (healing) and 
perfection. 
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In his reflections on seeing aspects Wittgenstein can be seen as developing a realism 
in philosophy which roots our perceptual abilities in our human practices. As such he can be 
understood as standing against all attempts to deform human nature through a refusal to enter 
into the play of our human vulnerabilities. The realism which Jesus Christ proclaims in the 
Sermon on the Mount invites us to enter into the play of the Kingdom of God in which the 
very aspects of our human nature which make us most vulnerable are the path to our 
perfection. It is in learning to see poverty as the source of divine riches, sorrow as the advent 
of joy, meekness as growth in strength, hunger as fulfilment, mercy as healing for our own 
souls, purity of heart as the key to seeing the truth, and peace-making as the path to our 
inheritance as God’s children, that we discover what it is to be human. The perfection of our 
nature is not brought about by overcoming our human dependencies, but by becoming 
vulnerable through the grace of God given to us in the beatitudes. Through his cross and 
resurrection Jesus Christ teaches us to see once again with the innocence of childhood, and 
raises up our fallen nature so that we may live as children of God; enfolding us in the story of 
God. This is to live in the eternal play of love which is the life of the Holy Trinity, the play 
through which the world was made and through which we are redeemed. 
 
 Conclusion: Learning to Live as Children of God 6.3
In this chapter we have developed the dialogue between Wittgenstein and moral 
theology by engaging with a theological account of virtue. In order to do this we followed 
McCabe’s theology of revelation as the enacted history of God, which uses analogy to help us 
understand our graced participation in the life of God as being caught up in the autobiography 
of God. McCabe draws upon Wittgenstein to argue that human beings are essentially 
autobiographical animals: the truth of life is the truth told by a creature that is able to narrate 
its own story. In filling out McCabe’s account we turned to the dialectical nature of 
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Wittgenstein’s conception of human understanding. This dialectic enables us to remain in that 
middle which is between the self as character and the self as author and in doing so raises the 
question of origins. We are author of our story, but also authored. MacIntyre’s account of 
human beings as dependent animals helps us to see how it is through our human 
vulnerabilities that we come to understand ourselves as authored. Our dependency as a 
creature opens us to see and live the truth of life, situating our freedom in a manner which 
enables us to see that we are not the ultimate author of our own lives. We are not the origin of 
our stories, but rather called to live it in dependence on others, and ultimately in dependence 
on the God who is revealed though the vulnerable humanity of Jesus Christ. Through Jesus 
Christ we are caught up in the story of God in a relationship which transforms and perfects 
the story of our creation, such that our stories become part of Gods’ story
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7 ACTION AND VIRTUE: TRANSFORMING ENGAGEMENT 
 Action and Language: Making Sense of What We Do 7.1
In this chapter we will examine how our reading of Wittgenstein can be used to 
understand human agency. In chapter five we noted how Anscombe in ‘Modern Moral 
Philosophy’ observes that our uses of moral terms such as ‘duty’ have become detached from 
the practices within which they originally found application. There is a disconnection 
between human actions and the language moral philosophers use to understand them. For 
Anscombe we need a renewal in our understanding of human psychology for such terms to 
make sense: “In present-day philosophy an explanation is required how an unjust man is a 
bad man, or an unjust action a bad one; to give such an explanation belongs to ethics; but it 
cannot even be begun until we are equipped with a sound philosophy of psychology.”1 To 
return such terms to their home in our human practices more is required than just a technical 
mastery of human psychology. For Wittgenstein, understanding requires more than just 
mastery of a language, as the following passage from Part II of the Investigations argues in 
regard to understanding a people with traditions which are strange to us: 
We also say of some people that they are transparent to us. It is, however, important as 
regards this observation that one human being can be a complete enigma to another. We 
learn this when we come into a strange country with entirely strange traditions; and, 
what is more, even given a mastery of the country’s language. We do not understand 
the people. (And not because of not knowing what they are saying to themselves.) We 
cannot find our feet with them.2 
 
Wittgenstein’s remarks here concern difficulties in understanding others, but they also help 
us to reflect on the difficulty of understand ourselves. In order to understand ourselves we 
                                                 
1 Anscombe, Human Life, Action and Ethics : Essays, 174. 
2 Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 223e. “Wir sagen auch von einem Menschen, er sei uns 
durchsichtig. Aber es ist für dieses Betrachtung wichtig, daß ein Mensch für einen andern ein völliges Rätsel 
sein kann. Das erfährt man, wenn man in ein fremdes Land mit gänzlich fremden Traditionen kommt; und zwar 
auch dann, wenn man die Sprache des Landes beherrscht. Man versteht die Menschen nicht. (Und nicht darum, 
weil man nicht weiß, was sie zu sich selber sprechen.) Wir können uns nicht in sie finden.” Philosophische 
Untersuchungen. In Tractatus Logico-Philosopicus, Ludwig Wittgenstein Werkausgabe Band 1, 568. 
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need more than just the mastery of a language. Overcoming the ways in which we misuse 
language involves learn how to be human. Wittgenstein’s philosophical exercises provide 
tools which can help us to see through the false pictures which hold us captive; enabling us to 
see what lies in front of our eyes. The recovery of our human nature involves developing 
those practices through which we begin to see and live the truth of life. In this chapter we will 
indicate ways in which a dialogue can develop between Wittgenstein and contemporary 
understandings of the relationship between nature, reason and human agency.  
In section 7.1 we will compare Wittgenstein’s desire for realism in philosophy with 
the recovery of the concept of nature in the works of Jean Porter. We will also relate our 
reading of Wittgenstein to Porter’s project of reviving the tradition in which natural law and 
virtue ethics go hand in hand. The encounter between Porter and Wittgenstein will not be all 
one-way traffic, and we will examine and respond to a Wittgensteinian criticism Pinches 
makes of Porter’s use of dialectic. Section 7.2 will draw on Brock’s Thomist understanding 
of human agency and compare Aquinas’ understanding of use with Wittgenstein’s account of 
the use of terms in our language. Finally, in section 7.3 we will examine how Wittgenstein’s 
understanding of situated freedom enables us to develop a critique of the account of human 
agency presented by those modern theories, such as proportionalism, which distinguish 
between moral and non-moral goods and evils. 
 
7.1.1 Agency and Natural Principles 
Jean Porter is a leading figure in the return within Catholic moral theology to an 
understanding of human nature which seeks to represent it in its concrete totality, and thus to 
show the essential significance of pre-rational human nature for the natural law. In this 
revival of natural law she reads Aquinas as developing a dialectical understanding of human 
nature, such that human beings are neither reduced to their pre-rational nature, nor identified 
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purely with a disembodied rationality, but live within the dialectical tension of being a 
rational animal. This dialectical tension is central to Porter’s understanding of natural law, 
and to her critiques of the dominant modern theories of ethics. In chapter four of Nature as 
Reason Porter compares Aquinas’ account of practical reasoning with contemporary 
approaches. To this end she contrasts “broadly Kantian” approaches to practical reason, 
which have a: “fundamental commitment” to the “autonomy of morality,”3 with those 
approaches which characterize the use of reason in moral reasoning as: “instrumental to aims 
generated outside itself.”4 This basic division is complicated by the fact that instrumentalist 
approaches split into cognitive verses non-cognitive theories of moral norms. Both hold that 
moral norms have a basis in human desires, but differ in how they regard: “the foundation of 
the logical status of moral norms.”5 On one side there are consequentialists, who for the most 
part are cognitivists, while on the other side Humean sentimentalists argue that moral norms 
have no cognitive basis, but are expressive of our desires. The former tend to be more radical 
in their ethical theories, emphasising where the requirements of reason entail we should 
abandon our ordinary moral sentiments, whereas the later tend to more conservative 
conclusions preferring to find an equilibrium in the play of our moral sentiments. This entails 
that although consequentialists are opposed to Kantians on the question of the autonomy of 
morality both differ from sentimentalists in placing emphasis on the role of rational 
procedure in moral reasoning. For this reason Porter argues that Kantianism and 
consequentialism tend to collapse into each other: “Kantianism and consequentialism, are 
unstable – each tends to collapse into its contrary, absent some stipulation about the proper 
objects and scope of practical reason itself.”6 
                                                 
3 Porter, Nature as Reason : A Thomistic Theory of the Natural Law, 235. 
4 Ibid., 239. 
5 Ibid., 241. 
6 Ibid., 244. 
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Porter argues that Aquinas’ account of practical reasoning does not fit into this 
division between sentimentalist and Kantian moral theories. Contrary to sentimentalist 
theories Aquinas: “does not believe that human action (much less human identity tout court) 
can be explained in terms of the contingent equilibrium of heterogeneous desires.”7 Against 
Kantian theories Aquinas does not accept that human agency is the operation of the will 
governed by the dictates of practical reason “detached from all desire.”8 In order to 
understand how Aquinas overcomes the dichotomy between given desire and autonomous 
reason it is necessary to see that although: “Aquinas gives a certain priory to desire in the 
processes of action,”9 his account of desire is cognitive. This applies both to the will, which 
Aquinas understands to be rational appetite, “and also with the more general forms of 
appetite found in all creatures.”10 The modern accounts of practical reason Porter examines, 
despite all their differences and oppositions, operate with the modern dichotomy between 
reason and desire. By contrast, in the psychology developed by Aquinas intellect and will 
condition one another, and although will and passions are distinguished they are: “both forms 
of appetite, and as such, each is oriented towards some perceived good.”11 
We have noted how Wittgenstein attempted to develop a form of realism which 
avoids both empiricism and idealism. As we consider the relevance of his philosophy for 
moral theology we can see various parallels between Wittgenstein’s realism and the account 
of practical reasoning Porter develops from Aquinas. Sentimentalist accounts of practical 
reasoning are normally built upon the basis of Humean empiricism, which views the 
operations of reason as subsequent to a causal account of human action. On the other hand, 
Kantian theories of autonomous reason, although in their contemporary forms shy of 
admitting idealist underpinnings, face the difficulty of showing how the autonomous use of 
                                                 
7 Ibid., 253. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Ibid. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Ibid., 254. 
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reason can find application within the actual world of human desire.12 The realism 
Wittgenstein seeks can thus be seen as opening the path to the development of an account of 
human agency which avoids reducing human practices to an empiricist understanding of 
human desire, while at the same time overcoming the temptation to sublime the will by 
turning it into a universal faculty for autonomous self-determination.  
There is, however, a key difference between Porter and Wittgenstein. Porter is aware 
that in order to prevent this dialectic coming apart (and thus falling into the dichotomies 
characteristic of modern moral theories) an account of human will and passion must be given 
a basis in natural principles. In any creature appetite is: “an inclination towards some end 
which is exigent, or at least appropriate to the existence and flourishing of a specific kind of 
creature,”13 and thus in understanding a creature’s appetites we are also giving an account of 
the nature of that creature. This applies both to sentient and non-sentient creatures, and is the 
application of the general metaphysical principle that: “all creatures sustain their existence in 
and through operations which are given order and direction by the creature’s specific form.”14 
These operations are oriented to the good of the creature, and in the case of human beings our 
specific form is such that: “both the passions and the will are necessarily oriented towards the 
good, each in accordance with its characteristic way of apprehending its proper object.”15  
In our critique of Wittgenstein we examined Charlton’s argument that Wittgenstein’s 
theory of meaning collapses into pragmatism since its account of our linguistic practices 
lacks any basis in a wider account of final causation. As we now continue the conversation 
between Wittgenstein and moral theology, we can see that without a wider account of human 
nature he risks being trapped within the dichotomy between sentimentalism and Kantianism. 
                                                 
12 Jürgen Habermas is aware of this problems and the need to recover sources of moral motivation from the 
lifeworld of pre-universalized desires. See Jürgen Habermas, Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, 
trans. Christian Lenhardt and Shierry Weber Nicholsen (Cambridge: Polity, 1990), 109. 
13 Porter, Nature as Reason : A Thomistic Theory of the Natural Law, 256. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Ibid. 
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Human agency is either reduced to a causal account which fails to explain the application of 
intentional concepts, or it is removed from any basis in physical nature leaving the 
connection between the world and the will mysterious (as we saw in chapter four). What is 
required to overcome this dilemma is an account of will which shows its basis in human 
nature; because it is within the unity of the human being, a creature who is a rational animal, 
that the will is a uniting faculty. Porter argues that this unity is provided in Aquinas’ 
understanding of the will as: “naturally and spontaneously oriented towards . . . components 
of well-being, including life itself, health, reproduction, and the like.”16 Furthermore, she 
notes that: “This claim, that the will is naturally and (under some conditions) necessarily 
oriented towards certain objects, provides a critical link between ‘nature as nature’ and 
‘nature as reason’ understood in a Thomistic sense.”17 By “nature as nature” Porter is 
referring to that nature we share with non-rational creatures. Thus, the natural principles 
which form the basis for the operation of the will also provide the basis for the relationship 
between the rational and the pre-rational aspects of our nature, such that they are not set in 
opposition, but united in an account of the concrete unity of the human being. 
Before we finish this section a brief word on emotion is timely. This is an important 
topic for moral theology and we have neglected it so far in our discussion of Wittgenstein and 
moral theology. There is an obvious point of dialogue here between Wittgenstein’s concern to 
show how our linguistic practices are rooted in our natural human reaction and the 
prominence role of the emotions play Aquinas’ account of the Christian life. Pinckaers argues 
that the role Aquinas gives to the emotions in the Summa: “rests on a unified conception of 
the human being and human action.”18 This unity is expressed in Aquinas’ understanding of 
                                                 
16 Ibid., 257. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Servais Pinckaers, "Reappropriating Aquinas' Account of the Passions," in The Pinckaers' Reader : Renewing 
Thomistic Moral Theology ed. John Berkman and Craig Steven Titus (Washington., D.C.: Catholic University 
of America Press, 2005), 278. “repose sur une conception unitaire de l’homme et de son agir” "Les Passions Et 
La Morale," Revue des Sciences philosophiques et théologiques  (1990): 383. 
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the: “natural harmony between the body and the soul, between sensation and spirit, in spite of 
the frictions we can experience.”19 Pinckaers characterizes this natural harmony as an 
interplay of our human faculties when he concludes that: “We can find the same harmony in 
the interplay of the human faculties; reason, will, sensation, and sense perception.”20 This 
interplay entails that for Aquinas the human agent is not split into a rational subject set over 
and against a natural self (the contrast Porter draws between Kantian and sentimentalist 
accounts of ethics), rather: “Thanks to the natural union between body and soul, and to the 
fundamental harmony that it creates between our faculties, humans can spontaneously move 
from the emotions to the spiritual, and, on the contrary, the spiritual can rebound through 
sensation, for good and bad.”21  
In seeking to return us to the play between the linguistic and the pre-linguistic 
Wittgenstein can be understood as helping us to overcome the instrumentalization which 
occurs when the emotions are seen as objects to be ignored or manipulated, and to re-connect 
with the dynamic basis of the unity of the human being in the play between the emotions and 
the spiritual. This is not merely a technical balancing of the various human faculties, but 
provides tools which can help us in a recovery of our human nature. The perspective in which 
we should see Wittgenstein’s later philosophy is not that of the technician standing externally 
to that which her acts will pass into, but as the engaged human agent. It is the situated 
freedom of the human agent which forms the perspective from which the dialectical self-
questioning of the later Wittgenstein arises. 
 
                                                 
19 "Reappropriating Aquinas' Account of the Passions," 278. “une harmonie naturelle entre le corps et l’âme, 
entre la sensibilité et l’espirit, quells que soient les tiraillements qui peuvent survenir.” "Les Passions Et La 
Morale," 383. 
20 "Reappropriating Aquinas' Account of the Passions," 278. “Elles se répercutent dans le jeu des facultés : 
raison, volunté, sensibilité, perception des sens.” "Les Passions Et La Morale," 383. 
21 "Reappropriating Aquinas' Account of the Passions," 278. “C’est donc grâce à l’union naturelle entre le corps 
et l’âme et à l’harmonie de fond qu’elle crée entre nos facultés, que peut s’opérer un passage spontané des 
passions au spirituel et que le spirituel peut, à son tour, rejaillir sur le sensible, pour le bien comme pour le mal.” 
"Les Passions Et La Morale," 383. 
231 
 
7.1.2 Self-Questioning Dialectic 
Despite the absence of a wider account of nature Wittgenstein’s use of dialectic helps 
him to hold in unity the internal and external aspects of the human being. Moreover, in 
chapter four we argued that the self-questioning nature of Wittgenstein’s later works helps 
him to avoid falling into the very philosophical mistakes he seeks to overcome. Despite his 
limitations and inconsistences, Wittgenstein directs us to the concrete reality of our human 
practices: that which lies before our eyes. One of the most valuable lessons Wittgenstein 
provides for moral theology is the need for constant re-examination and questioning. A 
danger contemporary moral theologians run is that of offering a narrative tracing the 
development of our moral concepts in which the perspective of the modern impartial observer 
pre-dominates as opposed to that of the Christian involved in the joys and the sorrows of the 
Christian life. The dialectical understanding of human practices which Wittgenstein develops 
is rooted in those practices, and thus seeks to avoid the perspective of the philosopher or 
theologian standing outside them. 
In Theology and Action Pinches draws upon Wittgenstein’s engaged perspective to 
develop a critique of contemporary theories in moral theology. Pinches argues that theories 
such as proportionalism are founded on the modern dichotomy between the causal physical 
world, and the intentional human world: “Proportionalism’s picture of the world is clearly 
physicalist, about action, and so also about human beings. To reiterate, it supposes there is a 
physical world (including, of course, physical human bodies) to which human minds come 
with their intentions and actions to effect some change.”22 Like Porter, Pinches also draws 
upon Aquinas’ understanding of human action in order to overcome this modern dualism 
between mind and body, emphasising that moral action is essentially human action, such that 
                                                 
22 Charles Robert Pinches, Theology and Action : After Theory in Christian Ethics (Grand Rapids, Mich. ; 
Cambridge: W.B. Eerdmans, 2002), 76. 
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any explanation of moral actions which removes them from their human context entails: 
“they are no longer recognizable as human actions at all.”23  
Although Pinches shares a great deal in common with Porter in returning to Aquinas 
for an account of human action which avoids modern dichotomies, he accuses Porter of 
carrying “modern presumptions about ‘morality’ that are incompatible with it.”24 The work to 
which Pinches refers in his criticisms is Porter’s 1995 book Moral Action and Christian 
Ethics.25 Here she attempts to overcome the dominance of: “an idea of rationality which takes 
mathematical reasoning as its paradigm,”26 by developing an account of moral concepts as 
open-textured empirical concepts. Porter’s objective is to avoid rationalism in ethics, while at 
the same time giving objective content to moral concepts. To this end she wishes to refute 
relativism by showing how certain moral judgements are universal: “It is true to say that no 
one can seriously deny that dishonesty, selfishness, cruelty, and the like, are bad qualities, or, 
correlatively, that truthfulness, thoughtfulness, and kindness are good.”27 Pinches accuses 
Porter of falling into the very modern dichotomy she is seeking to overcome. He argues that 
Porter presents a typically modern account of how we form moral concepts, which rests on 
the picture of the isolated objective observer, who stands outside our human practices 
isolating a sub-set of actions which we designate as moral. As such Porter’s account implies 
that our grasp of moral concepts is subsequent to practices. By contrast he argues that: 
“Aquinas does not begin a discussion of morality and then turn in the midst of it to a 
discussion of human action. Instead, he begins discussing morality with a discussion of 
human action.”28 The application of concepts occurs within human practices and cannot be 
understood in abstraction from those practices. In situating Aquinas’ account of moral 
                                                 
23 Ibid., 28. 
24 Ibid., 141. 
25 Jean Porter, Moral Action and Christian Ethics, First paperback edition. ed., New Studies in Christian Ethics 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999). 
26 Ibid., 8. 
27 Ibid., 131. 
28 Pinches, Theology and Action : After Theory in Christian Ethics, 146. 
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concepts within the context of human practice Wittgenstein’s influence on Pinches is clear to 
see. 
 How fair is this criticism of Porter? The answer to this question turns on the degree to 
which Porter’s method can be considered an expression of the dialectical reasoning which 
takes place within our human practices, or as the adoption of an observer perspective which 
stands beyond those practice. In her subsequent writings, such as the highly influential 
Natural and Divine Law,29 and the work we examined above, Nature as Reason, Porter 
stresses the dialectical nature of moral reasoning. In Nature as Reason she draws upon a work 
we examined in the first chapter in connection with its account of dialectical reading: 
MacIntyre’s First Principles, Final Ends, and Contemporary Philosophical Issues. Here 
MacIntyre attempts to overcome the modern division between analytical and empirical 
concepts by returning to an Aristotelian understanding of dialectical reasoning towards first 
principles.30 Porter uses MacIntyre to argue that empirical content is not determined by a 
process of generalizing abstraction, as in classic modern empiricism, but is grasped in the 
course of investigation. An empirical investigation proceeds from an initial definition, which 
is not fully developed and may be significantly revised, to understand by the use of dialectic 
more fully what is being examined. This entails that those definitions which represent: “the 
essential properties of specific kinds” are not those we begin with, but are “included in the 
outcome of a successful inquiry.”31 Through drawing attention to the essentially dialectic 
nature of empirical investigations, Porter provides an account of how the content of moral 
concepts is determined which avoids falling into the dichotomies typical of modern theories. 
This is not to say, however, that the dialectic Porter develops is beyond criticism, and the 
danger that the external observer perspective will remerge in the practice of dialectic remains. 
                                                 
29 Jean Porter, Natural and Divine Law : Reclaiming the Tradition for Christian Ethics (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. 
B. Eerdmans, 1999). 
30 See Nature as Reason : A Thomistic Theory of the Natural Law, 103-25. 
31 Ibid., 111. 
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This danger is particularly acute in the historical reconstructions of our moral concepts which 
Porter carries out. The lesson we repeatedly learn from Wittgenstein is that it is essential to 
reconnect our use of concepts with the practices in which they have a home. For moral 
theologians these are the living practice of the Christian community.  
If Pinches fails to take into account the use of dialectic in Porter, his reading of 
Wittgenstein also betrays a lack of appreciation of his use of dialectic. We have argued that 
those followers of Wittgenstein who place emphasis on the autonomy of human practices at 
the cost of ignoring their dialectical nature fall into the modern dichotomy between theory 
and practice by failing to see the essential role of theory within human practice. Thus, we can 
turn Pinches’ criticism of Porter back on him by asking whether he falls into this trap. The 
title of his book Theology and Action: After Theory in Christian Ethics indicates that he 
places himself among those who are against the use of theory in ethics. The theories he 
rejects, however, are all modern theories, and in his use of Aquinas he acknowledges 
something of Aquinas use of analogue and dialectic by referring to his understanding of the 
natural species of actions.32 There is a danger, nonetheless, that by failing to acknowledge the 
dialectical nature of moral reasoning Pinches does not pay sufficient attention to the natural 
principles which are the basis of our moral practices. This leaves his account of human action 
vulnerable to the criticisms we have brought against Wittgenstein from Charlton and Rhees. 
If we ignore the basis of our human practices in pre-rational human nature then our 
account of those practices lacks friction, and spins off, collapsing in on itself (here we recall 
Porter’s criticism of Kantian ethics). On the other hand, failure to understand the universal 
horizon of our practices results in their fragmentation into self-enclosed language-games (this 
brings to mind Porter’s criticism of Humean moral theories). Porter can be seen as attempting 
to keep both these moments of dialectic in tension, such that moral reasoning proceeds from 
                                                 
32 Pinches, Theology and Action : After Theory in Christian Ethics, 95-96. 
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the immanent perspective of the moral agent,33 while transcending particular practices in 
seeking to determine the natural principles of all human action.34 Whether Porter fully 
succeeds in holding this dialectical tension in a fruitful unity is a question beyond the scope 
of this thesis, but it is instructive to return to the constant self-questioning nature of 
Wittgenstein’s later thought, and conclude that perhaps no philosopher or theologian will 
ever fully succeed in striking a balance in this tension. In addition to the inherent difficulty of 
combining the particular and the universal, immanence and transcendence, there is also the 
human tendency to grasp at solutions and the need to return to the child-like interplay which 
lies on the boundary between the linguistic and the pre-linguistic.  
The Augustinian reading of Wittgenstein offered by Mulhall counsels against 
grasping at ready-made solutions to philosophical and theological questions. The blindness 
which prevents us from seeing what lies in front of our eyes is particularly acute when it 
comes to the question of human nature, for the deformation of our desires prevents us from 
returning to the basis of those very desires in our nature. This accentuates the 
instrumentalization of human nature and moral reasoning risks becoming the application of a 
technique for achieving a given result from objectified nature. In his criticisms of 
proportionalism Christopher Kaczor picks up on Pinckaers’ argument that the proportionalist 
understanding of moral reasoning replaces the emphasis on virtue in Aristotle and Aquinas 
with the application of a technique.35 In section 7.3 we will develop this criticism of 
proportionalism in more detail. In the next section (7.2) we will examine how Wittgenstein’s 
philosophy is more than just a series of techniques by comparing his understanding of the 
uses of language with Brock’s Thomistic account of human agency. 
                                                 
33 This does not imply introspection, but rather the fact that there is no neutral perspective outside our moral 
practices from which to assess them. 
34 Porter stresses that these principles do not entail there is no variation between cultures in moral practices; 
rather they place limits on what we can make sense of as human, see Porter, Nature as Reason : A Thomistic 
Theory of the Natural Law, 136. 
35 See Christopher Robert Kaczor, Proportionalism and the Natural Law Tradition (Washington, D.C.: Catholic 
University of America Press, 2002), 134. 
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 Agency, Autonomy and Nature 7.2
7.2.1 Intentional and Physical Agency 
In chapter two we traced the development of Wittgenstein’s philosophy by following 
the changes in his account of application from the search for the general form of the 
proposition in the Tractatus through to the emphasis in his later writings on the basis of 
application in natural human reactions. This development moves from the transcendent 
perspective of the Tractatus in which Wittgenstein offers a mystical perspective: “6.45 To 
view the world sub specie aeterni is to view it as a whole—a limited whole. Feeling the world 
as a limited whole—it is this that is mystical,”36 to the engaged perspective of the 
Investigations in which he urges us to return to the “rough ground.”37 In chapter five we 
defended Wittgenstein against the charge that this change in perspective entails that his later 
thought reduces human practices to the purely immanent, against which the transcendent 
appears as alien and external. Such would be the case if Wittgenstein had merely reversed the 
perspective of the Tractatus, so that his thought pivots from the transcendent perspective of 
silence to the engaged perspective of the finite horizon Ernst warns against.38 The reading of 
Wittgenstein we have put forward seeks to show how in his later philosophy he developed a 
set of dialectical practices which offer a perspective of situated freedom. This perspective 
combines transcendence and immanence in a manner which does not place them in 
opposition, but shows how in the middle of our human practices we raise the question of 
origins. 
                                                 
36 Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, 88. “6.45 Die Anschauung der Welt sub specie aeterni ist ihre 
Anschauung als – begrenztes – Ganzes. Das Gefühl der Welt als begrenztes Ganzes ist das mystische.” Logisch-
Philosophische Abhandlung. In Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, Werkausgabe Band 1, 84. 
37 Philosophical Investigations, §107. “den rauhen Boden!” Philosophische Untersuchungen. In Tractatus 
Logico-Philosopicus, Ludwig Wittgenstein Werkausgabe Band 1, §107. 
38 Nieli makes this accusation against Wittgenstein. See Nieli, Wittgenstein : From Mysticism to Ordinary 
Language : A Study of Viennese Positivism and the Thought of Ludwig Wittgenstein. 
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The significance of this perspective for an account of human agency in moral 
theology can be seen if we compare it with the disengaged perspective of the Tractatus. In 
Aquinas, God and Action39 David Burrell turns in his account of human action to the 
Wittgenstein of the Tractatus. Burrell argues that it is a mistake to identify actions with their 
causal role in bringing about results, a mistake which Aquinas did not make: “I shall show 
how Aquinas’ paradigm for actus – intentional activity – in no way countenances any 
inherent connection between action and accomplishment.”40 He sees Wittgenstein in the 
Tractatus as helping us to overcome our identification of actions with their casual results. 
The key passages Burrell quotes from the Tractatus concern the relationship between the will 
and the world, including the following passage in which Wittgenstein challenges the 
assumption that there is a causal connection between the will and the world: 
6.374 Even if all that we wish for were to happen, still this would only be a favour 
granted by fate, so to speak: for there is no logical connexion between the will and the 
world, which would guarantee it, and the supposed physical connexion itself is surely 
not something that we could will.41 
 
The contrast which Wittgenstein draws here between the logical and the physical is one 
which continues throughout his works. If we read the later Wittgenstein as drawing a strict 
separation between the world of human intentional activity and the world of contingent, 
physical causal interactions, then Burrell would seem to be justified in his conclusion that the 
therapeutic nature of Wittgenstein’s later philosophy consist in helping us to: “renounce the 
fruits”42 of our actions, and so release us from the illusion that actions are to be identified 
with their results. 
                                                 
39 David B. Burrell, Aquinas : God and Action (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1979). 
40 Ibid., 163. 
41 Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, 84. “6.374 Auch wenn alles, was wir wünschen, geshähe, so 
ware dies doch nur, sozusagen, eine Gnade des Schicksals, denn es ist kein logischer Zusammenhang zwischen 
Willen und Welt, der dies verbürgte, und den angenommenen physikalischen Zusammenhang könnten wir doch 
nicht selbst wieder wollen.” Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung. In Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, 
Werkausgabe Band 1, 82. 
42 Burrell, Aquinas : God and Action, 171. 
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We argued in section 7.1.2 that Wittgenstein’s self-questioning dialectic enables him 
to avoid the pitfalls set up by the modern dichotomy between human intention and physical 
causation. Burrell in his reading of Wittgenstein fails to appreciate this development of 
dialectic in his later works. As a consequence, not only does Burrell misread Wittgenstein, he 
also continues under the influence of this misreading to contrast the world of exterior 
physical nature with the world of interior intentions.  Hence, although he is aware that 
Aquinas understands ‘cause’ to be an analogous term43 he fails to see how Aquinas’ use of 
analogy connects, as well as distinguishes, how human actions are causes with a wider 
account of physical causation. Like Wittgenstein, Burrell’s conception of physical causation 
is reductive, but without the self-questioning dialectic which characterizes Wittgenstein’s 
later thought his account of human agency splits the intentional agent away from any basis in 
bodily interaction with the world. 
In chapter five we briefly examined Brock’s account of human agency, which like 
Burrell’s is based upon Aquinas, but unlike Burrell’s takes note of Aquinas’ use of analogies 
with the physical world in his account of human action. In chapter four of Action and 
Conduct Brock sets out an account of the agency of the will. Brock draws attention to: 
“Aquinas’s assertion that the completion of the act of the will exists in relation to something 
to be done by the one willing,”44 in order to set forth an account of intentional action which 
uses analogy in relation to a wider account of natural agency as bringing something about. 
Since the realm of intentional action is that of voluntary action45 Brock states that this 
account of human agency: “will be carried out chiefly through an analysis of the very notions 
of ‘wanting’ and ‘the wanted’, to show that wanting is chiefly a disposition to cause 
                                                 
43 See ibid., 170. 
44 Brock, Action and Conduct : Thomas Aquinas and the Theory of Action, 138. 
45 For Aquinas the voluntary covers all sentient creatures insofar as their actions originate in interior principles, 
and likewise intentionality is not redistricted to the human action. Brock’s account of human agency takes this 
common inheritance into account in his understanding of human intentional action, while drawing the 
distinctions which intellect and will make to human agency. 
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something.”46 The contrast with Burrell could not be starker, and Brock goes on to 
distinguish his causal account of human agency from a Kantian conception of agency.47 To 
this end Brock argues that an account of the will must start with an understanding of agent 
causality: “it is not at all trivial to maintain that voluntariness pertains chiefly to objects of a 
certain kind of agent-causality, and that this presupposes, as a matter of principle, powers of 
bringing things about, ‘physical’ powers if you like.”48 Like Pinckaers, Brock locates the 
origins of human action in natural principles: 
by its very nature voluntary action, and therefore also the will, presupposes and 
depends upon other things besides the will itself. It is to say that voluntary activity is 
inserted with a larger order of things, not only as a matter of fact but also as a matter of 
principle. In particular, it is to say that the will’s existing under the conditions of a 
determinate nature, human nature in the case of man’s will, is quite ‘natural’ to it.”49 
 
Brock argues that this insertion of voluntary activity into “a larger order of things,” is 
achieved by Aquinas through his notion of ‘use’. This notion is: “a rather neglected one in the 
studies on his [Aquinas’] psychology of action,”50 but, “brings together most of the salient 
features of his conception of the will’s causality.”51 In particular, it provides the connexion 
between the interior act of the will and its exterior effects,52 and is: “an act that is at once an 
immediately voluntary action and a physical passion.”53 For Brock, this account of use is 
essential in any account of human agency, and is the application to voluntary action of the 
more general physical principle which Aquinas takes from Aristotle that the action of an 
                                                 
46 Brock, Action and Conduct : Thomas Aquinas and the Theory of Action, 138. 
47 Porter draws upon Brock’s account of human agency. See, Porter, Nature as Reason : A Thomistic Theory of 
the Natural Law, 296. 
48 Brock, Action and Conduct : Thomas Aquinas and the Theory of Action, 146. 
49 Ibid. 
50 Ibid., 171. 
51 Ibid., 172. 
52 As Brock explains, we should not confuse interior and exterior here with what remains within the agent and 
what is external to the agent. Some interior acts of the well have effects which are external to the agent, and 
conversely some exterior acts of the will remain within the agent. The distinction between interior and exterior 
acts of will is a logical distinction, not a spatial distinction. This does not entail that Wittgenstein would approve 
of the manner in which Aquinas understands and presents this logic, but it does help us to see why a fruitful 
dialogue is possible between Aquinas and those analytical philosophies of action which draw upon Wittgenstein.  
53 Brock, Action and Conduct : Thomas Aquinas and the Theory of Action, 175. 
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agent terminates in the patient: “the same act is at once immediately ‘of’ the agent, as its 
action, and ‘of’ the patient, as what it undergoes.”54 
 
7.2.2 Nature and Use 
Brock is aware that this emphasis on use: “may start to give the impression that what 
is being proposed is some kind of ‘utilitarianism’, treating human action as essentially a kind 
of means toward something outside itself, something merely instrumental.”55 He thus argues 
that Aquinas’ understanding of use differs from utilitarianism in two essential respects. 
Firstly, ‘use’ is to be understood according to the nature of the thing that is used. Secondly, 
there is a distinction between using something which is exterior to us and the use of our own 
nature. The former involves productive (technical) practices, whereas the later concerns 
human practices.56 Thus, in order to see how an account of human nature provides a basis for 
an understanding of human agency which avoids collapsing into Kantianism or 
consequentialism we need to attend to the different senses of ‘use’ in Aquinas.  
In distinguishing the various senses of ‘use’ in Aquinas, Brock draws attention to the 
difference between those uses where: “the goal is indeed extrinsic to what is used,” and those 
in which the goal is “immanent”57 to the action. The former are technical or productive uses, 
whereas the latter are fully human actions. When Aquinas distinguishes between these two 
senses of use it is important to note that he is making a logical as oppose to a spatial 
distinction. In the article from the Summa theologicae which Brock quotes in regard to this 
                                                 
54 Ibid. 
55 Ibid., 192. 
56 In speaking here of human practices we mean those practices which are not merely an expression of a 
particular role or function we have (e.g. being a carpenter), but are expressive of what it is to be a human (e.g. 
just, courageous). For an analysis of Aquinas’ account of human action see: McInerny, Aquinas on Human 
Action : A Theory of Practice. Such practices are often described as moral practices, but there are various 
confusions with the use of the term ‘moral’ which are best avoided in giving an account of human action There 
is a danger, however, that in speaking of ‘human acts’ and ‘human agency’ that we imply acts which are 
technical acts of production are not carried out freely by a human being. In order to avoid this confusion it is 
important to return to the contexts of application in which we distinguish between human acts and technical 
acts. 
57 Brock, Action and Conduct : Thomas Aquinas and the Theory of Action, 192. 
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distinction Aquinas contrasts acts which: “pass into external matter, e.g. to cut and to burn,” 
with “acts which do not pass into external matter, but remain in the agent, e.g. to desire and 
to know: and such are all moral acts, whether virtuous or sinful.”58 
At first sight Aquinas’ way of making this distinction would seem to confirm 
Burrell’s interpretation, but once we remember that this is a logical distinction it becomes 
clear that we are dealing with two different (but related) logics of action, rather than two 
types of action which are distinguished as happening in different spaces. Those acts which 
pass into external matter remain, nevertheless, acts of the agent which brings them about. So 
how do we distinguish between acts which pass into something external and those which 
remain immanent to the agent? Here we do well to follow Wittgenstein’s instructions and 
return to the contexts of application for our terms. When an architect designs a building this 
remains an action of the architect, yet our interest is not in the inner transformation of the 
architect, but the building she has created. We do not call the architect ‘design’, but rather 
call her a designer. Conversely, when a shopkeeper deals honestly with a customer this may 
involve the use of things external to the honest action, such as the use of standard weights and 
measures, and the dispensing of goods, but the action itself does not pass into the external 
things, but remains in the shopkeeper. Thus we call the shopkeeper and not the goods she has 
dispensed honest. The difference between these two designations reflects the fact that 
whereas the actions which architects perform (qua architect) are not essential to a person’s 
character, human acts, such as acts of honesty, are essential to our character. A person who 
changes profession from architecture to shop keeping has not thereby essentially become a 
                                                 
58 Aquinas, The 'Summa Theologica' of St. Thomas Aquinas, Tr. By Fathers of the English Dominican Province. 
[22 Vols. In 20], I-II, q. 74, a. I. This is not the translation Brock uses, but the differences in translation are not 
material to the argument being made here: “transeunt in exteriorem materiam, ut urere et secare . . . non 
transeuntes in exteriorem materiam, sed manentes in agente, sicut appetere et cognoscere, et tales actus sunt 
omnes actus morales, sive sint actus virtutum, sive peccatorum.” S.Thomae Aquinatis Opera Omnia. I-II, q. 74, 
a. I. It is interesting to note here that Aquinas speaks of “actus morales”, which would seem to be most naturally 
translated as moral acts, which is the translation here chosen by Brock. The problems with the modern use of the 
term “moral” have led us in general, however, to avoid speaking of moral acts, preferring instead to speak of 
“human acts.” 
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changed person. Important things about her and her life have changed, but her essential 
character has remained the same. In contrast, a shopkeeper who becomes dishonest has 
changed something essential about her character. 
It is important to note that all actions in their concrete reality can be considered either 
from a human or a technical point of view. The difference in logic between characterizing 
acts as technical and as human does not divide concrete acts into two different classes. 
Rather, all acts can be considered from a technical perspective and from a human perspective. 
The difference between these perspectives is that whereas the human perspective when 
specifying its goals takes into account the whole of reality, the technical perspective abstracts 
from reality in specifying its goals. Pinckaers, in the context of a critique of proportionalism, 
sums this up in the following passage in which he distinguishes technical finality from 
Aquinas’ understanding of moral finality: 
The difference between finality of the technical type and moral finality consists 
principally in this: the first abstracts from the nature of realities taken as means and 
ends, considering only their useful qualities, in such a way that everything can become 
a means to an end and can also be seen as an end for a series of means. In contrast, 
moral finality is determined by the very nature of realities; some things are ends by 
nature and can never, as such, be legitimately considered as means, while others are by 
nature means and can never be seen as ends properly understood.59 
 
How does this account of Aquinas’ understanding of use compare with the emphasis 
Wittgenstein places on the use of language? In chapter one during our discussion of 
Wittgenstein and metaphysics we saw how he compares the various uses of language with the 
uses of the different tools in a tool box. The analogy is one which connects Wittgenstein to 
the metaphysical tradition going back to Plato, and the development of metaphysics together 
                                                 
59 Pinckaers, "Revisionist Understandings of Actions in the Wake of Vatican II," 255. “La difference entre la 
finalité de type technique et la finalité morale consiste principalement en ceci : la première fait abstraction de la 
nature des réalités prises comme moyen et fin, ne considérant que leurs qualités utiles, de sorte que toute chose 
peut devenir un moyen pur une fin, comme aussi être prise comme fin pour une série de moyens. Au contraire, 
la finalite morale est déterminée par la nature même des réalités, de sorte que certaines seront des fin par leur 
nature et ne pourront jamais comme tells, être prises légitimement comme moyens, tandis que d’autres seront, 
par nature, des moyens et ne pourront jamais être prises proprement comme des fins.” Ce Qu'on Ne Peut Jamais 
Faire : La Question Des Actes Intrinsèquement Mauvais, Histoire Et Discussion, 86. 
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with grammar. Charlton’s criticism of Wittgenstein turns on the accusation that he views the 
use of words as purely instrumental. Our defence of Wittgenstein in chapter three against this 
accusation drew attention to his understanding of the differing uses words; entailing that they 
are instruments which are shaped according to those various uses. We argued, however, that 
an adequate account of those various uses depends upon wider physical and metaphysical 
principles which are lacking in Wittgenstein. These wider principles are particularly relevant 
in the case of human nature. If we recall Aquinas’ distinction between actions which: “pass 
into external matter” and those which “remain in the agent,” in both cases these actions are 
shaped according to the nature of that which they are in. As such, Aquinas is not marking a 
distinction between a natural realm of efficient causation and an intentional realm of human 
action; rather it is a distinction between actions considered as productive and actions 
considered as human. Both types of action rest upon natural principles, and both as we noted 
earlier, are types of causal action. 
In the first four chapter of this thesis we argued that there are good grounds for 
understanding what Wittgenstein is doing in his later philosophy as developing philosophical 
practices which help us to recover our human nature. If this is the case, Wittgenstein’s 
philosophical practice aims primarily at producing an inner transformation of the person who 
engages with it. This inner transformation is not merely that which occurs when we gain 
technical knowledge about the world, but involves an essential transformation of our 
character. If I learn a new technique in mathematics I am said to be improving as a 
mathematician, whereas leaning how to overcome my fears makes we a more courageous 
human being. Since Wittgenstein characterizes his later philosophy as providing tools which 
help us to overcome the various entanglements our misuse of language brings about, it is 
clear that he does not regard his task as being purely that of a technician. The tool analogy 
Wittgenstein develops to help us see the variety of ways we use words may at first sight 
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imply that he understands our use of language as purely technical, and his work as that of a 
technician in helping to find technical solutions to our problems. By contrast, the reading of 
Wittgenstein we have developed argues that he sees his work as primarily that of helping us 
to reconnect with our human nature, and as such he can be seen as following in that 
metaphysical tradition which takes its lead from Plato in using the techniques of grammar at 
the service of virtue. This is not to say that the strategies and games Wittgenstein offers in his 
later philosophy are in themselves exercises in moral philosophy or theology; rather they are 
tools which are apt or not apt to be used as we develop an account of human life. 
 
 The Application of Terms in Moral Theology 7.3
In order to understand how Wittgenstein offers more than just a set of techniques, but 
helps us to overcome the splitting of the human being found in modern moral thought, we 
will build upon the criticisms of proportionalism given in section 7.1.2. Both Pinches and 
Pinckaers argue that proportionalists misunderstand human agency, which is to say that 
proportionalists fail to understand the grammar of human action. Pinches draws upon 
Wittgenstein to argue that proportionalists split the human agent between a physical being to 
be acted upon and an intentional self that acts. For Pinckaers proportionalism reduces human 
actions to purely technical operations. Our reading of Wittgenstein can help us to understand 
how proportionalists misuse language, tearing evaluative terms such as ‘good’ and ‘right’ 
away from their contexts of application. 
Proportionalism is governed by the application of various distinctions central to which 
is the distinction between a non-moral level60 of good and evil and the moral level of good 
                                                 
60 Some proportionalists use the term pre-moral, others prefer non-moral. 
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and evil.61 This distinction is summed up in the following entry in the Encyclopaedia of 
Catholicism by James Walter: 
The proponents [of proportionalism] make a distinction between moral and premoral 
values/disvalues. Moral values and disvalues describe the qualities of persons as they 
confront situation, e.g., just or unjust. Premoral evils or disvalues refer to the harms, 
lacks, deprivations, etc. that occur in, or as a result of, human agency, e.g. death. 
Premoral values refer to those conditioned goods that we pursue for human and non-
human well-being.62 
 
 The distinction between non-moral and moral goods and evils is derived from the 
observation that the language of good and evil can be used to describe the state of the world 
prior to human intentional activity. A forest fire which causes widespread destruction of 
plants and animals can be described as an evil for those living beings. There is no suggestion, 
however, that the fire can be held guilty for its crimes, and thus the evil ascribed to the fire is 
not the same as the evil imputed to the human being who deliberately started the fire. This 
difference in the use of language leads proportionalists to argue that we have two separate 
levels of good and evil such that in the analysis of any human act we must distinguish 
between the non-moral goods and evils involved and the moral good and evil brought about. 
What begins as a distinction made in the context of how we ascribe good and evil to non-
human agents has now become a distinction between two levels of good and evil. Hoose 
notes how two of the leading figures in the development of proportionalism, Peter Knauer 
                                                 
61 Louise Janssens notes now this distinction is based upon the old distinction between physical evils and moral 
evils: “Of old, a distinction between malum physicum and malum morale was made. Nowadays, we prefer the 
term “ontic evil” to the term “physical evil,” because the contemporary meaning of “physical” corresponds more 
to the meaning of “material.” Louis Janssens, "Ontic Evil and Moral Evil," in Readings in Moral Theology No. 
1: Moral Norms and Catholic Tradition ed. Charles E. Curran, and Richard A. McCormick (New York: Paulist 
Press, 1979), 60. In making this distinction Janssens intends to follow Aquinas. Paul M. Quay S.J. responds to 
Janssens’ appropriation of Aquinas by making two important observations which help to confirm our analysis of 
the distinction between nonmoral and moral goods and evils. Firstly: “Thomas carefully distinguishes an evil 
that has no moral aspects, whether at the human or the subhuman level, from any mere absence of good. 
Apparently avoiding the formation of a fixed technical vocabulary, he generally speaks descriptively of these 
two notions in accord with the immediate context.” Paul M. Quay S. J., "Disvalue of Ontic Evil," Theological 
Studies 46 no 2 Jun (1985): 263. Secondly: “It would be hard to find a clearer statement that ‘ontic evil’ is not at 
all equivalent to ‘physical evil’ in its traditional sense.” Ibid., 264. Quay’s observations here show how 
Aquinas’ use of evaluative terms such as “good” and “evil” is carefully tied to given contexts, and that modern 
appropriations of Aquinas often generalize distinctions he makes in a manner which removes them from their 
contexts of application. 
62 James. J. Walter, "Proportionalism," in The Harpercollins Encyclopedia of Catholicism, ed. Richard P. 
McBrien (s.l.: HarperCollins, 1995), 1058. 
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and Louis Janssens, make this distinction: “Knauer distinguishes between physical evil and 
moral evil. Janssens does the same thing, but prefers the term “ontic evil” to “physical evil” 
because the contemporary meaning of “physical” corresponds more to material.””63 
Proportionalists differ in how they use this distinction, but they take it as self-evident and 
given. For example, Gareth Hallett in the course of criticising those proportionalist who fail 
to take moral values64 into account in their determination of proportionate good continues to 
take the non-moral/moral distinction as something which runs through all human acts as we 
aim to maximize value: “VM [value maximization], too, looks to the proportion of value and 
disvalue. However, as a species of unrestricted proportionalism, it envisages maximizing all 
values, moral as well as nonmoral.”65 
But what sense does it make to speak of moral and non-moral goods or values? If we 
return to the original contexts within which we ascribe responsibility to agents it is essential 
to note that such ascription are made of the agent qua agent. It is because fire is an agent that 
we can ascribe responsibility to it. As an agent fire can be described as good or evil: a good 
fire warms us on a cold day, an evil fire destroys our possessions. Such ascription use (as 
Brock points out) analogy, and involve situating human agency in a wider context of physical 
agency. The primary practices within which we learn to ascribe responsibility are the human 
practices attributing praise and blame to other human beings, but, these practices take shape 
in a dialectical interplay with the wider physical world of agency. 
Up to this point we have shown how the ascription of good and evil to non-human 
agents takes shape from the original contexts in which we make such ascriptions. But how do 
                                                 
63 Hoose, Proportionalism : The American Debate and Its European Roots, 33. Hoose adds here (quoting 
Janssens) that “Ontic evil is what we call “any lack of a perfection at which we aim, any lack of fulfilment 
which frustrates our natural urges and makes us suffer.”Ibid. The quotation from Janssens is from Janssens, 
"Ontic Evil and Moral Evil," 60. 
64 Hallett prefers to talk of values rather than goods because he sees value as a broader term which covers both 
moral and non-moral goods and evils: “My chief reason for preferring the word-pair value and disvalue over 
good  and evil is that evil too readily suggests just moral evil, whereas VM is broader.” Garth L. Hallett, Greater 
Good : The Case for Proportionalism (Washington: Georgetown University Press, 1995), 13. 
65 Ibid., 109. 
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we move from talk about non-human agents as good or evil to talk of non-moral goods and 
evils? Does it make any sense to speak of fire as a non-moral good or evil? In what respect is 
fire good or evil when we talk of it as a non-moral good or evil. The fire that destroys my 
possessions can be described as a good fire insofar as it does well what fire does (e.g. burn 
things up), because ascriptions of good and evil need to specify the respect in which what 
they describe is good or evil. Such specifications need not be explicit, but the context of 
ascription must make clear what we mean by saying that something is good. Now a 
proportionalist could argue that talk of non-moral goods and evils is merely a short-hand for 
the contexts in which we ascribe responsibility to non-human agents. So when we talk of fire 
as a non-moral good or evil it is just a way of saying that we can ascribe responsibility to fire 
in an analogous manner to our ascriptions of responsibility to human agents, while at the 
same time marking the essential differences between human responsibility and non-human 
responsibility. The problem with this defence is that the short-hand misleads us into positing 
the existence of moral and non-moral goods and evils in a manner which detaches our use of 
the terms “moral”, “good” and “evil” from their contexts of use. 
In the Investigations Wittgenstein distinguishes between those reforms of our 
terminology which are undertaken for particular practical purposes and the misuses of 
language he is concerned with: 
Such a reform for practical purposes, an improvement in our terminology designed to 
prevent misunderstandings in practice, is perfectly possible. But these are not the cases 
we have to do with. The confusions which occupy us arise when language is like an 
engine idling, not when it is doing work.66 
 
This remark is found in a section of the Investigations in which Wittgenstein argues that he 
uses language-games not to produce a model of reality, but to provide objects of comparison 
which enable us to: “throw light on the facts of our language by way not only of similarities, 
                                                 
66 Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, § 132. 
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but also of dissimilarities.”67 The problem with the division of the world into moral goods 
and evils and non-moral goods and evils is that is does not provide us with such “objects of 
comparison,” but rather with a model to which: “reality must correspond.”68 
The confusion involved in the division of the world into moral and non-moral good 
and evils is evident if we use an example. Proportionalists describe health as a non-moral 
good which we intend in a moral act, as the following passage from Knauer expresses in the 
following analysis of the surgical removal of a limb: 
In the operation the surgeon does not think of anything except the skilful removal of the 
limb of the patient. This removal is the concrete thing which is willed by him, and one 
can say that this act is “the effect willed in itself.” But the morality of the act is not 
determined on this level. Whether the removal of a limb is a health measure or a 
mutilation of the patient cannot be recognized in the concrete actuality which might be 
photographed. The reason why the surgeon removes the limb must be looked at. What 
value does the act seek to serve? It is done because of the health of the patient.69 
 
If descripting health as a non-moral good is merely short-hand for ascribing responsibility to 
a non-human agent then speaking of health as a non-moral good makes no sense, since health 
is not an agent. In fact, taken on its own the term “health” does not refer to any anything; 
there is no such thing as health. In chapter one we narrated Anscombe’s confusion 
concerning the use of the word “blue”, and how Wittgenstein helped her to overcome the 
empiricist assumption that “blue” refers to an object. There are blue objects in the world, but 
blue is not itself an object we can point to and grasp. Similarly, the concept “health” does not 
refer to something which exists in itself; rather we grasp the concept health by learning to 
apply it in various analogical ways. Our ability to grasp these analogies is essential to 
understanding the concept “health”, as we can speak of healthy organisms, healthy practices, 
healthy relationships, healthy diets and healthy environments, to give just some of the 
analogical uses of the term. For some of these uses questions of agency are relevant, but it is 
                                                 
67 Ibid., § 130. 
68 Ibid., § 131. 
69 Peter S.J. Knauer, "The Hermeneutical Function of the Principle of Double Effect," in Readings in Moral 
Theology, ed. Charles E. Curran and Richard A. McCormick (New York: Paulist Press, 1979), 22. 
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not health which is the agent cause. When we describe a diet as a healthy diet we are saying 
that the diet brings about health, not that health is itself an agent.  
A proportionalist could argue that amongst all these analogical uses the primary 
significance of the term “health” is given when we speak of healthy organisms. Knauer 
speaks of the “health of the patient” not of health in an abstract sense. Whether an organism 
is healthy is a scientific question, not a question for moral evaluation. The problem with this 
reply is that it again involves the ascription of the term “non-moral” to something which is 
not an agent. A healthy organism is an agent, but that is because organisms are agents, not 
because “health” is an agent. A sick panda can act, and although the sickness might affect 
how the panda acts it is not the acting agent. 
In chapter two we traced how Wittgenstein came to question the assumptions of the 
Tractatus and abandoned the search for the general form of the proposition. Wittgenstein 
came to see how he had allowed the dictates of logic to determine his account of application. 
The application of concepts cannot be determined once and for all through fixing a general 
form for the proposition; rather application is determined within the various contexts in 
which concepts are applied. We can draw a parallel lesson for our critique of proportionalism. 
Proportionalists, as we have seen, abstract terms such as “good” and “evil” from their 
contexts of application in order to provide a general theory of moral judgement. In a manner 
typical of modern moral theories proportionalists place emphasis on the analysis of individual 
acts of judgement, and rather than examining such acts in their concrete contexts of 
application seek a general theory which will allow any act to be assessed as morally good or 
evil. Pinckaers expresses this atomization of human agency in the following passage from 
The Sources of Christian Ethics in which he traces the influence of late medieval nominalism: 
Human action then would be made up of a succession of free decisions of independent 
acts—cases of conscience as they would later be called—having only superficial 
relation to one another. Each would have to be studied in isolation. Like each individual 
person, each act became a kind of absolute, like a small island. Hence the note of 
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insularity that has been attributed to Ockham’s thought and that evokes his English 
background.70 
 
The picture which holds us captive here is of the individual agent acting in a single instance, 
abstracted from the wider contexts in which we make sense of human agency. It is a picture 
which holds the promise of autonomy; the radical freedom to choose good or evil 
unconstrained by any factor heteronomous to oneself. Iris Murdoch provides a powerful 
counter-image to help us escape from the grip of this picture when she describes the modern 
understanding of the human agent in the following terms: “The moral agent is pictures as an 
isolated principle of will, or burrowing pinpoint of consciousness, inside, or beside, a lump of 
being which has been handed over to other disciplines, such as psychology or sociology.”71 
The will is imposed on the world, unconstrained by anything beyond its own dictates. This is 
a disturbing image, but the picture of the isolated individual agent has such a powerful grip 
on our modern imagination that rather reject it modern thinkers generally seek to determine 
human agency by providing a general form of moral judgement. This is what leads 
proportionalists among others to remove evaluative terms such as “good” and “evil” from 
their contexts of application, just as Wittgenstein in the Tractatus removes the term “object” 
from its contexts of application in this theory of simple objects. 
In order to overcome this picture of the individual moral agent a radical change is 
required in how we think of human agency. This is the kind of change Wittgenstein has in 
mind when he argues that: “The preconceived idea of crystalline purity can only be removed 
by turning our whole examination around. (One might say: the axis of reference of our 
                                                 
70 Pinckaers, The Sources of Christian Ethics, 244. “L’agir humain va donc être constitué par une suite de 
decisions libres, d’actes indépendants – de cas de conscience, comme on dira plus tard, - n’entretenant plus entre 
eux que des relations superficielles et qu’il faudra étudier en particulier. Comme chaque individu, chaque acte 
deviant une manière d’absolu, comme une petite île. D’où le caractère d’insularité qu’on a pu attribuer à la 
pensée d’Ockham et qui évoque son origine anglaisse. Ainsi a-t-il posé par sa conception de la liberté et de 
l’acte humain la base de ce qui deviendra la casuistique.” Les Sources De La Morale Chrétienne : Sa Méthode, 
Son Contenu, Son Histoire, 253-54. 
71 Iris Murdoch, The Sovereignty of Good, Studies in Ethics and the Philosophy of Religion (London: Routledge 
& Kegan Paul, 1970), 47. 
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examination must be rotated, but about the fixed point of our real need.)”72 To understand 
how we apply concepts such as good and evil it is necessary to return to the human practices 
in which they find a home. These practices are the virtues which enable us to grow as human 
beings. As such, they involve more than the technical mastery of various techniques. To see 
this let us return to the concept of health. 
A healthy human beings is, as we noted above, one who is a healthy organism. Such a 
person is said to be in good health, and this can be determined in a technical manner by 
health care professionals. In order to become and remain healthy she needs to exercise, eat 
well, sleep etc. and hope to avoid various hazards which remain beyond her control. All this 
does not, however, imply that she is a good human being. A human being can be in perfect 
physical health and yet be vicious and cruel. In order to be described as a good human being 
someone needs to consistently act in a manner which fulfils what it is to be human, which is 
to say that she must develop those practices which enable human beings to fulfil their nature. 
These practices are the virtues.  
It is the exercise of the virtues which enable us to apply evaluative terms such as 
“good” and “evil” in their fullest attribution to human beings. Those who exercise the virtues 
are called good to the degree to which the virtues perfect their human nature, whereas those 
who exercise the opposite to virtue, vice, are said to be evil to the degree their human nature 
is corrupted. Furthermore, those who are good through the exercise of the virtues are able, to 
the degree they possess the virtues, to apply evaluative terms such as good and evil to that 
which is good and evil. Conversely, those who lack virtue, to the degree they do not possess 
the virtues, also lack this ability. In the Investigations Wittgenstein gives the following 
description of what it is for thought to be in harmony with reality: “The agreement, the 
harmony, of thought and reality consists in this: if I say falsely that something is red, then for 
                                                 
72 Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, § 108. 
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all that, it isn’t red. And when I want to explain the word “red” to someone, in the sentence 
“That is not red”, I do it by pointing to something red.”73 What Wittgenstein is getting at here 
is that the person who makes the false attributions already understands what it is for thoughts 
to be in harmony with reality through mastering various practices such as attribution of 
colour predicates and being able to point out particular colours. We can extend this example 
to the attribution of evaluative terms by noting the when we say falsely that something is 
good then, for all that, it isn’t good. Our ability to consistently attribute good to that which is 
good and evil to that which is evil depends upon the degree to which we exercise the virtues. 
This is more than merely the acquisition of various techniques, and is, as we argued earlier in 
this chapter an inner transformation of the human being. 
 
 Conclusion: Nature, Dialectic and Theology 7.4
In this chapter we developed the conversation between Wittgenstein and moral 
theology by drawing compassions between his later philosophy and Porter’s revival of moral 
theology through a return to the practice of the virtues with their basis in human nature. We 
examined Pinches’ criticism of Porter, which led us to Wittgenstein’s emphasis upon the 
constant questioning of our practices; reconnecting them with their basis in our natural 
human reactions. In section 7.2 we compared Burrell’s interpretation of Aquinas’ conception 
of human agency with Brock’s interpretation, and observed how Brock draws our attention to 
Aquinas’ use of analogy by situating his account of human agency in a wider context of 
natural causation. Burrell draws inspiration from the Wittgenstein of the Tractatus in arguing 
that for Aquinas there is no inherent connection between actions and what they accomplish. 
In doing this he fails to take account of the changes in Wittgenstein’s conception of human 
agency that take place in his later works, which call into question the transcendent 
                                                 
73 Ibid., § 429. 
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perspective of the Tractatus and returns us to the ‘middle’ of our human practices by 
situating an account of human freedom in our natural human histories. This does not reduce 
human practices to the mere achievement of certain technical goals, but enables us to develop 
an understanding of the logical relationship between the inner and exterior aspects of human 
action. This entails that Wittgenstein’s philosophical practices should be read as practices 
which can help us to recover our humanity, as oppose to merely technical exercise. Finally, in 
section 7.3 we saw how Wittgenstein’s understanding of human agency can help us to 
overcome the confusions involved in the distinction between moral and non-moral goods and 
evils. Here we conclude our dialogue between Wittgenstein and moral theology as a 
provisional dialogue which indicates where a fuller dialogue could take its starting points. 
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GENERAL CONCLUSION 
The objective of this thesis was to develop a dialogue between Wittgenstein and 
moral theology with particular reference to the works of recent and contemporary theologians 
working in the Catholic tradition. The first four chapters offered a reading of Wittgenstein’s 
philosophy with the intention of providing starting points for the conversation with moral 
theology developed in chapters five, six and seven. In chapter one we noted some particular 
challenges to this conversation; firstly the difficulty of interpreting Wittgenstein due to the 
wide and often incompatible interpretations of this works, and secondly his stated hostility to 
metaphysics. This second challenge is especially significant for the Catholic tradition of 
moral theology, which has used metaphysics in the service of the Gospel to throw light on the 
Christian life. Our response in chapter one was to re-evaluate how metaphysics is understood, 
and to use this re-evaluation to argue that Wittgenstein in the dialectical practices of his later 
works is not so far from that tradition which finds its origins in Plato. Here we were guided 
by Anscombe in reading Wittgenstein as a conversation partner with philosophers such as 
Plato who are associated with metaphysics. We also followed Anscombe by interpreting 
Wittgenstein as attempting to develop a form of realism in his philosophy which overcomes 
the opposed dangers of idealism and empiricism. 
In chapter two we developed an account of Wittgenstein’s philosophical development 
up to the Investigations by following the theme of application as it evolves in his writings 
from the Tractatus onwards. This reading aimed to show how Wittgenstein’s later emphasis 
on the contexts of application for our concepts connects him to the pre-modern understanding 
of the relationship between theory and practice, and aims to overcome the modern dichotomy 
between the form and the content of thought. 
Chapters three and four provided challenges to our reading of Wittgenstein by 
following the criticisms Charlton and Rhees make against him. We acquitted Wittgenstein of 
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these charges to some degree, but acknowledged that although he helps us to recover a lost 
notion of nature his lack of engagement with the philosophy of nature leaves him vulnerable 
to the charge that his account of meaning risks collapsing into a form a pragmatism. The 
purpose of these chapters was to set up the terms for the conversation between Wittgenstein 
and moral theology; providing not only starting points for dialogue but also helping us to see 
the role that natural principles play in an account of human thought and action. In particular, 
the role of the pre-conceptual in the development of our conceptual capacities was stressed, 
and the lessons we can learn from Wittgenstein in respecting the origins of our linguistic 
habits on the border between the conceptual and the pre-conceptual. 
The engagement between Wittgenstein and moral theology began in chapter five by 
responding to the challenge that Wittgenstein’s later philosophy is a form of immanentism 
cut off from any notion of divine transcendence. This response engaged with the recent 
revival in moral theology of nature as a central category, to argue that our reading of 
Wittgenstein has various parallels with the concerns of those moral theologians who have 
worked in recent times to revive the natural law and virtue traditions. The aspects of 
Wittgenstein’s later philosophy which enabled him to overcome the dichotomies of modern 
thought also provide a means for overcoming the modern division between immanent human 
nature and the ‘external’ work of God. Here Mulhall’s readings of the Investigations as a 
work concerned with origins is key to drawing parallels with Pinckaers’ presentation of 
Aquinas’s account of nature. This enabled us to argue that Wittgenstein’s thought is open to 
theology. 
In chapter six we deepen the conversation between Wittgenstein and moral theology 
by using MaCabe’s Wittgenstein inspired account of human beings as autobiographical 
creatures. MaCabe helps us to re-envisage the relationship between grace and nature by 
developing a theology of God’s Incarnate Word, in which we are caught up in God’s 
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autobiography. We developed MaCabe’s account by again reflecting on the question of 
origins, showing how Wittgenstein can help us to see that pondering our own story opens us 
to that which is our ultimate origin. We then returned to Wittgenstein’s remarks on following 
a rule and seeing aspects to suggest ways in they can help us to understand more deeply the 
transformation of our nature brought about in grace. 
Finally, in chapter seven we examined how Wittgenstein’s writings can help to throw 
light on contemporary accounts of human agency in moral theology. To this end we traced 
various parallels between Wittgenstein and the works of theologian and philosophers such as 
Porter and Brock, before using insights from Wittgenstein to show how the contemporary 
distinction between moral and non-moral goods and evils is based upon various confusions. 
These reflections, like those of the previous two chapters, are somewhat schematic and 
indicate where future dialogue between Wittgenstein and moral theology could take place. It 
is our hope, however, that the work of analysis carried out in this thesis will be of some 
service to moral theologians as they develop a conversation between Wittgenstein and 
contemporary questions in moral theology. 
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